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2016 DIGILAW 1747 (DEL)

FEDERATION GHAZIPUR SUBZI MANDI v. GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI

2016-04-07

RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW

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ORDER : CMs No.5832/2016 & 5833/2016 (of the petitioners for restoration of petition and for condonation of 25 days delay in applying therefore) 1. Passover is sought on behalf of the counsel for the petitioners. 2. It is precisely for this reason that the petition was dismissed for non-prosecution. 3. These applications are also dismissed for non prosecution. RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW, J. 4. Subsequently, Ms. Geeta Luthra, Sr. Advocate has mentioned the matter and has been heard. 5. This petition was filed impugning the price demanded from the petitioners, being commission agents, for allotment of shops in Fruit and Vegetable Market, Ghazipur, Delhi. 6. Vide order dated 31st January, 2011, notice of the petition was issued, the respondents directed to consider the objections of the petitioners treating the writ petition as a representation and without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the parties, the time for the petitioners to pay 10% of the price then demanded was extended. 7. The petitioners filed CM No.10714/2011 for extension of time to make the payment. The said application came up first before this Court on 27th July, 2011, when finding that the petitioners had been granted repeated extensions to make the payment, no order thereon was made. However, subsequently on 15th September, 2011, on the statement of the counsel for the respondents that subject to the payments being definitely made within fifteen days, the time be so extended, it was ordered accordingly but with the clarification that the respondents will be at liberty to take coercive action including of cancellation since the petitioners were found to be delaying the matter. 8. The matter was re-considered by the respondents in accordance with the order dated 31st January, 2011 supra and the price earlier demanded was found to be just and which led to the amendment of the writ petition, to challenge the said decision as well. 9. Even after the petition was amended as aforesaid, adjournments were taken by the petitioners on 16th November, 2011, 25th January, 2012, 3rd October, 2012, 22nd April, 2013 and 2nd December, 2013 (when it was also clarified that there was no interim order in this case). 10. The petitioners filed CM No.4372/2014 for a direction to the respondents to consider and dispose of the petitioners’ representation dated 11th February, 2014 and vide order dated 31st March, 2014 it was so ordered. 11. 10. The petitioners filed CM No.4372/2014 for a direction to the respondents to consider and dispose of the petitioners’ representation dated 11th February, 2014 and vide order dated 31st March, 2014 it was so ordered. 11. Thereafter the matter remained pending on this account. On 17th March, 2015, it was informed that the representation of the petitioner had been decided on 10th March, 2015. 12. On 13th October, 2015, when this matter was listed, an adjournment slip was circulated. While adjourning the matter to 16th November, 2015, it was noted that the matter appeared to be covered by the judgment dated 9th September, 2015 of this Court in W.P.(C) No.1414/2012 titled Fal Avam Subzi Mandi Mashakhor Association Vs. Government of NCT of Delhi (against which LPA No.850/2015 was filed and dismissed vide judgment dated 3rd February, 2016). 13. It was in these circumstances, when the senior counsel for the petitioners failed to appear on 16th November, 2015, the petition was dismissed for non-prosecution. 14. Though the petitioners were aware of the dismissal for non-prosecution on 16th November, 2015 but took their own sweet time to file these applications for restoration of the writ petition and for condonation of delay in applying therefore which are dated 6th January, 2016 but were repeatedly re-filed and came up first before this Court on 19th February, 2016 i.e. after more than three months from the date when the petition was dismissed for non-prosecution. 15. A reading of the order dated 19th February, 2016 shows that though the learned Judge before whom the applications came up on 19th February, 2016 was not inclined to entertain these applications but on the contention of the senior counsel for the petitioners that the applications should be listed before me, as I had passed the order dated 16th November, 2015 of dismissal of the petition for non-prosecution, the applications were so listed before me on 11th March, 2016. 16. On 11th March, 2016, the senior counsel for the petitioners upon being asked to argue the petition on merits expressed inability and the matter was adjourned to today. 17. The aforesaid shows the intent of the petitioners to merely keep this petition pending, without any real intent to pursue the same. The same amounts to abuse of the process of the Court. 18. 17. The aforesaid shows the intent of the petitioners to merely keep this petition pending, without any real intent to pursue the same. The same amounts to abuse of the process of the Court. 18. In the application for restoration also, no sufficient reason has been given for the petitioners not addressing the arguments on 16th November, 2015, when the petition was dismissed for non-prosecution or for condonation of delay in applying therefore. 19. In the aforesaid facts and circumstances, there is no ground to condone the delay in filing the application for restoration or to restore the writ petition to its original position but to satisfy my conscience that the utter negligence in pursuing the writ petition is not causing any injustice to the petitioners, the senior counsel for the petitioners has been heard on merits also. 20. As aforesaid, the challenge in the petition is to the price fixed for the shops in the Fruit and Vegetable Market at Ghazipur Sabzi Mandi. 21. This petition is by as many as eleven petitioners. It is stated in the application for restoration on (a) that 10% of the price has been paid by the petitioners; (b) that possession of the shops has been handed over to the petitioners; (c) that “respondents have handed over the possession of B Category Shops to the petitioners, only when they have received the entire sale consideration i.e. Rs.44,22,266/-. Most of the petitioners have taken loan from Delhi Financial Corporation to pay the sale consideration”; (d) that “in fact in some of the cases, respondents have received the entire sale consideration but still they have not handed over the possession of the shops”; (e) that the respondents have delayed the handing over of possession by more than 15 years; and, (f) that in the year 2000, the petitioners were displaced from Fruit and Vegetable Mandi, Makhi Sarai, Shahdara, Delhi, as their land was acquired for construction of Metro. 22. The senior counsel for the petitioners has argued that the respondents have charged the petitioners as part of price, composition fee which the respondents were charged by Delhi Development Authority (DDA) on account of delay on the part of the respondents. It is argued that since the delay was attributable to the respondents themselves, the respondents could not have charged proportionate composition fee from the petitioners. 23. It is argued that since the delay was attributable to the respondents themselves, the respondents could not have charged proportionate composition fee from the petitioners. 23. I have enquired from the senior counsel for the petitioners, whether not the respondents are entitled to charge from the petitioners the costs incurred by them and how can the respondents be made to bear part of the costs. 24. No answer is forthcoming. 25. I have further enquired from the senior counsel for the petitioners that once the petitioners have paid the price and got possession, how does the present petition survive. 26. The senior counsel for the petitioners states that only those have got the possession who have paid the full price and they also have paid the price, without prejudice to their rights in the present petition. However, on enquiry, as to where is the plea that the price has been paid without prejudice to their rights in this petition, neither any plea is shown nor any document shown in this regard. 27. It is also argued that while in the case of other Mandis, option of payment in instalment has been given, the same option has not been given to the petitioners. 28. On enquiry, whether not the petitioners were paid compensation for acquisition of the shops in Shahdara Sabzi Mandi, though the senior counsel for the petitioners does not deny that the compensation was so received by the petitioners but states that the said compensation was a pittance. 29. Another grievance urged by the senior counsel for the petitioners is of interest @ 12% per annum being charged for delay in payment. 30. Not only all the aforesaid arguments are vague, without any reference to pleadings or to any document but there from it appears that there is no merit in the petition also. If the petitioners were dissatisfied with the compensation for their shops in Shahdra Subzi Mandi, they should have challenged the same and cannot make that a ground for claiming lowering of price of shops which are not said to be allotted in lieu of acquired shops. Similarly, the payment terms of shops in other Subzi Mandies cannot be invoked for challenging price fixed of shops of subject Subzi Mandi particularly when no foundation has been laid for claiming parity. 31. I have in Rishi Pal Vs. Similarly, the payment terms of shops in other Subzi Mandies cannot be invoked for challenging price fixed of shops of subject Subzi Mandi particularly when no foundation has been laid for claiming parity. 31. I have in Rishi Pal Vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi 177 (2011) DLT 531, J.B.S. Chauhan Vs. Union of India MANU/DE/0838/2011 and in Indraprastha Gas Limited Vs. Petrol and Natural Gas Regulatory Board MANU/DE/2313/2012 (DB), considering the case law with respect to the scope of interference by the Court in price fixation, held the scope of interference to be very limited. Need to reiterate the same is not felt. Suffice it is to state that it is the settled principle of law that it is not the function of the Court to sit in judgment and interfere in price fixation matters or over such matters of economic policy and it must be left to the government to decide the same and that if an allottee is not willing to take or accept the allotment at the rates, it is always open to him to decline the allotment and the price of the land prevailing at the time of communication of the letter of allotment is the rate payable by the allottee; that unless by the terms of a particular statute price fixation is made a quasi-judicial function, it is really legislative in character. 32. My conscience is thus satisfied that the petitioners on merits also do not have a case. 33. The senior counsel for the petitioners subsequently has sent photocopies of judgments in Mayurdwaj Cooperative Group Housing Society Ltd. Vs. Delhi Development Authority 2011 I AD (Delhi) 113 and Vardan Co-operative Group Housing Society Ltd. Vs. Delhi Development Authority (2006) 129 DLT 278 but on a reading thereof, I am unable to find the same to be of any relevance to the controversy in hand. 34. The applications are accordingly dismissed. I refrain from imposing costs.