JUDGMENT : K.S. Jhaveri, J. 1. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment and orders passed by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Ahmedabad Bench (hereinafter referred to as 'the Tribunal') dated 31.05.2010 & 30.03.2012 in ITA No. 2078/Ahd/2006 & 2887/Ahd/2011 for the Assessment Year 2001-02 & 2005-06 respectively, the revenue has preferred the present Tax Appeals for consideration of the following substantial question of law: "Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal was right in law in upholding the penalty under section 271(1)(c) of the Income Tax Act, 1961?" 2. So far as Tax Appeal No. 2393 of 2010 is concerned, the assessee is a non banking financial company and a venture of Government of Gujarat. The return of income for the assessment year 2001-02 was accompanied by the audited profit and loss account, balance sheet, auditor's report in Form No. 3CA and 3CD and supporting statements of accounts. The profit and loss account showed the net profit of Rs. 27,80,90,559/-. In the return, from the above net profit the assessee provided for an amount of Rs. 1,62,81,556/- for bad and doubtful debt; whereas the amount of Rs. 21,98,638/- was the provision made for diminution in value of investments in accordance with the accounting standard. The Assessing Officer disallowed the same. The assessee preferred an appeal before CIT(A) but the CIT(A) confirmed the views of the Assessing Officer on both the counts. The assessee preferred an appeal before the Tribunal and the Tribunal following the decision of the Special Bench of the Tribunal in the case of the assessee in its earlier decision, held against the assessee. 2.1 So far as Tax Appeal No. 601 of 2013 is concerned, the assessee is a partnership firm running educational institution. The firm had claimed depreciation u/s. 32 as well as deduction u/s. 24 on school building which was let out. The return of income was filed and assessment was completed by making disallowances of depreciation and disallowance of legal expenses. A penalty was also imposed on disallowances of depreciation and legal expenses. Aggrieved by the assessment order, the assessee preferred appeal before CIT(A) who restricted the disallowances of depreciation of Rs. 10,41,438 to Rs. 6,71,643/- and the remaining disallowance of depreciation and the entire disallowance of legal expenses was confirmed. A penalty was also imposed on disallowances of depreciation and legal expenses. Aggrieved by the assessment order, the assessee preferred appeal before CIT(A) who restricted the disallowances of depreciation of Rs. 10,41,438 to Rs. 6,71,643/- and the remaining disallowance of depreciation and the entire disallowance of legal expenses was confirmed. The assessee preferred appeal before the Tribunal and the Tribunal dismissed the appeal thereby confirming the penalty imposed u/s. 271(1)(c) of the Act. 3. Mr. Manish J. Shah, learned advocate appearing for the assessee in both the matters submitted that the Tribunal erred in upholding penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) and in holding that the assessee had furnished inaccurate particulars of income. Drawing attention to the provision of Section 45Q of the Reserve Bank of India Act, he submitted that the Tribunal failed to appreciate that section 45Q provided that the provision of Chapter IIIB of the said Act overrides the provisions of all other Acts naturally including the Income Tax Act, that in the understanding of the assessee, the prudential norms and directions of the Reserve Bank of India, which were issued under that Chapter, were therefore, binding on the assessee and overriding the provisions of the Income Tax Act, that there was judicial opinion by way of Tribunal decisions supporting the stand of the assessee, and the assessee had disclosed right in the computation of income as stated above that it was making the claim of bad debts and diminution in value of assets in accordance with the above norms. He has placed reliance on a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Commissioner of Income Tax v. Reliance Petroproducts (P) Ltd. reported in [2010] 322 ITR 158 and submitted that even otherwise no penalty could have been imposed. He submitted that the Tribunal failed to appreciate that the ratio of Apex Court is that if the claim is made disclosing all the facts, it is not a case for penalty and therefore the said ratio fully applies to the facts of the assessee's case. 3.1 Drawing attention of this Court to the observations made by the Tribunal in para 5.15 of its order, Mr. 3.1 Drawing attention of this Court to the observations made by the Tribunal in para 5.15 of its order, Mr. Shah submitted that the Tribunal erred in holding that the fact of the assessee being a Government Company is of no relevance, on the contrary, higher onus is there on the assessee because it has better professional assistance and its accounts are compulsorily subject to audit and how their auditors failed to notice that in law wrong claim was being made. He submitted that the Tribunal held that since the onus under clause (b) of Explanation (1) to section 271(1)(c) is not discharged, the assessee is guilty of concealment. He submitted that the Tribunal totally missed that the assessee had claimed it in accordance with the prudential norms of Reserve Bank of India and therefore it is not a case to which clause (b) will apply. 3.2 Mr. Shah submitted that CIT(A) pointed in para 5.1.2 that; "They resorted to the new claim of the provisions of the RBI Act overriding the provisions of Income-tax Act" forgetting that in computation itself it is pointed out that the provision for bad and doubtful debt was made in accordance with RBI directions but the CIT(A) found that this was an afterthought. He submitted that the CIT(A) ultimately held that the assessee had furnished inaccurate particulars and upheld the penalty in respect of the above two additions. He submitted that it is worth noting that the Assessing Officer in the assessment order records no satisfaction of concealment of income or furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income, even then in the penalty order he holds the assessee to be guilty of concealment of income; whereas the CIT(A) holds the assessee to be guilty of furnishing inaccurate particulars of income. 3.3 Mr. Shah submitted that so far as Tax Appeal No. 601 of 2013 is concerned, the Tribunal failed to appreciate that the claim of depreciation on rented premises was due to a bona fide mistake which should not have attracted penalty u/s. 271(1)(c). He submitted that the disallowance of legal expenses also could not have attracted penalty u/s. 271(1)(c)as there was no concealment nor any inaccurate particulars were filed by the assessee but it was a mere disallowance of a claim made by the assessee on which two views could be possible. He submitted that the disallowance of legal expenses also could not have attracted penalty u/s. 271(1)(c)as there was no concealment nor any inaccurate particulars were filed by the assessee but it was a mere disallowance of a claim made by the assessee on which two views could be possible. He has relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of T. Ashok Pai v. Commissioner of Income Tax reported in [2007] 292 ITR 11 (SC), wherein the Apex Court has held as under: "16. The term 'inaccurate particulars' is not defined. Furnishing of an assessment of value of the property may not by itself be furnishing of inaccurate particulars. Even if the explanations are taken recourse to, a finding has to be arrived at having regard clause (a) of Explanation 1 that the Assessing Officer is required to arrive at a finding that the explanation offered by an assessee, in the event, he offers one was false. He must be found to have failed to prove that such explanation is not only not bona fide but all the facts relating to the same and material to the income were not disclosed by him. Thus, apart from his explanation being not bona fide, it should be found as of fact that he has not disclosed all the facts which was material to the computation of his income. 17. The explanation having regard to the decision of this Court must be preceded by a finding as to how and as to in what manner he furnished the particulars of his income. It is beyond any doubt or dispute that for the said purpose the Income Tax Officer must arrive at its satisfaction in this behalf." 3.4 Mr. Shah has further relied upon the following decisions: "(I) Geeta Prints (P.) Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax reported in [2013] 33 taxmann.com 393 (Gujarat) wherein this court has held that the assessee had made full disclosure about the claim which was also certified by the chartered accountant and necessary declarations in the prescribed forms were made. It is further held therein that may be in the case of the assessee, such claim on merits was not granted. However this did not mean that the assessee had concealed any income. It is further held therein that may be in the case of the assessee, such claim on merits was not granted. However this did not mean that the assessee had concealed any income. It is further held therein that the issue ultimately at any rate was debatable since one High court has already held in favour of the assessee. (II) Decision of this Court rendered in Tax Appeal No. 1052 of 2010 wherein this Court has held as under: "5. Having thus heard learned counsel for the parties and having perused the documents on record, we find that the Tribunal has given sufficient reasons for upholding the orders of CIT(Appeals) deleting the penalty. The Tribunal records that deduction claimed by the assessee in respect of bad debts and disallowance of expenses on estimation basis were not found to be false or fabricated by the Assessing Officer. The disallowances were made only on technical point which was highly disputable as to decide the issue. The special bench of the Tribunal was required to be constituted. It was further observed that bad debts claimed by the assessee were not found to be bogus. It was further observed that the expenses claimed also were not found to be bogus or inflated. The disallowances were made on the basis of the facts and figures furnished by the assessee. 6. In view of the facts noted by the Tribunal and the conclusions arrived at, we do not find any reason to interfere when it is found that the assessee had made full disclosures and made claims which though were ultimately disallowed, were not found to be bogus and when it is found that the issue was highly debatable, the order deleting the penalty is not required to be interfered with. Tax Appeal is, therefore, dismissed." (III) Dahod Sahakari Kharid Vechan Sangh Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax reported in 2006 (282) ITR 321 wherein this court has held as under: "24. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the case, it is apparent that the assessee's contention that it had no malafide intention or mens rea has not been found to be untrue by any of the authorities. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the case, it is apparent that the assessee's contention that it had no malafide intention or mens rea has not been found to be untrue by any of the authorities. The finding by the Tribunal in this context that the assessee had made separate claim in the profit and loss account for deduction of gratuity on the basis of actual payment to non-suit the assessee as regards the explanation offered is based on a misconception of facts and law. It was never the assessee's case that, out of the amount received from the Insurance Company, such amount was actually paid out and claimed as a deduction. In fact, this becomes clear when one reads the assessment order and the penalty order wherein the assessing officer has stated that the assessee cannot claim the sum of Rs. 68,332/- as a deduction on due basis. The assessee has never claimed any deduction qua this amount. The deduction claimed is qua a separate amount, and that too, on actual payment basis. There is no claim for deduction on due basis. The entire premise, therefore, is incorrect. 25. Once there is absence of mens rea, mere omission from the return of income of an item of receipt neither amounts to concealment, nor deliberate furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income, as laid down by the Apex Court, unless and until there is some evidence or some circumstances to show that the omission was attributable to an intention or desire on part of the assessee to conceal the income so as to avoid imposition of tax thereon. In the present case, the assessee is a cooperative society managed through a governing board and as stated by the society, there is no personal interest involved. The omission has occurred not with an intention but due to oversight. As held by this Court, absence of proof acceptable to the department cannot be equated with fraud or willful default. The circumstances must show that there was a conscious act of concealment or furnishing of inaccurate particulars on part of the assessee. There is nothing on record to show that any particular individual has any personal interest in committing the act of omission of showing the amount received from Insurance Company as income of the assessee, a cooperative society. The circumstances must show that there was a conscious act of concealment or furnishing of inaccurate particulars on part of the assessee. There is nothing on record to show that any particular individual has any personal interest in committing the act of omission of showing the amount received from Insurance Company as income of the assessee, a cooperative society. In fact, the entries in the books of account reflect that the assessee had credited the said sum to the fund account directly and the said entry appeared in the balance sheet without going through the profit and loss account." (IV) Price Waterhouse Coopers Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Kolkatta - I and Another reported in 2012 (348) ITR 306 wherein. "17. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, we are of the view that the facts of the case are rather peculiar and somewhat unique. The assessee is undoubtedly a reputed firm and has great expertise available with it. Notwithstanding this, it is possible that even the assessee could make a "silly" mistake and indeed this has been acknowledged both by the Tribunal as well as by the High Court. 18. The fact that the Tax Audit Report was filed along with the return and that it unequivocally stated that the provision for payment was not allowable under Section 40A(7) of the Act indicates that the assessee made a computation error in its return of income. Apart from the fact that the assessee did not notice the error, it was not even noticed even by the Assessing Officer who framed the assessment order. In that sense, even the Assessing Officer seems to have made a mistake in overlooking the contents of the Tax Audit Report. 19. The contents of the Tax Audit Report suggest that there is no question of the assessee concealing its income. There is also no question of the assessee furnishing any inaccurate particulars. It appears to us that all that has happened in the present case is that through a bona fide and inadvertent error, the assessee while submitting its return, failed to add the provision for gratuity to its total income. This can only be described as a human error which we are all prone to make. The calibre and expertise of the assessee has little or nothing to do with the inadvertent error. This can only be described as a human error which we are all prone to make. The calibre and expertise of the assessee has little or nothing to do with the inadvertent error. That the assessee should have been careful cannot be doubted, but the absence of due care, in a case such as the present, does not mean that the assessee is guilty of either furnishing inaccurate particulars or attempting to conceal its income. 20. We are of the opinion, given the peculiar facts of this case, that the imposition of penalty on the assessee is not justified. We are satisfied that the assessee had committed an inadvertent and bona fide error and had not intended to or attempted to either conceal its income or furnish inaccurate particulars. " (V) India Cement Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras reported in 1966 (60) ITR 52 (SC) wherein the Apex Court has held as under: "15. In S.F. Engineer v. Commissioner of income Tax (2) the Bombay High Court held that the expenditure incurred for raising loan for the carrying on of a business cannot in all cases be regarded as an expenditure of a capital nature. On the facts of the case they held that as construction and sale of the building was the sole business of the firm and the building was its stock-in-trade, and the loan was raised and used wholly for the purpose of acquiring this stock-in- trade and not for obtaining any fixed assets or raising any initial capital or for expansion of the assessee's business, the expenditure incurred for the raising of loan was not an expenditure of capital nature but revenue expenditure. Although the conclusion of the High Court was correct, we are not able to agree with the principle that the nature of the expenditure incurred in raising a loan would depend upon the nature and purpose of the loan. A loan may be intended to be used for the purchase of raw-material when it is negotiated, but the company may after raising the loan change its mind and spend it on securing capital assets. Is the purpose at the time the loan is negotiated to be taken into consideration or the purpose for which it is actually used? A loan may be intended to be used for the purchase of raw-material when it is negotiated, but the company may after raising the loan change its mind and spend it on securing capital assets. Is the purpose at the time the loan is negotiated to be taken into consideration or the purpose for which it is actually used? Further suppose that in the accounting year the purpose is to borrow and buy raw- material but in the assessment year the company finds it unnecessary to buy raw-material and spends it on capital assets. Will the income tax officer decide the case with reference to what happened in the accounting year or what happened in the assessment year? In our opinion, it was rightly held by the Nagpur Judicial Commissioner in Nagpur Electric Light and Power Co. v. Commissioner of Income Tax(1) that the purpose for which the new loan was required was irrelevant to the consideration of the question whether the expenditure for obtaining the loan was revenue expenditure or capital expenditure. 16. To summarise this part of the case, we are of the opinion that (a) the loan obtained is not an asset or advantage of an enduring nature; (b) that the expenditure was made for securing the use of money for a certain period-, and (c) that it is irrelevant to consider the object with which the loan was obtained. Consequently, in the circumstances of the case, the expenditure was revenue expenditure within S. 10(2)(xv)." (VI) Decision rendered by this Court in Tax Appeal No. 531 of 2015 on 05.08.2016 wherein this Court has considered the provisions of Section 45Q of the Income Tax Act. (VII) Commissioner of Income Tax v. Corporation Bank Ltd. reported in 2002 (254) 791 wherein the Apex Court has held as under: "7. Turning attention to the first question as regards the provisions under Section 147(a) be it noted and as the facts depict, there is no failure on the part of the assessee in furnishing the particulars pertaining to the above noted sum as not recoverable for the relevant accounting year and the statements filed along with the original return disclosed the full details of the aforesaid account. There is, therefore, no failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly the material facts necessary for the assessment years for the respective years and as such Section 147(a) has no manner of application and is not attracted in the facts of the matter under consideration. The High Court on consideration of the facts came to the conclusion that the Tribunal was justified in coming to the said finding and we also record our concurrence therewith. 8. Incidentally this issue came for consideration before this court in a batch of cases on more or less identical situations and this court while dealing with this matter finally, recorded that the question as regards reopening of the assessment under Section 147(a) of the Act would not arise further. The question in the facts of the matter under consideration is thus covered by the judgment of this court in State Bank of Travancore v. CIT, [1986] 158 ITR 102." 4. Mr. M.R. Bhatt, learned Senior Counsel appearing with Ms. Mauna Bhatt, learned advocate appearing for the revenue in Tax Appeal No. 2393 of 2010 has drawn the attention of this Court to the reasonings adopted by the CIT(A) as well as the Tribunal and submitted that in view of the concurrent findings arrived at by the authorities below this Court may not interfere in the appeal. He submitted that the Tribunal has discussed the case in detail and rightly come to the conclusion that this is a case of concealment and therefore the penalty has been rightly imposed. He submitted that the assessee committed the default of concealment of its income by furnishing inaccurate particulars thereof in relation to its claim for deduction of provision for bad and doubtful debts and provision made for diminution in value of the investments. In support of his submissions, he has relied upon the decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of Dinesh Kumar v. Commissioner of Income Tax reported in [2002] 254 ITR 240 wherein the Delhi High Court in paras 2 to 4 has held as under: "3. We have heard learned counsel for the parries. Learned counsel for the assessed stated that the assessed had discharged the onus put on him and to say that there was no substance in the explanation which was offered or that the same was not supported by materials has no legal foundation. We have heard learned counsel for the parries. Learned counsel for the assessed stated that the assessed had discharged the onus put on him and to say that there was no substance in the explanation which was offered or that the same was not supported by materials has no legal foundation. Learned counsel for the Revenue, on the other hand, submitted that after analysing the factual position, the Income-tax Officer, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Tribunal came to hold that the explanation offered by the assessed was not acceptable and the case was clearly covered by the Explanation to Clause (c) of Section 271(1) of the Act. It is further submitted that the conclusions are essentially factual giving rise to no question of law. 4. The question whether in a given case the explanation offered by the assessed is acceptable or not is essentially one of fact giving rise to no question of law. We find that the forums below have analysed the case of the assessed and the explanation offered by him and concluded that the source of the loan allegedly obtained was not properly explained. This conclusion is also one of fact. That being the position, no question of law arises out of the order of the Tribunal. Therefore, we decline to answer the question referred." 5. Mr. K.M. Parikh, learned advocate appearing for the revenue in Tax Appeal No. 601 of 2013 has also supported the impugned orders passed by the authorities below and submitted that the same having been passed in accordance with law does not call for interference by this Court. He submitted that in view of the wrong claim made by the assessee inspite of knowing fully well the provisions of law, the Tribunal is justified in passing the impugned order. 6. The sole question in both these appeals is with regard to levy of penalty u/s. 271(1)(c). The assessee in one of the appeals is a government company engaged in the business of providing loans, leasing and hire purchase services and providing financial services whereas in the other appeal, the assessee is a partnership firm running education institution. From the assessment order it is clear that there is no satisfaction recorded by the Assessing Officer regarding concealment of income or for furnishing any inaccurate particulars. From the assessment order it is clear that there is no satisfaction recorded by the Assessing Officer regarding concealment of income or for furnishing any inaccurate particulars. Therefore, from the plain reading of the assessment order itself it is clear that the assumption of jurisdiction to levy penalty is lacking in the present case. The notice issued by the Assessing Officer has also not stated whether the penalty proceedings are initiated for concealment of income or for furnishing inaccurate particulars. 6.1 From the perusal of the impugned orders passed by the CIT(A) as well as the Tribunal, it is clear that there has been an ambiguity in the and/or difference of opinion amongst the authorities below as to whether the assessee has made a wrong claim or has concealed certain particulars. 6.2 The contention with regard to section 45Q of the Act has been raised by learned advocate for the assessees. Though technically it ought not to have been claimed under the Income tax Act, but now by way of the decision of this Court rendered in Tax Appeal No. 531 of 2015, the claim has been allowed by this Court. This Court in Tax Appeal No. 531 of 2015 has observed as under: "28. In the light of the view adopted by the court, it is not necessary to enter into any detailed discussion as regards the applicability or otherwise of the CBDT Circular to the facts of the present case. The Supreme Court in UCO Bank, Calcutta v. CIT (supra) has held that such circulars are not meant for contradicting or nullifying any provision of the statute. They are meant for proper administration of the statute, they are designed to mitigate the rigours of the application of a particular provision of the statute in certain situations by applying a beneficial interpretation to the provision in question so as to benefit the assessee and make the application of the fiscal provision, in that case, in consonance with the concept of income and in particular, notional income as also the treatment of such notional income under the accounting practice. The court, accordingly, did not find any inconsistency or contradiction between the circular so issued and section 145 of the Income Tax Act. The court, accordingly, did not find any inconsistency or contradiction between the circular so issued and section 145 of the Income Tax Act. In the aforesaid premises, until the circular is revoked, the same continues to be in force and the same having been issued to mitigate the hardships caused to the class of assessees covered by the circular, such assessees would be entitled to the benefit thereof. Merely because by virtue of the provisions of section 43D of the Act, a certain class of assessees is given benefit under the provisions of the Act would not mean that the same would override the circular. 29. On behalf of the appellant it has been contended that section 43D of the Act itself recognises recognition of taxability of such interest and that when a specific provision in the nature of section 43D of the Act has been made, and entities like the assessee are excluded from the purview thereof, the assessee cannot indirectly claim benefit which would amount to a benefit similar to that under section 43D of the Act. In this regard, it may be noted that the benefit claimed by the assessee is not under any provision of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The assessee being bound by the RBI Guidelines which are issued under the provisions of the RBI Act has not shown the interest on NPA as income. By virtue of the provisions of section 45Q of the RBI Act, the provisions of Chapter IIIB thereof have an overriding effect over other laws including the Income Tax Act, 1961. Therefore, notwithstanding the provisions of section 43D of the Act, since the provisions of section 45Q of the RBI Act have an overriding effect vis-a-vis income recognition principles in the Companies Act, the Assessing Officer is bound to follow the RBI Directions so far as income recognition is concerned. The contention that the assessee cannot indirectly claim the benefit which would amount to a benefit similar to that under section 43D of the Act, therefore, does not merit acceptance." 7. We have also considered the decisions rendered in the case of Reliance Petroproducts (supra) wherein the Apex Court has observed as under: "8. A glance at this provision would suggest that in order to be covered, there has to be concealment of the particulars of the income of the assessee. We have also considered the decisions rendered in the case of Reliance Petroproducts (supra) wherein the Apex Court has observed as under: "8. A glance at this provision would suggest that in order to be covered, there has to be concealment of the particulars of the income of the assessee. Secondly, the assessee must have furnished inaccurate particulars of his income. Present is not the case of concealment of the income. That is not the case of the Revenue either. However, the Learned Counsel for Revenue suggested that by making incorrect claim for the expenditure on interest, the assessee has furnished inaccurate particulars of the income. As per Law Lexicon, the meaning of the word "particular" is a detail or details (in plural sense); the details of a claim, or the separate items of an account. Therefore, the word "particulars" used in the Section 271(1)(c) would embrace the meaning of the details of the claim made. It is an admitted position in the present case that no information given in the Return was found to be incorrect or inaccurate. It is not as if any statement made or any detail supplied was found to be factually incorrect. Hence, at least, prima facie, the assessee cannot be held guilty of furnishing inaccurate particulars. The Learned Counsel argued that "submitting an incorrect claim in law for the expenditure on interest would amount to giving inaccurate particulars of such income". We do not think that such can be the interpretation of the concerned words. The words are plain and simple. In order to expose the assessee to the penalty unless the case is strictly covered by the provision, the penalty provision cannot be invoked. By any stretch of imagination, making an incorrect claim in law cannot tantamount to furnishing inaccurate particulars. In Commissioner of Income Tax, Delhi v. Atul Mohan Bindal [ 2009(9) SCC 589 ], where this Court was considering the same provision, the Court observed that the Assessing Officer has to be satisfied that a person has concealed the particulars of his income or furnished inaccurate particulars of such income. This Court referred to another decision of this Court in Union of India v. Dharamendra Textile Processors [ 2008(13) SCC 369 ], as also, the decision in Union of India v. Rajasthan Spg. & Wvg. Mills [ 2009(13) SCC 448 ] and reiterated in para 13 that:-- "13. This Court referred to another decision of this Court in Union of India v. Dharamendra Textile Processors [ 2008(13) SCC 369 ], as also, the decision in Union of India v. Rajasthan Spg. & Wvg. Mills [ 2009(13) SCC 448 ] and reiterated in para 13 that:-- "13. It goes without saying that for applicability of Section 271(1)(c), conditions stated therein must exist." 9. Therefore, it is obvious that it must be shown that the conditions under Section 271(1)(c) must exist before the penalty is imposed. There can be no dispute that everything would depend upon the Return filed because that is the only document, where the assessee can furnish the particulars of his income. When such particulars are found to be inaccurate, the liability would arise. In Dilip N. Shroff v. Joint Commissioner of Income Tax, Mumbai & Anr. [ 2007(6) SCC 329 ], this Court explained the terms "concealment of income" and "furnishing inaccurate particulars". The Court went on to hold therein that in order to attract the penalty under Section 271(1)(c), mens rea was necessary, as according to the Court, the word "inaccurate" signified a deliberate act or omission on behalf of the assessee. It went on to hold that Clause (iii) of Section 271(1) provided for a discretionary jurisdiction upon the Assessing Authority, inasmuch as the amount of penalty could not be less than the amount of tax sought to be evaded by reason of such concealment of particulars of income, but it may not exceed three times thereof. It was pointed out that the term "inaccurate particulars" was not defined anywhere in the Act and, therefore, it was held that furnishing of an assessment of the value of the property may not by itself be furnishing inaccurate particulars. It was further held that the assessee must be found to have failed to prove that his explanation is not only not bona fide but all the facts relating to the same and material to the computation of his income were not disclosed by him. It was then held that the explanation must be preceded by a finding as to how and in what manner, the assessee had furnished the particulars of his income. The Court ultimately went on to hold that the element of mens rea was essential. It was then held that the explanation must be preceded by a finding as to how and in what manner, the assessee had furnished the particulars of his income. The Court ultimately went on to hold that the element of mens rea was essential. It was only on the point of mens rea that the judgment in Dilip N. Shroff v. Joint Commissioner of Income Tax, Mumbai & Anr. was upset. In Union of India v. Dharamendra Textile Processors (cited supra), after quoting from Section 271 extensively and also considering Section 271(1)(c), the Court came to the conclusion that since Section 271(1)(c) indicated the element of strict liability on the assessee for the concealment or for giving inaccurate particulars while filing Return, there was no necessity of mens rea. The Court went on to hold that the objective behind enactment of Section 271(1)(c) read with Explanations indicated with the said Section was for providing remedy for loss of revenue and such a penalty was a civil liability and, therefore, willful concealment is not an essential ingredient for attracting civil liability as was the case in the matter of prosecution under Section 276-C of the Act. The basic reason why decision in Dilip N. Shroff v. Joint Commissioner of Income Tax, Mumbai & Anr. (cited supra) was overruled by this Court in Union of India v. Dharamendra Textile Processors (cited supra), was that according to this Court the effect and difference between Section 271(1)(c) and Section 276-C of the Act was lost sight of in case of Dilip N. Shroff v. Joint Commissioner of Income Tax, Mumbai & Anr. (cited supra). However, it must be pointed out that in Union of India v. Dharamendra Textile Processors (cited supra), no fault was found with the reasoning in the decision in Dilip N. Shroff v. Joint Commissioner of Income Tax, Mumbai & Anr. (cited supra), where the Court explained the meaning of the terms "conceal" and inaccurate". It was only the ultimate inference in Dilip N. Shroff v. Joint Commissioner of Income Tax, Mumbai & Anr. (cited supra) to the effect that mens rea was an essential ingredient for the penalty under Section 271(1)(c) that the decision in Dilip N. Shroff v. Joint Commissioner of Income Tax, Mumbai & Anr. (cited supra) was overruled. 10. We are not concerned in the present case with the mens rea. (cited supra) to the effect that mens rea was an essential ingredient for the penalty under Section 271(1)(c) that the decision in Dilip N. Shroff v. Joint Commissioner of Income Tax, Mumbai & Anr. (cited supra) was overruled. 10. We are not concerned in the present case with the mens rea. However, we have to only see as to whether in this case, as a matter of fact, the assessee has given inaccurate particulars. In Webster's Dictionary, the word "inaccurate" has been defined as:-- "not accurate, not exact or correct; not according to truth; erroneous; as an inaccurate statement, copy or transcript". 11. We have already seen the meaning of the word "particulars" in the earlier part of this judgment. Reading the words in conjunction, they must mean the details supplied in the Return, which are not accurate, not exact or correct, not according to truth or erroneous. We must hasten to add here that in this case, there is no finding that any details supplied by the assessee in its Return were found to be incorrect or erroneous or false. Such not being the case, there would be no question of inviting the penalty under Section 271(1)(c) of the Act. A mere making of the claim, which is not sustainable in law, by itself, will not amount to furnishing inaccurate particulars regarding the income of the assessee. Such claim made in the Return cannot amount to the inaccurate particulars." 7.1 Similarly in the case of Dahod Sahakari Kharid Vechan Sangh Ltd. (supra), this Court has held as under: "24. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the case, it is apparent that the assessee's contention that it had no malafide intention or mens rea has not been found to be untrue by any of the authorities. The finding by the Tribunal in this context that the assessee had made separate claim in the profit and loss account for deduction of gratuity on the basis of actual payment to non-suit the assessee as regards the explanation offered is based on a misconception of facts and law. It was never the assessee's case that, out of the amount received from the Insurance Company, such amount was actually paid out and claimed as a deduction. It was never the assessee's case that, out of the amount received from the Insurance Company, such amount was actually paid out and claimed as a deduction. In fact, this becomes clear when one reads the assessment order and the penalty order wherein the assessing officer has stated that the assessee cannot claim the sum of Rs. 68,332/- as a deduction on due basis. The assessee has never claimed any deduction qua this amount. The deduction claimed is qua a separate amount, and that too, on actual payment basis. There is no claim for deduction on due basis. The entire premise, therefore, is incorrect. 25. Once there is absence of mens rea, mere omission from the return of income of an item of receipt neither amounts to concealment, nor deliberate furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income, as laid down by the Apex Court, unless and until there is some evidence or some circumstances to show that the omission was attributable to an intention or desire on part of the assessee to conceal the income so as to avoid imposition of tax thereon. In the present case, the assessee is a cooperative society managed through a governing board and as stated by the society, there is no personal interest involved. The omission has occurred not with an intention but due to oversight. As held by this Court, absence of proof acceptable to the department cannot be equated with fraud or willful default. The circumstances must show that there was a conscious act of concealment or furnishing of inaccurate particulars on part of the assessee. There is nothing on record to show that any particular individual has any personal interest in committing the act of omission of showing the amount received from Insurance Company as income of the assessee, a cooperative society. In fact, the entries in the books of account reflect that the assessee had credited the said sum to the fund account directly and the said entry appeared in the balance sheet without going through the profit and loss account." 7.2 Thus, we are of the view that the contention raised by the assessees is required to be accepted. The revenue is not in a position to show the mens rea in the present cases. The revenue is not in a position to show the mens rea in the present cases. Disallowance of certain claims neither amounts to concealment nor deliberate furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income as laid down by the Apex Court unless and until there is some evidence or some circumstance to show that the omission was attributable to an intention or desire on the part of the assessee to conceal the income so as to avoid imposition of tax thereon. Thus, jurisdiction u/s. 271(1)(c) of the Act cannot be assumed. 7.3 In the case of Geeta Prints (P.) Ltd. (supra), this court has observed that when no information as given in the return was found to be incorrect, penalty could not be imposed. In the present case, the claims made were not granted by the Assessing Officer on merits. This did not mean that the assessee had tried to conceal the income. 8. We have also given our thoughtful consideration to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of T. Ashok Pai (supra) and we feel that the said decision is very much applicable on the facts and circumstances of the present case. It is settled law now that merely because some omission or wrong statement was made in the original return, penalty proceedings for concealment as contemplated by section 271(1)(c) might not be attracted. In the penalty proceedings, when it is found as a fact that the assessee had acted on the basis of wrong legal advice or misinterpretation, the question of his failure to discharge his burden in terms of Explanation to Section 271(1)(c) of the Act would not arise. 9. In the present case, we are of the view that the impugned orders passed by the Tribunal as well as CIT(A) are erroneous with regard to levy of penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) of the Act. We therefore find that the Tribunal was not right in law in upholding the penalty under section 271(1)(c) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 and the question is required to be answered accordingly. 10. In the premises aforesaid, the questions raised in the present appeals are answered in favour of the assessees and against the revenue. The impugned orders passed by the Tribunal as well as CIT(A) with regard to levy of penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) of the Act are hereby quashed and set aside. Appeals are accordingly allowed.