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2016 DIGILAW 1755 (ALL)

Ram Devi v. Virendra Kumar Shukla

2016-05-06

SATYENDRA SINGH CHAUHAN, VIJAY LAXMI

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JUDGMENT Heard learned counsel for the appellants and learned counsel for the respondents. 2. This appeal is directed against the judgment and award dated 21.10.2013 passed by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Hardoi in MACP No.223 of 2012 whereby the Tribunal dismissed the claim petition. Aggrieved against this award, the present appeal was preferred by the appellants to set aside the impugned award and to award compensation in their favour to the tune of Rs.48,00,000/-. 3. The brief facts which are necessary for the disposal of this appeal are as under: - That one Bhagwandeen died in motor accident who was going with Krishna Pal, his jija, from his village to Sandi on 03.07.2012 at about 1.00 pm. on foot, when he was hit by a dala No. UP 30A 9319 from the back and suffered fatal injuries. Bhagwandeen succumbed to injuries. The claim petition was filed by the appellants including father of the deceased, who expired after the passing of the impugned ward. The Tribunal dismissed the claim petition and hence this appeal. 4. Learned counsel for the appellants/claimants while assailing the legality and correctness of the impugned order contended that the Tribunal without adverting to all the factual details and terms raised in the claim petition, disposed of the petition in a cryptic manner. According to the learned counsel the death of the Bhagwandeen was caused due to rash and negligent driving by the driver of dala No. UP 30A 9319 on the date and time of the accident. The appellants/claimants adduced cogent evidence and as such the Tribunal ought to have allowed the claim petition. The procedure of deciding the claims before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal are the different from that of the investigation of the incident by the police and the Criminal Trial. The Tribunal had acted illegally in holding that the accident was not caused by the vehicle in question. No case under Section 340 I.P.C. was made out and the Tribunal had acted illegally in directing to register the case. 5. It is further submitted that the Tribunal disbelieved the witnesses of the claimants and wrongly observed that the dala in question was not involved in the accident. The alleged final report was made one of the basis for rejecting the claim petition which cannot be made the basis of dismissal of claim petition. 5. It is further submitted that the Tribunal disbelieved the witnesses of the claimants and wrongly observed that the dala in question was not involved in the accident. The alleged final report was made one of the basis for rejecting the claim petition which cannot be made the basis of dismissal of claim petition. Learned counsel for the appellants/claimants has placed reliance of Shiv Murti Singh versus Nawab Khan reported in 2014 (32) 1553 wherein it was observed by Allahabad High Court (Lucknow Bench) that the final report filed by the police in criminal case could not have been made basis for rejecting the claim as the claim is to be decided on its own merits and evidence on record taking into account the Rule of Preponderance of Probability. 6. According to the appellants, Krishan Pal Pw3 was an eye witness to the accident in question. The carbon copy of the FIR, the post mortem report were relevant documents and there was sufficient proof on record before the tribunal. Therefore, reading all the evidence, oral and documentary filed by the petitioner as a whole, it stands proved on record that deceased had sustained fatal injuries due to rash and negligent driving of respondent No.1 while driving the offending vehicle. The award was against the material on record and against the law and was liable to be set aside. 7. As against it, the owner of the offending vehicle, the respondent no.1 denied the accident alleging that the accident was caused by some other vehicle and the respondent was falsely implicated in this case due to election politics. Dala of respondent was not involved in the case and there was no negligence on their part in causing the accident in question. Learned counsel for the respondent, however, supported the impugned order and urged that it does not call for any interference. 8. However, before making any analytical discussion about the rejection of the claim petition by the tribunal, it would be appropriate to mention the settled law about the quasi-judicial nature of the functions of the tribunal under the Motor Vehicle Act. The Motor Vehicle Act dealing with compensation is a benevolent legislation and not a penal one. Under Section 168 of the Act, a Claims Tribunal is enjoined to hold an inquiry to determine compensation which must appear to it to be just. The Motor Vehicle Act dealing with compensation is a benevolent legislation and not a penal one. Under Section 168 of the Act, a Claims Tribunal is enjoined to hold an inquiry to determine compensation which must appear to it to be just. The proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act are not akin to the proceedings in a civil suit and the strict rules of evidence are not applicable in an inquiry conducted by the Claims Tribunal. In State of Mysore Vs. S.S. Makapur, 1993 (2) SCR 943, the Supreme Court observed as under: ......that tribunals exercising quasi-judicial functions are not courts and that therefore they are not bound to follow the procedure prescribed for trial of actions in courts nor are they bound by strict rules of evidence. They can unlike courts, obtain all information for the points under the enquiry from all sources, and through all channels, without being fettered by rules and procedure, which govern proceedings in court. The only obligation which the law casts on them is that they should not act on any information which they may receive unless they put it to the party against whom it is to be used and give him a fair opportunity to explain it. What is a fair opportunity depend on the facts and circumstances of each case but where such an opportunity has been given, the proceedings are not open to attack on the ground that the enquiry was not conducted in accordance with the procedure followed in courts. 9. In a Petition under Section 166 of the Act, the Claimants were merely to establish their case on the touchstone of preponderance of probability and holistic view is to be taken while dealing with the Claim Petition under the Motor Vehicles Act. In Bimla Devi and Ors.v Himachal Road Transport Corporation and Ors., (2009) 13 SC 530, the Supreme Court observed as under in Para 15: 15. In a situation of this nature, the Tribunal has rightly taken a holistic view of the matter. It was necessary to be borne in mind that strict proof of an accident caused by a particular bus in a particular manner may not be possible to be done by the claimants. The claimants were merely to establish their case on the touchstone of preponderance of probability. The standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt could not have been applied. 10. The claimants were merely to establish their case on the touchstone of preponderance of probability. The standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt could not have been applied. 10. Bimla Devi (supra) was relied on by the Supreme Court in its latest judgments in Parmeshwari v. Amir Chand, (MANU/SC/0358/2011 : 2011) 11 SCC 635 and Kusum Lata v. Satbir, (2011) 3 SCC 646 . Further, in Kaushnumma Begum & Ors. v. New India Assurance Company Limited, 2001 ACJ 421 SC, the Supreme Court observed that the issue of wrongful act or omission on the part of driver of the motor vehicle involved in an accident has to be left to a secondary importance and mere use or involvement of motor vehicle in causing bodily injuries or death to a human being or damage to property would make the petition maintainable under Section 166 and 140 of the Act. 11. It is also settled law that the term rashness and negligence has to be construed lightly while making a decision on a petition for claim under MVAct as compared to meaning of these words in the Indian Penal Code. In N.K.V. Bros. (P) Ltd. Vs. M. Karumai Ammal and others (1980) 3 SCC 457 , Hon'ble Apex Court while observing that acquittal in a criminal case will not defeat the accident claim held that the requirement of culpable rashness under Section 304A of I.P.C.is more drastic than negligence sufficient under the law of tort to create liability. 12. In United India Insurance Company Ltd. Vs. Shila Dutta and others (2011)10 SCC 509 , a three Judges Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court culled out certain underlying principles and propositions for deciding claim petitions under the Act. Some of them as relevant to the facts of present case are : - 1. The rules of the pleadings in principle do not strictly apply as the claimant is required to make an application in a form prescribed under the Act. In fact, there is no pleading where the proceedings are suo moto initiated by the Tribunal. 2. That, though the Tribunal adjudicates on a claim and determines the compensation, it does not do so as in adversarial litigation. 3. The Tribunal is required to follow such summary procedure as it thinks fit. It may choose one or more persons possessing special knowledge of the matters relevant to inquiry, to assist it in holding the enquiry. 2. That, though the Tribunal adjudicates on a claim and determines the compensation, it does not do so as in adversarial litigation. 3. The Tribunal is required to follow such summary procedure as it thinks fit. It may choose one or more persons possessing special knowledge of the matters relevant to inquiry, to assist it in holding the enquiry. 4. The Tribunal while passing the award makes a statutory determination of compensation on the occurrence of an accident after due enquiry in accordance to the statute. 13. In Dulcina Fernandes and others Vs. Joaguim Xavier Cruz and another, (2013) 31 LCD 2432 , Hon'ble Supreme Court following the dictum laid down by it in Shila Dutta and Bimla Devi's Cases (Supra) held that the rules of pleadings do not strictly apply to motor accident claim cases and that the plea of negligence is required to be decided by the Tribunal on the touch stone of preponderance of probability and not on the basis of proof beyond reasonable doubt. 14. Turning to the facts of the instant case, it may be noticed that one of the main ground taken by the tribunal for rejecting the claim petition was that the final report was filed by the Police in the criminal case and no case was made out in the criminal side. But from perusal of record it is clear that the final report was filed by the Police in criminal case after 16 days of the delivery of the impugned award i.e. on 06.11.2013 while the award was delivered before as on 21.10.2013. The observation was made by the tribunal on the statement of the owner of the vehicle that the final report was filed in this case. In fact the final report was not in existence till the delivery of the impugned judgement, which raises several questions against the owner of the vehicle and about his connivance with Police. 15. The Tribunal while rejecting the claim petition disbelieved the statement of Krishna Pal PW3. The reliance of the tribunal on final report in rejecting the claim, which was not in existence till the date of the impugned judgement and award was wholly illegal. 15. The Tribunal while rejecting the claim petition disbelieved the statement of Krishna Pal PW3. The reliance of the tribunal on final report in rejecting the claim, which was not in existence till the date of the impugned judgement and award was wholly illegal. In order to reach to a conclusion as to whether the driver of the offending vehicle was negligent and the accident was caused by offending vehicle, the tribunal was required to appreciate the evidence available on record in the light of principles discussed above and to take holistic view of the matter particularly when the carbon copy of FIR and postmortem report was made available on record .The delay of two days in filing the FIR was not material since so much of time was necessary for the cremation etc. of the deceased. 16. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of the record of the case, we find force in the submission of the learned counsel for the appellants/claimants. 17. From perusal of the impugned judgment and award, it is clear that the Tribunal neither set out the facts of the case of the parties nor took note of the grounds raised by the claimants nor made any attempt to appreciate the evidence in the light of the settled legal principles applicable to the proceedings under M.V. Act as discussed above. 18. The appeal thus succeeds and is accordingly allowed. The impugned judgment and award dated 21.10.2013 is set aside. 19. As a necessary consequence, the case is remanded to the tribunal for deciding the appeal afresh on merits, keeping in view the principle of law quoted above. Needless to observe, the Tribunal will do so after affording an opportunity of hearing to both the parties in accordance with law on merits uninfluenced by our observations. We request the Tribunal to decide the claim preferably within six months. No costs.