JUDGMENT & ORDER : 1. This second appeal is directed against judgment and decree dated 06.07.2011 and 11.07.2011 respectively, passed by learned Addl. District Judge, Kamalpur, North Tripura in Title Appeal No.3 of 2010, whereunder the judgment and decree of dismissal dated 08.10.2010 passed by learned Civil Judge, Junior Division, Kamalpur, North Tripura in Title Suit No.7 of 2009 has been affirmed. 2. The second appeal against concurrent finding of the trial Court and the first appellate Court has been admitted for hearing by order dated 06.09.2011 passed by this Court on the following substantial question of law: “Whether in absence of any written statement, disputing the appellant’s claim of adverse possession for more than a statutory period and in view of the entries in Exbt. Nos.2 and 3(record of right), the learned Court below committed error by holding that the appellant do not hold the title in respect of the suit by way of adverse possession.” 3. The appellants as plaintiffs(hereinafter mentioned as plaintiffs) instituted Title Suit No.7 of 2009 in the Court of Civil Judge, Junior Division, Kamalpur against respondent Nos.1 to 5 and proforma-respondent No.6, Sukumar Saha, since deceased, who is substituted by the respondent No.6 to 6(1d)(hereinafter mentioned as defendants) seeking declaration that the plaintiffs and defendant No.6 become the joint owners and possessors of the suit land, and in the alternative a declaration of their right, title and interest in the suit land by way of adverse possession against the rightful owners, i.e. defendant Nos.1 to 5 and also prayed for permanent injunction restraining the defendant Nos.1 to 5 from interfering with their possession in any manner. 4. It is inter alia contended by the plaintiffs that Chaitanya Ch. Saha, father of the plaintiffs and defendant No.6 had been possessing the suit land exercising all acts of right, title and interest over the suit land, denying the title of the State defendants and that in Khatian No.1/113 of Mouja Kanchanpur which refers to Old Khatian No.111, the possession of Chaitanya Ch. Saha was recorded and that Khatian No.111 was finally published on 09.03.1965 and Khatian No.1/113 was published finally on 31.07.1986. That Chaitanya Ch. Saha was in possession till his death i.e. 26.06.2001. The plaintiffs being the daughters of Chaitanya Ch. Saha and the defendant No.6 being the son of said Chaitanya Ch. Saha was recorded and that Khatian No.111 was finally published on 09.03.1965 and Khatian No.1/113 was published finally on 31.07.1986. That Chaitanya Ch. Saha was in possession till his death i.e. 26.06.2001. The plaintiffs being the daughters of Chaitanya Ch. Saha and the defendant No.6 being the son of said Chaitanya Ch. Saha were entitled to continue in possession and that they were possessing the suit land for more than statutory period of limitation, denying the title of the rightful owner and therefore entitled to get the declaration as sought for. 5. The defendant Nos.1 to 5 did not appear and contest the suit and so the hearing was directed ex parte against them. 6. Defendant No.6 contested the suit by filing written statement contending that the plaintiffs were his full blood sisters and that they were given in marriage at Agartala and West Bengal in the year 1984 and 1988 respectively and there were no occasions for them to possess the suit land, denying the title of the rightful owner. From 1963 he has/had been possessing the suit land, denying the title of the State defendants and living on the suit land in his house and also doing business in the shop-hut. The plaintiffs never possessed the suit land exercising the act of hostile possession and so they are not entitled to get any decree as prayed by them. 7. The trial Court framed three issues, namely- “(i) Is the suit maintainable in its present form and nature? (ii) Are the plaintiffs in possession of the suit land adversely for a period more than 30 years till the filing of this suit against the defendant nos.1 to 5? If so, have the plaintiffs acquired right, title and interest over the suit land by adverse possession? (iii) To what relief/reliefs are the plaintiffs entitled?” 8. In the course of trial, the plaintiffs examined themselves as PWs 1 and 2 and also examined two more witnesses, namely PW3 Babul Saha and PW4 Dilip Sarkar. In support of their case the plaintiffs proved the following documents- (a) Exbt.2 Certified copy of Khatian No.111. (b) Exbt.3(series) Certified copy of Khatian No.1/113, (c) Exbt.1. Survivorship certificate, dated 18.09.2001, (d) Exbt.4. Death certificate of Chaitanya Chandra Saha. (e) Exbt.5. Notice under section 80, CPC. Defendant No.6 examined himself as DW1 and also examined two more witnesses, namely- DW2 Bidhu Bhushan Sharma and DW3 Uttam Adhikari. (b) Exbt.3(series) Certified copy of Khatian No.1/113, (c) Exbt.1. Survivorship certificate, dated 18.09.2001, (d) Exbt.4. Death certificate of Chaitanya Chandra Saha. (e) Exbt.5. Notice under section 80, CPC. Defendant No.6 examined himself as DW1 and also examined two more witnesses, namely- DW2 Bidhu Bhushan Sharma and DW3 Uttam Adhikari. 9. The trial Court decided the issues against the plaintiffs and dismissed the suit. 10. Aggrieved, the plaintiffs preferred Title Appeal No.3 of 2010 and by impugned judgment and decree dated 06.07.2011 the learned Addl. District Judge dismissed the appeal and hence this second appeal. 11. Heard learned counsel, Mrs. S. Deb(Gupta) for the plaintiff-appellants and learned senior counsel, Mr. P.K. Biswas, assisted by learned counsel, Mr. P. Majumder for the defendant-respondent Nos.6 to 6(1d) i.e. the legal heirs of defendant No.6. Learned counsel, Mr. N. Majumder appears on behalf of respondent Nos.1 to 5 but refrained from making any submission since those respondents did not contest the suit. 12. The plaintiffs instituted the suit seeking declaration of right, title and interest by way of adverse possession. Burden, therefore heavily lies on the plaintiffs to prove that they acquired title over the suit land by dint of their alleged hostile possession of the suit land for more than thirty years. It is the case of the plaintiffs that their father, Chaitanya Ch. Saha had been possessing the suit land and his possession has been recorded in Khatian No.111 and subsequent Khatian No.1/113 of Mouja Kanchanpur. The plaintiffs did not make any statement from which date their alleged possession to the suit land has turned to hostile possession. Their simple statement is that their father had been possessing the suit land and in the khatian it was recorded that their father was in illegal occupation of the suit land and therefore they being the daughters have acquired the right left by their father. The plaintiffs heavily relied on Exbts.1 and 2 i.e. Khatian No.111 and Khatian No.1/113 of Mouja Kanchanpur. The defendant No.6 asserted that the plaintiffs were given in marriage in the year 1984 and 1988 at Agartala and West Bengal respectively and they had/have been residing there with their family and never possessed the suit land denying the title of the rightful owner. The defendant No.6 asserted that the plaintiffs were given in marriage in the year 1984 and 1988 at Agartala and West Bengal respectively and they had/have been residing there with their family and never possessed the suit land denying the title of the rightful owner. According to defendant No.6, he is residing on the suit land in his permanent residence and doing business in the shop-hut denying the right, title and interest of the rightful owner i.e. the defendant Nos.1 to 5. 13. Learned counsel, Mrs. Deb(Gupta) has submitted that the possession of Chaitanya Ch. Saha over the suit land for more than statutory period of limitation has clearly been established. The plaintiffs being the daughters of Chaitanya Ch. Saha entitled to the right accrued in favour of their deceased father. According to learned counsel, Mrs. Deb(Gupta), marriages of the plaintiffs were solemnized in the year 1984 and 1988 respectively but they continued their possession by visiting the suit land time to time and they used to reside also in a part of the suit land while visiting it from their matrimonial homes. The oral evidence adduced by the plaintiffs and her witnesses has not at all been considered by the learned trial Judge and therefore the judgment was supposed to be interfered by the appellate Court but the appellate Court also arrived at a wrong and perverse finding. She has also submitted that defendant No.6 was minor at the time when Exbts.1 and 2 were prepared in the name of Chaitanya Ch. Saha. So the claim of defendant No.6 that he alone had been possessing the suit land adversely does not stand. The plaintiffs after their marriage left the parental home but they being the legal heirs inherited the right left by their father which cannot be stolen by defendant No.6, their full-blood brother. The plaintiffs therefore prayed for declaration of their right, title and interest by way of adverse possession and since the principal defendants i.e. the rightful owners of the suit land did not contest the claim of the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs are entitled to get the declaration of title by adverse possession. It is also submitted by learned counsel, Mrs. Deb(Gupta) that possession does not mean that the plaintiffs must remain in the suit land for twenty four hours. It is also submitted by learned counsel, Mrs. Deb(Gupta) that possession does not mean that the plaintiffs must remain in the suit land for twenty four hours. After marriage, they are living in their respective matrimonial homes but since their full blood brother i.e. defendant No.6 residing in the suit land they by visiting the suit land continued their possession and therefore they are equally entitled to the suit land with defendant No.6. 14. Possession must be distinguished from mere occupation or detention. Possession in the eye of law consists of the fact of physical occupation and dominion and control as well as the consciousness of mind of the person having dominion over an object that he has it and can exercise it. The unity of two elements, namely, occupation and animus possidendi is recognized as constituting “possession” in the eye of law. Possession is a flexible term and is not restricted to mere occupation. Legal possession is occupation with the intention of exercising the right of ownership in respect of it. Mere acts of user which do not interfere and are consistent with the owner’s title, are not sufficient to constitute dispossession of the owner or start adverse possession in favour of the occupant. Whether in particular circumstances, the acts of the occupation means to possession and whether such possession is on behalf of the legal owner or in opposition to his title are matters of inference to be drawn from proved facts. 15. The concept of ‘adverse possession’ contemplates a hostile possession i.e. a possession which is expressly or impliedly in denial of the title of the true owner. Possession to be adverse must be possession by a person who does not acknowledge the others right but denies them. The principle of law is firmly established that a person who bases his title on adverse possession must show by clear and unequivocal evidence that his possession was hostile to the real owner and amounted to a denial of his title to the property claimed. For deciding whether the alleged acts of a person constituted adverse possession, the animus of the person doing those acts is the most crucial factor. Here, burden lies on the plaintiff to prove that his possession is hostile under a colour of title, actual, open, uninterrupted, notorious, exclusive and continuous. For deciding whether the alleged acts of a person constituted adverse possession, the animus of the person doing those acts is the most crucial factor. Here, burden lies on the plaintiff to prove that his possession is hostile under a colour of title, actual, open, uninterrupted, notorious, exclusive and continuous. Adverse possession is made out by the coexistence of two distinguished ingredients; first, such a title as will afford colour, and second, such possession under it as will be adverse to the right of the true owner and title by adverse possession becomes complete only when the possession of the trespasser continues uninterruptedly for a full statutory period. 16. This High Court in the case of Basanta Kumar Ghosh v. Premananda Nama reported in (2014) 2 TLR 83 in para 24 held thus- “24. Learned counsel also referred the decisions of the Gauhati High Court in the case of Jamila Begum & Ors. V. Sudhir Chandra Paul and Ors., reported in (2013) 1 TLR 896 and the case of Tapasi Rani Das & Ors. V. Sajal Das, reported in (2013) 2 TLR 992. Both the judgments were scribed by me (S. C. Das, J.). In both the cases, it has been held that by “adverse possession” is meant possession which is hostile, under a claim or colour of title, actual, open uninterrupted, notorious, exclusive and continuous. Adverse possession is made out by the co-existence of two distinct ingredients: first, such a title as will afford colour, and second, such possession under it as will be adverse to the right of the true owner and title by adverse possession becomes complete only when the possession of the trespasser continues uninterruptedly for the full statutory period. In both the reported decisions the nature of possession, which should be considered as adverse possession has been categorically discussed.” 17. In the case of Gopal Krishna Deb & Ors. v. Jagadindra Kishore Dev Barma & Ors., reported in AIR 1954 Tripura 21, the Court has held that to prove title to any land by adverse possession it is not sufficient to show that some acts of possession have been done. The possession required must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and in extent to show that it is adverse to the owner. The possession required must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and in extent to show that it is adverse to the owner. In other words, the possession must be actual, visible, exclusive, hostile and continued during the time necessary to create a bar under the statute of limitation. In the facts of that particular case, the Court has held that where the defendants had remained in permissive possession for a few years and their application for the land being settled to them was rejected and they had prayed for time to vacate on account of rainy season but they did not plead adverse possession they could not be deemed to be in adverse possession as against the real owner and the real owner would be deemed to have remained in possession. 18. In the case of Vasantiben Prahladji Nayak & Ors. v. Somnath Muljibhai Nayak & Ors. reported in (2004) 3 SCC 376 the Supreme Court has held thus :- “To establish ouster in cases involving claim of adverse possession the defendant has to prove three elements namely, hostile intention; long and uninterrupted possession; and exercise of the right of exclusive ownership openly and to the knowledge of the owner. In cases of adverse possession, the starting point of limitation does not commence from the date when the right of ownership arises to the plaintiff but it commences from the date when the defendant’s possession became adverse.” 19. In the case of S.M. Karim v. Mst. Bibi Sakina, reported in AIR 1964 SC 1254 , the Supreme Court has held that the claim of adverse possession must be clearly pleaded. The Court has held that adverse possession must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and extent and a plea is required at the least to show when possession becomes adverse so that the starting point of limitation against the party affected can be found. 20. Referring to S.M. Karim(supra), the Supreme Court in Balkrishan v. Satyaprakash reported in (2001) 2 SCC 498 in para 7 has observed thus- “7. The law with regard to perfecting title by adverse possession is well settled. A person claiming title by adverse possession has to prove three nec-nec vi, nec clam and nec precario. In other words, he must show that his possession is adequate in continuity, in publicity and in extent. The law with regard to perfecting title by adverse possession is well settled. A person claiming title by adverse possession has to prove three nec-nec vi, nec clam and nec precario. In other words, he must show that his possession is adequate in continuity, in publicity and in extent. In S.M. Karim v. Bibi Sakina : AIR 1964 SC 1254 speaking for this Court Hidayatullah, J.(as he then was) observed thus: “Adverse possession must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and extent and a plea is required at the least to show when possession becomes adverse so that the starting point of limitation against the party affected can be found.” 21. The plaintiffs neither in their pleadings nor in their evidence made any statement as to from which date their claim of adverse possession started against the rightful owners. They based their claim on the basis of the entries made in the khatian in the name of their father, Chaitanya Ch. Saha. The basis of their claim is their right of inheritance. So the question to be decided is whether the right which Chaitanya Ch. Saha had acquired during his lifetime in respect of the suit land vested on the plaintiffs or not even after their leaving the suit land, after their marriage. No doubt, right of inheritance is a natural right. The plaintiffs are entitled to step to the shoes of their father in respect of all the properties left behind by their father. It is their birth right. They are equally entitled to all the properties left behind by their father in equal share with defendant No.6. But to have this share they have to prove that the property left behind by their father was a property to which they are entitled to step in. 22. Mere entry in the khatian as an unlawful occupier does not necessarily mean that Chaitanya Ch. Saha acquired a right of claiming title by adverse possession. The basis of the plaintiffs’ claim is simply the entries made in Exbts. 1 and 2. In Exbts. 1 and 2, unlawful occupation of the suit land has been recorded in the name of Chaitanya Ch. Saha. During the lifetime of Chaitanya Ch. Saha he did not get any declaration of his right, title and interest by way of adverse possession. Therefore, simply depending on the entries made in the khatians(Exbts. 1 and 2. In Exbts. 1 and 2, unlawful occupation of the suit land has been recorded in the name of Chaitanya Ch. Saha. During the lifetime of Chaitanya Ch. Saha he did not get any declaration of his right, title and interest by way of adverse possession. Therefore, simply depending on the entries made in the khatians(Exbts. 1 and 2) the plaintiffs cannot establish their right to have a declaration from a Court of their having claim of adverse possession. 23. The Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar reported in AIR 2012 SC 559 relying on its earlier decision reported in Hemaji Waghaji Jat v. Bhikhabhai Khengarbhai Harijan & Ors. reported in (2009) 16 SCC 517 has elaborately discussed the law of adverse possession. We may gainfully refer here paragraphs 35, 39 and 42 to 51 of the judgment which read as follows: “35. A person pleading adverse possession has no equities in his favour since he is trying to defeat the rights of the true owner. It is for him to clearly plead and establish all facts necessary to establish adverse possession. Though we got this law of adverse possession from the British, it is important to note that these days English Courts are taking a very negative view towards the law of adverse possession. The English law was amended and changed substantially to reflect these changes, particularly in light of the view that property is a human right adopted by the European Commission. This Court in Revamma ( AIR 2007 SC 1753 ) (supra) observed that to understand the true nature of adverse possession, Fairweather v. St Marylebone Property Co [1962] 2 WLR 1020 : [1962] 2 All ER 288 can be considered where House of Lords referring to Taylor v. Twinberrow [1930] 2 K.B. 16, termed adverse possession as a negative and consequential right effected only because somebody else's positive right to access the court is barred by operation of law. As against the rights of the paper-owner, in the context of adverse possession, there evolves a set of competing rights in favour of the adverse possessor who has, for a long period of time, cared for the land, developed it, as against the owner of the property who has ignored the property. 39. As against the rights of the paper-owner, in the context of adverse possession, there evolves a set of competing rights in favour of the adverse possessor who has, for a long period of time, cared for the land, developed it, as against the owner of the property who has ignored the property. 39. In Hemaji Waghaji Jat case ( AIR 2009 SC 103 ),, this Court ultimately observed as under: "32. Before parting with this case, we deem it appropriate to observe that the law of adverse possession which ousts an owner on the basis of inaction within limitation is irrational, illogical and wholly disproportionate. The law as it exists is extremely harsh for the true owner and a windfall for a dishonest person who had illegally taken possession of the property of the true owner. The law ought not to benefit a person who in a clandestine manner takes possession of the property of the owner in contravention of law. This in substance would mean that the law gives seal of approval to the illegal action or activities of a rank trespasser or who had wrongfully taken possession of the property of the true owner. 33. We fail to comprehend why the law should place premium on dishonesty by legitimising possession of a rank trespasser and compelling the owner to lose his possession only because of his inaction in taking back the possession within limitation." Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution - a principle of a civilized society. 42. We inherited this law of adverse possession from the British. The Parliament may consider abolishing the law of adverse possession or at least amending and making substantial changes in law in the larger public interest. The Government instrumentalities - including the police - in the instant case have attempted to possess land adversely. This, in our opinion, a testament to the absurdity of the law and a black mark upon the justice system's legitimacy. The Government should protect the property of a citizen - not steal it. And yet, as the law currently stands, they may do just that. If this law is to be retained, according to the wisdom of the Parliament, then at least the law must require those who adversely possess land to compensate title owners according to the prevalent market rate of the land or property in question. And yet, as the law currently stands, they may do just that. If this law is to be retained, according to the wisdom of the Parliament, then at least the law must require those who adversely possess land to compensate title owners according to the prevalent market rate of the land or property in question. This alternative would provide some semblance of justice to those who have done nothing other than sitting on their rights for the statutory period, while allowing the adverse possessor to remain on property. While it may be indefensible to require all adverse possessors - some of whom may be poor - to pay market rates for the land they possess, perhaps some lesser amount would be realistic in most of the cases. The Parliament may either fix a set range of rates or to leave it to the judiciary with the option of choosing from within a set range of rates so as to tailor the compensation to the equities of a given case. 43. The Parliament must seriously consider at least to abolish "bad faith" adverse possession, i.e., adverse possession achieved through intentional trespassing. Actually believing it to be their own could receive title through adverse possession sends a wrong signal to the society at large. Such a change would ensure that only those who had established attachments to the land through honest means would be entitled to legal relief. 44. In case, the Parliament decides to retain the law of adverse possession, the Parliament might simply require adverse possession claimants to possess the property in question for a period of 30 to 50 years, rather than a mere 12. Such an extension would help to ensure that successful claimants have lived on the land for generations, and are therefore less likely to be individually culpable for the trespass (although their forebears might). A longer statutory period would also decrease the frequency of adverse possession suits and ensure that only those claimants most intimately connected with the land acquire it, while only the most passive and unprotective owners lose title. 45. Reverting to the facts of this case, if the Police department of the State with all its might is bent upon taking possession of any land or building in a clandestine manner, then, perhaps no one would be able to effectively prevent them. 46. 45. Reverting to the facts of this case, if the Police department of the State with all its might is bent upon taking possession of any land or building in a clandestine manner, then, perhaps no one would be able to effectively prevent them. 46. It is our bounden duty and obligation to ascertain the intention of the Parliament while interpreting the law. Law and Justice, more often than not, happily coincide only rarely we find serious conflict. The archaic law of adverse possession is one such. A serious re-look is absolutely imperative in the larger interest of the people. 47. Adverse possession allows a trespasser - a person guilty of a tort, or even a crime, in the eyes of law - to gain legal title to land which he has illegally possessed for 12 years. How 12 years of illegality can suddenly be converted to legal title is, logically and morally speaking, baffling. This outmoded law essentially asks the judiciary to place its stamp of approval upon conduct that the ordinary Indian citizen would find reprehensible. 48. The doctrine of adverse possession has troubled a great many legal minds. We are clearly of the opinion that time has come for change. 49. If the protectors of law become the grabbers of the property (land and building), then, people will be left with no protection and there would be a total anarchy in the entire country. 50. It is indeed a very disturbing and dangerous trend. In our considered view, it must be arrested without further loss of time in the larger public interest. No Government Department, Public Undertaking, and much less the Police Department should be permitted to perfect the title of the land or building by invoking the provisions of adverse possession and grab the property of its own citizens in the manner that has been done in this case. 51. In our considered view, there is an urgent need for a fresh look of the entire law on adverse possession. We recommend the Union of India to immediately consider and seriously deliberate either abolition of the law of adverse possession and in the alternate to make suitable amendments in the law of adverse possession. A copy of this judgment be sent to the Secretary, Ministry of Law and Justice, Department of Legal Affairs, Government of India for taking appropriate steps in accordance with law.” 24. A copy of this judgment be sent to the Secretary, Ministry of Law and Justice, Department of Legal Affairs, Government of India for taking appropriate steps in accordance with law.” 24. In the case of Gurdwara Sahib v. Gram Panchayat Village Sirthala reported in (2014) 1 SCC 669 , the Supreme Court has taken note of its earlier decision in Hemaji Waghaji Jat(supra) as well as Mukesh Kumar(supra) and observed thus- “8. There cannot be any quarrel to this extent that the judgments of the courts below are correct and without any blemish. Even if the plaintiff is found to be in adverse possession, it cannot seek a declaration to the effect that such adverse possession has matured into ownership. Only if proceedings are filed against the appellant and the appellant is arrayed as defendant that it can use this adverse possession as a shield/defence.” 25. The law of limitation has not been changed and/or amended as yet though there is consistent observation of the Apex Court from 2009 onwards. Section 27 of the Limitation Act prescribes the extinguishment of right to property at the determination of the period limited by the Limitation Act. As discussed hereinbefore, heavy burden lies on a person who claims extinguishment of the title of rightful owner by dint of hostile possession. The hostile possession must be adequate in continuity and exclusive. The plaintiffs simply claimed their right referring to their inheritance but could not prove their possession for a period of thirty years with all adequacy, continuity and exclusiveness. Since their father did not acquire a title by adverse possession they cannot claim title over the suit land by way of adverse possession which their father did not acquire. The father of the plaintiffs died on 26.06.2001. The plaintiffs failed to prove that before his death he acquired title by adverse possession. Even the plaintiffs did not make any statement in their pleadings or in their deposition as to from which date their father exerted the possession, denying title of the rightful owner. The entry made in the khatian by itself cannot prove that Chaitanya Ch. Saha had been possessing the suit land denying the title of the rightful owner. Even the plaintiffs did not make any statement in their pleadings or in their deposition as to from which date their father exerted the possession, denying title of the rightful owner. The entry made in the khatian by itself cannot prove that Chaitanya Ch. Saha had been possessing the suit land denying the title of the rightful owner. No doubt, the entry made in the khatian has a presumptive value of correctness until otherwise is proved but in a case of claim of adverse possession it would support the claim of the person whose name entered in the khatian and for such an entry the successor of that person cannot automatically claim title by adverse possession. 26. Learned counsel, Mrs. Deb(Gupta) has rightly submitted that the trial Court did not discuss the oral evidence adduced by the plaintiffs, but as I find the appellate Court taken into consideration the oral evidence adduced by both side. 27. Since there is a concurrent finding of two courts, this Court in the second appeal shall not interfere in the concurrent finding, unless it is found that the finding is absolutely perverse. The substantial question of law what has been formulated cannot be termed as a substantial question of law as argued by learned senior counsel, Mr. Biswas. 28. In the context of Section 100 of CPC, any question of law which affects the final decision in a case is a substantial question of law as between the parties. A question of law while arising incidentally or collaterally cannot be termed as a substantial question of law. Where there is a clear and settled enunciation on a question of law by the High Court or by the Apex Court, it cannot be said that the case involves a substantial question of law. It is said that a substantial question of law arises when a question of law, which is not finally settled by the Apex Court or by the concerned High Court, arises for consideration in the case. The substantial question of law formulated in this second appeal cannot be legally termed as a substantial question of law; rather it is simply a question of fact with some sorts of reference to the doctrine of adverse possession. 29. Learned counsel, Mrs. The substantial question of law formulated in this second appeal cannot be legally termed as a substantial question of law; rather it is simply a question of fact with some sorts of reference to the doctrine of adverse possession. 29. Learned counsel, Mrs. Deb(Gupta) has submitted that perversity is a substantial question of law and since the trial Court did not discuss the evidence on record, the judgment suffers from perversity. She has also submitted that the appellate Court has also not properly considered the evidence and therefore the same principle may be applied. No doubt, perversity is a substantial question of law to be considered in a second appeal. Perversity in respect of the appreciation of evidence may be termed that the trial Court or the appellate Court arrived at a finding not at all based on the pleadings or evidence of the parties or that the courts below arrived at a finding which is contrary to the pleadings and evidence on record. Unfortunately, in the present case, the plaintiff-appellants failed to show that the concurrent finding of both the Courts below is contrary to the pleadings and evidence on record. I am in agreement with the learned counsel, Mrs. Deb(Gupta) that the trial Court did not discuss the evidence on record and simply has taken note of the exhibited documents but the appellate Court, as I find, discussed the evidence on record and arrived at a concurrent finding with the trial Court and therefore I am of considered opinion that the finding of the Courts below cannot be termed as a perverse finding. Unless there is a clear substantial question of law, I think a second appeal should not be admitted for hearing. I may gainfully refer here paragraph 70 of the judgment passed by the Apex Court passed in Gurdev Kaur and Ors. V. Kaki & Ors. reported in (2007) 1 SCC 546 which reads as follows: “Now, after 1976 amendment, the scope of Section 100 has been drastically curtailed and narrowed down. The High Courts would have jurisdiction of interfering under Section 100 CPC only in a case where substantial questions of law are involved and those questions have been clearly formulated in the memorandum of appeal. The High Courts would have jurisdiction of interfering under Section 100 CPC only in a case where substantial questions of law are involved and those questions have been clearly formulated in the memorandum of appeal. At the time of admission of the second appeal, it is the bounden duty and obligation of the High Court to formulate substantial questions of law and then only the High Court is permitted to proceed with the case to decide those questions of law. The language used in the amended section specifically incorporates the words as "substantial question of law" which is indicative of the legislative intention. It must be clearly understood that the legislative intention was very clear that legislature never wanted second appeal to become "third trial on facts" or "one more dice in the gamble". The effect of the amendment mainly, according to the amended section, was: (i) The High Court would be justified in admitting the second appeal only when a substantial question of law is involved; (ii) The substantial question of law to precisely state such question; (iii) A duty has been cast on the High Court to formulate substantial question of law before hearing the appeal; (iv) Another part of the section is that the appeal shall be heard only on that question.” I am also inspired to refer paragraph 61 of the judgment which reads thus: “61. In the Fifty-fourth Report of the Law Commission of India, it is incorporated that it may be permissible to point out that a search for absolute truth in the administration of justice, however, laudable, must in the very nature of things be put under some reasonable restraint. In other words, a search for truth has to be reconciled with the doctrine of finality. In judicial hierarchy finality is absolutely important because that gives certainty to the law. Even in the interest of litigants themselves it may not be unreasonable to draw a line in respect of the two different categories of litigation where procedure will say at a certain stage that questions of fact have been decided by the lower courts and the matter should be allowed to rest where it lies without any further appeal. This may be somewhat harsh to an individual litigant; but, in the larger interest of the administration of justice, this view seems to us to be juristically sound and pragmatically wise. This may be somewhat harsh to an individual litigant; but, in the larger interest of the administration of justice, this view seems to us to be juristically sound and pragmatically wise. It is the light of the basic approach that we will now proceed to consider some of the cases which were decided more than a century ago.” 30. I am of considered opinion that the plaintiffs filed to prove their claim on adverse possession to the suit land and hence they are not entitled to get a decree of declaration of their right, title and interest by way of adverse possession. 31. The appeal accordingly stands dismissed with costs. 32. Send back the L.C. records along with a copy of this judgment.