JUDGMENT: By this petition, the petitioner (original defendant) is challenging the judgment and order dated 27/7/2015 passed by the learned District Judge at Ponda in Misc. Civil Appeal No.130/2014. By the impugned judgment the learned District Judge has allowed the appeal, thus partly granting the application for temporary injunction filed by the respondents/plaintiffs. The petitioner is restrained from dumping slack in part of the suit property. 2. The brief facts are that the respondent has filed the aforesaid suit against the petitioners for a declaration that the document dated 7/2/2008 is forged, illegal and without any legal sanctity. The respondent is seeking a decree for possession of a distinct portion of the suit property admeasuring 7400 which is marked by letters A,B,P,Q,R,S and H at Exhibit “C” and for an injunction restraining the petitioners or anybody on their behalf, from illegally dumping slack or any other waste material in the aforesaid portion of suit property admeasuring 7400 sq.mtrs and for a permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the petitioner or anybody on their behalf from interfering in the suit property in any manner. 3. The case made out in the plaint is that there is a larger property bearing survey no.472 at village Madkai, Ponda, Goa, which is owned by the respondents, which is admeasuring 1,20,250 sq.mtrs. Out of this, an area admeasuring 89,850 sq.mtrs was acquired for the purposes of the Industrial Development Corporation. The suit property is towards the eastern side of the larger property. The petitioners who are running an industry on plot no.E-6 is to the western side of the area which is left out from survey no.472 after acquisition. The case made in the plaint is that the petitioner no.1 has unauthorizedly carried out encroachment in the suit property to the extent of 7400 sq.mtrs where the petitioners are dumping slack generated out of its industrial operation. 4. The respondent nos.2 and 3 herein are the original defendants nos2 and 3 before the trial Court. The petitioner claims that it is in lawful and peaceful possession of the land admeasuring 27,000 sq.mtrs from out of survey no.472 and the petitioner has acquired lease hold rights over the same by obtaining final possession which is duly signed by the Attorney of the respondent no.1. The petitioner claims that it is in lawful and peaceful possession of the land admeasuring 27,000 sq.mtrs from out of survey no.472 and the petitioner has acquired lease hold rights over the same by obtaining final possession which is duly signed by the Attorney of the respondent no.1. It is contended that although the said land adeamsuring 27000 sq.mtrs has not still been used for any business activity, “sometimes the by-product namely slack is stored on the plot which slack is being sold to the independent contractors. It is contended that the petitioner has obtained lease hold rights over 27000 sq.mtrs of land by following due process of law for “rent price” of Rs.4,53,600/-sq.mtrs, which is acknowledged by Shri Nilesh Kamat, respondent no.3 herein. It is contended that the petitioner having obtained lawful possession of the property on payment of the “rent price” the respondent no.1 is not entitled to any order of temporary injunction. 5. The learned trial Court by order dated 17/10/2014 had dismissed the application for temporary injunction on the ground that the documents produced show that the petitioner is in possession of 27000 sq.mtrs of land since the year 2008 upon payment of the necessary rent which has been received by the respondent no.1. In so far as the challenge to the genuineness of allotment in favour of the petitioner is concerned, the learned trial Court had found that at the stage of grant of temporary injunction the Court has to take the documents on the face of it and cannot go into the legality or illegality of the same “which are required to be proved at the time of evidence”. In short, the learned trial court found that the petitioner has been put in possession of the land, notwithstanding the challenge to the genuineness and legality of the documents which can be gone at the trial. In that view of the matter, the application for temporary injunction came to be rejected. 6. The Appellate Court framed three points, namely, i) whether the suit is properly instituted (ii) whether the relief sought by the respondent no.1 is hit by the principles of delay and laches? (iii) whether the respondent no.1 has established three principles for grant of temporary and mandatory injunction. The learned District Judge has answered the points no.(i) and (iii) in the affirmative and point no.(ii) in the negative. 7. (iii) whether the respondent no.1 has established three principles for grant of temporary and mandatory injunction. The learned District Judge has answered the points no.(i) and (iii) in the affirmative and point no.(ii) in the negative. 7. In so far as the question of delay and laches is concerned, the learned District Judge has found that the act of dumping of slack is continuous and although the cause of action for filing the suit is shown to have accrued for the first time in November 2008, the suit came to be filed within three years (erroneously recorded as three months) of the same. The learned District Judge has found that the cause of action also arose on 21/8/2009 and 27/11/2009 and as such the relief is not hit on account of delay and laches. 8. In so far as merits are concerned the learned District Judge has found that admittedly, there is no document of lease in favour of the petitioner and even if there was any such document, it could not have been executed by respondent nos.2 and 3 alone, who were working for respondent no.1. The learned District Judge has then found that the procedure as contemplated in Articles 317 to 324 of Code of Communidade (which were required to be followed while granting the property on long term lease) has not been followed and the petitioner cannot take advantage of any such grant in their favour. The learned District Judge also found that under the Indian Registration Act, any such document is required to be registered and therefore the document cannot be relied upon. In that view of the matter, the appeal has been partly allowed, restraining the petitioner from dumping slack in the area excluding 7400 sq.mts.. 9. I have heard Shri Pangam, the learned counsel for the petitioner and Shri Usgaonkar the learned counsel appearing or the respondents. With the assistance of the learned counsel for the parties, I have perused the impugned orders and the relevant record. 10. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the cause of action in the suit is shown to have accrued in November 2008, while the suit is filed in March 2011. It is submitted that on account of the delay and laches the respondent no.1 was not entitled to the grant of temporary injunction. 10. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the cause of action in the suit is shown to have accrued in November 2008, while the suit is filed in March 2011. It is submitted that on account of the delay and laches the respondent no.1 was not entitled to the grant of temporary injunction. The learned counsel has thereafter referred to the various documents including the document of delivery of formal possession, executed on 10/12/2007. It is submitted that once it is prima facie shown that the petitioner is in possession of the disputed land, injunction could not have been granted. The learned counsel submitted that the trial Court was right in observing that the legality of the document under which the petitioner has been granted the land, cannot be gone into at the stage of temporary injunction. The learned counsel submitted that admittedly the petitioner has paid the “rent price” of Rs.4,53,600/-which has been deposited in the account of the respondent no.1 about which there cannot be any dispute. He submits that the impugned order has the effect of dispossessing the petitioner at the interim stage. The learned counsel has pointed out that an artificial distinction is being made out in respect of a portion of the land admeasuring 7400 sq.mtrs and the remaining land when the petitioner has been placed in possession of the entire land admeasuring 27000 sq.mtrs. The learned counsel has placed reliance on the decision in the case of Wander Ltd. And Another Vs. Antox India P. Ltd., 1990 (Supp.) SCC 727, in order to submit that the appellate Court ought not have interfered with the exercise of discretion of the Court of first instance and substitute its own, unless the discretion is shown to have been exercised arbitrarily or in a perverse manner. It is submitted that an appeal against exercise of discretion is said to be an appeal on principle and the appellate Court cannot reassess the material and to reach a conclusion different from the one reached by the court below. He therefore submits that the appellate Court was not justified in reversing the order of the learned trial Court. 11. On the contrary, Shri Usgaonkar, the learned Senior Counsel for the respondent no.1 has submitted that the petitioner had applied for a permanent lease. He therefore submits that the appellate Court was not justified in reversing the order of the learned trial Court. 11. On the contrary, Shri Usgaonkar, the learned Senior Counsel for the respondent no.1 has submitted that the petitioner had applied for a permanent lease. The learned Senior counsel points out that under the Code of Comunidade, the respondent no.1 can grant a short term lease (Article 291), a long term lease (Article 317) and a 'Afromento', which is permanent lease under Article 324 of the Code. It is submitted that though the learned District Judge has referred to provisions of Article 317 to 324, the Article applicable would be Article 324 onwards of Chapter 6. The learned Senior Counsel has taken me through the various Articles in order to point out that the procedure as laid down has not been followed in this case. In so far as the payment of “rent price” is concerned, it is submitted that it is deposited in a newly opened account in Sarswat branch at Ponda. The learned Senior Counsel has pointed out that under the Code of Comundiade the respondent no1. cannot grant any land for business/commercial purpose, and such a such grant can only be for residential or agricultural purposes. It is submitted that the respondent nos. 2 and 3 without any authority and out of collusion, had executed certain documents which have no legal effect. It is submitted that the ultimate order of grant has to be by the Government as the Commundiade works under the tutelage of the Government. 12. The learned Senior Counsel has then referred to the written statements submitted by the respondent nos.2 and 3 in which they are casting aspersions on each other of a fraud having been committed. It is submitted that the respondent nos.2 and 3 have been placed under suspension and this is a case in which the respondent nos.2 and 3 out of collusion and in breach of the provisions of the Code of Commundiade have brought into existence certain documents which are void abinitio and without any legal effect. It is submitted that this was not a case where the examination of the legality of the documents required any detailed inquiry and the Court was only supposed to look to the provisions of Article 324 onwards of Chapter 6 of the Code. It is submitted that this was not a case where the examination of the legality of the documents required any detailed inquiry and the Court was only supposed to look to the provisions of Article 324 onwards of Chapter 6 of the Code. It is submitted that it was necessary for the petitioner to have prima facie shown that he has been legally put into possession and mere factual possession would not entitle the petitioner to grant of temporary injunction as has been rightly held by the learned District Judge. 13. In so far as delay and laches are concerned, it is contended that the discharge of the slack is a continuing wrong. It is submitted that when the so called grant in favour of the petitioner is ex facia illegal, the consideration of delay and laches may not come in the way. The learned Senior Counsel submits that the trial in the suit has commenced and this Court may not interfere with the impugned order passed. 14. On hearing the learned counsel for the parties I do not find that nay case for interference is made out. 15. Respondent no.1/Comunidade is governed by the Code of Comunidades which is statutory in nature. Elaborate provisions are made for grant of lands owned by the Comunidade on a short term lease, a long term and an 'Aformento' or 'emhyteusis', which is a permanent lease. Under Article 324, an 'Aformento', can be granted in respect of uncultivated and undeveloped lands belonging to the Comunidade and even the ones cultivated of vegetables, when required for the cultivation of rice, fruit-bearing trees or for the construction of houses. It has not been brought to my notice, that land belonging to the Comunidade can be leased out for a commercial purpose. Such a grant can only be after a public auction, as provided for under Article 324. Under Article 335 after the auction is conducted the secretary of the administration is required to forward the file to the Administrator, who with his remarks shall send it to the Directorate of Civil Administration Services. The ultimate order of grant is of the Government which is having supervisory control over the affairs of the Comunidade. Prima facie at this stage none of these requirements are shown to be compiled with. The respondents nos.2 and 3 are attributing fraud in grant of the land to each other. The ultimate order of grant is of the Government which is having supervisory control over the affairs of the Comunidade. Prima facie at this stage none of these requirements are shown to be compiled with. The respondents nos.2 and 3 are attributing fraud in grant of the land to each other. Be that as it may, it would neither be necessary nor appropriate to record any final conclusion on the issues as the suit is still pending before the trial court. For the present purpose it is not possible to act on the basis of the document under which the petitioner claims to have obtained the possession. At the stage of consideration of an application for temporary injunction, prima facie possession has to be established, which has some semblance, with the right to obtain and retain such possession. The impugned order in fact strikes a balance by restraining the petitioner from dumping slack only in the remaining portion of the suit property (excluding 7400 sq.mtrs.). In such circumstances I am not inclined to entertain the challenge in the exercise of the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court as the impugned order does not suffer from any infirmity. The submission that the learned District Judge could not have interfered with the discretion of the trial Court cannot be accepted, as the exercise of discretion by the trial Court in rejecting the application for temporary injunction cannot be said to be legal and proper. The Court could not have been oblivious of the statutory provisions as contained in the Code of Comunidade. In the result the petition is dismissed with no order as to costs. Needless to mention that the trial court shall decide the suit on its own merits without being influenced by any of the observations made herein which are essentially of a prima facie nature.