JUDGMENT AND ORDER : 1. Heard Shri H.S. Paonam, the learned Senior Advocate assisted by Shri N. Bipin, the learned counsels appearing for the petitioner; Shri S. Nepolean, the learned Government Advocate appearing for the State respondents and Shri M. Devananda, the learned counsel appearing for the private respondent. 2. The instant writ petition has been filed by the petitioner questioning the validity and correctness of the impugned order dated 21-07-2016 by which he has been repatriated to his parent department as OSD/LDA, Manipur during the tenure of his deputation. 3.1. According to the petitioner, while he was serving as Superintending Engineer, he was appointed as Project Director, Loktak Development Authority vide order dated 17-06-2006 issued by the Chairman, Loktak Development Authority and after having served as Project Director for more than three years, his service was utilized as OSD/LDA. At that time, the petitioner came to know that a full time Chief Engineer was needed in the Engineering Wing, Department of Education(S), Government of Manipur on deputation and accordingly, he submitted an application to the concerned authority of the Department of Forest and Environment, Government of Manipur about his willingness to apply for the said post in case such proposal came from the Education Department. The Department of Forest and Environment conveyed ‘No-objection’, vide its letter dated 23-12-2013 addressed to the Principal Secretary (Education), to the proposed deputation of the petitioner as the Chief Engineer in Engineering Wing, Education Department on the condition that his pay and allowance be paid by the Education Department. 3.2. The Education Department(S) vide its order dated 17-01-2014 appointed the petitioner as the Chief Engineer on deputation for a period of two years with immediate effect stating therein that the conditions of his deputation would be governed by the O.M. dated 18-08-1982 issued by the Department of Personnel, Government of Manipur. The said order was issued by the Education Department(S) in consultation with the Departments of Personnel and Forest & Environment, Government of Manipur and consequent upon the issuance of the said order dated 17-01-2014, the petitioner took charge of the Chief Engineer and discharged his duties and responsibilities with utmost sincerity and dedication to the satisfaction of the concerned authority. The said order was issued by the Education Department(S) in consultation with the Departments of Personnel and Forest & Environment, Government of Manipur and consequent upon the issuance of the said order dated 17-01-2014, the petitioner took charge of the Chief Engineer and discharged his duties and responsibilities with utmost sincerity and dedication to the satisfaction of the concerned authority. After having satisfied with his performance, the petitioner’s term of deputation was extended for another period of one year i.e., from 17-01-2016 to 16-01-2017 vide order dated 08-02-2016 issued by the Education Department (S). 3.3. To his shock and surprise, the petitioner came to know that the Education Department(S) issued the impugned order dated 21-07-2016 for purpose of utilizing the service of the Private respondent herein as the Chief Engineer, Engineering Wing of the Education Department (S) and consequent thereupon, the petitioner was repatriated to his parent department as OSD/LDA but since no formal order was communicated to the petitioner till then, he did not hand over the charge to the private respondent. Being aggrieved by the impugned order dated 21-07-2016, the instant writ petition had been filed by the petitioner on the inter alia grounds that his term of deputation was shortened without assigning any reason and also without obtaining his consent; that the replacement of the petitioner by the private respondent who is substantively holding 2 or 3 post lower to the petitioner, is smacked with vice of arbitrariness and amounts to colourable exercise of power; that while issuing the impugned order, the Education Department(S) has not consulted with the Department of Personnel as required under the law; that the issuance of the impugned order is smacked with vice of malafide for the reason that the petitioner was to be relieved from the post with immediate effect and that the premature repatriation which cast stigma on the petitioner, would affect his future prospects. 4. The stand of the State of Manipur as indicated in their affidavit is that as per the O.M. dated 18-08-1982 issued by the Department of Personnel, the shortening of the period of deputation is at the discretion of the State Government and as such, the question of obtaining the consent of the officer concerned, while shortening the period of deputation, does not arise at all. Since the Education Department considered for speedy completion of various works relating to Engineering Wing of the Education Department(S), certain arrangement was required to post/depute an able officer so as to work as the Chief Engineer and accordingly, the Education Department(S) decided to shorten the period of deputation of the petitioner and there is no illegality or irregularity in issuing the impugned order dated 21-07-2016. It is further stated in their affidavit that although the private respondent is holding the substantive post of Assistant Engineer (PWD), he is at present holding the charge of Additional Chief Engineer and therefore, on utilisation of the service of the private respondent, the petitioner could not have any grievance against him. Since the petitioner was on deputation, his continuation on deputation was at the discretion of the Education Department and further, since the petitioner could be repatriated to his parent department at any time, he could not insist his continuance in the deputation post. The writ petition is contested by the private respondent also by filing an affidavit-in-opposition wherein it is stated that the State Government has the discretion either for extension or shortening the period of deputation and while shortening the period of deputation as per the O.M. dated 18-08-1982, the consent of the incumbent is not required at all. Although the private respondent is holding the substantive post of Assistant Engineer (PWD), he has been allowed to hold the charge of Additional Chief Engineer. As per the notification issued by the Government of India, deputation ought to have been restricted to officers below 56 years of age and in view thereof, the Education Department(S) has repatriated the petitioner to his parent Department. 5. From the pleadings narrated herein above, three main issues have arisen in the present case which requires consideration by this court and the same are as under: (a) Whether the State Government, in terms of the provisions of the O.M. dated 18-08-1982, can shorten the period of deputation of an officer without his consent? (b) Whether the period of deputation can be shortened by the State Government without assigning any reason thereof? (c) Whether the impugned order is smacked with vice of arbitrariness and malafide being violative of Article 14 & 16 of the Constitution of India? 6. (b) Whether the period of deputation can be shortened by the State Government without assigning any reason thereof? (c) Whether the impugned order is smacked with vice of arbitrariness and malafide being violative of Article 14 & 16 of the Constitution of India? 6. To decide the first issue (a), the interpretation of the provisions of the O.M. dated 18-08-1982 is indispensable and in particular, para 2 thereof which is reproduced herein below:- “2. Period of deputation - 2 years on the first instance which may be shortened or extended up to the limit of 3 years at the discretion of the State Govt. with the consent of the officer.” The appointment on deputation or transfer on deputation is one of the methods of appointment which is well known in the service jurisprudence. This method of appointment is generally found either in the rules framed by the State Governments under Article 309 of the Constitution of India or in the Office Memoranda issued by them, from time to time, based on the policy decisions taken by them. The concept of “deputation” has been examined and explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Punjab & ors. Vs. Inder Singh & ors., reported in (1997) 8 SCC 372 , the para 18 of which is as under: “18. The concept of “deputation” is well understood in service law and has a recognised meaning. “Deputation” has a different connotation in service law and the dictionary meaning of the word “deputation” is of no help. In simple words “deputation” means service outside the cadre or outside the parent department. Deputation is deputing or transferring an employee to a post outside his cadre, that is to say, to another department on a temporary basis. After the expiry period of deputation the employee has to come back to his parent department to occupy the same position unless in the meanwhile he has earned promotion in his parent department as per the Recruitment Rules. Whether the transfer is outside the normal field of deployment or not is decided by the authority who controls the service or post from which the employee is transferred. There can be no deputation without the consent of the person so deputed and he would, therefore, know his rights and privileges in the deputation post. Whether the transfer is outside the normal field of deployment or not is decided by the authority who controls the service or post from which the employee is transferred. There can be no deputation without the consent of the person so deputed and he would, therefore, know his rights and privileges in the deputation post. The law on deputation and repatriation is quite settled as we have also seen in various judgments which we have referred to above. There is no escape for the respondents now to go back to their parent departments and working there as Constables or Head Constables as the case may be.” Thus, it is seen that by this method of appointment on deputation or transfer on deputation, an employee is deputed or transferred to a post outside his cadre for certain period of time on a temporary basis and the deputation is possible only after the consent of the employee concerned is obtained and the reason behind this requirement of consent appears to be that the employee ought to know his rights and privileges in the deputation post. There can be no dispute on this proposition but one of the short questions that arise, in the present case, for consideration is as to whether the period of deputation of an employee of the State who has been deputed or transferred to a post outside his cadre, can be shortened without his consent or not as per the O.M. dated 18-08-1982. In this regard, the learned Government Advocate and the learned counsel appearing for the private respondent have not produced any document which specifically provides that the consent is not required at all nor have they produced any decision rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court to that effect. However, the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner has placed reliance on the decision rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Spentex Industries Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of Central excise & ors., reported in 2015 (9) JT 288 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held: “22. In this hue, we may now advert to the reasoning given by the Joint Secretary itself in the order passed in Revision Petition wherein he has discussed the issue in the following perspective: “...Govt. notes that as a principle and a policy measure, Govt. In this hue, we may now advert to the reasoning given by the Joint Secretary itself in the order passed in Revision Petition wherein he has discussed the issue in the following perspective: “...Govt. notes that as a principle and a policy measure, Govt. has accepted that export of goods from India should be relieved of domestic levies (both customs and Central Excise) in order to promote export of domestic products from India and to make then internationally competitive. In order to achieve this objective, two schemes operate, namely, export under bond and export under payment of duty and both are comparable, as objectives of both the schemes are same i.e., to neutralize the burden of internal levies on goods exported. In case of former, export goods are exempted from payment of duty, subject to conditions/restrictions etc. and in the case of latter export goods are cleared on payment of duty which is rebated subject to production of proof or export. For export under bond Rule 19 provides for excisable goods to be exported without payment of duty, subject to conditions etc. which are detailed in Notfn. No. 42/2001–CE(NT) dt. 26-06-2001 and Notification No. 43/2001-CE(NT) dtd. 26-06-2001 further relieves the burden of duty on inputs used to manufacture such goods by obtaining them duty free under bond. Thus, export goods are relieved of the burden of excise duty both on finally exported goods as well the inputs used vide these legislative and machinery provisions. As both schemes are comparable as objective to serve the common goal of relieving the burden of domestic taxation, the other scheme provides for similar dispensation in case goods are exported on payment of duty by way of rebating central excise duty suffered on such export goods. Rule 18 provides for rebate of duty on such export goods or duty paid on material used in manufacture of such export goods. While Notification No. 40/2001–Central Excise (NT) dtd. 26-06-2001 as amended deals with details provisions for rebate on finishing goods, Notfn. No. 41/201 C.E. (NT) as amended deals and provides the detailed procedural provisions for input stage rebate also. Similar provisions and export relief existed for export on payment of duty and under bond in the erstwhile Rule 12 and 13 of Central Excise Rules. 26-06-2001 as amended deals with details provisions for rebate on finishing goods, Notfn. No. 41/201 C.E. (NT) as amended deals and provides the detailed procedural provisions for input stage rebate also. Similar provisions and export relief existed for export on payment of duty and under bond in the erstwhile Rule 12 and 13 of Central Excise Rules. The fundamental objective of existing rules and the earlier ones is the same i.e., to neutralise the duty element on the goods exported and hence no other interpretation denying the relief sought appears possible. Circular No. 129/40/95 dt. 29-09-1995, para 1.5 of Chapter 8 of Part V of CBEC Manual further leaves no room for any other interpretation.” (iv) Interpretation of word ‘OR’ occurring in Rule 18: The aforesaid discussion leads us to the only inevitable consequence which is this: the word ‘OR’ occurring in Rule 18 cannot be given literal interpretation as that leads to various disastrous results pointed out in the preceding discussion and, therefore, this word has to be read as ‘and’ as that is what was intended by the rule maker in the scheme of things and to carry out the objectives of the Rule 18 and also to bring it at par with Rule 19. 23. We are conscious of the principle that the word ‘or’ is normally disjunctive and ‘and’ is normally conjunctive (see Union of India v. Kamlabhai Harjiwandas Parekh and others, (1968) 1 SCR 463 ). However, there may be circumstances where these words are to be read as vice-versa to give effect to manifest intention of the Legislature as disclosed from the context. 24. Of course, these two words normally ‘or’ and ‘and’ are to be given their literal meaning in unless some other part of same Statute or the clear intention of it requires that to be done. However, whenever use of such a word, viz., ‘and’/’or’ produces unintelligible or absurd results, the court has power to read the word ‘or’ as ‘and’ and vice-versa to give effect to the intention of the Legislature which is otherwise quite clear. However, whenever use of such a word, viz., ‘and’/’or’ produces unintelligible or absurd results, the court has power to read the word ‘or’ as ‘and’ and vice-versa to give effect to the intention of the Legislature which is otherwise quite clear. This was so done in the case of State of Bombay v. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala, (1957) 1 SCR 874 and while doing so, the Court observed as under: “...Considering the nature, scope and effect of the impugned Act, we entertain no doubt whatever that the first category of prize competitions does not include any innocent prize competitions. Such is what we conceive to be the clear intention of the Legislature as expressed in the impugned Act read as a whole and to give effect to this obvious intention as we are bound to do, we have perforce to read the word “or” appearing in the qualifying clause after the word “promoter” and before the word “or” as “and”. Well-known canons of construction of statutes permit us to do so. (See Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statues, 10th edition, page 238)” The facts of the said case namely Spentex Industries Ltd. case are not similar to that of the present case and therefore, the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court therein is not applicable to this present case. Moreover, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has clearly observed that the words “or” and “and” can be read as vice-versa to give effect to the manifest intention of the Legislature. Therefore, the issue is to be resolved only by interpreting the provisions of the O.M. dated 18-08-1982 itself to find out the true intent of the State Government while issuing the O.M. based on its policy decision and from the perusal thereof, it is indubitably clear that the period of deputation can be extended for another one year with the consent of the officer. It may be noted at this juncture that it is, admittedly, the discretionary power of the State Government either to depute or transfer an employee to a post outside his cadre and if that be so, the contention of the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner does not seem to be correct for the reason that in a catena of decisions, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that an employee who is on deputation, can be repatriated at any time provided that the employee is unsuitable or his performance is unsatisfactory and in other words, an employee can be repatriated to his parent department during the tenure of deputation on cogent reasons. If the contention of the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner is accepted, the State Government will have difficulty and impediment in the exercise of its discretionary power and in the event of a consent being refused to be given by the employee, in a given case, to shorten his period of deputation, the State Government will have no option but to allow him to complete his period of deputation even though his performance is not satisfactory or his service is no longer required by the borrowing Department. This court is of the view that this could not have been the intention of the State Government while issuing the said O.M. dated 18-08-1982 and therefore, the issue is decided against the petitioner. 7. The other two issues (b) and (c) are inter-related and therefore, the same are being considered together by this court. Shri H.S. Paonam, the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner has submitted that the impugned order issued by the State Government is smacked with vice of arbitrariness and malafide and in other words, the impugned order is bad in law because no reason has been assigned for issuing it which is contrary to the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. In support of his contention, he has placed reliance on the decision rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India & anr. Vs. V. Ramakrishnan & ors. In support of his contention, he has placed reliance on the decision rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India & anr. Vs. V. Ramakrishnan & ors. reported in (2005) 8 SCC 394 wherein the first respondent was appointed on deputation as Chief Engineer of the PWD, Government of Pondicherry pending selection of the regular incumbent by the UPSC with effect from 01-07-2004 and he was repatriated to his parent Department vide order dated 14-02-2005 which came to be challenged by him before the CAT. In the meantime, One Shri R. Sundar Raju approached the CAT by way of an application questioning the deputation of the first respondent on the ground that the first respondent was not eligible as per rules for which draft rules came to be framed later. The Hon’ble CAT allowed the application filed by the first respondent which was upheld by the Hon’ble High Court. The Hon’ble Supreme Court did not find any infirmity in the judgment of the Hon’ble High Court and in para 32 of its judgment and order, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held: “32. Ordinarily, a deputationist has no legal right to continue in the post. A deputationist indisputably has no right to be absorbed in the post to which he is deputed. However, there is no bar thereto as well. It may be true that when deputation does not result in absorption in the service to which an officer is deputed, no recruitment in its true import and significance takes place as he is continued to be a member of the parent service. When the tenure of deputation is specified, despite a deputationist not having an indefeasible right to hold the said post, ordinarily the term of deputation should not be curtailed except on such just grounds as, for example, unsuitability or unsatisfactory performance. But, even where the tenure is not specified, an order of reversion can be questioned when the same is mala fide. An action taken in a post-haste manner also indicates malice. (See Bahadursinh Lakhubhai Gohil v. Jagdishbhai M. Kamalia SCC para 25.)” The learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner has placed further reliance in Union of India & anr. Vs. S.N. Maity & anr. An action taken in a post-haste manner also indicates malice. (See Bahadursinh Lakhubhai Gohil v. Jagdishbhai M. Kamalia SCC para 25.)” The learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner has placed further reliance in Union of India & anr. Vs. S.N. Maity & anr. reported in (2015) 4 SCC 164 wherein respondent 1 was appointed as Controller General of Patents on deputation for a period of five years or until further orders vide Notification dated 07-08-2003 which was pursuant to issuance of an advertisement and selection process which eventually led to recommendation by UPSC for making such appointment. However, he was repatriated to his parent Department after one year only and the order of repatriation was challenged by him before the Tribunal which after accepting the stand of the Union of India that the first respondent had no right to continue in the post as he was on deputation, dismissed the original application. Keeping in view the circumstances that the authorities did not disclose the ground for which the appointment had been disturbed by repatriating him to his parent Department; that in the absence of any reasonable or valid ground, the order was bound to be treated as arbitrary thereby inviting the frown of Article 14 of the Constitution of India etc., the Hon’ble High Court set aside the order of repatriation. On an appeal by way special leave being preferred, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed: “15. The controversy that has emerged in the instant case is to be decided on the touchstone of the aforesaid principles of law. We have already opined that it is not a case of simple transfer. It is not a situation where one can say that it is a transfer on deputation as against an equivalent post from one cadre to another or one department to another. It is not a deputation from a government department to a government corporation or one Government to the other. There is no cavil over the fact that the post falls in a different category and the first respondent had gone through the whole gamut of selection. On a studied scrutiny, the notification of appointment makes it absolutely clear that it is a tenure posting and the fixed tenure is five years unless it is curtailed. But, a pregnant one, this curtailment cannot be done in an arbitrary or capricious manner. There has to have some rationale. On a studied scrutiny, the notification of appointment makes it absolutely clear that it is a tenure posting and the fixed tenure is five years unless it is curtailed. But, a pregnant one, this curtailment cannot be done in an arbitrary or capricious manner. There has to have some rationale. Merely because the words “until further orders” are used, it would not confer allowance on the employer to act with caprice. To counter the contention of the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner, Shri S. Nepoleon, the learned Government Advocate has submitted that the decisions relied upon by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner do not help the petitioner at all and rather, the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India & anr. Vs. V. Ramakrishnan & ors. (supra) is in favour of the respondents. To substantiate his contention that the petitioner has no right to continue in the borrowing department and since the power of the State Government being discretionary, the petitioner can be repatriated at any time, he has relied upon the decision rendered by the Hon’ble Gauhati High Court in the case of Marthon J. Sangma Vs. State of Meghalaya reported in 2007 (1) GLT 103 wherein the appellant, after following due process of selection, was appointed as BDO, at his own grade/scale of pay, initially for period of one year which was extended upto 31-03-2005 and he was repatriated to his parent department vide Notification dated 20-06-2005 which came to be challenged by way of a writ petition which was dismissed by the learned Single Judge. In a writ appeal being preferred by the appellant, the Hon’ble High Court upheld the judgment of the learned Single Judge by observing inter-alia that the authority concerned has the right to repatriate the deputationist to the parent department and a deputationist has no right to continue in the borrowing department. The submission of Shri M. Devananda, the learned counsel appearing for the private respondent is similar to that of the learned Government Advocate and it has been submitted by him that the petitioner has no right to insist that he ought to continue on deputation. He has placed reliance in State of Punjab & ors. Vs. Inder Singh (supra) and also in the case of Smti Gitanjali S. Bhattacharyya Vs. He has placed reliance in State of Punjab & ors. Vs. Inder Singh (supra) and also in the case of Smti Gitanjali S. Bhattacharyya Vs. Union of India reported in [2009 (1) GLT 317 (Gau)] wherein the petitioner who is on deputation to Council for Advancement of People’s Action and Rural Technology, challenged the order dated 01-09-2008 by which she was repatriated to her parent department. The Hon’ble High Court, after referring to various decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, dismissed the writ petition by holding inter-alia that the deputationist has a limited right to continuing in the post to which he has been deputed till the completion of the tenure of deputation. The borrowing department, for good and sufficient reason, can repatriate a deputationist to the parent Department even during the tenure of deputation. The Hon’ble High Court further held that the court in exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot go into the sufficiency or otherwise of the materials available before the management of CAPART for passing an order of repatriation but can definitely go into the question as to whether there are prima facie materials available before the management of CAPART to pass an order of repatriation, during the tenure of deputation, as a deputationist has the limited right to continue in the disputed post till the end of the deputation period. From the aforesaid decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court as well as the Hon’ble Gauhati High Court, it is absolutely clear that an employee has no right to continue on deputation and his period of deputation can be curtailed or shortened during the tenure of his deputation but it shall be done by the concerned authority only after assigning good, sufficient and cogent reasons thereof. 8. Other two issues (b) and (c), referred to hereinabove, that arise for consideration are not as to whether the petitioner has any right to continue on deputation or not and moreover, the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner has not submitted that the petitioner has any right to continue on deputation. Such an issue relating to the right of the petitioner who is on deputation, is not called for decision in the present case because the law is well settled and is no longer res integra. Such an issue relating to the right of the petitioner who is on deputation, is not called for decision in the present case because the law is well settled and is no longer res integra. The questions to be considered are as regards the arbitrary and malafide actions on the part of the State Government on the basis of the facts and surrounding circumstances of the present case. It is not in dispute that the petitioner was appointed as the Chief Engineer, Engineering Wing of Education Department(S) vide order dated 17-01-2014 on deputation for a period of two years. This government order was issued in consultation with the Departments of Personnel and Forest & Environment and in other words, through the proper channel. On the expiry of the said two years, the Department of Education(S) issued another order dated 08-02-2016 extending the term of deputation of the petitioner for another period of one year with effect from 17-01-2016 to 16-01-2017 and before issuing the said order, the Departments of Personnel and Forest & Environment were again consulted. Before the completion of the said period of one year, the Department of Education(S) issued the impugned order dated 21-07-2016 by which the State Government was pleased to utilise the service of the private respondent as the Chief Engineer, Engineering Wing of the Education(S) Department with immediate effect. The para 3 of the impugned order specifically states that consequent upon the utilization of the service of the private respondent, the petitioner is repatriated to his parent Department as OSD/LDA with immediate effect. On a careful perusal of the impugned order, it is seen that no reason has been assigned for repatriation of the petitioner and the only inference that can be drawn from it, is that since the service of the private respondent is utilised, the service of the petitioner is no longer required and hence, he is repatriated with immediate effect because both of them cannot be permitted to hold the same post. What is interesting is that the appointment of the petitioner on deputation has been extended by one year and if the State Government desires that his period of deputation may be shortened, may be, for the reason that his service is no longer required or his service is not satisfactory, it could have done so by assigning appropriate reasons. What is interesting is that the appointment of the petitioner on deputation has been extended by one year and if the State Government desires that his period of deputation may be shortened, may be, for the reason that his service is no longer required or his service is not satisfactory, it could have done so by assigning appropriate reasons. The State Government has not produced any material on record to show that the Department of Education(S) was not satisfied with the performance of the petitioner during the said period of two years or that his service was no longer required by the Education Department and the fact that he was given extension for another period of one year shows that the Department of Education(S) had no any grievance against him. Moreover, the fact that Department of Education(S) wanted to utilise the service of the private respondent, shows that the service of a Chief Engineer is still required in its Department and if that be so, there is no reason as to why the petitioner be not allowed to complete his period of deputation. There is no material on record to show as to when the relevant file for utilisation of the service of the private respondent was processed and as to who initiates the file despite the fact that the petitioner’s period of deputation is not yet over and for what reason. The relevant file will definitely indicate as to why the service of the private respondent is required to be utilised by the Education Department in place of that of the petitioner. From the impugned order, it can only be inferred that the relevant file might have been processed and decision taken thereon prior to the issuance of the impugned order. It is understandable if the service of the private respondent is utilised after the petitioner having been repatriated on some cogent reasons. But it is just to the contrary that the petitioner is wanted to be thrown out because of the service of the private respondent being utilised by the Education Department(S) for no good reason at all. Another aspect which cannot be ignored by this court, is that the substantive post of the private respondent is the Assistant Engineer and although he has been allowed to hold the charge of the Addl. Another aspect which cannot be ignored by this court, is that the substantive post of the private respondent is the Assistant Engineer and although he has been allowed to hold the charge of the Addl. Chief Engineer, he has not yet been promoted even to the post of Executive Engineer which is two/three posts lower than that of the Chief Engineer. In this regard, the justification given by the respondents including the State Government in their affidavits, is that although the private respondent was appointed as the Assistant Engineer in the year 1986, no regular promotion could be granted to him because of pending litigations. It may be true to that extent but if one looks at the eligibility criteria for appointment as the Chief Engineer which is the promotional post from the post of Addl. Chief Engineer or that of the Superintending Engineer with requisite experience, no Assistant Engineer or for that matter, the private respondent could be considered for appointment as the Chief Engineer on deputation irrespective of the fact that he has served as the Addl. Chief Engineer for some years on in-charge basis. It will make no difference as regards the utilisation of the service of the private respondent as the Chief Engineer also when he appears to have not fulfilled the eligibility criteria. In its affidavit, the State Government has made an attempt to justify the impugned order by stating that when the various works relating to engineering projects of the Education Department was required to be completed at a great speed, an able officer was required to be posted/deputed as the Chief Engineer. It may be noted that when the State Government assigns no reason for issuing the impugned order in itself, the same cannot be justified and explained in the affidavit. Assuming that the reason has been assigned by the State Government in its affidavit, there is no material on record or no averment made in its affidavit as to how the private respondent can be considered to be an able officer, and not the petitioner, when he himself is holding the substantive post of the Assistant Engineer and is not yet eligible for being appointed as the Chief Engineer. The State Government being an institution, is required to exercise its discretionary power, fairly and reasonably, in accordance with certain principles of law. The State Government being an institution, is required to exercise its discretionary power, fairly and reasonably, in accordance with certain principles of law. From these circumstances, narrated herein above, it can be safely held that the impugned order was issued only to accommodate and favour the private respondent completely ignoring the case of the petitioner as well as that of the other eligible officers working in other engineering departments of the State Government which is arbitrary and malafide being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. Therefore, the issues (b) and (c) are decided in favour of the petitioner. 9. For the reasons stated hereinabove, the writ petition is partly allowed and consequently, the impugned order dated 21-07-2016 is quashed and set aside with no order as to costs.