JUDGMENT : Abhilasha Kumari, J. 1. This petition under Article-226 of the Constitution of India has been preferred, inter-alia, with a prayer to quash and set aside the order dated 27.01.2009, passed by respondent No. 2-District Superintendent of Police, Surendranagar, whereby the application of the petitioner for the grant of appointment on compassionate grounds has been rejected. 2. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that the father of the petitioner was serving on the post of Constable under the respondent-Department. He passed away while in harness. The deceased employee left behind him his wife, being the mother of the petitioner and two daughters, one of whom is elder to the petitioner. At the time of his father's death, the petitioner was a minor. The mother of the petitioner made an application on 09.09.1999 to respondent No. 2, stating that she has a son and two daughters and as the son (the petitioner) is a minor, he may be considered for the grant of compassionate appointment after he attains the age of majority. The date of birth of the petitioner being 06.09.1989, he attained majority on 06.09.2007. On 17.09.2007, the petitioner made a representation to respondent No. 3, requesting for the grant of compassionate appointment on the ground that he had now attained the age of majority. There was no response to this application, therefore, again on 08.11.2007, the petitioner addressed another representation to respondent No. 2. On 12.03.2008, the respondents addressed a letter to the petitioner asking him to enclose the educational certificates of his mother and stating that if she is not educated, his application would be considered. According to the respondents, there was no reply from the petitioner to this communication, therefore, on 24.07.2008, the petitioner was informed to appear for a medical examination. The petitioner was got medically examined. As stated in the certificate to this effect given by the Civil Surgeon dated 06.08.2008, he was found physically fit for employment. However, the case of the petitioner for the grant of compassionate appointment was rejected by the impugned order dated 27.01.2009, on several grounds. Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner has approached this Court. 3. Mr. Y.J. Patel, learned advocate for the petitioner has submitted that, the father of the petitioner passed away on 22.08.1999. However, the case of the petitioner for the grant of compassionate appointment was rejected by the impugned order dated 27.01.2009, on several grounds. Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner has approached this Court. 3. Mr. Y.J. Patel, learned advocate for the petitioner has submitted that, the father of the petitioner passed away on 22.08.1999. Without losing any time, the mother of the petitioner made an application on 09.09.1999, to the effect that the petitioner was a minor at that point of time and the respondents ought to give him appointment on compassionate grounds as and when he attains the age of majority. It is submitted that in the impugned order the first reason for rejection is that the mother of the petitioner did not make the application within time. The application was made on 09.09.1999, therefore, there is no delay in making the application and this ground for the rejection of the application is not correct. 3.1 Insofar as the second ground for rejection is concerned, it is submitted that though no application was made on behalf of the elder sister of the petitioner on her attaining majority, however, in view of the letter dated 09.09.1999 written by the mother of the petitioner, the respondents ought to have considered the case of the petitioner. 3.2 Regarding the third ground of rejection, to the effect that on the date of death of the petitioner's father, the petitioner was not major and the application was not made within the stipulated period of time, the same submission is reiterated by the learned advocate for the petitioner that the mother had already made the application on behalf of the petitioner, therefore, there was no delay in making the application. The petitioner has made the application as soon as he attained the age of majority, therefore, this ground is also not correct. 3.3 With regard to the fourth ground regarding the elder sister of the petitioner who became major before him, it is submitted that this ground ought not to come in the way of the petitioner in view of the fact that his mother had already written to the respondents that the petitioner be considered for appointment on his attaining the age of majority. 3.4 Learned advocate for the petitioner has submitted that the fifth ground for rejection that the family has pulled on for a period of eight years after the death of the father of the petitioner is also not correct, as the family is in a pitiable condition and is facing financial hardships. 3.5 Regarding the sixth ground for rejection, namely, that terminal benefits have been received by the family of the petitioner it is submitted that it is a settled position of law that getting terminal benefits of family pension would not detract from the entitlement of the family member of the deceased employee for being considered for appointment on compassionate grounds. 3.6 In support of the submission regarding delay in deciding the application of the petitioner, learned advocate for the petitioner has placed reliance upon a judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in State of Gujarat and others v. Hasmukhbhai Khemchandbhai Makwana, reported in 2010 (4) GLR 3463. 4. The petition has been strongly opposed by Ms. Snusha Joshi, learned Assistant Government Pleader by submitting that, after the death of the employee on 22.08.1999, the mother of the petitioner, who is the widow of the deceased employee, ought to have made an application on her own behalf, within the stipulated period of time. Had she been illiterate, then an application ought to have been made on behalf of the eldest child, upon that child attaining the age of majority. It is submitted that the petitioner has an elder sister by the name of Kiranben, whose date of birth is 06.01.1985. She has attained the age of majority on 06.01.2003, but no application has been made on her behalf. As per the Policy of the State Government dated 16.12.1991, an application for appointment on compassionate grounds has to be made within a period of two years from attaining the age of majority. The petitioner was not the eldest child and no application was made on behalf of the eldest daughter after she became a major. It is submitted that there is no provision in the policy to wait for the second child to become a major and then apply for the grant of compassionate appointment. The family has survived for a period of eight years. It is submitted that there is no provision in the policy to wait for the second child to become a major and then apply for the grant of compassionate appointment. The family has survived for a period of eight years. They have also received terminal benefits and are getting family pension, therefore, it cannot be said that they are in pitiable condition and need immediate help and succour. 4.1 Distinguishing the judgment of the Division Bench in State of Gujarat and others v. Hasmukhbhai Khemchandbhai Makwana (supra), it is submitted by the learned Assistant Government Pleader that in the present case there is no delay in the rejection of the application of the petitioner. The petitioner made the application on 17.09.2007, which has been rejected on 27.01.2009. The application of the petitioner has been made belatedly. Even otherwise, the petitioner, being the second child, has no right or entitlement to be considered for compassionate appointment dehors the policy. 4.2 Learned Assistant Government Pleader has relied upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Ashokbhai Mohanbhai Vankar v. State of Gujarat and others (Special Civil Application No. 16816/2012), dated 12.09.2014, wherein facts were almost identical to the facts of the present case. 4.3 On the above grounds, it is submitted that the petition be rejected. 5. This Court has heard learned counsel for the respective parties, perused the averments made in the petition, the affidavit-in-reply and the other documents on record. 6. There is no dispute regarding the fact that when the father of the petitioner died on 22.08.1999, the petitioner was a minor, being aged about 10 years, the date of birth of the petitioner is 06.09.1989. There is also no dispute regarding the fact that the petitioner is not the eldest child of the deceased employee, but has an elder sister named Kiranben, whose date of birth is 06.01.1985. The policy applicable in the case of the petitioner would be the policy prevalent at the time when his father passed away. Thus, the policy dated 16.12.1991, which was in vogue at the relevant point of time, would be applicable to the case of the petitioner. A copy of the said policy has been annexed as Annexure-II to the affidavit-in-reply filed on behalf of respondent No. 2. Paragraph-3 of the said policy is relevant. Thus, the policy dated 16.12.1991, which was in vogue at the relevant point of time, would be applicable to the case of the petitioner. A copy of the said policy has been annexed as Annexure-II to the affidavit-in-reply filed on behalf of respondent No. 2. Paragraph-3 of the said policy is relevant. As per the said policy, the widow of the deceased employee is to be considered for compassionate appointment first. If such widow is illiterate and if her eldest child is a minor, then a relaxation of two years can be granted in making an application after the minor attains majority. This aspect has not been disputed by the petitioner. Reliance is being placed by the petitioner on the aspect that his mother made an application on 09.09.1999, stating that though she has a son and two daughters, however, only her son be considered for compassionate appointment on attaining the age of majority. What the mother of the petitioner has not disclosed in the said application is that, one of her daughters is elder to the petitioner and she would have attained majority prior to him. As per the policy, the elder daughter could have made the application within two years from attaining majority. The mother of the petitioner did not make any application on her own behalf for the grant of compassionate appointment. In view of the policy prevaling at that point of time, the first reason for the rejection of the application of the petitioner that the widow and the eldest daughter also did not apply and the petitioner applied belatedly appears to be correct. An application was made by the petitioner on 17.09.2007, after he attained the majority. There is no stipulation in the policy dated 16.12.1991, that if the eldest child does not make an application within the stipulated period of time after attaining the age of majority then the second child would be entitled to do so when he or she attains the age of eighteen years. The petitioner, therefore, can have no claim for compassionate appointment only on the ground that he is the son of the deceased employee and his mother has, in a manner of speaking, "reserved" the right to make the application on his behalf by her application dated 09.09.1999. 7. The petitioner, therefore, can have no claim for compassionate appointment only on the ground that he is the son of the deceased employee and his mother has, in a manner of speaking, "reserved" the right to make the application on his behalf by her application dated 09.09.1999. 7. Just such a situation arose in the case of Ashokbhai Mohanbhai Vankar v. State of Gujarat and others (supra), relied upon by the learned Assistant Government Pleader. This Court has dealt with it in the following manner: "15. The main thrust of the submissions advanced by the learned advocate for the petitioner is that the case of the petitioner for grant of appointment on compassionate grounds ought to have been dealt with under the policy prevailing when the employee died. It may be noted that the employee passed away on 16.12.1993, when the petitioner was a minor. There is no record that at the relevant point of time, the mother of the petitioner had made any application for compassionate appointment either on her own behalf, or on behalf of the petitioner. For the first time, the petitioner made an application on 01.08.2008, after attaining the age of majority on 17.07.2008. This application has been rejected by the impugned order dated 26.11.2010, on the ground that the eldest child of the deceased employee (a daughter) ought to have applied within two years of attaining majority. If no such application is made, then compassionate appointment cannot be given to the other children of the deceased employee. 16. It is an admitted position, emerging from the perusal of the communication dated 12.07.2010, of the petitioner, himself, that he is not the eldest child of the deceased. After the death of his father, no application was made by his mother. This is stated in the said communication, though averments in the petition suggest that the mother of the petitioner approached the respondents and was told to apply when the petitioner attains majority. Such averments are not supported by any material on record. On the contrary, in the letter dated 12.07.2010, addressed by the petitioner to respondent No. 3, it is clearly stated that the petitioner has an elder sister who had attained the age of majority before him. However, no application was made by her thereafter. Such averments are not supported by any material on record. On the contrary, in the letter dated 12.07.2010, addressed by the petitioner to respondent No. 3, it is clearly stated that the petitioner has an elder sister who had attained the age of majority before him. However, no application was made by her thereafter. The reason for this is also reflected in the said letter and is indicative of the social mindset which discriminates subtly but insidiously, against a daughter, even in the parental home. The petitioner states that his elder sister would get married and go to her matrimonial home and it is only the son who would stay with the parents and look after them, therefore he should be given compassionate appointment. This letter clearly reveals that the petitioner is asking for appointment dehors the policy prevailing at the relevant point of time that envisaged that the eldest child, whether son or daughter ought to apply within two years from attaining majority. Admittedly, this was not done as the petitioners elder sister did not make any application. As stated in the impugned communication dated 26.11.2010, as per the prevailing policy, there was no provision that applications of other members of the family would be entertained if the child who attains majority first, does not apply within the stipulated period of time. The impugned decision dated 26.11.2010 is as per the policy in vogue at the relevant period of time when the father of the petitioner died." 8. The facts of the present case are more or less similar. In this case as well, the elder sister did not apply at the time of attaining majority. There is no provision in the policy that the application of any other member of the family, such as the petitioner, would be entertained if the eldest child who attains majority first, does not apply within the stipulated period of time. No benefit can be derived by the petitioner on the ground that by the application dated 09.09.1999, made by his mother, she has stated that the petitioner be considered for compassionate appointment when he attains majority. 9. The right for consideration would flow from the provisions of the prevalent policy and would not depend on the whims and fancies of the applicant. The applicant cannot pick and choose how and to whom the appointment can be given. 9. The right for consideration would flow from the provisions of the prevalent policy and would not depend on the whims and fancies of the applicant. The applicant cannot pick and choose how and to whom the appointment can be given. Applications have to be made in consonance with the prevailing policy. 10. The very purpose of granting compassionate appointment is to provide financial aid and succour to the family of the deceased employee at the time when the bread-winner has passed away. Compassionate appointment is not a matter of right, but is a beneficial policy and the benefit of such a policy can only be derived by those persons who fulfill the requirements of such policy. In the present case, neither the widow of the deceased employee applied for compassionate appointment nor did her elder daughter apply upon attaining the age of majority. The fact that the petitioner applied after attaining the age of majority does not give him any right to be considered as the policy does not confer any such right upon him. 11. Much emphasis has been laid by the learned advocate for the petitioner on the aspect that the petitioner was called for a medical examination, was got medically examined and found to be fit for employment. It is submitted that since he was found fit and is eligible, he ought to have been appointed. The answer to this is to be found in the letter dated 12.03.2008 of the respondents, addressed to the petitioner, wherein it has been clearly stipulated that he should send the educational certificates of his mother, namely, the widow of the deceased employee and if she is illiterate, only then would his application be considered. It is not disputed that the petitioner did not reply to this letter, as is stated in paragraph-6 of the affidavit-in-reply. The aspect that the petitioner has an elder sister does not appear to have been disclosed to the respondents. The petitioner was, therefore, asked to undergo a medical examination and was found physically fit for employment. He was given a Certificate dated 06.08.2008 to this effect. Thereafter, the application of the petitioner for compassionate appointment was rejected by the detailed order impugned in the present petition. As has been stated hereinabove, the widow of the deceased employee did not apply for herself and neither did her elder daughter apply when she attained majority. He was given a Certificate dated 06.08.2008 to this effect. Thereafter, the application of the petitioner for compassionate appointment was rejected by the detailed order impugned in the present petition. As has been stated hereinabove, the widow of the deceased employee did not apply for herself and neither did her elder daughter apply when she attained majority. No right, therefore, accrues to the petitioner, being the second child, to apply for compassionate appointment after he attained majority. That the petitioner was found to be medically fit does not give him any right for appointment, contrary to the existing policy. 12. A perusal of the Policy dated 16.12.1991 discloses that the grounds for rejection given by the respondents are just, proper and in consonance with the policy applicable in the case of the petitioner. The aspect that financial benefits have been given to the family and they are not in a pitiable condition and have pulled on for eight years, are a matter of fact. The relevance of these grounds is not required to be tested, as the petitioner has not been successful in making out any legal ground in support of his challenge to the impugned order. 13. Insofar as the judgment of the Division Bench in the case of State of Gujarat and others v. Hasmukhbhai Khemchandbhai Makwana (supra) is concerned, it has been rendered in a totally different context. In that case the application for grant of compassionate appointment was pending for a number of years and, in the meanwhile, the prevalent policy underwent a change. In that context, the Court has stated that such a casual attitude and inaction on the part of the authority is not justified or bona-fide. There can be no dispute regarding the observations made by the Division Bench in the context of the facts obtaining in that case. In the present case, such is not the position, therefore, these observations would not be applicable. 14. Considered from all possible angles, the case of the petitioner is found to be devoid of merit and deserving of rejection. 15. The petition, therefore, stands rejected. Rule is discharged. Parties to bear their own costs.