ORDER : The petitioner was working as a Junior Assistant in the first respondent School, which is an aided school, governed by The Tamil Nadu Recognized Private Schools [Regulation] Act, 1973. In contemplation of certain charges relating to financial irregularities, the Management of the School placed him under suspension by order dated 20.07.2001 w.e.f. 21.07.2001. Challenging the said order of suspension, the petitioner filed a writ petition in W.P.No.13541 of 2001 before this court. Initially, this court had passed an order of interim stay of the order of suspension. In pursuance of the same, the petitioner joined duty on 06.08.2001. Finally, the said writ petition was disposed of by order dated 28.04.2003. Without going into the merits of the case, this court simply issued a direction to the respondents to take into account the representations of the petitioner and also after hearing him to dispose of the same on merits within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of the said order. The District Educational Officer, Cheranmahadevi, by his proceedings in Na.Ka.No.2881/A3/95 dated 31.05.2002 issued a direction to the school management to claim salary arrears for the petitioner for the period between 12.03.1996 and 25.05.1996, that is, the period of suspension and also to continue to pay salary as per the revised scale of pay. That order is under challenge before this court in W.P.No.22367 of 2002 at the instance of the management. 2. Thereafter, the school management issued a charge memorandum to the petitioner on 20.07.2007, levelling as many as three charges. According to the first charge, as authorized by the school committee for the academic year 1998-99, the petitioner collected a sum of Rs.49,450/- from the students towards special fees and tution fees for English medium, but, without remitting the same into the Government account, misappropriated the said amount; the second charge was that in respect of the amount paid towards the retirement benefits to one former Teacher by name Sri. M. Navaneetha Krishnan, there was an audit objection, according to which, a sum of Rs.3,630/- had been paid in excess to Sri. Navaneetha Krishnan. Based on such audit objection, the said Sri. Navaneetha Krishnan paid Rs.3,630/- to the petitioner so as to remit the same in to the government account. M. Navaneetha Krishnan, there was an audit objection, according to which, a sum of Rs.3,630/- had been paid in excess to Sri. Navaneetha Krishnan. Based on such audit objection, the said Sri. Navaneetha Krishnan paid Rs.3,630/- to the petitioner so as to remit the same in to the government account. But, the petitioner, having collected the same from the retired employee, did not remit the same into the government account and thus misappropriated the same; and the third charge was that on 11.06.1998, the petitioner received a cheque from the school management for a sum of Rs.11,00,00/- for the purpose of collection and paying the same to the teachers towards their four months salary for the month of July, 1997 to September, 1997. Having encashed the said amount from the State Bank of India, the petitioner paid to the teachers only a sum of Rs.10,90,991/- and he did not remit back the balance of Rs.9009/- to the management and misappropriated the same. The petitioner, without submitting any explanation for the charges, asked for certain documents from the school committee. Though he was informed by the school committee permitting him to peruse the records, he did not turn up. Therefore, according to the management, he was set ex parte and it was held that all the three charges had been proved against him. Based on the same, the school management passed an order dated 06.08.2003 removing him from service. The said order was communicated by the Secretary of the School Committee to the petitioner. Challenging the said order of removal, the petitioner has come up with the present writ petition in W.P.No.4436 of 2004. 3. I have heard the learned senior counsel for the petitioner; the learned counsel appearing for the respondents 1 and 2; and the learned Additional Government Pleader for the 3rd respondent and also perused the records carefully. 4. Though several grounds have been raised in the writ petition, the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner would focus his argument mainly on two grounds. The first and the foremost ground is that there was no enquiry held into the charges and consequently there was no enquiry report. Thus, without any enquiry and without affording sufficient opportunity to the petitioner, the impugned order has been passed, he contended. The first and the foremost ground is that there was no enquiry held into the charges and consequently there was no enquiry report. Thus, without any enquiry and without affording sufficient opportunity to the petitioner, the impugned order has been passed, he contended. According to him, the impugned order thus grossly violates the principles of natural justice and so the same is liable to be set aside. 5. The learned senior counsel would next contend that the school committee was biased inasmuch as it consisted of the Head Master Mr. Ramanujam on whose complaint the charges were framed as a member. 6. The learned counsel appearing for the school management would vehemently oppose this writ petition. Referring to the counter filed by the Secretary of the respondent school, the learned counsel would contend that though sufficient opportunity was afforded to the petitioner to submit his explanation and to participate in the proceedings and that he was permitted to peruse the records, he did not avail of those opportunities and allowed the proceedings to come to a close ex parte. Thus, it is not now available for the petitioner to allege that there was violation of principles of natural justice. The learned counsel would further submit that there was no bias on the part of the school committee at all against the petitioner. 7. I have considered the above rival submissions carefully. 8. So far as the first ground is concerned, I find merit in the same. It is true that having received the charge memo, levelling serious charges of misappropriation, the petitioner made several representations seeking for certain documents, but, copies of documents were not furnished at all to him. Further, the statements recorded, if any, during the preliminary enquiry, were also not supplied to him. The charge memo also was not accompanied by any list of documents or witnesses proposed to be examined to prove the charges. In the absence of the details of witnesses proposed to be examined and in the absence of the statements of those witnesses already recorded, if any, during the preliminary enquiry and in the absence of supply of copies of documents, in my considered view, it would not have been possible for the petitioner to submit his explanation for the charges levelled against him. The only reply by the management in this regard is that the petitioner was permitted to peruse the documents, but, he did not turn up. In my considered view, since the documents are not voluminous, it is not understandable as to why the management refused to give copies of such documents. Supplying copies of the documents is part of the fair procedure to be followed in the matter of enquiry into the charges. Such opportunity should be real and it should not be fanciful. Thus, in my considered view, the failure on the part of the management to abide by the procedure established by law is the serious violation of principles of natural justice and, thus, the petitioner was disabled from submitting appropriate explanation. 9. Secondly, the school committee proceeded to go-ahead with the charges and the petitioner was asked to appear for the enquiry despite the fact that the petitioner gave an application requesting for adjournment of enquiry. In the estimation of the school committee, there was no sufficient ground to adjourn the proceedings. To this extent, this court does not find any fault on the part of the school committee. The school committee, in the impugned order, however, has stated that the petitioner was set ex parte and therefore, charges were held to have been proved. If that be so, it could be stated that what are all the evidences, either documentary or oral, produced before school committee upon which the school committee came to the conclusion that the charges were proved. In the counter as well as during the course of argument before this court, the management has not stated that any such witness was examined to prove the charges. The management has also not stated that any document was proved in evidence to prove the charges. Though ex parte, law requires that charges should be held to be proved only on application of evidence to be let in during enquiry. Here, in the instant case, without there being any oral evidence or documentary evidence, it is alleged that the school committee came to the conclusion that the charges were proved. Quite strangely, there was no report drawn up by the committee holding the petitioner guilty of the charges and the reasons as to why such conclusions were arrived at. Here, in the instant case, without there being any oral evidence or documentary evidence, it is alleged that the school committee came to the conclusion that the charges were proved. Quite strangely, there was no report drawn up by the committee holding the petitioner guilty of the charges and the reasons as to why such conclusions were arrived at. The learned counsel for the management admitted before this court that there was no such enquiry report drawn up at all. It is the law that such enquiry report should be drawn up and a copy of the same should be served on the delinquent calling upon to submit his explanation. That was also not done in this case. A letter was sent to the petitioner informing him that he had been found guilty of charges and, therefore, it had been proposed to impose punishment upon him. As I have already pointed out, since there was no enquiry report drawn up, a copy of the enquiry report could not be served on the petitioner. Therefore, the petitioner would not have been in a position to submit his appropriate explanation for the said findings of the committee also. From these facts, it is crystal clear that fair procedure was not followed by the management in conducting the proceedings against the petitioner which culminated in the removal of the petitioner from service. As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner, I find that there has been serious violation of principles of justice and on this ground by itself, the impugned order is liable to be set aside. 10. The next ground is that the committee, which conducted the proceedings, was seriously biased against the petitioner. The learned senior counsel would submit that the charges were framed against him only on the complaint of one Mr. Ramanujam, who was the Head Master of the School. But, Mr. Ramanujam, was one of the persons in the school committee which held enquiry against the petitioner. His very presence, according to the learned senior counsel, would have influenced the other members and, therefore, according to him, the impugned order suffers from personal bias. 11. I find force in the said argument. As seen from the records, though the charges were framed only on the complaint of Mr. His very presence, according to the learned senior counsel, would have influenced the other members and, therefore, according to him, the impugned order suffers from personal bias. 11. I find force in the said argument. As seen from the records, though the charges were framed only on the complaint of Mr. Ramanujam, without recusing from the enquiry proceedings, he continued to be an active member of the committee which held the enquiry. Thus, the conclusions of the committee would have been influenced by his participation. Thus, bias, as pleaded by the petitioner stands fortified. On this ground also, the impugned order is liable to be set aside. 12. Since the impugned order is liable to be set side, on the above technical grounds, now, this court has to examine whether it would be appropriate to permit the management to proceed with the enquiry afresh by affording sufficient opportunity to the petitioner and then, to pass final order in this matter. In my considered view, adopting the said recourse would only be violative of principles of natural justice. The charges relate to the years 1997-98 and 1998-99. The charge memo was issued in the year 2001. At this length of time, that is, after about 18 years, if the management is now permitted to hold an enquiry afresh into the charges, the petitioner would not be in a position to face the charges by producing both oral and documentary evidences. Therefore, in my considered view, it would not be doing justice to allow the management to hold enquiry afresh at this length of time and, so I am not inclined to give such opportunity. 13. In view of the foregoing discussions the writ petition succeeds and the petitioner is entitled for reinstatement in service with full wages and all other attendant benefits. 14. In the result, the writ petition is allowed and the impugned order of removal is set aside. The petitioner shall be deemed to have been in service from 06.08.2003 onwards and he shall be treated to have been retired from service on attaining the age of superannuation and he shall be paid all the consequential monetary benefits. No costs.