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2016 DIGILAW 1813 (ALL)

ATUL KUMAR JAIN v. STATE OF U. P.

2016-05-11

KARUNA NAND BAJPAYEE

body2016
JUDGMENT : Hon'ble Karuna Nand Bajpayee, J. This application u/s 482 of Cr.P.C. has been filed on behalf of applicants seeking the quashing of summoning order dated 30.3.2016 passed by learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Muzaffar Nagar as well as entire criminal proceedings of Criminal Case No. 2666/9 of 2016 (State vs. Vishal and others) u/s 498A, 323, 506 I.P.C. and 3, 4 D.P. Act pending in the Court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Muzaffar Nagar. Heard learned counsel for the applicants and learned A.G.A. Submission of counsel for the accused-applicants is that the order taking cognizance and issuing summons against the applicants dated 30.3.2016 being an order without reasons is bad in the eyes of law as it would reflect non application of mind and therefore is liable to be quashed. It has also been argued on behalf of applicants that the perusal of record of investigation goes to show that the entire allegations made by the opposite party no.2 are false and incorrect and the applicants have been falsely implicated in order to exert pressure upon them and hence entire proceeding is also liable to be quashed. Learned counsel for applicants has argued that the impugned order dated 30.3.2016, whereby the court below has taken cognizance and has issued summons to the applicants, also reflects non application of mind as it has been passed on a printed proforma. In support of his contention, learned counsel for applicants has relied upon one unreported judgment dated 16.3.2016 passed by another Bench of this Court in Criminal Revision No.5602 of 2010 (Yogendra Kumar Jain vs. State of U.P. and others). Reliance has also been placed on Fakhruddin Ahmad vs. State of Uttaranchal reported in 2008 LawSuit (SC) 1361. On the other hand, learned A.G.A. has vehemently rebutted the contention of applicant-side by submitting that the order taking cognizance and issuing summons against accused is not required to have reasons, much more so when such order is passed upon a charge sheet filed by the investigating officer under section 173(2) of code of criminal procedure which itself contains the entire material collected by Investigating Officer, and hence, the impugned order is not amenable to challenge only on this score. According to learned A.G.A. the merit of the order is to be tested on the basis of the contents and allegations of F.I.R. and material available on case diary or on the basis of any other requirement of law necessary to be fulfilled in order to pass order of cognizance and issuing summons against accused. While placing reliance on the decision of Apex Court in Kanti Bhadra Shah and another vs. State of West Bengal, (2000) 1 SCC 722 and U.P. Pollution Control Board vs. Mohan Meakins Ltd. and others, (2000) 3 SCC 745 , learned A.G.A. has elaborated his argument by submitting that if any brief order is to be passed by the learned judicial magistrate like the present one and the recording of reasons is not a condition precedent, judicial application of mind shall not depend upon nor should be inferred from the format of the order as the same is an independent exercise and the absence whereof can only be demonstrated by the aggrieved person through the material available on record as to whether it makes out and substantiate the offences against the accused or not. Learned A.G.A. has tried to buttress his argument by giving an example from day to day court proceeding that while taking up cases serially, if the court after hearing the case and perusing the record passes some order in one particular case and thereafter, if another case with similar controversy is taken up next and the court after hearing the case and perusing the record gives dictation to the steno of the court by merely saying "same order" and the steno prepares another order similar to the earlier order, whether such eventuality can give occasion to any person aggrieved from such order to say or argue that the order suffers from complete non application of mind. The obvious answer would be ''No" because another order might be similar to the previous one in all its contents or substance, but the same has been passed after adverting to all the facts and circumstances of the case and has been passed after applying the judicial mind for sufficient period of time. The obvious answer would be ''No" because another order might be similar to the previous one in all its contents or substance, but the same has been passed after adverting to all the facts and circumstances of the case and has been passed after applying the judicial mind for sufficient period of time. If similar controversies are coming up repeatedly as they are bound to come up before the courts by the very nature of proceedings, and if the court is to repeat its orders in similar matters, it is not at all necessary and is in fact quite natural for the court that it shall not repeat the same words again and again in detail. Submission is that if an order has been signed by the court each and every word written in the order has to be deemed to be the order of the court. Whether the order is in the handwriting of the Judge himself or in the handwriting of the Steno, or whether it has been dictated and typed by Steno or has been transcribed by computer are all irrelevant aspects and cannot be made a legitimate or conclusive basis to infer application or non application of mind. If the order can validly be passed in brief without containing any reasons, the merit of the order is liable to be judged on the basis of material available on record, which must justify the passing of such an order and not on the basis of manner of preparation of order or the format of order. An order taking cognizance of offence and issuing summons against accused is passed u/s 190 read with Section 204 of Code of Criminal Procedure. The eventuality to pass such order occurs either in a police challani case or in a complaint case. The requirement of recording reasons in the order while taking cognizance of the offence and issuing summons against the accused has been considered and discussed by the Apex Court in various judgments and without burdening this order by quoting plethora of case laws, the case of Kanti Bhadra Shah and another vs. State of West Bengal, 2000 (1) SCC 722 ; U.P. Pollution Control Board vs. Mohan Meakin Ltd. and others, 2000 (3) SCC 745 ; Bhushan Kumar and another vs. State (NCT of Delhi) and another, (2012) 5 SCC 424 may be advantageously referred to. The cases of Kanti Bhadra Shah (supra) and Bushan Kumar (supra) relate with police challani case wherein charge sheet was filed before the concerned judicial Magistrate who took cognizance of the offence and issued summoning order and while doing so the concerned judicial Magistrate passed a brief order. While dealing with the submission that the order taking cognizance and issuing summons must reflect reasons and the judicial court is bound to record reasons in such orders, the Apex Court in Kanti Bhadra Shah's case (supra) observed in para nos.11 and 12 as follows :- "11. Even in cases instituted otherwise than on police report the Magistrate is required to write an order showing the reasons only if he is to discharge the accused. This is clear from Section 245. As per the first sub-section of Section 245, if a magistrate, after taking all the evidence considers that no case against the accused has been made out which if unrebutted would warrant his conviction, he shall discharge the accused. As per sub-section (2) the Magistrate is empowered to discharge the accused at any previous stage of the case if he considers the charge to be groundless. Under both sub-sections he is obliged to record his reasons for doing so. In this context it is pertinent to point out that even in a trial before a court of session, the judge is required to record reasons only if he decides to discharge the accused. (vide Section 227 of the Code). But if he is to frame the charge he may do so without recording his reasons for showing why he framed the charge. 12. If there is no legal requirement that the trial court should write an order showing the reasons for framing a charge, why should the already burdened trial Courts be further burdened with such an extra work. The time has reached to adopt all possible measures to expedite the court procedures and to chalk out measures to avert all roadblocks causing avoidable delays. If a Magistrate is to write detailed orders at different stages merely because the counsel would address arguments at all stages, the snail paced progress of proceedings in trial courts would further be slowed down. We are coming across interlocutory orders of Magistrates and Sessions Judges running into several pages. If a Magistrate is to write detailed orders at different stages merely because the counsel would address arguments at all stages, the snail paced progress of proceedings in trial courts would further be slowed down. We are coming across interlocutory orders of Magistrates and Sessions Judges running into several pages. We can appreciate if such a detailed order has been passed for culminating the proceedings before them. But it is quite unnecessary to write detailed orders at other stages, such as issuing process, remanding the accused to custody, framing of charges, passing over to next stages in the trial. It is a salutary guideline that when orders rejecting or granting bail are passed, the Court should avoid expressing one way or other on contentious issues, except in cases such as those falling within Section 37 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985." In Bhushan Kumar's case (supra) the Apex Court referred the case of Kanti Bhadra Shah (supra) as well as U.P. Pollution Control Board's case (supra) and observed in paragraph nos.12, 13, 14, 19 and 20 as follows :- (12) A "summons" is a process issued by a Court calling upon a person to appear before a Magistrate. It is used for the purpose of notifying an individual of his legal obligation to appear before the Magistrate as a response to violation of law. In other words, the summons will announce to the person to whom it is directed that a legal proceeding has been started against that person and the date and time on which the person must appear in Court. A person who is summoned is legally bound to appear before the Court on the given date and time. Willful disobedience is liable to be punished under Section 174 IPC. It is a ground for contempt of court. (13) Section 204 of the Code does not mandate the Magistrate to explicitly state the reasons for issuance of summons. It clearly states that if in the opinion of a Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence, there is sufficient ground for proceeding, then the summons may be issued. It is a ground for contempt of court. (13) Section 204 of the Code does not mandate the Magistrate to explicitly state the reasons for issuance of summons. It clearly states that if in the opinion of a Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence, there is sufficient ground for proceeding, then the summons may be issued. This section mandates the Magistrate to form an opinion as to whether there exists a sufficient ground for summons to be issued but it is nowhere mentioned in the section that the explicit narration of the same is mandatory, meaning thereby that it is not a pre-requisite for deciding the validity of the summons issued. (14) Time and again it has been stated by this Court that the summoning order under Section 204 of the Code requires no explicit reasons to be stated because it is imperative that the Magistrate must have taken notice of the accusations and applied his mind to the allegations made in the police report and the materials filed therewith. (15) ................................. (16) ................................ (17) ................................ (18) ................................ (19) This being the settled legal position, the order passed by the Magistrate could not be faulted with only on the ground that the summoning order was not a reasoned order. (20) It is inherent in Section 251 of the Code that when an accused appears before the trial Court pursuant to summons issued under Section 204 of the Code in a summons trial case, it is the bounden duty of the trial Court to carefully go through the allegations made in the charge sheet or complaint and consider the evidence to come to a conclusion whether or not, commission of any offence is disclosed and if the answer is in the affirmative, the Magistrate shall explain the substance of the accusation to the accused and ask him whether he pleads guilty otherwise, he is bound to discharge the accused as per Section 239 of the Code." The case of U.P. Pollution Control Board (supra) relates with the complaint case procedure wherein the learned Session Judge in revision petition set aside the order issuing process passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate merely on the ground that the same was not a speaking order. The issue reached up to the Apex Court and after referring Kanti Bhadra Shah's case (supra) the Apex court observed in paragraph nos.5, 6 and 7 as follows :- "5. We may point out at the very outset that the Sessions judge was in error for quashing the process at the first round merely on the ground that the Chief Judicial Magistrate had not passed a speaking order. In fact it was contended before the Sessions judge, on behalf of the Board, that there is no legal requirement in Section 204 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (For short the `Code') to record reasons for issuing process. But the said contention was spurned down in the following words: "My attention has been drawn to Section 204 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and it has been argued that no reasons for summoning an accused person need be given. I feel that under Section 204 aforesaid, a Magistrate has to form an opinion that there was sufficient ground for proceeding and, if an opinion had to be formed judicially, the only mode of doing so is to find out express reasons for coming to the conclusions. In the impugned order, the learned Magistrate has neither specified any reasons nor has he even formed an opinion much less about there being sufficient ground for not proceeding with the case." 6. In a recent decision of the Supreme Court it has been pointed out that the legislature has stressed the need to record reasons in certain situations such as dismissal of a complaint without issuing process. There is no such legal requirement imposed on a magistrate for passing detailed order while issuing summons vide Kanti Bhadra Shah vs. State of West Bengal [ 2000(1) SCC 722 ]. The following passage will be apposite in this context: "12. If there is no legal requirement that the trial court should write an order showing the reasons for framing a charge, why should the already burdened trial courts be further burdened with such an extra work. The time has reached to adopt all possible measures to expedite the court procedures and to chalk out measures to avert all roadblocks causing avoidable delays. If a Magistrate is to write detailed orders at different stages, the snail-paced progress of proceedings in trial courts would further be slowed down. The time has reached to adopt all possible measures to expedite the court procedures and to chalk out measures to avert all roadblocks causing avoidable delays. If a Magistrate is to write detailed orders at different stages, the snail-paced progress of proceedings in trial courts would further be slowed down. We are coming across interlocutory orders of Magistrates and Sessions Judges running into several pages. We can appreciate if such a detailed order has been passed for culminating the proceedings before them. But it is quite unnecessary to write detailed orders at other stages, such as issuing process, remanding the accused to custody, framing of charges, passing over to next stages in the trial." (Emphasis supplied) 7. It was unfortunate that the Sessions judge himself did not look into the complaint at that stage to form his own opinion whether process could have been issued by the Chief Judicial Magistrate on the basis of the averments contained in the complaint. Instead the sessions judge relegated the work to the trial magistrate for doing the exercise over again. .................." What spells out from a careful study of these case laws is that particularly the cases in which charge sheet is submitted by the Investigating Officer u/s 173 (2) of Cr.P.C. and cognizance of the offence is taken by the Magistrate u/s 190(1)(b) of Cr.P.C., there is no legal requirement that the Judicial Magistrate should pass an order specifying reasons as to why he opts to do so and there is no need to further burden the already burdened lower courts with such extra work and the time has reached to adopt all possible measures to expedite the court procedure and to chalk out measures to avert all road blocks causing avoidable delays. It further spells out that at the stage of taking cognizance of the offence u/s 190(1)(b) of Cr.P.C. and thereafter issuing process u/s 204 of Cr.P.C., it is imperative that the Magistrate must have taken notice of the accusations and applied his mind to the allegations made in the Police report and the materials filed therewith. The applicants have placed reliance on the judgment of Supreme Court in Fakhruddin Ahmad vs. State of Uttaranchal reported in 2008 LawSuit (SC) 1361 and order of this Court in Criminal Revision No.5602 of 2010 dated 10.12.2010 wherein reliance has been placed upon the said case of Fakhruddin Ahmad (supra). The applicants have placed reliance on the judgment of Supreme Court in Fakhruddin Ahmad vs. State of Uttaranchal reported in 2008 LawSuit (SC) 1361 and order of this Court in Criminal Revision No.5602 of 2010 dated 10.12.2010 wherein reliance has been placed upon the said case of Fakhruddin Ahmad (supra). So far as the order passed in Revision No.5602 of 2010 (Yogendra Kumar Jain vs. State of U.P. and others) dated 10.12.2010 in which because of being non speaking order containing no reasoning the impugned order was set aside, is concerned, it may be mentioned that such a view was earlier taken by the single bench presided by Hon'ble B.K. Narayana, J. while passing the order dated 10.12.2010 in aforesaid revision. But it may be pertinent to note that subsequently the same bench had the occasion to consider this particular point about the requirement of reasons in the order of taking cognizance or summoning the accused in another matter Illmas vs. State of U.P., 2011 (75) ACC 703 decided on 21.9.2011. While hearing the aforesaid case Illmas (supra), various Apex Court authorities, which have been quoted above in the earlier part of this order, were cited before the bench which appeared not to have been placed before the court while hearing the aforesaid criminal revision No.5602 of 2010 upon which the reliance is being placed by the accused-applicant in the present case. After expatiating upon in great detail about all the legal nuances of the matter on this particular aspect of the law, the court reiteraed the view that was taken in the case of Kanti Bhadra Shah (supra) by the Apex Court. It was observed by the court in the case of Illmas (supra) as follows : "12. I have very carefully examined the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties present and perused the impugned order as well as the other materials brought on record and the law cited by them on the issues arising in the case. 13. It was observed by the court in the case of Illmas (supra) as follows : "12. I have very carefully examined the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties present and perused the impugned order as well as the other materials brought on record and the law cited by them on the issues arising in the case. 13. Coming to the first submission made by the learned counsel that the impugned order by which the cognizance has been taken and the applicant has been summoned by the court below is fraught to be quashed on the ground of it being a non-speaking order, I am of the considered view that Section 204 of the Code of Criminal Procedure no where requires recording of reasons by a Magistrate for summoning a person as accused. On this aspect authoritative support can be drawn from the decision of the Apex Court in U.P. Pollution Control Board (supra) wherein the Apex Court held as follows:- "5. We may point out at the very outset that the Sessions Judge was in error for quashing the process at the first round merely on the ground that the Chief Judicial Magistrate had not passed a speaking order. In fact it was contended before the Sessions Judge, on behalf of the Board, that there is no legal requirement in S. 204 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (For short the 'Code') to record reasons for issuing process. But the said contention was spurned down in the following words : "My attention has been drawn to S. 204 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and it has been argued that no reasons for summoning an accused persons need be given. I feel that under S. 204 aforesaid, a Magistrate has to form an opinion that there was sufficient ground for proceeding and, if an opinion had to be formed judicially, the only mode of doing so is to find out express reasons for coming to the conclusions. In the impugned order, the learned Magistrate has neither specified any reasons nor has he even formed an opinion much less about there being sufficient ground for not proceeding with the case." 6. In a recent decision of the Supreme Court it has been pointed out that the legislature has stressed the need to record reasons in certain situations such as dismissal of a complaint without issuing process. In a recent decision of the Supreme Court it has been pointed out that the legislature has stressed the need to record reasons in certain situations such as dismissal of a complaint without issuing process. There is no such legal requirement imposed on a magistrate for passing detailed order while issuing summons vide Kanti Bhadra Shah v. State of West Bengal (2000) 1 SCC 722 : 2000 AIR SCW 52 : AIR 2000 SC 522 : 2000 Cri LJ 746. The following passage will be apposite in this context (para 12) : "If there is no legal requirement that the trial Court should write an order showing the reasons for framing a charge, why should the already burdened trial Courts be further burdened with such an extra work. The time has reached to adopt all possible measures to expedite the Court procedures and to chalk out measures to avert all road-blocks causing avoidable delays. If a Magistrate is to write detailed orders at different stages, the snailpaced progress of proceedings in trial Courts would further be slowed down. We are coming across interlocutory orders of Magistrates and Sessions Judges running into several pages. We can appreciate if such a detailed order has been passed for culminating the proceedings before them. But it is quite unnecessary to write detailed orders at other stages, such as issuing process, remanding the accused to custody, framing of charges, passing over to next stages in the trial." A single Judge of this Court in the case of Mohd. Sayeed (supra) after considering a catena of decisions of the Apex Court as well as of this Court on the point held has hereunder:- "21. After going through the several decisions of Hon'ble Supreme Court as well as of this Court on the subject in issue, I am of the view that once the Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence either without discussing what are the reasons behind it, it shall be presumed that on the basis of material available before him he is satisfied that there is sufficient material for taking cognizance and if he is satisfied with those materials for taking cognizance, the detail discussion of those materials by the learned Magistrate is not required. Further once he issues process, even without writing word "cognizance is taken" it is presumed that he has taken cognizance, the writing of word "cognizance is taken" is not necessary. Further once he issues process, even without writing word "cognizance is taken" it is presumed that he has taken cognizance, the writing of word "cognizance is taken" is not necessary. The reason is that by issuance of process he proceeds with the case and the accused who has been summoned for trial have sufficient opportunity to defend himself at the appropriate stage provided in code. In response of issuance of process/summons it is not open for the accused to challenge the summoning order on the ground that no cognizance has been taken or no satisfaction has been shown or there is no detail discussion of the material available rather he has to follow the next step of the process. 14. The case of Fakhruddin (supra) upon which the learned counsel for the applicant has placed extensive reliance is of no help to him as the Apex Court in the case of Fakhruddin (supra) was examining the validity of the order passed by Uttaranchal High Court by which it had declined to quash the charge sheet on the ground that it had no power to look into the documents and papers which were filed along with charge sheet for the purpose of considering the prayer for quashing of prosecution, and the Apex Court, while disagreeing with the reasons spelt out by the High Court for refusing to quash the charge sheet set aside the order of the Uttaranchal High Court and remitted the matter back to the High Court for deciding the accused's prayer for quashing of his prosecution afresh in accordance with law. 15. I have very carefully gone through the judgment of the Fakhruddin Ahmad (supra) case and there is nothing in the said judgment which may be said to lend any support to the aforementioned submission of the learned counsel for the applicant. 16. 15. I have very carefully gone through the judgment of the Fakhruddin Ahmad (supra) case and there is nothing in the said judgment which may be said to lend any support to the aforementioned submission of the learned counsel for the applicant. 16. Consequently, the first ground of challenge to the impugned order on behalf of the applicant is bereft of any merits and is hereby repelled." The perusal of aforesaid view and observations given by the Court would make it expressly demonstrable that the aforesaid bench presided by Hon'ble B.K. Narayana, J. revisited its earlier view taken in similar matter which was based only on the Apex Court's decision given in the case of Fakhruddin Ahmad (supra) and in the wake of the specific authorities of the Hon'ble Apex Court on this very point the bench changed its view on the matter in question and adopted the view in consonance with what was laid down by the Apex Court specifically about the requirement of reasons in such matters. Adverting to the case of Fakhruddin Ahmad (supra) relied upon by applicant it may be seen that the appellant before the Supreme Court was an accused for offence u/s 420, 467, 468, 471 IPC and while investigation was pending, the appellant filed a complaint against his opponent and his partner u/s 138 of the Act and Section 420 IPC whereupon the judicial magistrate took cognizance of the complaint and issued summons against the complainant. In this background, the appellant before the Supreme Court had approached the High Court against the criminal proceedings lodged by his opponent and pending against him for quashing thereof. The High Court declined to interfere and thereafter the appellant approached Supreme Court against the order of High Court. Under these facts the Supreme Court observed that it is imperative that the judicial magistrate must have taken notice of the accusation and applied his mind to the allegations made in the complaint or the police report or the information received from a source other than a police report, as the case may be, and the material filed therewith. The Supreme Court further observed that for dismissal of the petition the High Court had to record a finding that the uncontroverted allegations, as made, established a prima facie case against the appellant. The Supreme Court further observed that for dismissal of the petition the High Court had to record a finding that the uncontroverted allegations, as made, established a prima facie case against the appellant. So far as the observations made by the Apex Court is concerned, there has never been any difference of opinion on the point that cognizance of offence can be taken only by judicial application of mind. But the question of questions is whether the absence of reasons would indicate non application of mind or not. The case law of Fakhruddin (supra) does not deal with the issue regarding requirement of reasons in the order of taking cognizance and issuance of the summons. The authoritative law on this particular aspect has already been quoted above as given in Kanti Bhadra Shah (supra), Bhushan Kumar (supra) and U.P. Pollution Control Board (supra). Hence, there is nothing contradictory to what is being carved out by this Court regarding the issue involved in the present matter. So far as the allegations apparently reflected from the F.I.R. itself are concerned, it appears that the F.I.R. of the case in question was lodged by Smt. Deepika Jain (wife of applicant no.2) in Police Station-Mahila Thana, District Muzaffar Nagar u/s 498A, 323, 506 I.P.C. and Section-3/4 D.P. Act as Case Crime No.0175 of 2015 wherein it was alleged that the marriage of informant Smt. Deepika Jain took place on 13.3.2016 with applicant No.2 and the father of informant had spent about 7 lakh rupees, which were beyond his status and had also handed over 2 lakh rupees in cash to the applicant no.2, applicant no.3 and applicant no.5 with a request that the said amount be handed over to the informant in the form of fix deposit and the gold jewellaries amounting to Rs.3 lakh approximately were also given along with furniture, fridge, double bed etc. But the said goods were not up to the satisfaction of inlaws of informant and they started mental harassment of informant and raised demand of additional dowry of Rs.5 lakh in cash and a vehicle for which the informant shown her incapability, due to which the husband -applicant no.2, father-in-law-applicant no.3, Jeth-applicant no.5, Devar-applicant no.7, Jethani-applicant no.6, mother-in-law applicant no.4 and applicant no.1 started committing physical violence and cruelty with informant frequently. It was also alleged that at one point of time the informant was tried to be killed by pouring kerosene upon her. However, upon hue and cry being raised they could not fulfil their wish to kill the informant and she came to her parental home on 15.7.2015 and anyhow saved her life and disclosed the incident to parents and also informed the higher officials. On 9.9.2015 the in-laws of informant also threatened her asking to return back with the demanded things, failing which she would be killed. The in-laws of informant retained all the aforesaid gifted goods and refused to return the same despite demand of informant and had also not given the F.D. of Rs.2 lakh to the informant. After perusing the F.I.R. when this Court tried to look into the material collected by the Investigating Officer, the court found that statements of witnesses mentioned in the charge sheet dated 11.3.2016 namely Smt. Deepika Jain, Shri Narendra Kumar Rastogi and Shri Rajesh Rastogi and other formal witnesses recorded by the Investigating Officer u/s 161 Cr.P.C. have not been appended with this criminal misc. application and only the statement of accused persons recorded by the Investigating Officer u/s 161 Cr.P.C. have been appended as Annexure no.3 in which they all have denied the allegations and have desired to press their defence before the concerned court through counsel. As no material available in case diary has been placed before this Court by the accused-applicants to find out as to whether the allegations as disclosed in the F.I.R. have been further corroborated by material collected in case diary or not, there appears no such material made available on file to discredit the opinion drawn by the Investigating Officer in the charge sheet dated 11.3.2016. The cognizance taken thereupon by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Muzaffar Nagar and summons issued against the applicants vide order dated 30.3.2016 stand uncontroverted in view of non filing of material available on record and goes to show that the uncontroverted allegations, as made in the F.I.R., establish a prima facie case against the applicants. In view of this, the impugned order dated 30.3.2016 as well as the criminal proceeding in pursuance thereof do not suffer from any illegality or impropriety, much less than any abuse of court's process. In view of this, the impugned order dated 30.3.2016 as well as the criminal proceeding in pursuance thereof do not suffer from any illegality or impropriety, much less than any abuse of court's process. The law regarding sufficiency of material which may justify the summoning of accused and also the court's decision to proceed against him in a given case is well settled. The court has to eschew itself from embarking upon a roving enquiry into the last details of the case. It is also not advisable to adjudge whether the case shall ultimately end in conviction or not. Only a prima facie satisfaction of the court about the existence of sufficient ground to proceed in the matter is required. Through a catena of decisions given by Hon'ble Apex Court this legal aspect has been expatiated upon at length and the law that has evolved over a period of several decades is too well settled. The cases of (1) Chandra Deo Singh Vs. Prokash Chandra Bose AIR 1963 SC 1430 , (2) Vadilal Panchal Vs. Dattatraya Dulaji Ghadigaonker AIR 1960 SC 1113 and (3) Smt. Nagawwa Vs. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi 1976 3 SCC 736 may be usefully referred to in this regard. The Apex Court decisions given in the case of R.P. Kapur Vs. State of Punjab AIR 1960 SC 866 and in the case of State of Haryana Vs. Bhajan Lal 1992 SCC(Cr.) 426 have also recognized certain categories by way of illustration which may justify the quashing of a complaint or charge sheet. Some of them are akin to the illustrative examples given in the above referred case of Smt. Nagawwa Vs. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi 1976 3 SCC 736 . The cases where the allegations made against the accused or the evidence collected by the Investigating Officer do not constitute any offence or where the allegations are absurd or extremely improbable impossible to believe or where prosecution is legally barred or where criminal proceeding is malicious and malafide instituted with ulterior motive of grudge and vengeance alone may be the fit cases for the High Court in which the criminal proceedings may be quashed. Hon'ble Apex Court in Bhajan Lal's case has recognized certain categories in which Section-482 of Cr.P.C. or Article-226 of the Constitution may be successfully invoked. Hon'ble Apex Court in Bhajan Lal's case has recognized certain categories in which Section-482 of Cr.P.C. or Article-226 of the Constitution may be successfully invoked. Illumined by the case law referred to herein above also, this Court has adverted to the entire record of the case. All other submissions made by the applicants' learned counsel call for adjudication on pure questions of fact which may be adequately adjudicated upon only by the trial court and while doing so even the submissions made on points of law can also be more appropriately gone into by the trial court in this case. This Court does not deem it proper, and therefore cannot be persuaded to have a pre-trial before the actual trial begins. A threadbare discussion of various facts and circumstances, as they emerge from the allegations made against the accused, is being purposely avoided by the Court for the reason, lest the same might cause any prejudice to either side during trial. But it shall suffice to observe that the perusal of the F.I.R. and the charge sheet as has been submitted makes out a prima facie case against the accused at this stage and there appear to be sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. I do not find any justification to quash the charge sheet or the proceedings against the applicants arising out of them as the case does not fall in any of the categories recognized by the Apex Court which may justify their quashing. The prayer for quashing the same is refused as I do not see any abuse of the court's process either. However, it is observed that if the bail has not been obtained as yet, the accused may appear before the court below and apply for bail within two months from today. The court below shall make an endeavour to decide the bail application on the same day, if possible, keeping in view the observations made by the Court in the Full Bench decision of Amrawati and another Vs. State of U.P. 2004 (57) ALR 290 and also in view of the decision given by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Lal Kamlendra Pratap Singh Vs. State of U.P. 2009 (3) ADJ 322 (SC). State of U.P. 2004 (57) ALR 290 and also in view of the decision given by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Lal Kamlendra Pratap Singh Vs. State of U.P. 2009 (3) ADJ 322 (SC). In the aforesaid period or till the date of appearance of the accused in the court below, whichever is earlier, no coercive measures shall be taken or given effect to. With the aforesaid observations this application is finally disposed off.