Research › Search › Judgment

Himachal Pradesh High Court · body

2016 DIGILAW 1818 (HP)

Mohinder Singh Gupta v. State of Himachal Pradesh

2016-08-30

TARLOK SINGH CHAUHAN

body2016
JUDGMENT : Tarlok Singh Chauhan, Judge. This petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure seeks quashment of FIR No.12/2015 dated 19.01.2015, registered at Police Station, Sadar, Solan, District Solan, under Sections 341, 506, 511, 427 and 34 of IPC and for quashing of order of cognizance dated 10.04.2015 taken by the learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Court No.II, Solan, in case titled ‘State of H.P. versus Mohinder Singh Gupta and others’ in Case No.18/2 of 2015. 2. Petitioners No.1 to 3 are the officials of the Himachal Pradesh Futuristic Communication Limited, Chambaghat, (in short ‘HFCL’) whereas, petitioner No.4 is a Contractor by profession. The ‘HFCL’ is in possession of the land comprised in Khasra No.2279/404, Khata/Khatauni no.697/863 min and 955/665 on the spot. 3. It is not in dispute that Company has filed a Civil Suit No.178/1 of 2009 against respondent No.2 on the ground that respondent No.2 is interfering in the land possessed by the Company. 4. It is also not in dispute that the Civil Court on 12.11.2009 granted interim injunction in favour of the Company and thereafter the said order was made absolute on 02.05.2011. 5. It is further not in dispute that respondent No.2 on 13.01.2010 filed an application dated 12.01.2010 in the Court of learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Solan, under Order 39 Rule 2-A CPC complaining of violation, willful disobedience of the ad-interim-injunction dated 12.11.2009 and the said application was dismissed on 16.09.2014. 6. It is yet again not in dispute that on the same and rather verbatim allegations, respondent No.2 after dismissal of the aforesaid application under order 39 Rule 2-A CPC approached the Magistrate, who vide its order dated 31.12.2014 forwarded the complaint to the SHO for registration of the FIR and it is this FIR and registration whereof have been assailed by the petitioners on various grounds as taken in the memo of parties, more particularly, on the ground that the dispute interse the parties is essentially a civil matter and is a gross abuse of the process of the Court. 7. In view of the above, the pivotal issue which arises for consideration is as to whether the FIR in question in the given facts and circumstances can be quashed. 8. 7. In view of the above, the pivotal issue which arises for consideration is as to whether the FIR in question in the given facts and circumstances can be quashed. 8. It is evident from the facts narrated above that the dispute between the parties is primarily of a civil nature and proceedings initiated by respondent No.2 apparently appear to be nothing but a ploy to subjugate the petitioners as it is only after the dismissal of the application under Order 39 Rule 2-A CPC that respondent No.2 approached the Magistrate. 9. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has time and again taken notice of the growing tendency of the complainants attempting to give a cloak of criminal offence to matters which are essentially and purely civil in nature, obviously either to apply pressure on the accused, or out of enmity towards the accused, or to subject the accused to harassment. Therefore, criminal Courts should ensure that proceedings before it are not used for settling scores or to pressurize parties to settle civil disputes. 10. Having regard to the nature of allegations set out in the complaint, I have no hesitation in concluding that an attempt has been made by respondent No.2 to convert a case of a civil nature into a criminal prosecution. As already observed above, the Courts must ensure that criminal prosecution is not used as an instrument of harassment or for seeking private vendetta or with an ulterior motive to pressurise the accused. 11. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Chandran Ratnaswami vs. K.C. Palanisamy and others (2013) 6 SCC 740 , held that the wholesome power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. entitles the High Court to quash a proceeding when it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the court or that the ends of justice require that the proceedings ought to be quashed. It was further held that the High Courts have been invested with inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, to achieve a salutary public purpose. A Court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. The ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice must be administered according to laws made by the legislature. It is apt to reproduce following observations: “33. A Court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. The ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice must be administered according to laws made by the legislature. It is apt to reproduce following observations: “33. The doctrine of abuse of process of court and the remedy of refusal to allow the trial to proceed is well-established and recognized doctrine both by the English courts and courts in India. There are some established principles of law which bar the trial when there appears to be abuse of process of court. 34. Lord Morris in Connelly vs. Director of Public Prosecutions, (1964) 2 All ER 401 (HL) observed: “There can be no doubt that a court which is endowed with a particular jurisdiction has powers which are necessary to enable it to act effectively within such jurisdiction… A court must enjoy such powers in order to enforce its rule of practice and to suppress any abuse of its process and to defeat any attempted thwarting of its process. * * * The power (which is inherent in a court’s jurisdiction) to prevent abuse of its process and to control its own procedure must in a criminal court include a power to safeguard an accused person from oppression or prejudice.” In his separate pronouncement, Lord Delvin in the same case observed that where particular criminal proceedings constitute an abuse of process, the court is empowered to refuse to allow the indictment to proceed to trial. 35. In Hui Chi-Ming vs. R. (1992) 1 AC 34 (PC)], the Privy Council defined the word “abuse of process” as something so unfair and wrong with the prosecution that the court should not allow a prosecutor to proceed with what is, in all other respects, a perfectly supportable case. 36. In the leading case of R. vs. Horseferry Road Magistrates’ Court, (1994) 1 AC 42, on the application of abuse of process, the court confirms that an abuse of process justifying the stay of prosecution could arise in the following circumstances: (i) where it would be impossible to give the accused a fair trial; or (ii) where it would amount to misuse/manipulation of process because it offends the court’s sense of justice and propriety to be asked to try the accused in the circumstances of the particular case. 37. 37. In R. vs. Derby Crown Court ex p Brooks, (1984) 80 Cr.App.R. 164, Lord Chief Justice Ormrod stated: “It may be an abuse of process if either (a) the prosecution has manipulated or misused the process of the court so as to deprive the defendant of a protection provided by law or to take unfair advantage of a technicality, or (b) on the balance of probability the defendant has been, or will be, prejudiced in the preparation of conduct of his defence by delay on the part of the prosecution which is unjustifiable.” 38. Lord Justice Neill in R. vs. Beckford, [1996] 1 Cr.App.R. 94: [1995] R.T.R. 251 observed that: “The jurisdiction to stay can be exercised in many different circumstances. Nevertheless two main strands can be detected in the authorities: (a) cases where the court concludes that the defendant cannot receive a fair trial; (b) cases where the court concludes that it would be unfair for the defendant to be tried.” What is unfair and wrong will be for the court to determine on the individual facts of each case. 39. This Court in State of Karnataka vs. L. Muniswamy and Others, (1977) 2 SCC 699 observed that the wholesome power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. entitles the High Court to quash a proceeding when it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. The High Courts have been invested with inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, to achieve a salutary public purpose. A court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. The Court observed in this case that ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice must be administered according to laws made by the legislature. It was held in this case (SCC p. 703, para 7): “7. ….. In the exercise of this wholesome power, the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. ….. In the exercise of this wholesome power, the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. The saving of the High Court's inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, is designed to achieve a salutary public purpose which is that a court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In a criminal case, the veiled object behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the material on which the structure of the prosecution rests and the like would justify the High Court in quashing the proceeding in the interest of justice. The ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice has got to be administered according to laws made by the legislature. The compelling necessity for making these observations is that without a proper realisation of the object and purpose of the provision which seeks to save the inherent powers of the High Court to do justice, between the State and its subjects, it would be impossible to appreciate the width and contours of that salient jurisdiction.” This case has been followed in a large number of subsequent cases of this Court and other courts. 40. In State of Haryana and Others vs. Bhajan Lal and Others, 1992 Supp.(1) SCC 335, this Court in the backdrop of interpretation of various relevant provisions of Cr.P.C. under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or the inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. gave the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of the court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Thus, this Court made it clear that it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list to myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised: (SCC p 379, para 102) “102. Thus, this Court made it clear that it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list to myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised: (SCC p 379, para 102) “102. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.” 41. This Court in Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. and Others vs. Mohd. Sharaful Haque and Another, (2005) 1 SCC 122 observed thus: (SCC p. 128, para 8) “8. … It would be an abuse of process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers, court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto.” 42. In Indian Oil Corpn. v. NEPC India Ltd. and Others, (2006) 6 SCC 736 this Court again cautioned about a growing tendency in business circles to convert purely civil disputes into criminal cases. The Court noticed the prevalent impression that civil law remedies are time consuming and do not adequately protect the interests of lenders/creditors. The Court further observed that: (SCC p. 749, para 13) “13. … Any effort to settle civil disputes and claims, which do not involve any criminal offence, by applying pressure through criminal prosecution should be deprecated and discouraged.” 43. In Inder Mohan Goswami and Another vs. State of Uttaranchal and Others, (2007) 12 SCC 1 , this Court after considering series of decisions observed: (SCC pp. 16-17, paras 46 & 50-52) “46. The court must ensure that criminal prosecution is not used as an instrument of harassment or for seeking private vendetta or with an ulterior motive to pressurise the accused. 16-17, paras 46 & 50-52) “46. The court must ensure that criminal prosecution is not used as an instrument of harassment or for seeking private vendetta or with an ulterior motive to pressurise the accused. On analysis of the aforementioned cases, we are of the opinion that it is neither possible nor desirable to lay down an inflexible rule that would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. Inherent jurisdiction of the High Courts under Section 482 CrPC though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when it is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the statute itself and in the aforementioned cases. In view of the settled legal position, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. **** **** **** 50. Civilised countries have recognised that liberty is the most precious of all the human rights. The American Declaration of Independence, 1776, French Declaration of the Rights of Men and the Citizen, 1789, Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, 1966 all speak with one voice—liberty is the natural and inalienable right of every human being. Similarly, Article 21 of our Constitution proclaims that no one shall be deprived of his liberty except in accordance with procedure prescribed by law. 51. The issuance of non-bailable warrants involves interference with personal liberty. Arrest and imprisonment means deprivation of the most precious right of an individual. Therefore, the courts have to be extremely careful before issuing non-bailable warrants. 52. Just as liberty is precious for an individual so is the interest of the society in maintaining law and order. Both are extremely important for the survival of a civilised society. Sometimes in the larger interest of the public and the State it becomes absolutely imperative to curtail freedom of an individual for a certain period, only then the non-bailable warrants should be issued.” 44. In G. Sagar Suri and Another vs. State of U.P. and Others, (2000) 2 SCC 636 , this Court observed that it is the duty and obligation of the criminal court to exercise a great deal of caution in issuing the process, particularly when matters are essentially of civil nature. 45. In S.N. Sharma vs. Bipen Kumar Tiwari and Others, (1970) 1 SCC 653 , this Court has stated thus: (SCC pp 658-59, para 11) “11. ….. 45. In S.N. Sharma vs. Bipen Kumar Tiwari and Others, (1970) 1 SCC 653 , this Court has stated thus: (SCC pp 658-59, para 11) “11. ….. It appears to us that, though the Code of Criminal Procedure gives to the police unfettered power to investigate all cases where they suspect that a cognizable offence has been committed, in appropriate cases an aggrieved person can always seek a remedy by invoking the power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution under which, if the High Court could be convinced that the power of investigation has been exercised by a police officer mala fide, the High Court can always issue a writ of mandamus restraining the police officer from misusing his legal powers. The fact that the Code does not contain any other provision giving power to a Magistrate to stop investigation by the police cannot be a ground for holding that such a power must be read in Section 159 of the Code.” 46. In State of West Bengal and Others vs. Swapan Kumar Guha and Others, (1982) 1 SCC 561 while examining the power of a police officer in the field of investigation of a cognizable offence, Chandrachud, C.J. has affirmed the view expressed by Mathew, J. and observed as follows: (SCC p. 577, para 22) “22. There is no such thing like unfettered discretion in the realm of powers defined by statutes and indeed, unlimited discretion in that sphere can become a ruthless destroyer of personal freedom. The power to investigate into cognizable offences must, therefore, be exercised strictly on the condition on which it is granted by the Code. ” 47. In Uma Shankar Gopalika vs. State of Bihar and Another, (2005) 10 SCC 336 , this Court has held as under: (SCC pp. 338-39, paras 6-7) “6. Now the question to be examined by us is as to whether on the facts disclosed in the petition of complaint any criminal offence whatsoever is made out much less offences under Sections 420/120-B IPC. The only allegation in the complaint petition against the accused persons is that they assured the complainant that when they receive the insurance claim amounting to Rs 4,20,000, they would pay a sum of Rs 2,60,000 to the complainant out of that but the same has never been paid. The only allegation in the complaint petition against the accused persons is that they assured the complainant that when they receive the insurance claim amounting to Rs 4,20,000, they would pay a sum of Rs 2,60,000 to the complainant out of that but the same has never been paid. Apart from that there is no other allegation in the petition of complaint. It was pointed out on behalf of the complainant that the accused fraudulently persuaded the complainant to agree so that the accused persons may take steps for moving the Consumer Forum in relation to the claim of Rs 4,20,000. It is well settled that every breach of contract would not give rise to an offence of cheating and only in those cases breach of contract would amount to cheating where there was any deception played at the very inception. If the intention to cheat has developed later on, the same cannot amount to cheating. In the present case it has nowhere been stated that at the very inception there was any intention on behalf of the accused persons to cheat which is a condition precedent for an offence under Section 420 IPC. 7. In our view petition of complaint does not disclose any criminal offence at all much less any offence either under Section 420 or Section 120-B IPC and the present case is a case of purely civil dispute between the parties for which remedy lies before a civil court by filing a properly constituted suit. In our opinion, in view of these facts allowing the police investigation to continue would amount to an abuse of the process of court and to prevent the same it was just and expedient for the High Court to quash the same by exercising the powers under Section 482 CrPC which it has erroneously refused.” 12. In Rajib Ranjan and others vs. R. Vijay Kumar (2015) 1 SCC 513 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that if the allegations like fabrication of records etc. had been mischievously made just to give a colour of criminality to a civil case, that too, after losing battle in civil proceedings, the filing of such complaint would not be bonafide and would rather amount to misuse and abuse of process of law. had been mischievously made just to give a colour of criminality to a civil case, that too, after losing battle in civil proceedings, the filing of such complaint would not be bonafide and would rather amount to misuse and abuse of process of law. Therefore, the High Court in such circumstances should have quashed the criminal proceedings in exercise of its power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. It is apt to reproduce the following observations: “23. In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, this Court has laid down principles on which Court can quash the criminal proceedings under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. These are as follows: (SCC pp. 378-79, para 102) “102.(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156 (1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155 (2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the Act concerned (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the Act concerned, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the Act concerned (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the Act concerned, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.” Principle Nos.6 and 7 are clearly applicable in the present case. 24. Having regard to the circumstances narrated and explained above, we are also of the view that attempt is made by the respondent to convert a case with civil nature into criminal prosecution. In a case like this, High Court would have been justified in quashing the proceedings in exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code. It would be of benefit to refer to the judgment in the case of Indian Oil Corpn. v. NEPC India Ltd. and others, (2006) 6 SCC 736 , wherein the Court adversely commented upon this very tendency of filing criminal complaints even in cases relating to commercial transaction for which civil remedy is available is available or has been availed. The Court held that the following observations of the Court in this behalf are taken note of: (SCC pp. 748-49, paras 13-14) “13. While on this issue, it is necessary to take notice of a growing tendency in business circles to convert purely civil disputes into criminal cases. This is obviously on account of a prevalent impression that civil law remedies are time consuming and do not adequately protect the interests of lenders/creditors. Such a tendency is seen in several family disputes also, leading to irretrievable breakdown of marriages/families. There is also an impression that if a person could somehow be entangled in a criminal prosecution, there is a likelihood of imminent settlement. Any effort to settle civil disputes and claims, which do not involve any criminal offence, by applying pressure through criminal prosecution should be deprecated and discouraged. In G. Sagar Suri v. State of U.P., (2000) 2 SCC 636 , this Court observed: (SCC p. 643, para 8) ‘8. Any effort to settle civil disputes and claims, which do not involve any criminal offence, by applying pressure through criminal prosecution should be deprecated and discouraged. In G. Sagar Suri v. State of U.P., (2000) 2 SCC 636 , this Court observed: (SCC p. 643, para 8) ‘8. … It is to be seen if a matter, which is essentially of a civil nature, has been given a cloak of criminal offence. Criminal proceedings are not a short cut of other remedies available in law. Before issuing process a criminal court has to exercise a great deal of caution. For the accused it is a serious matter. This Court has laid certain principles on the basis of which the High Court is to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code. Jurisdiction under this section has to be exercised to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.’ 14. While no one with a legitimate cause or grievance should be prevented from seeking remedies available in criminal law, a complainant who initiates or persists with a prosecution, being fully aware that the criminal proceedings are unwarranted and his remedy lies only in civil law, should himself be made accountable, at the end of such misconceived criminal proceedings, in accordance with law. One positive step that can be taken by the courts, to curb unnecessary prosecutions and harassment of innocent parties, is to exercise their power under Section 250 CrPC more frequently, where they discern malice or frivolousness or ulterior motives on the part of the complainant. Be that as it may.” 25. In Inder Mohan Goswami and another v. State of Uttaranchal and others, (2007) 12 SCC 1 , the Court reiterated the scope and ambit of power of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code in the following words: (SCC pp. 10-11 & 16, paras 23-25 & 46) “23. This Court in a number of cases has laid down the scope and ambit of courts' powers under Section 482 CrPC. Every High Court has inherent power to act ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice, for the administration of which alone it exists, or to prevent abuse of the process of the court. This Court in a number of cases has laid down the scope and ambit of courts' powers under Section 482 CrPC. Every High Court has inherent power to act ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice, for the administration of which alone it exists, or to prevent abuse of the process of the court. Inherent power under Section 482 CrPC can be exercised: (i) to give effect to an order under the Code; (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. 24. Inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC though wide have to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with great caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in this section itself. Authority of the court exists for the advancement of justice. If any abuse of the process leading to injustice is brought to the notice of the court, then the could would be justified in preventing injustice by invoking inherent powers in absence of specific provisions in the statute. Discussion of decided cases 25. Reference to the following cases would reveal that the courts have consistently taken the view that they must use this extraordinary power to prevent injustice and secure the ends of justice. The English courts have also used inherent power to achieve the same objective. It is generally agreed that the Crown Court has inherent power to protect its process from abuse. In Connelly v. DPP, 1 1964 AC 1254 Lord Devlin stated that where particular criminal proceedings constitute an abuse of process, the court is empowered to refuse to allow the indictment to proceed to trial. Lord Salmon in DPP v. Humphrys, 1977 AC 1 stressed the importance of the inherent power when he observed that it is only if the prosecution amounts to an abuse of the process of the court and is oppressive and vexatious that the judge has the power to intervene. He further mentioned that the court's power to prevent such abuse is of great constitutional importance and should be jealously preserved. ** ** ** 46. The court must ensure that criminal prosecution is not used as an instrument of harassment or for seeking private vendetta or with an ulterior motive to pressurise the accused. He further mentioned that the court's power to prevent such abuse is of great constitutional importance and should be jealously preserved. ** ** ** 46. The court must ensure that criminal prosecution is not used as an instrument of harassment or for seeking private vendetta or with an ulterior motive to pressurise the accused. On analysis of the aforementioned cases, we are of the opinion that it is neither possible nor desirable to lay down an inflexible rule that would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. Inherent jurisdiction of the High Courts under Section 482 CrPC though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when it is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the statute itself and in the aforementioned cases. In view of the settled legal position, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained.” 13. Apart from the above, it would be noticed that the complaint submitted to the Magistrate is nothing but the ‘cut, copy, paste version’ of the application filed before the Court under the provisions of Order 39 Rule 2-A CPC which as observed earlier stands dismissed. 14. The incident, if any, took place in the year 2010, whereas, respondent No.2 approached the Magistrate only in December, 2014. Apparently, there is no explanation for the delay of more than 4 years and such delay is bound to be fatal as these criminal proceedings have been initiated by a frustrated litigant like respondent No.2 with malafide intention and ulterior motive of wrecking vengeance on the petitioners. 15. It is more than settled that chagrined and frustrated litigants should not be permitted to give vent to their frustrations by cheaply invoking the jurisdiction of the criminal Court. The Court proceedings ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment and persecution. 16. Therefore, I have no difficulty in concluding that the FIR is clearly lodged to spite the other party because of private and personal grudge and to enmesh the other party in long and arduous criminal proceedings and thus an abuse of the process of law. 17. 16. Therefore, I have no difficulty in concluding that the FIR is clearly lodged to spite the other party because of private and personal grudge and to enmesh the other party in long and arduous criminal proceedings and thus an abuse of the process of law. 17. Similar reiteration of law can be found in recent judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Manoj Kumar Sharma and others versus State of Chhatishgarh and another, Criminal Appeal No.775/2013, decided on 23.08.2016 wherein the aspects of delay in lodging of FIR and scope of interference by the High Court in exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, were discussed in detail. 18. Having said so, I have no option but to allow the instant petition and consequently the FIR No.12/2015 dated 19.01.2015, registered at Police Station, Sadar, Solan, District Solan, under Sections 341, 506, 511, 427 and 34 of IPC and order of cognizance dated 10.04.2015 taken by the learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Court No.II, Solan, in case titled ‘State of H.P. versus Mohinder Singh Gupta and others’ in Case No.18/2 of 2015, against the petitioners, are ordered to be quashed. 19. The petition is allowed in the aforesaid terms. Pending application, if any, also stands disposed of.