JUDGMENT : Sandeep Sharma, J. By way of present petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, petitioner has prayed for following main relief:- “(i) That a writ of certiorari be passed against the respondents and the impugned Award dated 15.7.2010 be set aside in the interest of justice and fair play.” 2. Briefly stated facts as emerged from the record are that on 16.5.1995 respondent No. 2 (hereinafter referred to as ‘workman’) was selected for the post of Pharmacist, on contract basis, for sale counter of medicines in Deen Dayal Upadhaya Hospital (hereinafter referred to as ‘DDU Hospital’). On 22.7.1995, he joined the office of H.P. State Civil Supplies Corporation (hereinafter referred to as “Corporation’), as per agreement dated 22.7.1995 entered into between workman Shri Ajay Sood and the Managing Director, H.P. State Civil Supplies Corporation. But, it appears that shop in the said hospital was not in existence, as such, workman was engaged on a consolidated salary of Rs.2000/-, at the head office of the Corporation. Since, Construction work of shop was in progress, workman was asked to look after the work of construction of the shop. As per workman, he accepted the offer for the reason that he was assured that he would be engaged in the medicine shop counter, whenever the same is ready. But fact remains that shop, which was under construction at the time of appointment of the workman in terms of agreement dated 22.7.1995, was allotted to the son of senior officer of H.P. Secretariat and that too without getting his name sponsored through Employment Exchange. 3. Workman-Ajay Sood also claimed that he had worked continuously without interruption w.e.f. 22.7.1995 till July, 1997 but in the month of October/November, 1996, Corporation suddenly stopped his wages and terminated his service without notice, in violation of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’). Workman claimed that at the time of his illegal termination he had completed 240 days during preceding 12 months and, as such, his services could not be terminated without complying Section 25 F of the Act. Workman also claimed that for the month of November, 1996, he was not paid salary. Workman claimed that at the time of his illegal termination he had completed 240 days during preceding 12 months and, as such, his services could not be terminated without complying Section 25 F of the Act. Workman also claimed that for the month of November, 1996, he was not paid salary. In the aforesaid background, workman raised industrial dispute before the concerned authorities as a result of which, appropriate government made following reference under Section 10(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act to the Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Shimla, for adjudication. 4. Learned Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court on the basis of evidence as well as pleadings, claim and counter claim filed on behalf of respective parties, framed following issues:- “1. Whether Shri Ajay Sood left the job, on his own, in November, 1996 as per statement of respondent? If so, its effect? ….OPP 2. If Issue No. 1 is not proved in affirmative, whether the petitioner is entitled for any relief? ……OPP 3. Whether the petitioner is not a workman and the petition is not maintainable? ….OPR 5. Subsequently, on the basis of pleadings as well as evidence adduced on record by the respective parties, learned Industrial Tribunal by way of impugned award dated 15.7.2010, allowed the claim of the workman. Learned Industrial Tribunal while accepting the claim of the workman ordered that workman be reinstated in service with seniority and continuity but without back wages w.e.f. 1.12.1996. 6. Being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the aforesaid impugned award dated 15.7.2010 passed by learned Industrial Tribunal, present petitioner - Corporation filed instant writ petition seeking relief’s as have been reproduced hereinabove. 7. Shri Arvind Sharma, counsel representing the Petitioner-Corporation vehemently argued that the impugned award passed by learned Tribunal-cum-Labour Court is not sustainable as the same is not based upon the correct appreciation of the evidence available on record. Mr. Sharma forcefully argued that learned Industrial Tribunal while accepting the claim of respondent No. 2-workman, failed to appreciate that respondent No.2 was not employee of the Corporation and, hence, could not be termed as a workman as defined in Section 2 Clause (S) of the Industrial Disputes Act and, as such, no direction could be issued to Corporation to reinstate respondent No. 2-Ajay Sood in service. Mr. Mr. Arvind Sharma also argued that job was assigned to respondent No. 2 by Corporation on the verbal agreement to work in the head office till completion of the construction of shop at DDU Hospital on the basis of stop gap arrangement on the payment of minimum Rs. 2000/- per month and, as such, learned Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court erred in holding respondent No. 2 as an employee of the Corporation. Mr. Sharma strenuously argued that since there is no employer and employee relationship between Corporation and workman, award passed by respondent No. 1 i.e. Industrial tribunal is totally wrong, illegal and contrary to the principle of law and justice, as such, deserves to be quashed and set aside. 8. Apart from above, Mr. Sharma forcefully contended that learned Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court below miserably failed to appreciate that engagement of Pharmacist by the Corporation was purely on commission basis and not on daily wages. He further contended that since contract was to be renewed on yearly basis, claim of the respondent No. 2 to be claiming himself to be employee of the Corporation could not be accepted at all by the learned Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court while answering the reference made to it. As per Mr. Sharma, moreover, as per verbal contract, the services of the Pharmacist could be terminated by authority at any point of time, in case, his service and conduct was not up to the mark. Since, services of the respondent No. 2 was not found satisfactory, Managing Director of the Corporation had all the power to terminate the contract without giving any notice. It is also contended on behalf of the Corporation that engagement of Pharmacist was purely on contract basis and same could be dispensed with/terminated at any point of time by the authorities without assigning any reason. 9. With a view to substantiate his aforesaid arguments, Mr. Sharma invited the attention of this Court to the judgment passed by H.P. Administrative Tribunal in OA. No. 2351 of 2005 titled as “Mahesh Kumar vs. H.P. State Civil Supplies Corporation & Ors.”, wherein, it was held that Pharmacist engaged on contract basis by the Corporation are not holder of the civil post as has been settled by the Hon’ble Apex Court in 2006 (4) SCC 1 . No. 2351 of 2005 titled as “Mahesh Kumar vs. H.P. State Civil Supplies Corporation & Ors.”, wherein, it was held that Pharmacist engaged on contract basis by the Corporation are not holder of the civil post as has been settled by the Hon’ble Apex Court in 2006 (4) SCC 1 . Petitioner-Corporation further contended that learned Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court has fallen in grave error while deciding issue No. 1 that the inquiry proceedings are not on the record and as a matter of fact the copy of the enquiry report annexed with the record was self-explanatory and could prove this fact beyond reasonable doubt that the workman was guilty of irresponsible behaviour, hence, his services were rightly terminated by the Managing Director of the Corporation. Mr. Sharma argued that learned Tribunal below has miserably failed to appreciate the evidence adduced on record in its right perspective. Mr. Sharma invited the attention of this Court to the statement of Managing Director, wherein he stated that workman had left job on his own sweet will in November, 1996 and did not report back for a longer period of time. While concluding his arguments, Mr. Sharma, forcefully contended that it stands duly proved on record that respondent No. 2-workman was not sincere towards his services and his irresponsible behaviour would have lead to huge losses to the Corporation, if he was allowed to continue to work in DDU Hospital. 10. Lastly, Shri Arvind Sharma, argued that learned Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Shimla, has fallen in grave error because bare perusal of impugned award clearly suggests that it has exceeded its jurisdiction while passing the impugned award. Mr. Sharma, forcefully contended that learned Industrial Tribunal was bound to answer the reference made to it by the government under Section 10 (a), whereas bare perusal of the impugned award suggests that it has nowhere decided the issue of abandonment of service by workman, while answering the reference as referred hereinabove. In the aforesaid background, Mr. Sharma prayed for quashing and setting aside of the impugned award passed by respondent No. 1. 11. Shri Sunil Mohal Goel, counsel representing respondent No. 2-workman, supported the impugned award passed by the learned Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court. In the aforesaid background, Mr. Sharma prayed for quashing and setting aside of the impugned award passed by respondent No. 1. 11. Shri Sunil Mohal Goel, counsel representing respondent No. 2-workman, supported the impugned award passed by the learned Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court. He vehemently argued that bare perusal of the impugned award suggests that same is based upon the correct appreciation of evidence adduced on record as well as law applicable in this case, as such, no interference, whatsoever, of this Court is warranted in the present facts and circumstances of the case. Mr. Goel also stated that this Court while exercising writ jurisdiction has no jurisdiction to re-appreciate the evidence on the basis of which learned Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court has come to the conclusion that the services of the respondent No. 2-workman was illegally terminated without resorting to the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act. With a view to refute the submissions having been made by Shri Arvind Sharma counsel representing the Corporation, Mr. Goel specifically invited the attention of the Court to the term of reference whereby learned Labour Court, Shimla was required to explore answer to question “whether the statement of Managing Director, H.P. State Civil Supplies Corporation Ltd., Kasumpati, Shimla that workman- Ajay Sood himself left his job in November, 1996 is legal and justified.” 12. While referring to the aforesaid question of law, Mr. Goel vehemently argued that the submissions having been made on behalf of Corporation by Shri Arvind Sharma is self-contradictory because sole question before the learned Labour Court was whether workman, namely, Ajay Sood, himself abandoned the job or not, but entire evidence led on record by Corporation itself suggest that workman at no point of time abandoned the job, rather Corporation terminated his services illegally without resorting to the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act under the garb of some disciplinary proceedings initiated against him. 13. With a view to substantiate the aforesaid contradictory plea being taken by the Corporation, Mr. Goel specifically invited the attention of this Court to the statement of RW1 Shri K.D. Sharma, Procurement Officer, Establishment, H.P. Civil Supplies Corporation, Shimla, wherein, he stated that workman-Ajay Sood was engaged as Pharmacist on contract basis on 22.7.1995 vide appointment letter Ex.RB. 13. With a view to substantiate the aforesaid contradictory plea being taken by the Corporation, Mr. Goel specifically invited the attention of this Court to the statement of RW1 Shri K.D. Sharma, Procurement Officer, Establishment, H.P. Civil Supplies Corporation, Shimla, wherein, he stated that workman-Ajay Sood was engaged as Pharmacist on contract basis on 22.7.1995 vide appointment letter Ex.RB. He also stated that since work and conduct of the workman Ajay Sood was not found satisfactory, he was served upon Show Cause Notice Ex.RF and after receipt of reply Ex.RG, enquiry was initiated against the workman and ultimately services of the workman were dispensed with vide Ex.RM. 14. Mr. Goel, while referring to the aforesaid portion of the statement, forcefully contended that bare perusal of statement made by RW1 clearly suggests that, at no point of time, workman abandoned the job, rather Corporation themselves terminated services of the workman without resorting to the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. In the aforesaid background, Mr. Goel prayed that present petition may be dismissed with cost in favour of the workman. 15. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and carefully gone through the record of the case. 16. Before proceedings on the merits of the case, it may be noticed that respondent No. 2-workman has not laid any challenge to the impugned award by way of any independent writ petition specifically challenging therein the denial of back wages by Labour Court, who otherwise held him entitled to the benefit of reinstatement with continuity of service and seniority. In the present case, it clearly emerge from the record that workman was appointed on the post of Pharmacist on contract basis for sale counter of medicines in Deen Dayal Upadhaya Hospital vide letter dated 22.7.1995. 17. However, it is undisputed that after his aforesaid appointment he was made to join in the office of Corporation with the assurance that as and when construction work of shop at DDU Hospital is completed, he would be engaged there in terms of agreement dated 22.7.1995. Corporation also admitted that during his engagement, workman was assigned the job of doing the miscellaneous work, which included release of consignment of medicines from transport company and handing over of the kits/boxes of medicines to the transporter for dispatching the same to various destination. Corporation also admitted that during his engagement, workman was assigned the job of doing the miscellaneous work, which included release of consignment of medicines from transport company and handing over of the kits/boxes of medicines to the transporter for dispatching the same to various destination. But as per Corporation, since workman failed to work to the satisfaction of Corporation and there were adverse remarks in his service record, disciplinary proceedings were initiated against workman and Show Cause Notice i.e. Ext. RF was served upon him calling upon him to explain his conduct. As per Corporation, workman-Ajay Sood submitted reply Ext.RG but the same was not found satisfactory and thereafter enquiry was initiated against the workman. Shri S.L. Bragta, Inquiry Officer, found workman at fault and ultimately vide order Ext. RM, services of the workman was dispensed with immediate effect. 18. Conjoint reading of claim as well as reply, clearly suggests that respondent No. 2-workman was appointed on contract basis by the Corporation after following due process for appointment. It also stands admitted on record that interview was conducted by Corporation on 16.5.1995 and workman was selected for the post of Pharmacist on contract basis for sale counter of medicines in DDU Hospital. It also stands proved on record that pursuant to aforesaid appointment having been offered to the workman and he joined duties on 22.7.1995 in the office of Corporation, where he was asked to look-after the work of construction of shop, which was being constructed through HPPWD. It also stands proved on record that apart from above construction work, workman was assigned the job of routine duties i.e. to clear the documents and material for transport, packing and dispatch of medicines boxes to various destinations and preparing of invoices. 19. It is an admitted case of the Corporation that since during aforesaid period, work of workman was not found satisfactory and disciplinary proceedings were initiated in accordance with law and services of workman was dispensed with vide Ext.RM. Hence, it stands duly proved on record that, at no point of time, workman abandoned the job, rather his services were dispensed with by the Corporation vide Ext.RM and it also stands duly proved on record by RW1, who himself appeared before the learned Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court as witness. Hence, it stands duly proved on record that, at no point of time, workman abandoned the job, rather his services were dispensed with by the Corporation vide Ext.RM and it also stands duly proved on record by RW1, who himself appeared before the learned Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court as witness. Though after perusing the pleadings, it clearly emerge that Corporation led on record totally contradictory evidence to prove the term of reference as referred hereinabove, whereby, learned Labour Court was specifically asked to ascertain “whether the statement of Managing Director, Civil Supplies Corporation that workman Shri Ajay Sood himself left his job is legal and justified.” 20. But in the present case, it stands clearly established that Corporation themselves terminated the services of the workman by resorting to the disciplinary proceedings, as such, this Court sees no force in the contention put on behalf Corporation that learned Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court while answering the reference exceeded its jurisdiction since it failed to return finding, if any, in terms of reference made to it under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. 21. Undoubtedly, it was incumbent upon the learned Labour Court to answer “whether Shri Ajay Sood himself abandoned the job in the November, 1996 or not in view of term of reference”, but interestingly perusal of reply filed by the Corporation as well as deposition made by RW1, who appeared as witness, clearly suggests that workman never abandoned the job, rather Corporation by resorting to the disciplinary proceedings, dispensed with the services of workman-Shri Ajay Sood. This Court after perusing the aforesaid reply and statement having been made on record by RW1, is of the view that there is no illegality and infirmity in the impugned award dated 15.7.2010 passed by learned Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, wherein on the basis of evidence led on record by the Corporation, learned Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court came to the conclusion that, at no point of time, workman abandoned job, rather his services were terminated illegally in violation of Section 25 (b), (f), (g), (h) and (n) of the Industrial Disputes Act. 22. 22. Since, Corporation itself failed to lead positive evidence before the learned Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court to prove that workman had himself abandoned the job, learned Labour Court rightly relying upon the written statement as well as submissions having been made on behalf of Corporation in the shape of RW1, recorded the findings that workman never abandoned the job and his termination from service by the Corporation in the garb of disciplinary is in violation of Section 25 (b), (f), (g), (h) and (n) of the Act. 23. It is not understood that how Corporation could lead such kind of evidence in the present case, especially, in view of term of reference as has been reproduced hereinabove. Corporation was to lead evidence to suggest that workman Ajay Sood himself abandoned the job. But in the instant case, interestingly Corporation itself by placing memo dated 3.11.1995, 14.11.1995 and 18.1.1996 admitted that during the period of engagement, work of workman was not found satisfactory, as such, Show Cause Notice was issued upon him and after due procedure disciplinary proceedings were initiated. It is own case of the Corporation that Show Cause Notice was issued to the workman but since his reply was not found satisfactory, his services were terminated. 24. Similarly, RW1 Shri K.D. Sharma while making statement before the learned Labour Court reiterated the aforesaid stand taken in the written statement by Corporation. Perusal of statement of RW1, nowhere suggests that, at no point of time, Ajay Sood - workman abandoned the job rather RW1 categorically stated that his services were dispensed with after resorting to disciplinary proceedings. Though perusal of award in its entirety suggests that learned Labour Court while deciding the controversy also not examined the validity and legality, if any, of the disciplinary proceedings allegedly initiated by the Corporation while dispensing with the services of the workman. But this Court after seeing the aforesaid aspects, as has been discussed above, is of the view that same was not required at all because learned Labour Court while specifically answering the question of law referred to it was to return finding, if any, on the basis of positive evidence, if any, led on record by the Corporation. 25. Since, in the instant case, Corporation itself stated that services of the workman were dispensed with by way of disciplinary proceedings, nothing left for learned Tribunal to decide in terms of reference. 25. Since, in the instant case, Corporation itself stated that services of the workman were dispensed with by way of disciplinary proceedings, nothing left for learned Tribunal to decide in terms of reference. The aforesaid admissions having been made on behalf of the Corporation were sufficient for the learned Labour Court to answer the term of reference as mentioned hereinabove. Perusal of impugned award also suggest that Corporation have not been able to prove on record the disciplinary proceedings, which were allegedly initiated against the workman. 26. Since, workman specifically alleged that, at no point of time, he was associated by Inquiry Officer Shri S.L Bragta, who conducted the inquiry, it was incumbent upon the Corporation to cite him as witness to depose before the learned Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court that sufficient opportunities were afforded by him to workman before submitting inquiry report. Since, S.L. Bragta, who was inquiry officer, was not examined in the present case, the plea of having adopted due procedure, if any, by the Corporation cannot be accepted on its face value, as such, the same was rightly rejected by the Courts below. 27. Similarly, this Court finds that though inquiry report Ex. RJ was placed on record but no inquiry proceedings were placed on record before the learned Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, hence learned Labour Court rightly concluded that from the record pertaining to inquiry proceedings, it would have come to the knowledge of the Court that whether inquiry officer had followed the principal of natural justice or not. 28. In the present case, where Corporation failed to examine inquiry officer, who conducted inquiry proceedings, and place inquiry report, version put-forth on behalf of RW1 Shri D.K. Sharma was rightly not accepted by the Court below on its face value. Though, this Court is of the view that there was no need at all for learned Labour Court to examine the aspect of inquiry, if any, as claimed by the Corporation, especially, keeping in view the term of reference, where only question of abandonment of job by workman was to be ascertained. 29. Since, Corporation itself admitted that services of workman was dispensed with after holding disciplinary proceedings, there was no requirement, if any, to see other part of the evidence on record by the Corporation. 29. Since, Corporation itself admitted that services of workman was dispensed with after holding disciplinary proceedings, there was no requirement, if any, to see other part of the evidence on record by the Corporation. It is well settled law that mere plea of abandonment is not sufficient to prove that workman abandoned the job rather employer is expected to lead positive evidence to suggest that workman abandoned the job. 30. In this regard, reliance is placed upon the judgment passed by Hon’ble Bombay High Court in case titled Ocean Creations Vs. Manohar Gangaram Kamble 2013 SCC Online Bom 1537 : (2014)140 FLR 725. It is profitable to reproduce paras No. 8, 9 and 10 of the judgment herein:- “8. The legal position is also settled that ‘abandonment or relinquishment of service’ is always a question of intention and normally such intention cannot be attributed to an employee without adequate evidence in that behalf. This is a question of fact which is to be determined in the light of surrounding circumstances of each case. It is well settled that even in case of abandonment of service, unless the service conditions make special provisions to the contrary, employer has to give notice to the workman calling upon him to resume duties and where he fails to resume duties, to hold an enquiry before terminating services on such ground. 9. In somewhat similar circumstances a Division Bench of this court comprising P.B. Sawant, J. (as he then was) and V.V. Vaze, J. in the case of Gaurishanker Vishwakarma v. Engle Spring Industries Pvt. Ltd. Observed thus: “…..it is now well settled that even in the case of the abandonment of service, the employer has to give a notice to the workman calling upon him to resume his duty and also to hold an enquiry before terminating his service on that ground. In the present case the employer has done neither. It was for the employer to prove that the workman had abandoned the service….. It is therefore difficult to believe that the workman who had worked continuously for six to seven years, would abandon his service for no rhyme or reason. It has also to be remembered that it was the workman who had approached the Government Labour Officer with a specific grievance that he was not allowed to join his duty. It is therefore difficult to believe that the workman who had worked continuously for six to seven years, would abandon his service for no rhyme or reason. It has also to be remembered that it was the workman who had approached the Government Labour Officer with a specific grievance that he was not allowed to join his duty. It was also his grievance that although he had approached the company for work from time to time, and the company’s partner Anand had kept on promising him that he would be taken in service, he was not given work and hence he was forced to approach the Government Labour Officer. In the circumstances, it is difficult to believe that he would refuse the offer of work when it was given tot him before the Labour Officer….” 10. Again a learned Single Judge of this court R.M. Lodha, J (as he then was) in the case of Mahamadsha Ganishah Patel v. Mastanbaug Consumers’ Co-op. Wholesale & Retail Stores Ltd. Observed thus:- “….The legal position is almost settled that even in the case of abandonment of service, the employer has to give notice to the employee calling upon him to resume his duty. If the employee does not turn up despite such notice, the employer should hold inquiry on that ground and then pass appropriate order of termination. At the time when employment is scarce, ordinarily abandonment of service by employee cannot be presumed. Moreover, abandonment of service is always a matter of intention and such intention in the absence of supportable evidence cannot be attributed to the employee. It goes without saying that whether the employee has abandoned the service or not is always a question of fact which has to be adjudicated on the basis of evidence and attending circumstances. In the present case employer has miserably failed to discharge the burden by leading evidence that employee abandoned service. The Labour Court has considered this aspect, and, in my view rightly reached the conclusion that the employer has failed to establish any abandonment of service and it was a clear case of termination. The termination being illegal, the Labour Court did not commit any error in holding the act of employer as unfair labour practice under Item-I, Schedule IV of the MRTU & PULP Act…..” 31. The termination being illegal, the Labour Court did not commit any error in holding the act of employer as unfair labour practice under Item-I, Schedule IV of the MRTU & PULP Act…..” 31. Since, Corporation has not been able to prove on record that disciplinary proceedings were conducted in accordance with law, this Court finds no illegality and infirmity in the impugned award passed by the learned Labour Court. On the other hand, workman while examining himself as PW1 clearly stated that in the month of November, 1996 respondent stopped paying salary but still he continued to work till July, 1997 when his services were terminated. Factum of continuation of services as claimed by PW1 itself stand admitted in the statement of RW1, wherein, he admitted that workman services were terminated after resorting to the disciplinary proceedings. PW1 also stated that, at no point of time, notice was given to him nor he was paid compensation after 1996 when his pay was withheld. He also admitted that without any notice and compensation, Corporation dispensed with his service without resorting to the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act. It also emerge from the statement of RW1 that Corporation appointed other person after termination of workman, which clearly suggests that there was violation of Section 25 (g). Whereas, RW1 while answering to aforesaid aspect of engagement of other person feigned ignorance with regard to engagement of Shri Sanjeev, Pharmacist, who was appointed at the place of workman without following due process of law. 32. Hence, in totality of facts and circumstances, this Court finds no reason, whatsoever, to intervene in the well reasoned award passed by the learned Labour Court. Moreover, this Court has very limited jurisdiction while exercising power under Section 226 to re-appreciate the evidence. 33. Apart from above, findings of fact recorded by learned Tribunal below on the basis of appreciation of evidence cannot be questioned in writ proceedings and writ court cannot act as an appellate court. In this regard, reliance is placed upon the judgment passed by Hon’ble Apex Court in case titled Bhuvnesh Kumar Dwivedi vs. M/s Hindalco Industries Ltd. 2014 AIR SCW 3157. It is profitable to reproduce paras 16, 17 and 18 of the judgment herein: “16. In this regard, reliance is placed upon the judgment passed by Hon’ble Apex Court in case titled Bhuvnesh Kumar Dwivedi vs. M/s Hindalco Industries Ltd. 2014 AIR SCW 3157. It is profitable to reproduce paras 16, 17 and 18 of the judgment herein: “16. ………The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Article 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior Courts or tribunals: these are cases where orders are passed by inferior Courts or Tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is no entitled to act as an Appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened for questioned in writ proceedings. A error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the interference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised. 17. The judgments mentioned above can be read with the judgment of this Court in Harjinder Singh’s case (supra), the relevant paragraph of which reads as under: 21. Before concluding, we consider it necessary to observe that while exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution in matters like the present one, the High Courts are duty bound to keep in mind that the Industrial Disputes Act and other similar legislative instruments are social welfare legislations and the same are required to be interpreted keeping in view the goals set out in the Preamble of the Constitution and the provisions contained in Part IV thereof in general and Articles 38, 39(a) to (e), 43 and 43-A in particular, which mandate that the State should secure a social order for the promotion of welfare of the people, ensure equality between men and women and equitable distribution of material resources of the community to sub-serve the common good and also ensure that the workers get their dues. More than 41 years ago, Gajendragadkar, J. opined that: 10…. The concept of social and economic justice is a living concept of revolutionary import; it gives sustenance to the rule of law and meaning and significance to the ideal of welfare State. 18. More than 41 years ago, Gajendragadkar, J. opined that: 10…. The concept of social and economic justice is a living concept of revolutionary import; it gives sustenance to the rule of law and meaning and significance to the ideal of welfare State. 18. A careful reading of the judgments reveals that the High Court can interfere with an order of the Tribunal only on the procedural level and in cases, where the decision of the lower Courts has been arrived at in gross violation of the legal principles. The High Court shall interfere with factual aspect placed before the Labour Courts only when it is convinced that the Labour Court has made patent mistakes in admitting evidence illegally or have made grave errors in law in coming to the conclusion on facts. The High Court granting contrary relief under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution amounts to exceeding its jurisdiction conferred upon it. Therefore, we accordingly answer the point No. 1 in favour of the appellant.” [Emphasis added] 34. Consequently, in view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court sees no force in the writ petition filed on behalf of Corporation, as such, the same is dismissed being devoid of any merit.