ORDER : Navin Sinha, J. The question of law arising for consideration in both the appeals being common, they have been heard together and are being disposed of by a common order. 2. For convenience, the facts to the extent necessary shall be discussed from D.B. Special Appeal (Writ) No. 560/2016 (Urban Improvement Trust, Udaipur and Ors. v. Vishweshwar Nath Pandey and Ors.) 3. The present appeals arise from order dated 24.02.2016 passed by the Learned Single Judge allowing S.B. Civil Writ Petition Nos.6730/2006 & 2398/2006 holding that the land acquisition proceedings initiated on 01.11.2002 stood lapsed by virtue of the provisions of Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as "the Right to Fair Compensation Act"). 4. Counsel for the Appellants submits that the Respondents obtained interim order restraining dispossession on a plea of being similarly placed as certain others who had interim orders in their favour even though they were not similarly situated. If the Appellants were restrained from dispossessing by virtue of an interim order, that period will have to be excluded. It was next submitted that the writ petition filed after publication of the Award was itself highly belated and not maintainable on grounds of delay and laches. 5. Counsel for the Respondents has opposed the appeals submitting that the order of the Learned Single Judge calls for no interference. 6. We have considered the submissions. 7. Notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as "the Land Acquisition Act") was issued on 01.11.2002. The declaration under Section 6 of the Act was published on 12.01.2004. The Award was made on 31.10.2005 and notices under Section 12(2) of the Act issued on 17.11.2005. Interim order was passed on 23.11.2006 restraining dispossession. It continued to operate till the disposal of the writ petition. In the meantime the Right to Fair Compensation Act came into force. It is an admitted fact that the award was made five years prior to coming into force of the latter Act. Likewise it is also not in dispute that compensation has not been paid till date and neither has it been deposited in Court. In the meantime the Right to Fair Compensation Act came into force. It is an admitted fact that the award was made five years prior to coming into force of the latter Act. Likewise it is also not in dispute that compensation has not been paid till date and neither has it been deposited in Court. The only question which survives is if the interim order of the Court was sufficient justification not to apply the time limitation of five years by excluding the said period and whether in the circumstances failure to deposit the compensation in Court will not vitiate the acquisition proceedings. 8. The matter is no more res integra and needs no further discussion in view of (2014) 3 SCC 183 [Pune Municipal Corporation and Anr. v. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki and Ors.] observing as follows : "17......we are of the view, therefore, that for the purposes of Section 24(2), the compensation shall be regarded as "paid" if the compensation has been offered to the person interested and such compensation has been deposited in the court where reference under Section 18 can be made on happening of any of the contingencies contemplated under Section 31(2) of the 1894 Act. In other words, the compensation may be said to have been "paid" within the meaning of Section 24(2) when the Collector (or for that matter Land Acquisition Officer) has discharged his obligation and deposited the amount of compensation in court and made that amount available to the interested person to be dealt with as provided in Sections 32 and 33. 9. What shall be the effect of the interim order passed by the Court and whether it is to be excluded or not also fell for consideration in (2015) 3 SCC 353 [Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Association v. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors.] observing as follows : 11. From a plain reading of Section 24 of the 2013 Act it is clear that Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act does not exclude any period during which the land acquisition proceeding might have remained stayed on account of stay or injunction granted by any court. From a plain reading of Section 24 of the 2013 Act it is clear that Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act does not exclude any period during which the land acquisition proceeding might have remained stayed on account of stay or injunction granted by any court. In the same Act, proviso to Section 19(7) in the context of limitation for publication of declaration under Section 19(1) and the Explanation to Section 69(2) for working out the market value of the land in the context of delay between preliminary notification under Section 11 and the date of the award, specifically provide that the period or periods during which the acquisition proceedings were held up on account of any stay or injunction by the order of any court be excluded in computing the relevant period. In that view of the matter it can be safely concluded that the Legislature has consciously omitted to extend the period of five years indicated in Section 24(2) even if the proceedings had been delayed on account of an order of stay or injunction granted by a court of law or for any reason. Such casus omissus cannot be supplied by the court in view of law on the subject elaborately discussed by this Court in Padma Sundara Rao (Dead) and Ors. v. State of T.N. 12. Even in the Land Acquisition Act of 1894, the Legislature had brought about amendment in Section 6 through an Amendment Act of 1984 to add Explanation 1 for the purpose of excluding the period when the proceeding suffered stay by an order of the court, in the context of limitation provided for publishing the declaration under Section 6(1) of the Act. To a similar effect was the Explanation to Section 11A which was added by Amendment Act 68 of 1984. Clearly the Legislature has, in its wisdom, made the period of five years under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act absolute and unaffected by any delay in the proceedings on account of any order of stay by a court. The plain wordings used by the Legislature are clear and do not create any ambiguity or conflict. In such a situation, the court is not required to depart from the literal rule of interpretation. 10. In 2015 (2) WLC (SC) Civil 409 [Karnail Kaur and Ors. The plain wordings used by the Legislature are clear and do not create any ambiguity or conflict. In such a situation, the court is not required to depart from the literal rule of interpretation. 10. In 2015 (2) WLC (SC) Civil 409 [Karnail Kaur and Ors. v. State of Punjab & Ors.] the view taken in Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Association (Supra) has been followed. We therefore find no reason to interfere with the order under appeals but without prejudice to the rights of the Appellants afresh for acquisition in accordance with law. Both the appeals are dismissed. Appeal dismissed with liberty to initiate fresh proceeding.