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Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

2016 DIGILAW 184 (MP)

Umesh Shukla v. State of M. P.

2016-03-02

SUJOY PAUL

body2016
ORDER : Sujoy Paul, J. In this petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has challenged the suspension order dated 18-5-2015 (Annexure P/1). 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the suspension order dated 18-5-2015 is liable to be set aside on two counts. Firstly, it is contended that this order is passed on the dictate of Lokayukta. There is no independent application of mind by the Superintendent of Police. Secondly, it is contended that the charge-sheet in the Departmental Enquiry was issued after 90 days from the date of suspension, hence the suspension stood revoked. 3. The prayer is opposed by Shri Sudeep Chaterjee, learned Panel Lawyer. 4. I have heard the parties at length. 5. The impugned order, on the face of it, shows that the petitioner was placed under suspension because a criminal case relating to demand of bribe is under investigation by Lokayukta-Establishment. The first question is whether the Authority can place the petitioner under suspension for this reason ? 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner during the course of arguments fairly admits that Rule 9(1) of the M.P.C.S. (C.C.A.) Rules, 1966 is the enabling provision. Rule 9(1) of the C.C.A. Rules makes it crystal clear that an employee can be placed under suspension- (a) where a disciplinary proceeding against him is contemplated or is pending, or (b) where a case against him in respect of any criminal offence is under investigation, inquiry of trial. 7. The provision makes it clear that an employee can be placed under suspension even when an investigation is going on in respect of criminal offence. Thus, I am unable to hold that the Superintendent of Police was either incompetent or there was no provision to place the petitioner under suspension. If Rule 9 of the C.C.A. Rules or the enabling provision is not quoted in the impugned order, this will not make the order vulnerable. The order nowhere shows that it has been passed without application of mind or on the dictate of Lokayukta Organization. Order, on the contrary shows that necessary ingredient for placing the petitioner under suspension is taken into account. Thus, the contention in this regard is rejected. 8. The second contention is regarding revocation of suspension because the Charge-sheet is issued after 90 days. For this submission, Shri Dileep Pandey relied on Rule 9 (5)(a) of C.C.A. Rules. Order, on the contrary shows that necessary ingredient for placing the petitioner under suspension is taken into account. Thus, the contention in this regard is rejected. 8. The second contention is regarding revocation of suspension because the Charge-sheet is issued after 90 days. For this submission, Shri Dileep Pandey relied on Rule 9 (5)(a) of C.C.A. Rules. The said Rules reads as under :- “(5)(a) An order of suspension made or deemed to have been made under this rule, shall continue to remain in force until it is modified or revoked by the authority competent to do so: [Provided that the order of suspension shall stand revoked on expiry of the period of forty-five-days from the date of order of suspension in case a copy of charges and other documents referred to in sub-rule (2-a) are not issued to such Government without obtaining the orders of the State Government for extension of the period for issue of the said documents, as required under sub-rule (2-b): Provided further that the order of suspension shall stand revoked on expiry of the period of 90 days from the date of order of suspension, in case the copy of charges and other documents referred to in sub-rule (2-a) are not issued to such Government servant.]” 9. This Sub-rule 5 (a) talks about Sub-rules (2-a) and (2-b) which read as under: “(2-a) Where a Government servant is placed under suspension under clause (a) of sub-rule (1). This Sub-rule 5 (a) talks about Sub-rules (2-a) and (2-b) which read as under: “(2-a) Where a Government servant is placed under suspension under clause (a) of sub-rule (1). the order of suspension shall contain the reasons for making such order and where it is proposed to hold an enquiry against such Government servant under rule 14, a copy of the articles of charges, the statement of imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour and a list of documents and witnesses by which each article of charge is proposed to be sustained shall be issued or caused to be issued by the disciplinary authority to such Government servant as required by sub-rule (4) of Rule 14, within a period of 45 days from the date of order of suspension: Provided that where the disciplinary authority is the [State Government or the High Court], the copy of charges and other documents mentioned above shall be issued or caused to be issued to such Government servant within a period of 90 days from the date of order of suspension.] (2-b) Where the disciplinary authority fails to issue to the Government servant, a copy of the charges and other documents referred to in sub-rule (2-a) within the period of 45 days, the disciplinary authority shall, before expiry of the said period, obtain orders in writing of the State Government for extension of the said period of suspension: Provided that the period of suspension shall in no case be enhanced beyond a period of 90 days from the date of the order of suspension.” 10. A conjoint reading of Clause (a) of Sub-rule (1) of Rule 9 and Sub-rule 5(a), (2-a) and (2-b) of the said Rules makes it clear that the question of automatic revocation of suspension would arise when the employee is placed under suspension because of pendency of disciplinary proceeding as per Rule 9(1)(a) of C.C.A. Rules. In the present case, the impugned order of suspension makes it clear that the petitioner was not suspended because of any disciplinary proceeding. He was suspended because an investigation for a criminal offence is going on. Thus, Sub-rule 5(a) of the said Rules cannot be pressed into service in the present case. Hence, when an employee is placed under suspension because of investigation in criminal case, there is no provision in the Rules that the suspension would be automatically revoked after 90 days. He was suspended because an investigation for a criminal offence is going on. Thus, Sub-rule 5(a) of the said Rules cannot be pressed into service in the present case. Hence, when an employee is placed under suspension because of investigation in criminal case, there is no provision in the Rules that the suspension would be automatically revoked after 90 days. In other words, it is prerogative of the employer to proceed simultaneously against an employee in a Departmental Enquiry. Putting it differently, despite pendency of a criminal investigation/enquiry, the employer may initiate a disciplinary proceeding. In that event, the employer may decide to issue Charge-sheet after sometime. The said Charge-sheet, if issued after 90 days, will not have an impact of automatic revocation of suspension because the suspension order was not passed because of pendency of any disciplinary proceeding. Thus, the second contention of Shri Dileep Pandey cannot be accepted. 11. Shri Dileep Pandey relied on 2005(4) M.P.L.J. 524 , Suresh Kumar Purohit v. State of M. P. and another. The said judgment relates with the aspect of independent application of mind. At the cost of repetition, in my opinion there is no material on record to show that the competent authority has placed the petitioner under suspension without application of mind. There is no iota of evidence to show that competent authority has acted under dictate of Lokayukta Organization. Hence in the fact situation of the present case, the said judgment is of no assistance. Apart from this, a Division Bench of this Court in 2012(3) M.P.L.J. 567 , A.P. Singh Gaharwar v. State of M. P. and others considered the aforesaid judgment. The Division Bench opined as under :- “23. We are, therefore, constrained to clarify that the decision rendered in the case of Suresh Kumar Purohit (supra) was and is confined to the facts of that particular case and cannot and shall not be treated as laving down the law or as a precedent for the purposes of interpreting the provisions of Rule 9 of the Rules of 1966. in any other case specifically in view of the analysis and interpretation of Rule 9(1) and 9 (5)(d) of the Rules of 1966, as made by us in the present case.” (Emphasis supplied) 12. On the basis of the aforesaid analysis, I find no reason to interfere in this petition. Hence, the petition fails and is hereby dismissed.