Research › Search › Judgment

Allahabad High Court · body

2016 DIGILAW 1843 (ALL)

Rameswari v. State of U. P.

2016-05-12

ADITYA NATH MITTAL

body2016
JUDGMENT Aditya Nath Mittal, J. – Challenge in this appeal is the judgement and order dated 23.08.1996 passed by IIIrd Additional Sessions Judge, Lakhimpur Kheri in Sessions Trial No.115 of 1991 by which the appellant has been convicted for the offence punishable under section 306 IPC with an imprisonment of five years rigorous imprisonment and one year rigorous imprisonment for the offence punishable under section 498-A IPC. 2. Brief facts of the case are that the police personnels got information on 05.12.1990 that the wife of Narendra Kumar had died due to burn injuries, upon which the police personnels went to the spot and prepared the inquest report. On 06.12.1990, at about 3.30 pm, a case under section 306 IPC was registered and the dead body was sent for post-mortem examination. After the investigation, the offence punishable under section 306 IPC was found against the appellant and the charge-sheet was filed. 3. The prosecution has examined Constable Ram Lal as PW-1; Constable Narain Bux Singh as PW-2; Ram Autar as PW-3; Som Nath as PW-4; Sundar Lal as PW-5; Dr. G. K. Singh as PW-6; Head Constable Ram Lochan as PW-7 and Sub-Inspector Siya Ram Mishra (retired) as PW-8. 4. After the prosecution evidence, the statement of the appellant was recorded under section 313 Cr.P.C. in which she had denied the evidence but no evidence in defence was adduced. 5. After appreciating the evidence on record, learned court below came to the conclusion that the appellant is guilty for the offence punishable under section 498-A and 306 IPC and accordingly sentenced her. It is to be mentioned that the appellant is the mother-in-law of the deceased. The husband of the deceased was found to be juvenile, who has been tried separately. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that for punishing the appellant for the offence punishable under section 306 IPC, the abetment or instigation should have been proved but in the present case, the only evidence against the appellant is that she resisted the deceased to go close to her husband because she wanted to get solemnise the marriage of her son with her niece. It has also been submitted that the offence punishable under section 306 IPC is not proved and the presumption under section 113-A of the Indian Evidence Act has been wrongly drawn. 7. It has also been submitted that the offence punishable under section 306 IPC is not proved and the presumption under section 113-A of the Indian Evidence Act has been wrongly drawn. 7. Learned counsel for the appellant in support of his submission has relied upon Mahendra Singh and another v. State of M.P., reported in 1995 Supp (3) SCC 731, wherein Hon'ble the Apex Court has held as under: "Learned Counsel for the appellant rightly submitted that but for the statement of the deceased there is no other pointed evidence from which it could be inferred that there was any abetment so as to bring the acts of the appellants within Section 306 I.P.C. under which the appellants have been punished. The dying declaration, per se, could not involve the appellants in offence punishable under Section 306 I.P.C., because it provides for abetment of suicide. Whoever abets the commission of suicide, and if any person commits suicide due to that reason, he shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years and shall also be liable to fine. Abetment has been defined in Section 107 I.P.C. to mean that a person abets the doing of a thing who firstly instigates any person to do a thing, or secondly, engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing, or thirdly, intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing. Neither of the ingredients of abetment are attracted on the statement of the deceased. The conviction of the appellants under Section 306 I.P.C. merely on the allegation of harassment to the deceased is not sustainable. The appellants deserve to be acquitted of the charge." Learned counsel for the appellant has again relied upon the case of Kishori Lal v. State of M.P. [Appeal (Crl.) 115 of 1999] wherein Hon'ble the Apex Court has held as under: " Section 107 IPC defines abetment of a thing. The offence of abetment is a separate and distinct offence provided in the Act as an offence. The offence of abetment is a separate and distinct offence provided in the Act as an offence. A person, abets the doing of a thing when (1) he instigates any person to do that thing; or (2) engages with one or more other persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing; or (3) intentionally aids, by act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing. These things are essential to complete abetment as a crime. The word "instigate" literally means to provoke, incite, urge on or bring about by persuasion to do any thing. The abetment may be by instigation, conspiracy or intentional aid, as provided in the three clauses of Section 107 . Section 109 provides that if the act abetted is committed in consequence of abetment and there is no provision for the punishment of such abetment, then the offender is to be punished with the punishment provided for the original offence. 'Abetted' in Section 109 means the specific offence abetted. Therefore, the offence for the abetment of which a person is charged with the abetment is normally linked with the proved offence" 8. On the other hand learned AGA has defended the impugned judgement and has submitted that there was sufficient evidence against the appellant to have instigated the deceased to commit suicide. In this regard, learned AGA has relied upon State of Punjab v. Iqbal Singh and others; 1991 SCC (Cri) 513. "The legislative intent is clear to curb the menace of dowry deaths, etc., with a firm hand. We must keep in mind this legislative intent. It must be remembered that since such crimes are generally committed in the privacy of residential homes and in secrecy, independent and direct evidence is not easy to get. That is why the legislature has by introducing sections 113A and 113B in the Evidence Act tried to strengthen the prosecution hands by permitting a presumption to be raised if certain foundational facts are established and the unfortunate event has taken place within seven years of marriage. This period of seven years is considered to be the turbulent one after which the legislature assumes that the couple would have settled down in life. It a married woman is subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or his family members section 498A, I.P.C. would be attracted. This period of seven years is considered to be the turbulent one after which the legislature assumes that the couple would have settled down in life. It a married woman is subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or his family members section 498A, I.P.C. would be attracted. If such cruelty or harassment was inflicted by the husband or his relative for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry immediately preceding death by burns and bodily injury or in abnormal circumstances within seven years of marriage, such husband or relative is deemed to have caused her death and is liable to be punished under section 304B, I.P.C. When the question at issue is whether a person is guilty of dowry death of a woman and the evidence discloses that immediately before her death she was subjected by such person to cruelty and/or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, section 113B, Evidence Act provides that the court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death. of course if there is proof of the person having intentionally caused her death that would attract section 302, I.P.C. Then we have a situation where the husband or his relative by his wilful conduct creates a situation which he knows will drive the woman to commit suicide and she actually does so, the case would squarely fall within the ambit of section 306, I.P.C. In such a case the conduct of the person would tantamount to inciting provoking or virtually pushing the woman into a desperate situation of no return which would compel her to put an end to her miseries by committing suicide. In the present case the facts clearly reveal from the divorce deed Exh. D-2 that the relations between the husband and the wife were strained even in 1977. There is intrinsic evidence in that document that the wife apprehended blood shed and harm to her children. Before the execution of this document she had sought police protection by her application/letter dated 12th October, 1977. Then in April, 1983 her efforts to secure a transfer from the school where she was harassed by the Head Master were frustrated by her husband. Before the execution of this document she had sought police protection by her application/letter dated 12th October, 1977. Then in April, 1983 her efforts to secure a transfer from the school where she was harassed by the Head Master were frustrated by her husband. Her husband had kept up the pressure for extra-dowry since her marriage and had stepped it up after the demise of her father on learning that her mother had received the G.P. Fund, Gratuity, etc., due to her father. Since she and her mother and brother were not able to meet this demand she was subjected to considerable torture. Added to that was the anxiety caused by her husband's conduct at trying to frustrate her efforts to seek a transfer from the school where she was serving. The last straw on the camel's back fell when she was severely beaten on the previous day, i.e. 6th June, 1983 as is evident from her letter of 7th June, 1983. An atmosphere of terror was created to push her into taking the extreme step. It would seem it was a carefully chalked out strategy to provoke her into taking the extreme step to kill herself and her children as she apprehended that they will be much more miserable after she is dead and gone. In this fact/situation can it be said that the husband had not been responsible in creating circumstances which would provoke or force her into taking the only alternative left open to her, namely suicide? Can it be said that the husband did not realise where he was leading her by his wilful conduct? We think in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the trial court had rightly convicted the husband under section 306 I.P.C. We think that the High Court committed an error in reversing the conviction. We, therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the High Court's order and restore the order of conviction and sentence passed by the trial court. We cannot countenance the plea for reduction of his sentence. No order on his C.M.P." 9. As regards the abetment under section 306 IPC, I have also considered the law laid down in the case of Netai Dutta v. State of W.B. Reported at (2005) 2 SCC 659 , wherein it has been held as under : "4. One Pranab Kumar Nag was an employee of M/s M.L. Dalmiya & Co. As regards the abetment under section 306 IPC, I have also considered the law laid down in the case of Netai Dutta v. State of W.B. Reported at (2005) 2 SCC 659 , wherein it has been held as under : "4. One Pranab Kumar Nag was an employee of M/s M.L. Dalmiya & Co. Ltd. During the course of his employment, he had been posted at various work sites of the company and on 11.9.1999 he was transferred to the work site of the company's stores located at 160, B.L. Saha Road, Kolkata. It seems that pursuant to the transfer order, Pranab Kumar Nag did not join duty and after a period of about two years he sent in a letter of resignation written in his own hand wherein he expressed his grievance of stagnancy of salary and also alleged that he was a victim of unfortunate circumstances. The company accepted his resignation with immediate effect. On 16.2.2001, a dead body was found at the railway tracks near Ballygunge railway station and it was revealed that it was the body of Pranab Kumar Nag. His brother went to the office where Pranab Kumar Nag had worked and made enquiries. The dead body of Pranab Kumar Nag was released to his brother after the post-mortem examination on 19.2.2001. After a period of two months, a complaint was lodged before the police post on the basis of a suicide note allegedly recovered from the dead body of Pranab Kumar Nag. Based on the complaint, a case was registered against the appellant and some others. A translated copy of the suicide note is produced before us by the appellant. We have carefully read the alleged suicide note.The substance of this suicide note is that deceased Pranab Kumar Nag alleged that appellant Netai Dutta and one Paramesh Chatterjee engaged him in several wrong-doings (he has shown as a type of torture) and at the end of the letter, a reference is also made to Paramesh Chatterjee and Netai Dutta alleging that he reported certain incidents to them. A reading of the letter would show that deceased Pranab Kumar Nag was not very much satisfied with the working conditions in the office. A reading of the letter would show that deceased Pranab Kumar Nag was not very much satisfied with the working conditions in the office. In the letter he has stated that he had to be at the work place sometimes throughout the day and night and he had to remain in the company of some drivers who had been sometimes in drunken condition at about one o' clock or two o' clock in the night. It is also alleged that the drivers who had been present at the work place had been having non-vegetarian food. He also complained that he had to work even on Sundays. He further stated that one day he could leave the work place at 8 o' clock in the evening and all the restaurants were closed and that he reported the matter to the present appellant. 5. There is absolutely no averment in the alleged suicide note that the present appellant had caused any harm to him or was in any way responsible for delay in paying salary to deceased Pranab Kumar Nag. It seems that the deceased was very much dissatisfied with the working conditions at the work place. But it may also be noticed that the deceased after his transfer in 1999 had never joined the office at 160, B.L. Saha Road, Kolkata and had absented himself for a period of two years and that the suicide took place on 16.2.2001. It cannot be said that the present appellant had in any way instigated the deceased to commit suicide or he was responsible for the suicide of Pranab Kumar Nag. An offence under Section 306 IPC would stand only if there is an abetment for the commission of the crime. The parameters of the "abetment" have been stated in Section 107 of the Indian Penal Code. Section 107 says that a person abets the doing of a thing, who instigates any person to do that thing; or engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, or the person should have intentionally aided any act or illegal omission. The explanation to Section 107 says that any wilful misrepresentation or wilful concealment of a material fact which he is bound to disclose, may also come within the contours of "abetment". 6. The explanation to Section 107 says that any wilful misrepresentation or wilful concealment of a material fact which he is bound to disclose, may also come within the contours of "abetment". 6. In the suicide note, except referring to the name of the appellant at two places, there is no reference of any act or incidence whereby the appellant herein is alleged to have committed any wilful act or omission or intentionally aided or instigated the deceased Pranab Kumar Nag in committing the act of suicide. There is no case that the appellant has played any part or any role in any conspiracy, which ultimately instigated or resulted in the commission of suicide by deceased Pranab Kumar Nag. 7. Apart from the suicide note, there is no allegation made by the complainant that the appellant herein in any way was harassing his brother, Pranab Kumar Nag. The case registered against the appellant is without any factual foundation. The contents of the alleged suicide note do not in any way make out the offence against the appellant. The prosecution initiated against the appellant would only result in sheer harassment to the appellant without any fruitful result. In our opinion, the learned Single Judge seriously erred in holding that the First Information Report against the appellant disclosed the elements of a cognisable offence. There was absolutely no ground to proceed against the appellant herein. We find that this is a fit case where the extraordinary power under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is to be invoked. We quash the criminal proceedings initiated against the appellant and accordingly allow the appeal. 10. In Madan Mohan Singh v. State of Gujarat and another; (2010) 8 SCC 628 , Hon'ble the Apex Court has held as under: 6. The further complaint in that so-called suicide note appears to be that the driver was not given a fixed vehicle though all the drivers were given fixed vehicles to drive. There is also a complaint against one Raghunathan suggesting that he misled the DGM and had given him a very bad vehicle to drive. By way of example, it was pointed out that the keys of the vehicle were taken in the absence of Incharge, M.K. Sovangya without giving any reasons verbally. Then he was not given any charge of the vehicle and running log book. By way of example, it was pointed out that the keys of the vehicle were taken in the absence of Incharge, M.K. Sovangya without giving any reasons verbally. Then he was not given any charge of the vehicle and running log book. Thirdly, he was sent the transfer order by post. The attendance of the office staff was not maintained and he was transferred and the vehicle was given to a regular labour. There is also a complaint about the salary of 15 days which was deducted by Madan Mohan Singh. A fair inquiry was sought for by the said driver. It was suggested that his retirement date was 25.12.2012 and salary should be recovered from Madan Mohan Singh as he had harassed him without giving any concrete reason. 10. We are convinced that there is absolutely nothing in this suicide note or the FIR which would even distantly be viewed as an offence much less under Section 306 , IPC. We could not find anything in the FIR or in the so-called suicide note which could be suggested as abetment to commit suicide. In such matters there must be an allegation that the accused had instigated the deceased to commit suicide or secondly, had engaged with some other person in a conspiracy and lastly, that the accused had in any way aided any act or illegal omission to bring about the suicide. 11. In spite of our best efforts and microscopic examination of the suicide note and the FIR, all that we find is that the suicide note is a rhetoric document in the nature of a departmental complaint. It also suggests some mental imbalance on the part of the deceased which he himself describes as depression. In the so-called suicide note, it cannot be said that the accused ever intended that the driver under him should commit suicide or should end his life and did anything in that behalf. Even if it is accepted that the accused changed the duty of the driver or that the accused asked him not to take the keys of the car and to keep the keys of the car in the office itself, it does not mean that the accused intended or knew that the driver should commit suicide because of this. 12. Even if it is accepted that the accused changed the duty of the driver or that the accused asked him not to take the keys of the car and to keep the keys of the car in the office itself, it does not mean that the accused intended or knew that the driver should commit suicide because of this. 12. In order to bring out an offence under Section 306 , IPC specific abetment as contemplated by Section 107 , IPC on the part of the accused with an intention to bring out the suicide of the concerned person as a result of that abetment is required. The intention of the accused to aid or to instigate or to abet the deceased to commit suicide is a must for this particular offence under Section 306 , IPC. We are of the clear opinion that there is no question of there being any material for offence under Section 306 , IPC either in the FIR or in the so-called suicide note. 13. It is absurd to even think that a superior officer like the appellant would intend to bring about suicide of his driver and, therefore, abet the offence. In fact, there is no nexus between the so called suicide (if at all it is one for which also there is no material on record) and any of the alleged acts on the part of the appellant. There is no proximity either. In the prosecution under Section 306 , IPC, much more material is required. The Courts have to be extremely careful as the main person is not available for cross-examination by the appellant-accused. Unless, therefore, there is specific allegation and material of definite nature (not imaginary or inferential one), it would be hazardous to ask the appellant-accused to face the trial. A criminal trial is not exactly a pleasant experience. The person like the appellant in the present case who is serving in a responsible post would certainly suffer great prejudice, were he to face prosecution on absurd allegations of irrelevant nature. In the similar circumstances, as reported in Netai Dutta v. State of W.B.[ 2005 (2) SCC 659 ], this Court had quashed the proceedings initiated against the accused. 14. In the similar circumstances, as reported in Netai Dutta v. State of W.B.[ 2005 (2) SCC 659 ], this Court had quashed the proceedings initiated against the accused. 14. As regards the suicide note, which is a document of about 15 pages, all that we can say is that it is an anguish expressed by the driver who felt that his boss (the accused) had wronged him. The suicide note and the FIR do not impress us at all. They cannot be depicted as expressing anything intentional on the part of the accused that the deceased might commit suicide. If the prosecutions are allowed to continue on such basis, it will be difficult for every superior officer even to work. 15. It was tried to be contended by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the complainant that at this stage, we should not go into the merits of the FIR or the said suicide note. It is trite law now that where there is some material alleged in the FIR, then such FIR and the ensuing proceedings should not be quashed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. It is for this reason that we very closely examined the FIR to see whether it amounts to a proper complaint for the offence under Sections 306 and 294(b) IPC. 16. Insofar as Section 294(b) IPC is concerned, we could not find a single word in the FIR or even in the so-called suicide note. Insofar as Section 306 IPC is concerned, even at the cost of repetition, we may say that merely because a person had a grudge against his superior officer and committed suicide on account of that grudge, even honestly feeling that he was wronged, it would still not be a proper allegation for basing the charge under Section 306 IPC. It will still fall short of a proper allegation. It would have to be objectively seen whether the allegations made could reasonably be viewed as proper allegations against the appellant-accused to the effect that he had intended or engineered the suicide of the concerned person by his acts, words etc. When we put the present FIR on this test, it falls short. 18. For all these reasons, we are of the clear opinion that the High Court erred in not quashing the proceedings. When we put the present FIR on this test, it falls short. 18. For all these reasons, we are of the clear opinion that the High Court erred in not quashing the proceedings. Allowing this appeal,we set aside the order of the High Court and allowing the petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. filed by the appellant-accused, the questioned proceedings are quashed." 11. I have considered the rival submissions of learned counsel for the appellant as well as learned AGA and perused the record. 12. The main question for consideration in this case is that whether the appellant instigated her daughter-in-law for committing suicide. 13. Constable Ram Lal (PW-1) has stated in his statement that he received the information at about 7.20 am that the wife of Narendra Kumar died due to burn injuries. Constable Narain Bux Singh (PW-2) has prepared the necessary documents for post-mortem. 14. Ram Autar (PW-3) is the father of the deceased who has proved the marriage of his daughter with the son of appellant and he has further stated that the appellant used to torture and caused cruelty to the deceased for demand of buffalo and Vikki Motorcycle, which was told by his daughter. The appellant or his family members had not made any information to him regarding the death of his daughter. He has further told that on the date of marriage, whole of the night there was dispute regarding the dowry. His daughter has told him that the appellant wanted to solemnise the marriage of her son with her niece. 15. Som Nath (PW-4) has also proved the marriage of daughter of Ram Autar (PW-3) and has also stated about the demand of dowry. 16. Sunder Lal (PW-5) has proved that the appellant wanted to solemnised the marriage of her son with her niece due to which she caused cruelty to her daughter-in-law. This witness has also proved the inquest report as Ext. Ka-1 and other memos as Ext. Ka-3 and Ka-4. 17. Dr. G. K. Singh (PW-6) has proved the post-mortem report of the deceased. Head Constable Ram Lochan (PW-7) has proved the formal papers of the prosecution while Sri Siya Ram Mishra (PW-8) has proved the investigation of the case as well as the documents of the prosecution. 18. Ka-1 and other memos as Ext. Ka-3 and Ka-4. 17. Dr. G. K. Singh (PW-6) has proved the post-mortem report of the deceased. Head Constable Ram Lochan (PW-7) has proved the formal papers of the prosecution while Sri Siya Ram Mishra (PW-8) has proved the investigation of the case as well as the documents of the prosecution. 18. As far as the offence punishable under section 306 IPC is concerned, learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that there was no instigation on the part of the appellant to instigate the deceased to commit suicide. It is relevant to mention that no first information report of the incident has been lodged by the father of the deceased, even after incident. Had there been any suspicion of dowry death or some complaint with the behaviour of accused, the FIR should have been lodged after knowing the incident in which the circumstances and factors for death could have been narrated. 19. It has come in the statement of Ram Autar (PW-3) that the appellant used to say that her son was very younger while the daughter-in-law was elder to her son and she intended to solemnised the marriage of her son with her niece. It has been further stated by him that due to this reason, the appellant had not permitted her son to go close or visit with the deceased. The same statement has also been given by Som Nath (PW- 4) . 20. The main question for consideration is that whether the act of the appellant i.e not permitting the daughter-in-law to go close to her husband as he was younger to her and she wanted to solemnised the marriage of her son with her niece; would amount to abetment as defined under section 107 IPC. It is not disputed that the death has occurred within seven years of marriage under unnatural circumstances. It is also not disputed that the husband of the deceased has been declared juvenile and he has been separately tried by the Juvenile Magistrate. 21. For convicting any accused for the offence punishable under section 306 IPC, there must be some evidence to show that the appellant was in any manner responsible for suicide or she has instigated the deceased to commit suicide. 21. For convicting any accused for the offence punishable under section 306 IPC, there must be some evidence to show that the appellant was in any manner responsible for suicide or she has instigated the deceased to commit suicide. It has also come in the evidence that the deceased has not committed suicide due to demand of dowry or cruelty and torture, although there is evidence that she was tortured for and in connection with the dowry. Therefore, the present case is a very peculiar case in which the suicide has not been committed for or in connection with the dowry but as per the evidence on record, she has committed suicide due to the fact that the appellant had not permitted her to go close to her husband for the reason that she wanted to solemnised the marriage of her son with her niece. 22. As per the definition of abetment provided under section 107 IPC, there must be some instigation to do a thing or there should be some conspiracy for doing that thing and if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy that will amount to abetment. The third ingredients is that there must be intention of any act or illegal omission for doing that thing. In the present case, the ingredients of abetment are not attracted from the statement of the witnesses. 23. The presumption under section 113-A of Indian Evidence Act is also not attracted in the present matter. From the perusal of the evidence on record, I am of the view that the conviction of appellant for the offence punishable under section 306 IPC is against the evidence on record and the findings in this regard are misconceived. Therefore, the appellant is liable to be acquitted for the offence punishable under section 306 IPC. 24. As far as the conviction under section 498-A IPC is concerned, Sunder Lal (PW-5) has categorically stated in his statement that the deceased has not made any complaint with him regarding demand of dowry or cruelty or torture but her only complaint was that she was not allowed to go close to her husband. Learned court below has also drawn the same conclusion that had there been any suicide due to demand of dowry, she could have told this fact to Sunder Lal. 25. Learned court below has also drawn the same conclusion that had there been any suicide due to demand of dowry, she could have told this fact to Sunder Lal. 25. As far as demand of dowry and cruelty is concerned, it is admitted that father of the deceased Ram Autar (PW-3) has not made any complaint to any of the higher officers regarding the alleged demand of dowry, although this witness has admitted in his statement that he has reported the matter to the police but no such evidence was adduced by the prosecution. It appears that the complainant Ram Autar (PW-3) has exaggerated his statement regarding the dispute on the date of marriage with respect to dowry because no such statement has been given under section 161 Cr.P.C. Had there been any complaint for demand of dowry or cruelty, this witness must have told the investigating officer regarding this fact. 26. Similarly Somnath (PW-4), has also not stated before the investigating officer that there was any demand of dowry or cruelty in connection with demand of dowry with the deceased. Ram Autar (PW-3) is the father of the deceased and Som Nath (PW-4) is the brother of the deceased. Investigating Officer Siya Ram Mishra (PW-8) has specifically stated in his statement that during investigation, the witnesses had not told about the demand of dowry. He has further specifically stated that during the course of investigation, there was no evidence at any stage regarding demand of dowry. 27. Sunder Lal (PW-5) who is the uncle of the deceased has also stated about the fact that the appellant did not permitted the deceased to go close to her husband and has admitted that the deceased had not told ever that the appellant or her husband are torturing him for the demand of dowry. He has further stated that there was no complaint that the appellant had not permitted her daughter-in-law to go close to her husband, although, the trial court has also came to the conclusion that from the evidence on record, it is not proved that the appellant had demanded any dowry from the deceased and it was also not proved that she was tortured for not fulfilling the demand of dowry. 28. 28. The learned Trial Court in paragraph 22 of the judgement has twisted the evidence and by taking the benefit of section 113- A of Indian Evidence Act, has come to the conclusion that the appellant was guilty for the offence punishable under section 498-A. In my opinion, the said twisting of the facts is beyond the evidence because when there was no complaint of dowry prior to the incident and when there was no such statement before the investigating officer regarding the demand of dowry or causing cruelty to the deceased, then it cannot be concluded that she was tortured for dowry. The learned trial court has come to the conclusion that the only reason to commit the suicide is that the appellant had not permitted her daughter-in-law to go close to her husband, therefore, she has committed suicide. In my opinion the said act of the appellant cannot come within the definition of cruelty in connection with demand of dowry. For attracting provisions of section 113-A or 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act, it is the first and foremost duty of the prosecution to prove the basic ingredients. In the present case, the prosecution has utterly failed in proving the main ingredients of Section 498-A and 306 IPC. Accordingly, the findings of the learned trial court in this regard are completely misconceived and against the evidence on record. Therefore, the appellant is liable to be acquitted for the offence punishable under section 498-A IPC also. 29. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The conviction of the appellant for the offences punishable under sections 306 IPC and 498-A IPC are set aside and the appellant is acquitted for the offences punishable under sections 306 IPC and 498-A IPC. Office is directed to send a certified copy of this judgment along with the lower court record to the court concerned. Appeal Allowed.