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2016 DIGILAW 1844 (GUJ)

Chief Officer v. Virendrarai Chimanlal Shah

2016-08-31

C.L.SONI

body2016
ORDER : C.L SONI, J. In this group of petitions filed by the Chief Officer of Nadiad Nagarpalika under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, orders passed by the Appellate Authority under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 (“the Act”) in different appeals preferred by the petitioner are challenged. Since the issues raised are common, the petitions are taken up for hearing together. 2. The respondent No. 1 of each petition who retired from service in the year 2006 preferred applications under the Act claiming difference of the Gratuity payable as per the award of the Industrial Tribunal in Reference (IT) No. 174 of 1974. 3. As per the award dated 18.2.1975, the petitioner Municipality is to pay one month's pay for each completed year of service subject to maximum 25 months' pay to its employee in pension scheme. 4. The applications preferred by the respondent No. 1 before the Controlling Authority were opposed by the petitioner Municipality on the grounds that as per the Gujarat Civil Service Rules (“the GCSR) which are for the employees of the State Government, 16½ months' pay was paid to the respondent No. 1 by considering 33 years of service and that since the award was terminated with effect from 4.12.2003, the benefit of the award could not be given to the employees retired after 4.12.2003 5. The Controlling Authority found that the provisions of the Act applied to the petitioner and that the employees are entitled to get better terms of gratuity as per section 4(5) of the Act and that since no documentary evidence was produced by the petitioner that the gratuity was payable to its employees as per the GCSR, the petitioner could not have paid the gratuity as per the GCSR to respondent No. 1. As regards objection for non-availability of the benefits of award after 4.12.2003, the Controlling Authority relying on the orders made by this Court in Special Civil Application No. 21865/2007, Letters Patent Appeal No. 581/2011 and the orders passed in SLP (Civil) No. 16198/2011 by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, held that the respondent No. 1 was entitled to benefit of award for payment of gratuity. The Controlling Authority thus passed orders for payment of the difference of gratuity with interest at the rate of 10% from 1.1.2007 to 2.6.2007 on full amount of gratuity payable as per the award and from 3.6.2007 on difference of gratuity till the same is paid. 6. It appears that the petitioner then preferred review applications before the Controlling Authority which came to be rejected. It was thereafter the petitioner preferred different appeals before the appellate authority after a period of limitation provided under section 7(7) of the Act. The appeals were opposed by and on behalf of the respondent no. 1 on various grounds including the ground of limitation. The appellate authority since found that the appeals were preferred beyond the period of limitation prescribed under section 7(7) of the Act, rejected the appeals by the impugned orders. 7. Learned Advocate Mr. Mehul Sharad Shah appearing for the petitioner submitted that the respondent no. 1 were not entitled to gratuity as per the award as by notice, the award was terminated and it was thereafter the respondent no. 1 retired from service. Mr. Shah submitted that the respondent no. 1 were paid gratuity of 16½ month's pay as provided under the GCSR and such gratuity amount being equal to the gratuity payable under the Act, the respondent no. 1 could not be made entitled to more amount of gratuity. Mr. Shah submitted that in any case, there was no question of payment of interest on the gratuity amount as the petitioner was not at fault for delayed payment of difference of gratuity. Mr. Shah submitted that in any case, reference is made to the Industrial Tribunal for cancellation of award and if the reference is allowed, the respondent no. 1 would not be entitled to gratuity as per the award and he therefore urged that the Court may direct not to pay and disburse the amount of gratuity to respondent no. 1 till the reference pending before the Tribunal is finally decided. 8. Learned Advocate Mr. Ashish Shah appearing for respondent No. 1 in each petition submitted that the award based on which the applications were filed for gratuity was in force when the respondent no. 1 retired from service and even today, it stands. Mr. Shah submitted that though as per the award, the respondent no. 8. Learned Advocate Mr. Ashish Shah appearing for respondent No. 1 in each petition submitted that the award based on which the applications were filed for gratuity was in force when the respondent no. 1 retired from service and even today, it stands. Mr. Shah submitted that though as per the award, the respondent no. 1 was entitled to get the gratuity, they are paid less amount of gratuity by applying GCSR. Mr. Shah submitted that the controlling authority has rightly held that the GCSR did not apply to the employees of the Municipality and, therefore, respondent no. 1 were entitled to claim the gratuity as per the award. Mr. Shah submitted that the reference pending before the Industrial Tribunal is to permit the petitioner to pay gratuity at 16½ months wages and such pendency of reference would not come in the way of respondent no. 1 to receive the gratuity as per the existing award when they retired from service. Mr. Shah submitted that as per section 4(5) of the Act, the employees are entitled to have better terms of gratuity and no error could be found with the order of the Controlling Authority and/or the Appellate Authority under the Act in passing the order for payment of difference of gratuity to respondent no. 1 based on the award. Mr. Shah submitted that this Court has finally decided the issues raised by the petitioner as regards payment of gratuity based on the award. He, therefore, urged to reject the petitions. 9. Having heard the learned advocates for both the sides, the Court finds that no error is committed by the appellate authority under the Act in rejecting the appeals of the petitioner on the ground of delay. It is not in dispute that the appeals were filed by the petitioner after the expiry of 120 days (60 days for filing the appeal +60 days period of delay if condoned) available for filing the appeal under sec. 7(7) of the Act against the order of the Controlling Authority. It is well settled position of law that the statutory authority has no power to condone the delay beyond the period provided in statute for entertaining the appeal. In such view of the matter, the petitions are required to be rejected without going into the merits of contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner. 10. It is well settled position of law that the statutory authority has no power to condone the delay beyond the period provided in statute for entertaining the appeal. In such view of the matter, the petitions are required to be rejected without going into the merits of contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner. 10. Irrespective of the above aspects of the matter, as rightly submitted by the learned advocate Mr. Ashish Shah for respondent no. 1 and not disputed by the learned Advocate Mr. Mehul Sharad Shah for the petitioner that on the similar contentions, this court has finally decided the group of petitions. The Court finds that dealing with similar contentions, learned Single Judge of this Court while delivering the judgment in Special Civil Application No. 3252 of 2014 and allied matters, has held and observed in para 4.4 to 6.4 as under: “4.4 The contentions in nutshell coming forth on behalf of the Municipality are that since it has given notice for termination of the settlement award on 04th December, 2003, the settlement award could not be resorted to by the other side to bind the Municipality and in any case, it was submitted that those who retired after 04th December, 2003 could not claim the gratuity on the basis of the providence in the said settlement award. It was the submission that now even the Reference is pending and this Court has taken notice of the said development in the aforesaid two petitions while passing orders therein. 5. Considered the facts, the controversy they encompass and the contentions canvassed by the parties. Therefrom it emerged undeniably that the very issue arise in the present group of petitions and was subject matter of consideration by this Court in previously filed Special Civil Application No. 21865 of 2007 and cognate matters. They were filed by similarly situated employees of the Nadiad Municipality. In those petitions, they prayed for setting aside of orders of Controlling Authority as well as the Appellate Authority under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, and for directing the Authorities concerned to implement the same consent award dated 18th February, 1975 in Reference (IT) No. 174 of 1974. Those petitioners also had retired after 04th December, 2003 and had claimed their gratuity on the basis of the settlement awards. The Municipality had filed appeals before the Appellate Authority, but failed. Those petitioners also had retired after 04th December, 2003 and had claimed their gratuity on the basis of the settlement awards. The Municipality had filed appeals before the Appellate Authority, but failed. 5.1 This Court by common judgment dated 18th August, 2010 dismissed the aforesaid petitions. From the below extracted paragraphs of the aforesaid judgment dated 18 th August, 2010, it could be seen that identical contentions were raised. Mr. Mehul Sharad Shah and Mr. B.Y Mankad, learned advocates for the respective respondent-Municipality, have submitted that on the basis of the earlier consent terms dated 17th February 1974, the award dated 18th February 1975 was passed, and therefore, the petitioners are not entitled to the benefit of amount of gratuity; that the moment at which the award is terminated by the respondent-Municipality under Section 19(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’), the effect of award is gone and, thereafter the respondent-Municipality is not duty bound to implement the award in question. Thus, they have prayed for dismissal of present petitions. The learned advocates for the respondent-Municipality have relied upon the decisions (1) in the case of Gujarat State Road Transport Corpn. v. Karsan Meghji Dabhi, reported in 1997 (2) GLR 1396 and (2) in the case of Master Silk Mills Pvt. Ltd. v. Ibrahim Habib, reported in 2000 (2) GLH 388. Having considered the contentions raised by the learned advocates for the respective parties, averments made in the petition as well as reply affidavits and the documentary evidence produced on record, it transpires that the settlement was arrived at between the parties and the consent award was passed accepting the said settlement. It is required to be noted that the said terms of settlement or award have been terminated by the respondent-Municipality in exercise of powers under Section 19(2) of the Act. However, it is required to be noted that an award passed by the Tribunal can be modified or terminated by such Tribunal or its higher forum only and not by the authority like the respondent-Municipality since it has not only terminated the consent terms dated 17 th February 1974 but also the award dated 18th February 1975 passed by the Tribunal. (Paras 6 and 7) 5.2 Section 19(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act also pressed into service. (Paras 6 and 7) 5.2 Section 19(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act also pressed into service. The Section provided that the settlement under Section 19(1) shall be binding for the period agreed upon between the parties and in absence of the period agreed upon, for six months and after expiry of the period aforesaid, until the expiry of two months from the date, notice would be required to be given of an intention to terminate by one party to the other parties to the settlement. As is contended herein, it was submitted in those group of petitions also that the settlement award in question was terminated under Section 19(2) of the Act. The Court negatived the contention and held that the said provision would not be applicable. It was held as under, It is required to be noted that as per the arguments advanced by the learned advocates for the respondent-Municipality, the respondent-authority has terminated the said terms of settlement in light of aforesaid provision, however, it is required to be noted that in the present case, the said terms of settlement were placed before Tribunal in a pending Reference and the Industrial Tribunal passed the award in terms of the said terms of settlement. In view of aforesaid provision, where the time limit is not prescribed, the respondent-Municipality can terminate the consent terms, however, in the present case the said terms of settlement had taken the shape of an award, which is required to be modified or terminated by the competent Court or the Tribunal itself and the award cannot be terminated by the respondent-Municipality. Further, the contention of the petitioners that the provisions of Section 19(4) of the Act will prevail over the provisions of Section 19(2) of the Act is also required to be accepted. However, in the present case, when the award is passed by the Tribunal accepting the terms of settlement, the said provisions would not be applicable in the present case. Even this Court while dealing with Special Civil Application No. 10298 of 2004 filed by one of the employees against the respondent-Municipality has negatived the contention of the respondent-Municipality that on revision of pay commission, the rights of the employees flowing from the said award are nullified, which itself goes to show that the said award was in existence on the relevant day. (Paras 6.1 and 6.2) 5.2.1 It was further observed, The contention of the petitioners that the respondent-Municipality has granted 25 months' gratuity to other similarly situated employees in the years 2007 and 2008 and, therefore, they may also be granted the same on the ground of parity, is required to be accepted. It is pertinent to note that some of the petitioners had made application to the respondent-Municipality under the Right to Information Act, 2005 seeking information as to whether any employee has been granted the benefit of 25 months' gratuity after the year 2002 or not. In pursuance of the said applications, the petitioners received the said information vide communications dated 20th September 2007 as well as 28th August 2008, whereby the respondent-authority has categorically stated that total 16 (sixteen) employees, as stated in the statement made in the said communication dated 28th August 2008, have been granted the benefit of 25 months' gratuity and commuted pension. So far as the decisions cited by the learned advocates for the respondent-Municipality are concerned, the facts of the present case are completely different from the cited cases. Further, it is not at all held that the application under the Gratuity Act as is made by the petitioners is prohibited. It is thus required to be noted that the ratio of the said decisions do not help the respondent-Municipality. Here it would be beneficial to reproduce the relevant paragraphs of the decision in the case of Gujarat Agricultural University (supra) relied upon by the petitioners, whereby it has categorically held by the Apex Court that the contract of service or the conditions of service provided in the provided in the settlement holds the field until new lawful settlement is brought into being…. (Paras 6.3 and 6.4) 5.3 Decision in Gujarat Agriculture University v. All Gujarat Kamdar Karmachari Union [ AIR 2010 SC 2507 ] was relied on by the Court in which it was categorically held that the contract of service or conditions of service provided in the settlement holds the field until new settlement is lawfully brought into existence. 5.4 The Letters Patent Appeal No. 581 of 2011 and cognate Appeals against the said common oral judgment came to be dismissed on 20thApril, 2011. The Letters Patent Appeal negatived the contentions of the Municipality holding as under, 3. 5.4 The Letters Patent Appeal No. 581 of 2011 and cognate Appeals against the said common oral judgment came to be dismissed on 20thApril, 2011. The Letters Patent Appeal negatived the contentions of the Municipality holding as under, 3. The contention of the appellant Municipality is that they have terminated the said both the Awards on 4th December, 2003 by giving notice to the Union showing their intention to terminate the settlement and Award. The argument of the learned counsel appearing for the appellant is that since the notice for termination of settlement and Award has been given, the Award is no more in existence and the gratuity could not be paid to the respondents in pursuance of the earlier Awards. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant has urged that pursuant to the application made by the Municipality to the Government to refer the matter to appropriate Government, the Reference was not made as inspite of the notice, the respondents were not present. This question cannot be raised by the appellants before us as it was not raised before the learned Single Judge. There were no pleadings before the learned Single Judge and there was no material found before the learned Single Judge and for the first time, this material has been found in these Appeals. It has been repeatedly held by the Apex Court and in case of Rajasthan Pradesh Vaidya Samiti v. Union of India (2010) 12 SCC 609 and more particularly in para-15 that in the writ petition or counter affidavit, not only the facts but also evidence in proof of those facts has to be pleaded and annexed to it. In the present case, there was no foundation laid in the counter affidavit and no material was annexed by the Municipality. Therefore, the learned Single Judge was not in a position to appreciate the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant in absence of any material. The material has been filed for the first time in this Appeal and it cannot be considered as it was not placed before the learned Single Judge. The appellants had not filed any review petition before the learned Single Judge, that any material was ignored by the learned Single Judge and which could not be considered by him. The material has been filed for the first time in this Appeal and it cannot be considered as it was not placed before the learned Single Judge. The appellants had not filed any review petition before the learned Single Judge, that any material was ignored by the learned Single Judge and which could not be considered by him. For the aforesaid reasons, we do not find any reason to accept the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant. 5.5 Both learned Single Judge in his common judgment dated 18thAugust, 2010 as well as the Division Bench while dismissing the Letters Patent Appeals as per the aforesaid judgment, relied on decision of the Supreme Court in Gujarat Agricultural University (supra) and quoted the following paragraphs from the said judgment. 19. The question now to be considered is whether the settlement dated August 22, 1980 became inoperative on expiry of its tenure for which a notice was given by Banaskantha General Workers Union. The answer has to be in the negative. In the case of Life Insurance Corporation of India v. D.J Bahadur, this Court held: “34. The core question that first falls for consideration is as to whether the Settlements of 1974 are still in force. There are three stages or phases with different legal effects in the life of an award or settlement. There is a specific, period contractually or statutorily fixed as the period of operation. Thereafter, the award or settlement does not become non est but continues to be binding. This is the second chapters of legal efficacy but qualitatively different as we will presently show. Then comes the last phase. If notice of intention to terminate is given under Section 19(2) or 19(6) then the third stage opens where the award or the settlement does survive and is in force between the parties as a contract which has superseded the earlier contract and subsists until a new award or negotiated settlement takes its place. Like nature, law abhors a vacuum and even on the notice of termination under Section 19(2) or (6) the sequence and consequence cannot be just void but a continuance of the earlier terms, but with liberty to both sides to raise disputes, negotiate settlements or seek a reference and award. Like nature, law abhors a vacuum and even on the notice of termination under Section 19(2) or (6) the sequence and consequence cannot be just void but a continuance of the earlier terms, but with liberty to both sides to raise disputes, negotiate settlements or seek a reference and award. Until such a new contract or award replaces the previous one, the former settlement or award will regulate the relations between the parties. Such is the understanding of industrial law at least for 30 years as precedents of the High Courts and of this Court bear testimony. To hold to the contrary is to invite industrial chaos by an interpretation of the ID Act whose primary purpose is to obviate such a situation and to provide for industrial peace. To distil from the provisions of Section 19 a conclusion diametrically opposite of the objective, intendment and effect of the section is an interpretative stultification of the statutory ethos and purpose. Industrial law frowns upon a lawless void and under general law the contract of service created by an award or settlement lives so long as a new lawful contract is brought into being. To argue otherwise is to frustrate the rule of law. If law is a means to an end -- order in society -- can it commit functional hara-kiri by leaving a conflict situation to lawless void?” 20. It is an admitted position that no new settlement has been entered between the employer and the workmen subsequently nor any award has replaced the settlement dated August 22, 1980. In this view of the matter, it has to be held that the settlement dated August 22, 1980 continues to regulate the conditions of service of the workmen covered thereby. The contract of service or the conditions of service provided in the settlement holds the field until new lawful settlement is brought into being. As a matter of fact, the employer was well aware of this legal position and, therefore, the daily rated labourers governed by the settlement were continued to be given only a day off in a week until the change was effected vide circular dated October 3, 1991. Thus, the Industrial Tribunal as well as the High Court cannot be said to have erred in relying upon the settlement dated August 22, 1980. Thus, the Industrial Tribunal as well as the High Court cannot be said to have erred in relying upon the settlement dated August 22, 1980. 5.6 It is further not in dispute that the matter was carried before the Supreme Court by filing Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 604 of 2012 which came to be dismissed on 04th September, 2013. Review Application was filed which is also dismissed by the Apex Court on 23rdMay, 2014. Learned advocate for the respondent-Municipality could not dispute the factum of dismissal of Special Leave to Appeal as well as Review Application before the Supreme Court. 6. When in respect of group of employees similarly situated, the very issue and the dispute stand finalized upto the Apex Court, where the set of facts involved and the contentions raised were similar, the re-agitation of the very contentions could not be permitted. The present petitioner-employees belong to same class of persons in whose cases, the controversy has finally rested as above on merits. The contentions which are a total repeat could not be countenanced. Learned advocate for the Municipality could raise and re-raise his same contentions harping to be accepted only by becoming blissfully oblivious to fundamentals of judicial discipline and law of precedent. 6.1 What was contended by learned advocate for the Municipality to attempt to persuade the Court to take a different view, was that now as per Notification dated 07th May, 2014, the appropriate government has made a Reference with regard to the afore-mentioned settlement award. The terms of Reference seen from the copy of the Notification produced by learned advocate for the Municipality, is that whether the award in Reference (IT) No. 174 of 1974 and in Reference (IT) No. 200 of 1977 were liable to be terminated as in the implementation thereof several issues relating to salary of the employees have been cropping up; whether the gratuity amount could be determined upon Fifth Pay Commissions recommendation. The argument of learned advocate for the Municipality that because of the said dispute having been referred to for adjudication, the benefit of settlement award cannot be given to the petitioners, in no manner hold good. The very fact that the issue about the terminability of award or whether is required to be terminated is referred to for adjudication, implies that the settlement award in question is in operation. The very fact that the issue about the terminability of award or whether is required to be terminated is referred to for adjudication, implies that the settlement award in question is in operation. The same is operative and the benefit thereunder could not be denied. 6.2 The contention was sought to be raised before this Court that the facts relating to the notice given by the Municipality in the year 2003 terminating the consent award were not before the learned Single Judge. Since the said aspect is brought on record in this group of petitions, a different view could be taken. The Division Bench in the judgment of the Letters Patent Appeals dealt with the said contention and did not permit the appellant-Municipality to raise the same. Even on that count, the say of the Municipality could not be accepted. This is for the reason that the said contention of the Municipality has now palled into insignificance and has become irrelevant, since the appropriate government has made a Reference as noted above. It was never relevant, and now hardly left relevant that the Municipality had given notice of termination in the year 2003. Therefore, the said contention has to be rejected outright. 6.3 In placing reliance on Kishorbhai Vishnubhai Desai (supra), learned advocate could only misled and misdirected himself. The order in that case dated 09th May, 2014 which was relied on, was an interim order passed while issuing Rule in the petition. Interim orders do not have precedential value and binding effect. In State of Assam v. Barak Upatyka [ AIR 2009 SC 2249 ] the Supreme Court stated that an interim order which does not finally and conclusively decide issue cannot be a precedent. It was observed that any reasons assigned in support of such non-final interim order containing prima-facie findings, are only tentative. Any interim directions issued on the basis of such prima-facie findings are temporary arrangement so that the matter does not become a fait accompli before final hearing. It is also well settled that nor a party can be allowed to take benefit of interim order which was passed pending a final decision in a case. The contention of learned advocate with regard to the order in Kishorbhai Vishnuprasad Desai (supra) is accordingly stated to be rejected. It is also well settled that nor a party can be allowed to take benefit of interim order which was passed pending a final decision in a case. The contention of learned advocate with regard to the order in Kishorbhai Vishnuprasad Desai (supra) is accordingly stated to be rejected. 6.4 Therefore the present petitioner-employees constitute the same class with that of petitioners of aforesaid writ petitions and the decision therein which culminated upto the Supreme Court against the Municipality with re-affirmation of the position that the petitioner-employees are entitled to receive the benefit of gratuity as per the consent award. The order passed by the Controlling Authority directing the payment of gratuity to the petitioners in accordance with the said formula and on the basis of the consent award in question did not book error in any of the case of the petitioners.” 11. Above said judgment was sought to be challenged by preferring the Letters Patent Appeal after the period of limitation. The Hon'ble Division Bench while rejecting the civil application for condonation of delay in Civil Application No. 8135 of 2015 with other applications, vide its order dated 29.7.2015 has observed in para 2 to 4.2 as under: “[2.0] As the issue involved in the main Letters Patent Appeals is with respect to the payment of gratuity and it prima facie appears that issue is squarely covered by the earlier decision of this Court confirmed upto Honble Supreme Court, however with respect to the other similarly situated employees of the very municipality, to prima facie satisfy ourselves, we have heard Shri Mehul Sharad Shah for the common applicant on merits as, if ultimately it is found that all the Letters Patent Appeals lack merits, to issue Rule in the present Civil Applications for condonation of delay and to call upon the concerned respondent employees who are all retired employees and thereafter to condone the delay and thereafter to dismiss the appeals would be exercise in futility and/or the same shall cause undue hardship and unnecessary expenses to the retired employees, we have heard Shri Mehul Sharad Shah, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the common applicant on merits. [3.0] Having heard Shri Mehul Sharad Shah, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the Municipality and Shri Ashish Shah, learned advocate appearing on behalf of some of the respondents retired employees, it appears that as such the issue involved in the Letters Patent Appeals is squarely covered in favour of the retired employees original petitioners in view of the earlier decisions of the learned Single Judge and thereafter Division Bench which have been confirmed upto the Honble Supreme Court. [3.1] At the outset it is required to be noted that dispute is whether the respective retired employees are entitled to gratuity subject to maximum of 25 months salary as per the judgment and award passed by the Industrial Tribunal in Reference (IT) No. 174 of 1974 as claimed by the respective employees or gratuity at 16.5 months salary. It is the case on behalf of the respective employees that as per the settlement award passed in Reference (IT) No. 174 of 1974, which is still in existence, the respective employees shall be entitled to the amount of gratuity considering 25 months salary. On the other hand it is the case on behalf of the Municipality that as subsequently the Municipality has adopted the pay scales paid to the government employees and therefore, the Municipality had issued the notice terminating the settlement as per Section 19 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and therefore, the respective appellant shall be entitled to the gratuity considering 16.5 months salary. That in the present cases the respective employees were paid the gratuity considering 16.5 months salary and therefore, the respective employees approached the authority under the Payment of Gratuity Act claiming the gratuity considering 25 months salary as per the settlement award passed in Reference (IT) No. 174/2014 along with the interest at the rate of 10% per annum. That the appropriate Authority allowed the said applications and issued the certificates in favour of the respective employees, however the same were not implemented and therefore, the respective employees preferred Special Civil Applications before this Court for an appropriate writ, direction and order directing the concerned Municipality and/or the authority to implement the certificates issued for recovery of the amount of gratuity considering 25 months salary with 10% interest thereon. The Municipality also preferred the respective Special Civil Applications challenging the orders passed by the authority under the Payment of Gratuity Act by which the Municipality was directed to pay the amount of gratuity to the respective employees considering 25 months salary. That by impugned common judgment and order the learned Single Judge relying upon and considering the earlier decision of the learned Single Judge dated 18.08.2010 in Special Civil Application No. 21865/2007 and other allied Special Civil Applications which came to be confirmed by the Division Bench by judgment and order dated 20.04.2011 passed in Letters Patent Appeal No. 581/2011 and other allied Letters Patent Appeals which have been confirmed by the Honble Supreme Court, by which similarly situated employees of the very Municipality were directed to be paid the amount of gratuity considering 25 months salary, the learned Single Judge has in the present cases also directed the Municipality to pay the gratuity to the respective employees the amount of gratuity considering 25 months salary with 10% interest thereon. [3.2] Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned common judgment and order the Municipality has preferred the present Letters Patent Appeals with respective condonation applications. [4.0] As observed herein above, to prima facie satisfy ourselves whether there is merit in the appeals or not, we have heard Shri Mehul Sharad Shah, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the applicant on merits. The only contention on behalf of the Municipality is that subsequently and after the decision of the learned Single Judge in Special Civil Application No. 21865/2007, which came to be confirmed by the Division Bench by judgment and order dated 20.04.2011 in Letters Patent Appeal No. 581/2011, the State Government has made a reference to the concerned Tribunal for terminating the settlement award passed in Reference (IT) No. 174/2014. It is submitted that therefore the respective employees may not be paid the amount of gratuity considering 25 months salary. It is submitted that earlier when the aforesaid Special Civil Application No. 21865/2007 and other allied Special Civil Applications came to be decided, it was at the stage of Section 19 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 notice only and there was no reference made by the State Government. It is submitted that earlier when the aforesaid Special Civil Application No. 21865/2007 and other allied Special Civil Applications came to be decided, it was at the stage of Section 19 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 notice only and there was no reference made by the State Government. It is submitted that therefore the learned Single Judge has materially erred in relying upon the earlier decision in Special Civil Application No. 21865/2007 confirmed by the Division Bench vide judgment and order passed in Letters Patent Appeal No. 581/2011. However, it is required to be noted that while deciding the aforesaid Letters Patent Appeal the Division Bench had relied upon the decision of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Gujarat Agricultural University v. All Gujarat Kamdar Karmachari Union reported in AIR 2010 SC 2507 and it is observed and held that so long as the concerned award stand and/or it is not modified and/or set aside, the same is required to be implemented. Therefore, merely because subsequently there is a reference made by the State Government at the instance of the Municipality to set aside the earlier settlement award passed in Reference (IT) No. 174/2014 is no ground not to implement the settlement award passed in Reference (IT) No. 174/2014 so long as it stands. [4.1] It is not in dispute that the retired employees in the present cases are similarly situated to that of the retired employees in Special Civil Application No. 21865/2007 and other allied Special Civil Applications who are already paid the amount of gratuity considering 25 months salary as per the settlement award passed in Reference (IT) No. 174/2014. Therefore, if the contention on behalf of the Municipality is accepted in that case there shall be two different set of employees within the same class. One set of retired employees shall get the amount of gratuity considering 25 months salary as per the settlement award passed in Reference (IT) No. 174/2014 and another set of employees who are similarly situated shall be denied the amount of gratuity as per 25 months salary as per the settlement award passed in Reference (IT) No. 174/2014. One set of retired employees shall get the amount of gratuity considering 25 months salary as per the settlement award passed in Reference (IT) No. 174/2014 and another set of employees who are similarly situated shall be denied the amount of gratuity as per 25 months salary as per the settlement award passed in Reference (IT) No. 174/2014. [4.2] Under the circumstances, the learned Single Judge in present case by impugned judgment and order has rightly directed the Municipality to pay the amount of gratuity to the respective retired employees at par with other similarly situated retired employees considering 25 months salary as per the settlement award passed in Reference (IT) No. 174/2014. Under the circumstances, as such there is no substance in any of the Letters Patent Appeals and the respective appeals lack merits.” 12. In light of the above, no interference is required in the impugned orders. Learned Advocate Mr. Mehul Sharad Shah, however, submitted that the other petitions being Special Civil Application No. 1222 of 2015 to 1226 of 2015 are admitted and awaiting final hearing and this Court may therefore admit these matters and decide the same finally after the reference pending before the Industrial Tribunal is decided. The Court finds that since the issues raised in the present proceedings are concluded by the final judgment, there is no question of keeping these matters pending. 13. In view of the above, the petitions are rejected. Notice is discharged.