JUDGMENT : A.J SHASTRI, J. The petitioner by way of present petition has challenged the legality and validity of the impugned notice issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 [‘the Act’ for short] and the order passed by the authority rejecting the objections raised by the petitioner dated 06.08.2010 2. Brief facts are as under: The petitioner is a private limited company and a non-banking financial corporation registered with the Reserve Bank of India right from September 2001. The petitioner filed its return for the assessment year 2005-06 on 31.10.2005 showing total income of Rs.24,41,300/- and the said return has been submitted along with a detailed computation of income, copy of accounts including profit and loss and balance sheet and in addition thereto, a copy of audit report under Section 44AB. 3. The petitioner was, during the assessment proceedings, asked to furnish detail particulars by way of issuing notice under Section 142(1) on 29.01.2007 inter alia asking the petitioner to clarify 17 points enumerated in the said notice. One of the points which was a center of controversy was pertaining to the details regarding bad debts written off and its justification which is reflected on Item No. (xi) in the said communication. 4. The petitioner has submitted various replies on each of the points and one of such explanation in the form of reply was dated 17.09.2007 which was made a part of the record of the petition. Having considered the reply submitted by the petitioner and having satisfied, the Assessing Officer did not disallow it by adding it back in the computation of income and has passed assessment order under Section 143(3) on 29.10.2007 The said scrutiny assessment has considered the issue pertaining to bad debts written off and its justification. The Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Circle IV then became the Assessing Officer of the petitioner and had issued notice under Section 148 on 16.12.2009 under the Income Tax Act stating that he has reason to believe that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment and thereby required the petitioner to submit the return. In turn, the petitioner submitted a reply on 21.12.2009 stating inter alia that earlier return, which has been filed on 31.10.2005, be considered as a return in response to the notice under Section 148. In turn, the petitioner submitted a reply on 21.12.2009 stating inter alia that earlier return, which has been filed on 31.10.2005, be considered as a return in response to the notice under Section 148. Later on, under the communication dated 22.12.2009, the petitioner has requested the authority to furnish the reasons for reopening. In response to the said request, the respondent authority supplied reasons which were recorded on 04.12.2009 under the communication and cover of letter dated 05.03.2010 Having gone through the reasons initially, the petitioner has challenged the said notice under Section 148 by way of filing writ petition being Special Civil Application No. 6461 of 2010. However, since the procedure which was contemplated having not observed by the petitioner as has been laid down in the decision of Supreme Court in case of GKN Driveshafts (India) Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer, reported in 259 ITR 19, the Hon'ble Court had rejected the petition summarily vide order dated 21.06.2010 For immediate perusal the said order is reproduced hereafter: “1. The petition challenges notice issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 dated 16th December, 2009 for assessment year 2005-2006. Considering the fact that after reasons have been supplied, the petitioner has not followed the procedure as enunciated by the Apex court in the case of GKN DRIVESHAFTS (INDIA) LTD. v. INCOME-TAX OFFICER, reported in 2003 ITR 19 , the petition is not required to be entertained, more particularly, as the impugned notice has been issued within a period of 4 (four) years from the end of the relevant assessment year. 2. Hence, without entering into the discussion and the merits of the issue involved, the petition is rejected for the afore-stated reasons. 3. Petition is accordingly summarily rejected.” 5. It appears from the record that thereafter, under a letter dated 23.07.2010 from he petitioner submitted its objection against reopening of assessment initially on two grounds: (I) That the regular assessment has been undertaken after thoroughly scrutinizing all queries which have been replied by the petitioner and only thereafter, the assessment order came to be passed. It was pointed out by the petitioner in the objection that the Assessing Officer has also allowed bad debts and therefore, now if the said issue is allowed to be opened, it would nothing but mere a change of opinion which is not permitted. It was pointed out by the petitioner in the objection that the Assessing Officer has also allowed bad debts and therefore, now if the said issue is allowed to be opened, it would nothing but mere a change of opinion which is not permitted. While canvassing the point in the objection, it has also been relied upon a decision in case of Commissioner of Income Tax v. Kelvinator of India Ltd., reported in 320 ITR 561 and after considering the ratio laid down by the said decision, the petitioner had raised an objection that the impugned action is impermissible. 6. The petitioner has pointed out that the said objections which have been raised have not been properly considered and vide order dated 06.08.2010, by giving brief reasons, the objections have been rejected. It is against that order as also against the impugned notice under Section 148 of the Act, the petitioner has brought the present petition before this Court challenging the legality and validity of the same. 7. Before narrating the brief contentions raised by the respective parties, it appears that the reasons which have been supplied to the petitioner are worth to be stated herein to examine the contentions in the context of those reasons. Hence, the same is reproduced herein: “It is noted that the assessee had written off bad debt at Rs.7,24,721 in its profit and loss account. Perusal of the details, it was noted as under:- Provision made for bad debt Rs.26,03,738 Add: Various accounts written off (Rs. 4387+Rs. 15588+Rs. 27033+Rs. 450) Rs.51,549 Rs.26,55,287 Less: Provision at the beginning of the year i.e as on 1.4.2004 Rs.19,30,566 Rs.7,24,721 From the above details, it transpires that amount of Rs.7,24,721 is not actually written off as irrecoverable but it is credited to the provisions of bad and doubt full debt, which is also confirmed by schedule 13 to the balance sheet, showing provisions of bad debt and doubt full debt, which was also confirmed by schedule 13 to the balance sheet, showing provision of bad debt of Rs.26,03,738 as on 31.3.2004 (Rs.19,30,566 as on 31.3.2004). Had the amount of Rs.7,24,721 been actually written off as irrecoverable, there would not be addition of Rs.7,24,721 in provision of bad debt as on 31.3.2005 The bifurcation of Rs.7,24,721 debited to the profit and loss account is as under (as per ledger account filed) Amount actually written off from accounts of various customers Rs.51,549/- Amount added to provisions of bad and doubt full debt. Rs.6,73,172/- Rs.7,24,721/- Therefore the amount of Rs.6,73,172 is not allowable deduction as per Explanation to section 36(1)(vii) vide which may bad debt or part thereof written off as irrecoverable in the accounts of the assessee shall not include any provisions for bad and doubt full debt made in the accounts of the assessee. Further, the amount of Rs.51,549 claimed to have been written off included the following debts which are not admissible as per section 36(1)(vii) since they were loan or deposit in nature and have not passed through the profit and loss account and assessable income in earlier years:- Sr. No. Name of Debt Amount Remarks 1 Security Deposit (mobile) 3000 Deposits not passed through profit and loss account and not part of assessable income earlier. 2 Telephone deposit 1540 -do- 3 Baroda People's co-op Bank 27033 Rs.165122 (O/D A/c. Facility) as on 1.4.2004 receipt Rs.16,500 (1.4.2004) (Rs.2.00 lakh F.D a/c. Dated 31.3.2005). Interest paid Rs.24,314 (29.5.2004) loan amount not passed through profit and loss account. Therefore, sum of Rs.31,573/- (out of Rs.51,549/- of bad debt claimed to have been written off of Rs.51,549/-) is also inadmissible. Hence, total bad debt of Rs.7,04,745/- (Rs. 6,73,172+Rs. 31,573/-) is inadmissible u/s. 36(1)(vii).” 8. In the context of aforesaid reasons and the background of facts, Mr. MJ. Shah learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has submitted before the Court that the main action on part of respondent authority is not only unjust and arbitrary but impermissible in view of settled position of law on the issue. It was contended by the counsel that in scrutiny assessment, while dealing with an issue of bad debts written off thorough examination has taken place. It is only thereafter, the assessment order came to be passed and therefore, to permit the petitioner to reopen that issue would be nothing but merely on the basis of change of opinion which is impermissible in view of series of decisions. 9. It is only thereafter, the assessment order came to be passed and therefore, to permit the petitioner to reopen that issue would be nothing but merely on the basis of change of opinion which is impermissible in view of series of decisions. 9. Counsel for the petitioner further drawn attention of the Court contending that, in the original return, an issue pertaining to bad debt is already a part of the said examination. While contending this, the counsel had drawn our attention to page 25 wherein, in a column, it has been mentioned that bad debts written off is figuring at Rs.7,24,721.25. It was also brought to the notice of us that while issuing notice under Section 142(1) of the Act on 29.01.2007, which is reflected on page 50 of the petition compilation, counsel has drawn attention at item No. (xi) of the said communication wherein also the petitioner was asked to furnish the details on the date of hearing regarding issue of bad debts written off and its justification. Counsel further drawn our attention to the detailed reply which has been submitted in response to the said notice which is produced at page 52 of the petition compilation wherein specifically an explanation was tendered regarding bad debts issue written off during the year. In the said communication on the provision of bad debt is kept and projected and is also cogently explained. Counsel further drawn our attention to the scrutiny assessment order dated 29.10.2007 passed under Section 143(3) of the Act wherein also it has been stated that the accountant of the petitioner attained the hearing from time to time. The case was discussed in detail and he has furnished the detailed information as called for from time to time. It was specifically communicated that the assessee-company is engaged in the business of higher purchase finance and cheque discount. By taking us to these documents, which are part of the record, counsel has submitted that the issue pertaining to bad debts is thoroughly gone into by the Assessing Officer and therefore, there is no justification in reopening the issue which has already been thoroughly gone into. By taking us to these documents, which are part of the record, counsel has submitted that the issue pertaining to bad debts is thoroughly gone into by the Assessing Officer and therefore, there is no justification in reopening the issue which has already been thoroughly gone into. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that in the objections which have been raised, the case was also put up and cogent explanation was given under a letter dated 23.07.2010 which is part of petition compilation at page 67 wherein also in paras 2, 3 and 4, the explanation pertaining to the issue of bad debt written off was also tendered. By drawing our attention to the decision in case of Commissioner of Income Tax v. Kelvinator of India Ltd. counsel submitted that the order of rejection of objection is not in consonance with the proposition of law laid down by the series of decisions including the decision of Commissioner of Income Tax v. Kelvinator of India Ltd. Counsel for the petitioner further drawn the attention that simply because the issue has not been incorporated in detail, it cannot be presumed that it has not been dealt with at all. While contending this, counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the affidavit filed by the Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax in the form of additional affidavit dated 25.10.2010 wherein in para 1 it has clearly stated that on account of paucity of time and heavy workload, the Assessing Officer could not incorporate the details of bad debt written off furnished by the petitioner. This clearly indicate according to the counsel for the petitioner that all full particulars have been provided in response to the query raised by the Assessing Officer. And it is only after satisfying the explanation, the issue has been allowed by Assessing Officer. Therefore, after scrutiny of assessment having submitted full particulars as and when demanded, it is not justified now at this stage to reopen the assessment under Section 148 of the Act even if it is within a period of four years. Reliance which has been placed on specific paragraph contained in additional affidavit is reduced hereafter: “1. Therefore, after scrutiny of assessment having submitted full particulars as and when demanded, it is not justified now at this stage to reopen the assessment under Section 148 of the Act even if it is within a period of four years. Reliance which has been placed on specific paragraph contained in additional affidavit is reduced hereafter: “1. I was working as Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, Circle-4, Baroda, 4th Floor, Aayakar Bhavan, Race Course Circle Baroda from 5.6.2006 to 14.7.2008 I have passed order u/s. 143(3) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 for Assessment year 2005-06 in the case of the petitioner assessee concerned. I further submit that in view of the workload and pressure of various files getting time barred assessment of the various assesses and on account of corporate assesses being under my jurisdiction, I could not incorporate the details of bad debt written off furnished by the petitioner assessee in the assessment order passed u/s. 143(3) of the Act. In light of the above, details with regard to bad debts written off of the petitioner assessee was not mentioned in the assessment order dated 29.10.2007 passed u/s. 143(3) of the Income Tax Act.” No other submissions have been made. 10. To oppose the petition, learned counsel for the revenue has mainly contended that the issuance of notice under Section 148 of the Act is within a period of four years and therefore, it is not open for the petitioner to hamper the said process of reopening which is already in contemplation. It was submitted by the counsel for the Revenue that bad debt has merely been provided for written off and there is no actual written off has taken place and therefore, by making mere provision for bad debt, it cannot be stated that this credited to the provision of bad and doubtful debts. Counsel further submitted that the issue pertaining to bad debt has not been gone into in detail and the said issue has not been disposed of by Assessing Officer by assigning any reason and therefore, it is to be presumed that the issue in question was not part of the consideration and assessment proceedings and thereby contend not to entertain the petition. Learned counsel has further drawn attention of the Court to the contents of affidavit submitted by the department and has submitted that simply because the authority could not incorporate the details of bad debt written off, it cannot be presumed that the same is allowed by the authority. Counsel further submitted that by virtue of amendment which took place under Section 147 w.e.f 01.04.1989 much power is entrusted to the assessing authority. The assessing authority has certainly the power of reopening after the amendment which has taken place. Counsel for the revenue further submitted that there is a tangible material available before the Assessing Authority to come to the conclusion and form a belief that there is escapement of income from the assessment and therefore, counsel submitted that it is thoroughly justified on the part of the respondent authority to reopen the assessment. Learned counsel for the Revenue has contended that no doubt the Assessing Officer could have set right an issue during the course of original assessment but the issue is whether the assessee can make a claim to which it was not entitled to? Since this issue was not dealt with about entitlement of the petitioner, the reopening is perfectly justified in the eye of law and considering these submissions, counsel for the revenue requested the Court to dismiss the petition. 11. Having heard learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respective parties and having gone through the record of the petition in detail, we are of the opinion that before examining the contention and before giving our anxious thought for considering the proposition of law laid down by some of the decisions is worth to be taken note of. Hence, the same is reproduced for immediate reference. 12. Both the sides have submitted on the issue of amendment to Section 147 w.e.f 01.04.1989 and therefore to understand the said proposition we have to deal with and consider the decision delivered by apex Court in case of Commissioner of Income Tax v. Kelvinator of India Ltd. (supra). In the said decision the short question which was paused before the Apex Court was, whether the concept of change of opinion stands obliterated w.e.f 01.04.1989 i.e after substitution of Section 147 of the Act by Direct Tax Laws (Amendment) Act, 1987. In the said decision the short question which was paused before the Apex Court was, whether the concept of change of opinion stands obliterated w.e.f 01.04.1989 i.e after substitution of Section 147 of the Act by Direct Tax Laws (Amendment) Act, 1987. Therefore, for consideration of the issue paused before the Court, the Apex Court analyzed the entire scheme of Section 147 onwards and have considered the effect of amendment to Section 147. The Hon'ble Apex Court while going through the changes which have taken place to Section 147 of the Act, has found that prior to Direct Tax Laws (Amendment) Act, reopening could be done under the two conditions and fulfillment of the said two conditions would confer jurisdiction on the Assessing Officer to make a back assessment but then after examining the amended provision w.e.f 01.04.1989, the Apex Court has found that subsequent to amendment only one condition remained viz. whether the Assessing Officer has reason to believe that income has escaped assessment. Only that condition would confers jurisdiction to reopen the assessment. Therefore, the Hon'ble Apex Court found that scope of reopening is no doubt become wider after amendment. However, the Hon'ble Apex Court anticipating the uncontrolled power has categorically stated that the Assessing Officer has no power to review. He has the only power to reassess and then the Hon'ble Apex Court stated that the reassessment also had to be done not in a routine manner but on fulfillment of certain pre-condition therefor as laid down after 1st April 1989. The Assessing Officer has power to reopen provided that there is tangible material to come to the conclusion that there is escapement of income from assessment. It has also been propounded that reasons imposed have a live link with formation of belief. The said proposition to understand minutely para 5 of the said decision is reproduced hereafter: “5. The Assessing Officer has power to reopen provided that there is tangible material to come to the conclusion that there is escapement of income from assessment. It has also been propounded that reasons imposed have a live link with formation of belief. The said proposition to understand minutely para 5 of the said decision is reproduced hereafter: “5. On going through the changes, quoted above, made to Section 147 of the Act, we find that, prior to Direct Tax Laws (Amendment) Act, 1987, re-opening could be done under above two conditions and fulfillment of the said conditions alone conferred jurisdiction on the Assessing Officer to make a back assessment, but in section 147 of the Act [with effect from 1st April, 1989], they are given a go-by and only one condition has remained, viz., that where the Assessing Officer has reason to believe that income has escaped assessment, confers jurisdiction to reopen the assessment. Therefore, post-1st April, 1989, power to re-open is much wider. However, one needs to give a schematic interpretation to the words “reason to believe” failing which, we are afraid, Section 147 would give arbitrary powers to the Assessing Officer to re-open assessments on the basis of “mere change of opinion”, which cannot be per se reason to reopen. We must also keep in mind the conceptual difference between power to review and power to re-assess. The Assessing Officer has no power to review; he has the power to re-assess. But re-assessment has to be based on fulfillment of certain pre-condition and if the concept of “change of opinion” is removed, as contended on behalf of the Department, then, in the garb of re-opening the assessment, review would take place. One must treat the concept of “change of opinion” as an in-built test to check abuse of power by the Assessing Officer. Hence, after 1st April, 1989, Assessing Officer has power to re-open, provided there is “tangible material” to come to the conclusion that there is escapement of income from assessment. Reasons must have a live link with the formation of the belief. Our view gets support from the changes made to Section 147 of the Act, as quoted hereinabove. Under the Direct Tax Laws (Amendment) Act, 1987, Parliament not only deleted the words “reason to believe” but also inserted the word “opinion” in Section 147 of the Act. Reasons must have a live link with the formation of the belief. Our view gets support from the changes made to Section 147 of the Act, as quoted hereinabove. Under the Direct Tax Laws (Amendment) Act, 1987, Parliament not only deleted the words “reason to believe” but also inserted the word “opinion” in Section 147 of the Act. However, on receipt of representations from the Companies against omission of the words “reason to believe”, Parliament re-introduced the said expression and deleted the word “opinion” on the ground that it would vest arbitrary powers in the Assessing Officer. We quote hereinbelow the relevant portion of Circular No. 549 dated 31stOctober, 1989, which reads as follows: “7.2 Amendment made by the Amending Act, 1989, to reintroduce the expression ‘reason to believe’ in Section 147.-A number of representations were received against the omission of the words ‘reason to believe’ from Section 147 and their substitution by the ‘opinion’ of the Assessing Officer. It was pointed out that the meaning of the expression, ‘reason to believe’ had been explained in a number of court rulings in the past and was well settled and its omission from section 147 would give arbitrary powers to the Assessing Officer to reopen past assessments on mere change of opinion. To allay these fears, the Amending Act, 1989, has again amended section 147 to reintroduce the expression ‘has reason to believe’ in place of the words ‘for reasons to be recorded by him in writing, is of the opinion’. Other provisions of the new section 147, however, remain the same.” 13. Yet in another decision delivered by the Division Bench of this Court in case of Gujarat Power Corporation Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax reported in 2013 (350) ITR 266, the Division Bench has considered this judgment of Commissioner of Income Tax v. Kelvinator of India Ltd. (supra) delivered by the Apex Court also and after considering various other decisions the Court has come to the conclusion that the reopening of assessment within a period of four years from the end of relevant assessment year after 01.04.1989 could be made as long as the same is not based on a mere change of opinion. 14. 14. While further considering the Hon'ble Apex Court judgments it was observed that after scrutinizing the claim minutely during the Assessment proceedings if the Assessing Officer does not reject such a claim but choses not to give any reasons, such a course of action that he adopts had hardly be stated that he did not form the opinion on such a claim. Therefore, when the Assessing Officer during scrutiny assessment notices a claim of exemption deduction for such like made by the assessee having some prima facie doubt raises queries asking the assessee to satisfy him with respect to such a claim thereafter, does not make any addition in the financial year of assessment. It can be stated to have form an opinion whether or not in the financial year he give his reason for making addition and after forming an opinion on the issue, the Court further held that any such reopening would be based on a mere change of opinion cannot be reopened simply because the Assessing Officer did not record reasons for making no disallowance on such claim of exemption would be of a no consequence. The relevant extracts of the said decision which are referred to worth to be taken note of. Hence reproduced hereafter: “37. Coming to the second question, as recorded, contention of the petitioner is that as in the present case, once the Assessing Officer examines a certain claim of the assessee in the original assessment proceedings, raises queries, receives replies, but thereafter makes no additions or disallowances, without giving reasons, it would not be permissible to reopen the assessment even within four years on very same grounds. The contention of the revenue is that in absence of any direct discussion in the assessment order, the Assessing Officer cannot be stated to have formed any opinion and that therefore, reopening within a period of four years of such an assessment would be permissible. 38. In this context, we may recall that as held by the Apex Court in the case of Commissioner of Income Tax v. (1) Kelvinator of India Ltd. (SC) (supra), even after 1.4.1989, reopening of an assessment previously framed after scrutiny would not be permissible on a mere change of opinion and that the Assessing Officer must have some tangible material to form a belief that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment. The concept of change of opinion is not done away with in the newly amended section 147 of the Act. 42. Bearing in mind these conflicting interests, if we revert back to central issue in debate, it can hardly be disputed that once the Assessing Officer notices a certain claim made by the assessee in the return filed, has some doubt about eligibility of such a claim and therefore, raises queries, extracts response from the assessee, thereafter in what manner such claim should be treated in the final order of assessment, is an issue on which the assessee would have no control whatsoever. Whether the Assessing Officer allows such a claim, rejects such a claim or partially allows and partially rejects the claim, are all options available with the Assessing Officer, over which the assessee beyond trying to persuade the Assessing Officer, would have no control whatsoever. Therefore, while framing the assessment, allowing the claim fully or partially, in what manner the assessment order should be framed, is totally beyond the control of the assessee. If the Assessing Officer, therefore, after scrutinizing the claim minutely during the assessment proceedings, does not reject such a claim, but chooses not to give any reasons for such a course of action that he adopts, it can hardly be stated that he did not form an opinion on such a claim. It is not unknown that assessments of larger corporations in the modern day, involve large number of complex claims, voluminous material, numerous exemptions and deductions. If the Assessing Officer is burdened with the responsibility of giving reasons for several claims so made and accepted by him, it would even otherwise cast an unreasonable expectation which within the short frame of time available under law would be too much to expect him to carry. Irrespective of this, in a given case, if the Assessing Officer on his own for reasons best known to him, chooses not to assign reasons for not rejecting the claim of an assessee after thorough scrutiny, it can hardly be stated by the revenue that the Assessing Officer can not be seen to have formed any opinion on such a claim. Such a contention, in our opinion, would be devoid of merits. If a claim made by the assessee in the return is not rejected, it stands allowed. Such a contention, in our opinion, would be devoid of merits. If a claim made by the assessee in the return is not rejected, it stands allowed. If such a claim is scrutinized by the Assessing Officer during assessment, it means he was convinced about the validity of the claim. His formation of opinion is thus complete. Merely because he chooses not to assign his reasons in the assessment order would not alter this position. It may be a non-reasoned order but not of acceptance of a claim without formation of opinion. Any other view would give arbitrary powers to the Assessing Officer. 43. We are, therefore, of the opinion that in a situation where the Assessing Officer during scrutiny assessment, notices a claim of exemption, deduction or such like made by the assessee, having some prima facie doubt raises queries, asking the assessee to satisfy him with respect to such a claim and thereafter, does not make any addition in the final order of assessment, he can be stated to have formed an opinion whether or not in the final order he gives his reasons for not making the addition. 51. In our opinion, any such reopening would be based on a mere change of opinion. In the reasons, the Assessing Officer started with the words, “from the records, it can be seen that…..”. Entire information and the material that the Assessing Officer, therefore, had at his command was reflected from the record itself. This coupled with the fact that in the original assessment, the Assessing Officer examined such claims in detail, would convince us that any reopening of the assessment of same claims on the basis of same material, amounts to a mere change of opinion. The fact that the Assessing Officer did not record reasons for making no disallowance on such claim of exemption, would be of no consequence.” 15. Now in the background of these proposition of law, if we analyze the record of the present petition on hand, it would quite clear that the petitioner was asked to furnish details regarding the claim of bad debt written off. Now in the background of these proposition of law, if we analyze the record of the present petition on hand, it would quite clear that the petitioner was asked to furnish details regarding the claim of bad debt written off. It is also found from the record that the same has been cogently explained and replied and therefore, while completing the scrutiny assessment, this issue has been gone into by the Assessing Officer and the perusal of record further indicates that while assessment order came to be passed, the accountant of the petitioner did attend the hearing. The case was discussed at length and submitted by the detailed information as called for from time to time and therefore, considering this material which is available on record, it appears to this Court that the issue pertaining to provision for bad and doubtful debt has been gone into and only thereafter this scrutiny assessment came to be passed. To arrive at such conclusion, we have also gone through the stand taken by the respondent-revenue authority. We have taken note of the contents stated by the deponent on behalf of the revenue contained in additional affidavit submitted before the Court. It was categorically stated by the deponent on additional affidavit that on account of workload and pressure of various files getting time barred asessement of various assessees and on account of corporate assessees being under jurisdiction of that Assessing Officer he had categorically deposed that he could not incorporate the details of bad debts written off furnished by the petitioner assessee. This would clearly indicate that the details have already disclosed before the Assessing Officer and while framing the assesment, the Assessing Officer has considered the same. It is only because of pressure of work he could not incorporate the details in an order under Section 143(3) of the Act and therefore, considering this overall view of the matter we are of the opinion that if the records speak like this it would not be permissible for respondent-authority to reopen the assessment otherwise the same would be based on change of opinion and since the change of opinion is already spelt out by this Hon'ble Court and the decision which has been referred to above. In the background of these facts and circumstances we are of the opinion that the case is squarely covered by the ratio laid down by the above mentioned two decisions viz. Gujarat Power Corporation Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax (supra) and Commissioner of Income Tax v. Kelvinator of India Ltd. (supra). Counsel for the petitioner has further taken up yet another decision in case of Swati Saurin Shah v. Income Tax Officer, Ward 5(2)(4) reported in [2016] 70 Taxman.Com 72 (Guj.) and has drawn the attention of this Court to relevant para of the said decision. Having perused the same we found that the same is also profitable to be considered by this Court. Hence, the extract of the same contained in para 12 is reproduced hereafter. “12. Insofar as the second ground for reopening the assessment, namely, deduction under section 54EC of the Act is concerned, it is evident that during the course of proceedings under section 143(3) of the Act, the Assessing Officer had called for details in this regard and the petitioner had produced the certificates issued by the Rural Electrification Corporation Ltd. for a total amount of Rs.81,00,000/- and had also placed reliance upon the decision of the Tribunal in the case of Aspi Ginwala v. ACIT, Baroda (supra) and the Assessing Officer after being satisfied as regards the claim of the petitioner, had allowed the deduction of Rs.81,00,000/- under section 54EC of the Act. From the reasons recorded, it appears that the ground for reopening is that according to the Assessing Officer the assessee is entitled to deduction of only Rs.50,00,000/- under section 54EC of the Act and that against the decision of the Tribunal in the above case, an appeal is pending consideration before the High Court. Thus, it appears that the present Assessing Officer now believes that the Assessing Officer who had framed the assessment under section 143(3) of the Act had made a mistake in allowing deduction in excess of Rs.50,00,000/- and now wants to correct the mistake. From the facts as emerging from the record, it appears that the Assessing Officer while allowing deduction in excess of Rs.50,00,000/- under section 54EC of the Act has placed reliance upon a decision of the jurisdictional Tribunal, under the circumstances, the view adopted by the Assessing Officer cannot be said to be erroneous. From the facts as emerging from the record, it appears that the Assessing Officer while allowing deduction in excess of Rs.50,00,000/- under section 54EC of the Act has placed reliance upon a decision of the jurisdictional Tribunal, under the circumstances, the view adopted by the Assessing Officer cannot be said to be erroneous. Moreover, assuming that the Assessing Officer made a mistake, section 147 of the Act cannot be availed of for the purpose of correcting a mistake. In effect and substance, therefore, the present Assessing Officer wants to sit in appeal over the decision of his predecessor Assessing Officer, who has examined the claim and allowed the claim of deduction of Rs.81,00,000/- under section 54EC of the Act, on the ground that the assessee was eligible for deduction only to the extent of Rs.50,00,000/- for the year under consideration. Thus, the reopening of assessment is not sustainable on either of the two grounds. The assumption of jurisdiction on the part of the Assessing Officer by issuance of the impugned notice under section 148 of the Act is, therefore, without authority of law and consequently, the impugned notice cannot be sustained.” 16. Considering this overall set of circumstances coupled with the fact that there is no other tangible material available to justify the reopening more particularly when the issue has been gone into in detail during the course of regular scrutiny assessment, it is hardly justify for the revenue to reopen the issue which has relied upon, examined and even if it is within a period of four years. The ratio laid down by the aforesaid decision referred to above would clearly clinch the issue and therefore, the action of revenue in reopening the assessment is not justified as it would tantamount to be on the basis of mere change of opinion which is not permissible as the conditions which has been retained under Section 147 is also not satisfied. 17. In that view of the matter we are of the opinion that the action on part of the respondent authority is not in consonance with proposition of law laid down and the background of facts would not warrant the Court to allow and precipitate further on account of main action on part of the respondent authority. Hence, the impugned notice dated 16.12.2009 and letter dated 06.08.2010 are hereby quashed and set aside. Rule is made absolute.