JUDGMENT : Vivek Singh Thakur, J. 1. The appellant-State has assailed acquittal of the respondent by filing present appeal challenging judgment dated 29.12.2015 passed in Sessions Trial No. 10 of 2015 by Special Judge, Chamba, Division Chamba, H.P. in case FIR No. 14 of 2015 dated 25.01.2015 registered under Section 20 of the of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 registered in Police Station Dalhousie, District Chamba, HP. 2. As per prosecution case, on 24.01.2015, Police Party consisting of Head Constable Kartar Singh HC Inder Singh, HHC Pritam Singh and HHC Mehar Singh had left Police Post Banikhet for patrolling at about 9.40 PM. In Banikhet Market they were talking with PW-1 Arun Kumar Rana and PW-10 Parth Sharma. At that time respondent had come from Bus Stand side, who on seeing police party, had frightened and gone to toilet at Bus Stand Banikhet but not come out for 7 minutes, therefore, he was called by HC. Kartar Singh. His name and address was inquired and after complying with provision of law his Pithu bag was checked from which 1.20 Kgs. charas was recovered. After completion of investigation challan was put in the Court. On conclusion of trial respondent was acquitted by trial Court. 3. We have heard learned Additional Advocate General and have gone through the record made available by him. 4. Acquitted of respondent by trial court is based on various grounds. Though we find that no interference is warranted in acquittal of respondent for reasons stated hereinafter however there are certain findings of trial court which are required to be interfered and/or clarified. 5. Learned trial Court has relied upon case State of H.P. Vs. Hanacho alias Stewert, Latest HLJ 2004 (HP) (DB) 642 in which joining of independent witness was considered to be necessary to ensure fairness in conducting search and to corroborate version of searching officer about search and seizure. This judgment was not applicable in present case as in this case two independent witnesses PW-1 Arun Kumar Rana and PW-10 Parth Sharma were associated by Investigating Officer. It is separate issue that when independent witnesses do not support or desist from lending support to prosecution case, then it will attract fairness of investigation or not. 6. This judgment was not applicable in present case as in this case two independent witnesses PW-1 Arun Kumar Rana and PW-10 Parth Sharma were associated by Investigating Officer. It is separate issue that when independent witnesses do not support or desist from lending support to prosecution case, then it will attract fairness of investigation or not. 6. Learned trial Court relying upon judgment passed in case Bhagwan Singh vs. State of Rajasthan reported in AIR 1976 SC 985 and judgment passed by this Court in case State of H.P. vs. Shesh Ram reported in 2015 (2) Him.L.R. (DB) 720 has held that grave miscarriage of justice has been caused to the accused in present case when entire material investigation was conducted by complainant HC Kartar Singh, himself. Learned trial Court has failed to take note of latest ratio of law on this point laid down by the Apex Court in cases State vs. V. Jayapaul reported in (2004) 5 SCC 223 , S. Jeevanantham vs. Sate reported in (2004) (5) SCC 230, Bhaskar Ramappa Madar and others vs. State of Karnataka reported in (2009) 11 SCC 690 and Vinod Kumar vs. State of Punjab reported in (2015) 3 SCC 220 . 7. Apex Court after distinguishing Bhagwan Singh’s Case ( AIR 1976 SC 985 ) referred mentioned supra alongwith another case titled as Megha Singh vs. State of Haryana, (1996) 11 SCC 709 in case titled as State vs. V. Jayapaul reported in (2004) 5 SCC 223 has held as under:- “4. We have no hesitation in holding that the approach of the High Court is erroneous and its conclusion legally unsustainable. There is nothing in the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code which precluded the appellant (Inspector of Police, Vigilance) from taking up the investigation. The fact that the said police officer prepared the FIR on the basis of the information received by him and registered the suspected crime does not, in our view, disqualify him from taking up the investigation of the cognizable offence. A sup motu move on the part of the police officer to investigate a cognizable offence impelled by the information received from some sources is not outside the purview of the provisions contained in Sections 154 to 157 of the Code or any other provisions of the Code. A sup motu move on the part of the police officer to investigate a cognizable offence impelled by the information received from some sources is not outside the purview of the provisions contained in Sections 154 to 157 of the Code or any other provisions of the Code. The scheme of Sections 154, 156 and 157 was clarified thus by Subba Rao, J. speaking for the Court in State of U.P. v. Bhagwant Kishore Joshi (AIR p.223, para 8). "Section 154 of the Code prescribes the mode of recording the information received orally or in writing by an officer in charge of a police station in respect of the commission of a cognizable offence. Section 156 thereof authorizes such an officer to investigate any cognizable offence prescribed therein. Though ordinarily investigation is undertaken on information received by a police officer; the receipt of information is not a condition precedent for investigation. Section 157 prescribes the procedure in the matter of such an investigation which can be initiated either on information or otherwise. It is clear from the said provisions that an officer in charge of a police station can start investigation either on information or otherwise." 5. In fact, neither the High Court found nor any argument was addressed to the effect that there is a statutory bar against the police officer who registered the FIR on the basis of the information received taking up the investigation. 6. Though there is no such statutory bar the premise on which the High Court quashed the proceedings was that the investigation by the same officer who 'lodged' the FIR would prejudice the accused inasmuch as the investigating officer cannot be expected to act fairly and objectively. We find no principle or binding authority to hold that the moment the competent police officer, on the basis of information received, makes out an FIR incorporating his name as the informant, he forfeits his right to investigate. If at all, such investigation could only be assailed on the ground of bias or real likelihood of bias on the part of the investigating officer. If at all, such investigation could only be assailed on the ground of bias or real likelihood of bias on the part of the investigating officer. The question of bias would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and it is not proper to lay down a broad and unqualified proposition, in the manner in which it has been done by the High Court, that whenever a police officer proceeds to investigate after registering the FIR on his own, the investigation would necessarily be unfair or biased. 7. There are two decisions of this Court from which support was drawn in this case and in some other referred to by the High Court. We would like to refer to these two decisions in some detail. The first one is the case of Bhagwan Singh v. State of Rajasthan. There, the Head Constable to whom the offer of bribe was allegedly made, seized the currency notes and gave the first information report. Thereafter, he himself took up the investigation. But, later on, when it came to his notice that he was not authorized to do so, he forwarded the papers to the Deputy Superintendent of Police. The DSP then reinvestigated the case and filed the charge sheet against the accused. The Head Constable and the accompanying Constables were the only witnesses in that case. This Court found several circumstances which cast a doubt on the veracity of the version of the Head Constable and his colleagues. This Court observed that "the entire story sounds unnatural." While so holding, this Court referred to "a rather disturbing feature of the case" and it was pointed out that: (SCC p. 18 para 5). "Head Constable Ram Singh was the person to whom the offer of bribe was alleged to have been made by the appellant and he was the informant or complainant who lodged the first information report for taking action against the appellant. It is difficult to understand how in these circumstances, Head Constable Ram Singh could undertake investigation..... This is an infirmity which is bound to reflect on the credibility of the prosecution case." 8. It is not clear as to why the Court was called upon to make the comments against the propriety of the Head Constable….. informant investigating the case when the reinvestigation was done by the Deputy Superintendent of Police. This is an infirmity which is bound to reflect on the credibility of the prosecution case." 8. It is not clear as to why the Court was called upon to make the comments against the propriety of the Head Constable….. informant investigating the case when the reinvestigation was done by the Deputy Superintendent of Police. Be that as it may, it is possible to hold on the basis of the facts noted above, that the so called investigation by the Head Constable himself would be a mere ritual. The crime itself was directed towards the Head Constable which made him lodge the FIR. It is well nigh impossible to expect an objective and undetached investigation from the Head Constable who is called upon to check his own version on which the prosecution case solely rests. It was under those circumstances the Court observed that the said infirmity "is bound to reflect on the credibility of the prosecution case." There can be no doubt that the facts of the present case are entirely different and the dicta laid down therein does not fit into the facts of this case. 9. Now, we may turn our attention to the case of Megha Singh v. State of Haryana on which reliance was placed by the High Court. 10. In Megha Singh's case, PW3, the Head Constable, found a country-made pistol and live cartridges on search of the person of the accused. Then, he seized the articles, prepared a recovery memo and a 'rukka' on the basis of which FIR was recorded by the S.I. of police. However, PW.3 the Head Constable himself, for reasons unexplained, proceeded to investigate and record the statements of witnesses under Section 161 Cr.P.C. The substratum of the prosecution case was sought to be proved by the Head Constable. In the appeal against conviction under Section 25 of the Arms Act and Section 6(1) of the TADA Act, this Court found that the evidence of PWs 2 & 3 was discrepant and unreliable and in the absence of independent corroboration, the prosecution case cannot be believed. Towards the end, the Court noted "another disturbing feature in the case." The Court then observed: (SCC p.771 para 4). PW 3. Siri Chand, Head Constable arrested the accused and on search being conducted by him a pistol and the cartridges were recovered from the accused. Towards the end, the Court noted "another disturbing feature in the case." The Court then observed: (SCC p.771 para 4). PW 3. Siri Chand, Head Constable arrested the accused and on search being conducted by him a pistol and the cartridges were recovered from the accused. It was on his complaint a formal first information report was lodged and the case was initiated. He being complainant should not have proceeded with the investigation of the case. But it appears to us that he was not only the complainant in the case but he carried on with the investigation and examined witnesses under Section 161 Cr.P.C. Such practice, to say the least, should not be resorted to so that there may not be any occasion to suspect fair and impartial investigation." 11. The conviction was set aside by this Court for the above reasons. 12. At first blush, the observations quoted above might convey the impression that the Court laid down a proposition that a Police Officer who in the course of discharge of his duties finds certain incriminating material to connect a person to the crime, shall not undertake further Investigation if the FIR was recorded on the basis of the information furnished by him. On closer analysis of the decision, we do not think that any such broad proposition was laid down in that case. While appreciating the evidence of the main witness, i.e., the Head Constable (PW-3), this Court referred to this additional factor--namely, the Head Constable turning out to be the investigator. In fact, there was no apparent reason why the Head Constable proceeded to investigate the case bypassing the Sub-Inspector who recorded the FIR. The fact situation in the present case is entirely different. The appellant-- Inspector of Police, after receiving information from some sources, proceeded to investigate and unearth the crime. Before he did so, he did not have personal knowledge of the suspected offences nor did he participate in any operations connected with the offences. His role was that of investigator--pure and simple. That is the obvious distinction in this case. That apart, the question of testing the veracity of the evidence of any witness, as was done in Megha Singh's case, does not arise in the instant case as the trial is yet to take place. The High Court has quashed the proceedings even before the trial commenced. 13. That is the obvious distinction in this case. That apart, the question of testing the veracity of the evidence of any witness, as was done in Megha Singh's case, does not arise in the instant case as the trial is yet to take place. The High Court has quashed the proceedings even before the trial commenced. 13. Viewed from any angle, we see no illegality in the process of investigation set in motion by the inspector of Police (appellant) and his action in submitting the final report to the Court of Special judge. 8. In another case titled as S. Jeevanantham vs. Sate reported in 2004 (5) SCC 230 , the Apex Court held as under:- “3. In the instant case, PW-8 conducted the search and recovered the contraband article and registered the case and the article seized from the appellant was narcotic drug and the counsel for the appellant could not point out any circumstances by which the investigation caused prejudice or was biased against the appellant. PW-8 in his official capacity gave the information, registered the case as part of his official duty and later investigated the case and filed charge-sheet. He was not in any way personally interested in the case. We are unable to find any sort of bias in the process of investigation.” 9. Similarly, in case titled as Bhaskar Ramappa Madar and others vs. State of Karnataka reported in (2009) 11 SCC 690 , the Apex Court held as under:- “8 So far as the desirability of the complainant undertaking investigation is concerned there is no legal bar. The decisions of this Court in Bhagwan Singh vs. State of Rajasthan (SCC at para-18) and Megha Singh vs. State of Haryana (SCC at para-4) have to be confined to the facts of the said cases. Merely because the complainant conducted the investigation, that would not be sufficient to cast doubt on the prosecution version to hold that the same makes the prosecution version vulnerable. The matter has to be decided on a case-to-case basis without any universal generalization. 10. In latest judgment passed by Apex Court in case titled as Vinod Kumar Vs. State of Punjab reported in (2015) 3 SCC 220 , it has been held as under:- “27. The matter has to be decided on a case-to-case basis without any universal generalization. 10. In latest judgment passed by Apex Court in case titled as Vinod Kumar Vs. State of Punjab reported in (2015) 3 SCC 220 , it has been held as under:- “27. In this regard, it is useful to refer to the pronouncement in State vs. V. Jayapaul wherein the Court posed the question whether the High Court was justified in quashing the criminal proceedings on the ground that the police officer, who had lodged/recorded the FIR regarding the suspected commission of certain cognizable offence by the respondent should not have investigated the case. The case against the accused was that he was indulging in corrupt practices by extracting money from the drivers and owners of the motor-vehicles while conducting check of the vehicles and making use of certain bogus notice forms in the process. The charge-sheet was filed under Sections 420 and 201 I.P.C. and Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Act. The Court referred to the decision in the State of U.P. v. Bhagwant Kishore Joshi, wherein it has been ruled thus: (Bhagwant Kishore Joshi case AIR 223, para 8). “8……Section 154 of the Code prescribes the mode of recording the information received orally or in writing by an officer in charge of a police station in respect of the commission of a cognizable offence. Section 156 thereof authorises such an officer to investigate any cognizable offence prescribed therein. Though ordinarily investigation is undertaken on information received by a police officer, the receipt of information is not a condition precedent for investigation. Section 157 prescribes the procedure in the matter of such an investigation which can be initiated either on information or otherwise. It is clear from the said provisions that an officer in charge of a police station can start investigation either on information or otherwise." (V. Jayapaul case SCC pp. 226-27 para 4).” 28. After reproducing the said paragraph, the Court proceeded to state thus: (V. Jayapaul case SCC p. 227 para 6).” "Though there is no such statutory bar, the premise on which the High Court quashed the proceedings was that the investigation by the same officer who "lodged" the FIR would prejudice the accused inasmuch as the investigating officer cannot be expected to act fairly and objectively. We find no principle or binding authority to hold that the moment the competent police officer, on the basis of information received, makes out an FIR incorporating his name as the informant, he forfeits his right to investigate. If at all, such investigation could only be assailed on the ground of bias or real likelihood of bias on the part of the investigating officer. The question of bias would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and it is not proper to lay down a broad and unqualified proposition, in the manner in which it has been done by the High Court, that whenever a police officer proceeds to investigate after registering the FIR on his own, the investigation would necessarily be unfair or biased. In the present case, the police officer received certain discreet information, which, according to his assessment, warranted a probe and therefore made up his mind to investigate. The formality of preparing the FIR in which he records the factum of having received the information about the suspected commission of the offence and then taking up the investigation after registering the crime, does not, by any semblance of reasoning, vitiate the investigation on the ground of bias or the like factor. If the reason which weighed with the High Court could be a ground to quash the prosecution, the powers of investigation conferred on the police officers would be unduly hampered for no good reason. What is expected to be done by the police officers in the normal course of discharge of their official duties will then be vulnerable to attack." Be it noted, the Court distinguished the decisions in Bhagwant Singh and Megha Singh. “29. At this juncture, it would be fruitful to refer to S. Jeevanatham V. State In the said case, the appellant was found guilty under Section 8(c) read with Section 20(b)(ii) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985. One of the contentions that was canvassed was that PW-8, who lodged the FIR had himself conducted the investigation and hence, the entire investigation was vitiated. The Court referred to the decision in Jayapaul (supra) and opined thus: (S. Jeevanantham case SCC pp 231-232. One of the contentions that was canvassed was that PW-8, who lodged the FIR had himself conducted the investigation and hence, the entire investigation was vitiated. The Court referred to the decision in Jayapaul (supra) and opined thus: (S. Jeevanantham case SCC pp 231-232. "In the instant case, PW 8 conducted the search and recovered the contraband article and registered the case and the article seized from the appellants was narcotic drug and the counsel for the appellants could not point out any circumstances by which the investigation caused prejudice or was biased against the appellants. PW 8 in his official capacity gave the information, registered the case and as part of his official duty later investigated the case and filed a charge-sheet. He was not in any way personally interested in the case. We are unable to find any sort of bias in the process of investigation." “30. In the instant case, PW-8, who was a member of the raiding party had sent the report to the police station and thereafter carried the formal investigation. In fact, nothing has been put to him to elicit that he was anyway personally interested to get the appellant convicted. In our considered view, the decision in S. Jeevanatham (supra) would be squarely applicable to the present case and, accordingly, without any reservation we repel the submission so assiduously urged by Mr. Jain, learned senior counsel for the appellant.” 11. At the time of passing judgment in case titled as State of H.P. vs. Shesh Ram reported in 2015 (2) HLR (DB) 720, it appears that latest case law could not be noticed as Vinod Kumar’s case was decided on 29.01.2015 by the Apex Court whereas judgment in Shesh Ram’s case was rendered by Division Bench of this Court on 28.02.2015. 12. In present case PW-12 Head Constable Kartar Singh was heading police patrolling party. He inquired respondent and on checking recovered contraband in Pithu bag of respondent and after sending Rukka to Police Station he carried out further investigation. There is nothing on record to elucidate that he was personally interested to get the appellant convicted. Only suggestion put to him is that being a villager of accused, he was inimical to accused being his villager and due to enmity he had lodged false case against the accused which had been denied by HC Kartar Singh. There is nothing on record to elucidate that he was personally interested to get the appellant convicted. Only suggestion put to him is that being a villager of accused, he was inimical to accused being his villager and due to enmity he had lodged false case against the accused which had been denied by HC Kartar Singh. It is also noticeable that accused is resident of village Bharni P.O. Tikrigarh Police Station Tissa, Tehsil Churah, District Chamba whereas PW-12 Kartar Singh is resident of village Kalhal Post Office and Tehsil Churah District Chamba and belonging from one Tehsil cannot be said belonging from same village. Moreover, even residence in same village cannot be a ground to draw inference that there was enmity between Investigating Officer and respondent. Something more to show enmity was required to be placed on record. Therefore, findings on this ground returned by ld. Sessions Judge are not sustainable. 13. After sealing contraband with seal ‘V’ the same was handed over to PW-1 Arun Kumar Rana but he had not produced the seal in the Court. Similarly, after resealing case property, PW-8 SHO Bhupender Singh had handed over seal ‘A’ to PW-6 Dharvinder Kumar. However, Dharvinder Kumar had also not produced the said seal in the Court for comparison. Relying upon the judgments in case titled as State of H.P. vs. Kurban Khan reported in 2015 (1) Criminal Court Case 598 : (2015) Criminal Law Journal 183 H.P. and State vs. Anil Kumar 2015 Criminal Court Case 300 HP : Latest HLJ 2015 (HP) 341 trial Court has treated non-production of seals by prosecution witnesses fatal to prosecution case. 14. Hon’ble Supreme Court in case titled as State vs. N.S. Gnaneswaran reported in (2013) 3 SCC 594 has held as under:- “12. The issue also requires to be examined on the touchstone of doctrine of prejudice. Thus, unless in a given situation, the aggrieved makes out a case of prejudice or injustice, some infraction of law would not vitiate the order/enquiry result. In judging a question of prejudice, the court must act with a broad vision and lock to the substance and not to technicalities (Vide: Jankinath Sarangi v. State of Orissa, State of U.P. v. Shatrughan Lal, State of A.P. v. Thakkidiram Reddy and Debotosh Pal Choudhury v. Punjab National Bank).” “13. In judging a question of prejudice, the court must act with a broad vision and lock to the substance and not to technicalities (Vide: Jankinath Sarangi v. State of Orissa, State of U.P. v. Shatrughan Lal, State of A.P. v. Thakkidiram Reddy and Debotosh Pal Choudhury v. Punjab National Bank).” “13. In Dahari v. State of U.P., this Court considered the prejudice in a trial where charges had not properly been taken care of. In the said case, the trial commenced against five accused under Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC and they stood convicted by the Sessions Court. The High Court though acquitted 3 persons but for the remaining accused conviction was maintained under Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC. This Court held that in such a factual situation, the High Court could most certainly have convicted the appellant under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC and as no prejudice has been shown to have been caused to them, the question of interference cold not arise.” 15. The judgments relied upon by trial Court referred above had been rendered n the given facts and circumstances of those cases, which are not applicable in present case. In present case no prejudice has been caused for non production of seal in the court as there was sufficient evidence placed on record other than original seal for comparison of seal affixed on case property so as to link contraband recovered on spot with case property produced in the Court. There is nothing on record to suggest that non-production of seals had caused prejudice to the accused. Availability of other sufficient evidence renders non-production of original seal as a technical defect, which does not vitiate trial unless prejudice is caused. 16. Purpose of production of original seal in the Court is to compare it with seal affixed on parcels of contraband and sample in the Court so as to prove that the parcels produced in the Court are the same which were prepared and sealed on the spot at the time of recovery from the accused and also to ensure that parcel sent for chemical examination and received back were the same which were seized and sealed on the spot. For that purpose in present case the Investigating Officers had prepared the sample seal on separate piece of cloth and had obtained signatures of independent witnesses on sample seal and the documents. 17. PW-1 Arun Kumar had admitted preparation of sample seal impression on piece of cloth and had admitted and identified his signatures on the said sample seal Ex. PW1/B. On production of parcels of recovered contraband Ex. P-1 he has identified his signatures on parcels Ex. P-1 and had also identified polythene Ex. P-2 & P-3, Charas Ex. P-4, which were recovered from accused and packed in parcel Ex. P-1 and he had also identified pithu bag Ex. P-5 recovered from accused. He has admitted that seal after use was handed over to him. Therefore, in present case it cannot be said that for non production of original seal in the court for comparison of seals appended on recovered contraband was not possible with seal on parcel sent to chemical analysis and parcels produced in the Court. It has been mentioned in the chemical analysis report as under:- Description of parcel: - One sealed cloth parcel baring four seals of “V” and four seals of “A”. The seals were found intact and tallied with specimen seals sent by the forwarding authority and seals impression impressed on the forms NCB-1. The parcel was kept in safe custody of the Assistant Chemical Examiner till the report of the same was signed & dispatched. 18. It is evident from aforesaid that one sealed cloth parcel bearing four seals of “V” and four seals of “A” and seal impression impressed upon forms NCB-1 were received by the said FSL. Facsimile of seals appended on parcels were also taken on NCB forms, which was also found same as in State FSL and when case property was produced in the Court. Therefore, non production of seals in present case was not fatal. 19. Trial Court relying judgments passed by this Court in case titled as Shashi Kumar and another vs. State of H.P. reported in Latest HLJ 2015 (HP) 596 and Gurmeet Singh vs. State of H.P. reported in 2015 (2) Him.L.R 766, has returned finding that perusal of abstract of Malkhana register Ex. 19. Trial Court relying judgments passed by this Court in case titled as Shashi Kumar and another vs. State of H.P. reported in Latest HLJ 2015 (HP) 596 and Gurmeet Singh vs. State of H.P. reported in 2015 (2) Him.L.R 766, has returned finding that perusal of abstract of Malkhana register Ex. PW-11/A indicated that there was no entry in the abstract of Malkhana register regarding production of the case property before trial Court and has held that said infirmity was also fatal to prosecution case. The judgments in the above referred cases were passed in the given facts and circumstances of those cases. As held by Hon’ble Apex Court in case State vs. N.S. God reported in (2013) 3 SCC 594 , unless prejudice is shown to be caused to the accused on account of procedural lapse on the part of prosecution, every lapse is not fatal to the prosecution case. Moreover, perusal of evidence in present case transpires that there is complete misreading of evidence by trial Court on this issue. Abstract of Malkhana register Ex. PW-11/A pertained to entry regarding depositing of case property by PW-8 SHO Bhupender Singh in Malkhana through PW-11 HC Deepak Kumar and not with regard to entry when case property was taken out from the Malkhana of production before Court. Ex. PW-11/A was with respect to entry at serial No. 74 dated 25.01.2015 whereas evidence in present case was recorded on 24.08.2015. Trial Court has also failed to notice that as and when case property was taken out from Malkhana for production in Court during recording of evidence, the same was duly entered in Malkhana register and was produced in Court through Malkhana Musharar. Before opening seal of case property in the court with permission of the court, the said fact was recorded during evidence which was duly attested and verified by learned Special Judge. After production in the Court the said case property was duly sealed with seal of the Court and was sent back through Malkhana Mushahar under the signature of Special Judge conducting trial. After production in the Court the said case property was duly sealed with seal of the Court and was sent back through Malkhana Mushahar under the signature of Special Judge conducting trial. It is evident from evidence recorded in present case that case property was produced in Court thrice against entry at serial No. 17 dated 24.08.2015, entry No. 19 dated 25.08.2015, Entry No. 45 dated 12.10.2015 which was duly recorded during the evidence before Court and every time case property was sent back to Malkhana under the seal of the Court. Therefore, findings returned by Sessions Judge on this issue are also not sustainable. 20. In present case independent witnesses have not supported prosecution case. PW-1 Arun Kumar Rana has not identified respondent to be the same person from whom charas was recovered. PW-10 Parth Sharma had denied recovery of charas from respondent. PW-1 had admitted signing of documents on the spot but on the contrary PW- 10 Parth Sharma who was friend of PW-1 Arun Kumar Rana had denied the signing of documents on the spot and had stated that all documents were signed in the Police Post and no recovery was effected in his presence. It is settled law that testimony of hostile witnesses is not to be brushed aside only on the ground that such witnesses is declared hostile. Statements of hostile witnesses can be considered for benefit of prosecution or defence in case their statements or part of statements are corroborated by other evidence on record. 21. Conviction can also be based upon testimony of official witness in absence of support of independent witness subject to official only but their testimony is to be assessed with due care and caution particularly when independent witnesses were associated but had not supported prosecution case. 22. PW-2 HC Inder Singh, in his examination-in-Chief, has stated that after arrest of respondent, Memo Ex. PW- 2/B of his personal search was prepared on the spot but in cross examination he has stated that no memo of personal search of respondent was prepared by Investigating Officer. This witness had also been cited as witness to Ex. PW-2/B. 23. PW-2 HC Inder Singh had stated that 10 minutes each were taken in preparation of consent memo and certificate of identification of contraband and it had taken four and half hours for completion of investigation on sport. This witness had also been cited as witness to Ex. PW-2/B. 23. PW-2 HC Inder Singh had stated that 10 minutes each were taken in preparation of consent memo and certificate of identification of contraband and it had taken four and half hours for completion of investigation on sport. Whereas PW-3 HHC Pritam Chand had stated that three-four minutes were taken to prepare certificate regarding identify of contraband and 5-7 minutes to prepare consent memo. Memo regarding search of Police party and witnesses were prepared within 10-15 minutes thereafter and seizure memo and Rukka were prepared within 45 minutes meaning thereby that about one hour and 10 minutes were taken till preparation of ‘Rukka’ but at the same time had stated that he remained on spot for two hours whereas prosecution case was that on preparation of Rukka the same was handed over to this witness and he had left spot. 24. PW-4 HHC Mehar Singh has stated that he remained on the spot for two hours whereas this witness was also handed over copy of Rukka to be handed over to Superintendent of Police Chamba which was ready after about one hour. 25. PW-12 HC Kartar Singh had stated that he remained on the spot for 4-5 hours, whereas PW-1 Arun Kumar Rana had stated that he had stayed on spot for 25 minutes and police party had also left spot after 25 minutes. 26. PW-2 HC Inder Singh has stated that witnesses left the spot after one and half hours whereas PW-1 had stated that they left the spot after 25 minutes and PW-10 Parth Sharma had stated that he had signed documents in police post whereas case of prosecution was that investigation was carried on the spot. 27. It has also come in evidence of PW-4 HHC Mehar Singh that Police Post was at a distance of 500 metres from the spot. It is also neither feasible nor convincing that in a chilled night of December the Police party remained seating on the road in the market at a distance of 500 metres from Police Post for completing investigation for about 4-5 hours. It is unnatural conduct which creates doubt on prosecution story. 28. It is also neither feasible nor convincing that in a chilled night of December the Police party remained seating on the road in the market at a distance of 500 metres from Police Post for completing investigation for about 4-5 hours. It is unnatural conduct which creates doubt on prosecution story. 28. PW-12 HC Kartar Singh stated that after registration of FIR PW-2 HHC Pritam Singh had returned back to Police Post whereas PW-3 HHC Pritam Singh had stated that he had returned back on the spot at about 1.25 AM. 29. PW-12 HC Kartar Singh had also claimed that respondent was arrested in market at 1.30AM. His own statement is not reconcilable as he had stated that PW-3 had come back to Police Post and PW-3 had stated that he had reached back at 1.25 AM. Then for what reason PW-12 was in the market at 1.30 AM. 30. PW-3 HHC Pritam Chand had stated that he had taken lift from the spot to go to Police Station Dalhousie whereas, PW-4 HHC Mehar Singh had stated that PW-3 Pritam Chand had left spot on foot. PW-12 HC Kartar Singh had stated that he did not know how PW-3 HHC Pritam Singh had taken Rukka from spot. 31. All these contradictions and discrepancies may be insignificant in case story of prosecution is corroborated by independent witnesses but in a case where independent witnesses had demolished the case of prosecution, these contradictions are material and significant which are fatal to the prosecution case. 32. Therefore trial Court has rightly held that there are material contradictions and inconsistencies in prosecution case which have resulted into failure of prosecution to bring guilt of accused home beyond all reasonable doubts. From perusal and scrutiny of evidence, it cannot be said that on this count trial court has not appreciated the evidence correctly and completely and acquittal of the accused has resulted into travesty of justice or has caused miscarriage of justice. 33. After considering arguments of respective counsel for parties and minutely examining testimonies of witnesses and other documentary evidence placed on record, we are of considered view that no case for interference in acquittal of respondent is made out. 34. The present appeal, devoid of any merit, is dismissed, but with reversal of finding on issues referred supra. Bail bonds, if any, furnished by the accused are discharged. 34. The present appeal, devoid of any merit, is dismissed, but with reversal of finding on issues referred supra. Bail bonds, if any, furnished by the accused are discharged. Records of the Court below be sent back forthwith.