JUDGMENT Hon’ble Ram Surat Ram (Maurya), J.—Heard Sri B.B. Paul, alongwith Sri A.P. Paul, for the petitioners in Petition No. 2716 of 2016 and Sri V.K. Singh, Senior Advocate, assisted by Sri Sukesh Kumar, for the petitioners in Petition No. 2960 of 2016. 2. Both these petitions arise out of Misc. Case No. 5 of 2015, Nathu Ram Sharma and others v. Ram Prasad and others, filed for leave to sue under Section 92 C.P.C., between the same parties. The facts necessary for deciding these petitions have been stated by respective petitioners in their petitions as such with the consent of the parties both the petitions were heard together and are being decided by a common judgments. 3. Petition No. 2716 of 2016 has been filed for direction to District Judge Mathura to decide application for leave to sue under Section 92 C.P.C. and also to pass appropriate order, in the application for interim injunction (99-C) filed by the plaintiffs in aforesaid suit. Petition No. 2960 of 2016 has been filed for setting aside the order of District Judge Mathura dated 10.2.2016, by which he has superseded his previous order dated 27.10.2015, directing for publication of the notices of Misc. Case No. 5 of 2015 in news paper “Times of India” and decided to hear the arguments of the parties on the application for interim injunction (99-C) filed in the aforesaid suit. 4. Swami Tulsi Das Ji disciple of Swami Ghoorey Lal Ji was a Hindu ascetic of ‘santmat’. Swami Tulsi Das Ji, later on, became popular in the name of Jai Gurudev Ji Maharaj. He had large numbers of followers and more than 250 Ashrams, for his religious speeches and other processions. He created religious and charitable trusts namely (i) Jai Gurudev Dharam Pracharak Sangh Trust, Mathura (registered on 20.11.1977) (ii) Jai Gurudev Dharam Pracharak Sanstha, Jai Gurudev Yogsthali, Agra-Delhi road, Maholi, Mathura (registered on 24.5.1979) and (iii) Jai Gurudev Kothi Mandir Trust, Khitaura, Etawah. According to Trust deeds, Swami Tulsi Das Ji Maharaj was life long President of all these trusts. The trusts consist three categories of members, namely (i) Namdani Members (ii) Prabandhak Members and (iii) Samanya Sabha Members. All these members have to be nominated by the President. The President has right to nominate his successor President of these trusts. 5. Swami Jai Gurudev Ji Maharaj left for heavenly abode on 18.5.2012. The trusts consist three categories of members, namely (i) Namdani Members (ii) Prabandhak Members and (iii) Samanya Sabha Members. All these members have to be nominated by the President. The President has right to nominate his successor President of these trusts. 5. Swami Jai Gurudev Ji Maharaj left for heavenly abode on 18.5.2012. Pankaj Kumar Yadav (defendant-7 in Misc. case No. 5 of 2015), submitted an Annual List before Deputy Registrar, Firms, Societies and Chits, Agra, showing himself as President of Jai Gurudev Dharam Pracharak Sanstha, being nominated by Swami Jai Gurudev Ji Maharaj. Uma Kant Tiwari (defendant-9 in Misc. case No. 5 of 2015) submitted another Annual List before Deputy Registrar, Firms, Societies and Chits, Agra, showing himself as President of Jai Gurudev Dharam Pracharak Sanstha, being nominated by Swami Jai Gurudev Ji Maharaj. Deputy Registrar, by his order dated 24.7.2012, accepted Annual List of Pankaj Kumar Yadav. 6. Ram Pratap, a rival claimant, filed a writ petition (registered as Writ-C No. 34416 of 2012) against aforesaid order. Writ Petition was disposed of by order dated 24.7.2012, giving liberty to the petitioners to establish their right in Civil Court. Order dated 24.7.2012 was challenged in Special Appeal No. 1375 of 2012. Division Bench by order dated 26.11.2012 partly allowed the special appeal and remanded the matter to Single Judge, for considering interim relief, claimed in writ petition. After remand, Single Judge again dismissed the writ petition, by order dated 23.8.2013, holding that a writ petition for interim relief is not maintainable. Again Special Appeal No. 1377 of 2013 was filed, which was dismissed by order dated 5.10.2013. Special Leave Petition (CC) No. 18185 of 2014 was filed before Supreme Court against aforesaid order, which was got dismissed as withdrawn on 18.11.2014 with liberty to redress their grievances in appropriate civil action. 7. Again Special Appeal No. 1377 of 2013 was filed, which was dismissed by order dated 5.10.2013. Special Leave Petition (CC) No. 18185 of 2014 was filed before Supreme Court against aforesaid order, which was got dismissed as withdrawn on 18.11.2014 with liberty to redress their grievances in appropriate civil action. 7. Ram Ujagar Singh, claiming to be General Secretary (of the Annual List submitted by Uma Kant Tiwari as President) of Jai Gurudev Dharam Pracharak Sanstha, filed a suit (registered as O.S. No. 595 of 2012) on 28.8.2012, for declaration that Swami Jai Gurudev Ji Maharaj, during his life time has nominated Uma Kant Tiwari as his successor President of Jai Gurudev Dharam Pracharak Sanstha, who has inherited office of President after death of Swami Jai Gurudev Ji Maharaj on 18.5.2012 and for permanent injunction, restraining Pankaj Kumar Yadav and Ram Krishna Yadav from exercising powers of President and Secretary respectively, operating accounts and dealing with the properties of the Trusts. This suit is pending before Civil Judge (Senior Division) Mathura. 8. Nathuram Sharma and others (respondents-1 to 7 in Petition No. 2960 of 2016 and Ram Pyare Singh and Shailendra Singh Chauhan filed a suit under Section 92 C.P.C. for framing scheme of administration and appointing new Trustees of the Trusts established by Swami Jai Gurudev Ji Maharaj, alleging that according to intention of the Settlor and Trust deeds, successor President has to be nominated by Swami Jai Gurudev Ji Maharaj but he left for heavenly abode on 18.5.2012, without nomination of his successor President. Pankaj Kumar Yadav (defendant-7) is claiming himself as nominated President, to whom Deputy Registrar has also approved on 24.7.2012. Similarly Uma Kant Tiwari (defendant-9) is also claiming himself as nominated President although none of them were nominated. Extensive properties of the Trusts are being misappropriated by these person. Alongwith plaint an application (4-C) for grant of leave to sue under Section 92 C.P.C. (registered as Misc. Case No. 5 of 2015) was also filed on 15.4.2015. In this suit, 13 persons were impleaded as the defendants. An application for interim injunction, restraining Pankaj Kumar Yadav (defendant-7) and Uma Kant Tiwari (defendant-9) from discharging functions of President, relating to ‘namdan’ or financial and other functions and alienating the movable and immovable properties of the Trust, was also filed. 9. In this suit, 13 persons were impleaded as the defendants. An application for interim injunction, restraining Pankaj Kumar Yadav (defendant-7) and Uma Kant Tiwari (defendant-9) from discharging functions of President, relating to ‘namdan’ or financial and other functions and alienating the movable and immovable properties of the Trust, was also filed. 9. District Judge vide order dated 15.4.2015 issued notices to the defendants fixing 22.5.2015 for objection and 29.5.2015 for disposal of the application for leave to sue under Section 92 C.P.C. The plaintiffs filed an application (36-C) on 26.5.2015 to adopt the procedure of representative suit and issue notices of the suit through publications in newspapers as there had been more than crores of followers of Swami Jai Gurudev Ji Maharaj. District Judge, by order dated 29.5.2015, directed for publication of the notice in national newspapers. Notices for the defendants in the suit were published in newspaper ‘Dainik Hindustan’ on 1.7.2015. District Judge, by order dated 16.7.2015, found service of the notices on the defendants was sufficient. 10. From the side of the defendants the applications 44-C and 46-C were moved, for grant of time for filing objection, which were allowed and 5.8.2015 was fixed by District Judge. On 5.8.2015, order to proceed ex parte against defendant-2 was recalled and 14.8.2015 was fixed for arguments. On that day, opposite parties filed their objections. One Vijay Prakash Srivastava filed an application (54-C) for his impleadment. Thereafter the case was adjourned for 26.9.2015. On 26.9.2015, the defendants filed an application (67-C) for publication of the notice of the suit in nation newspapers as the newspaper ‘Dainik Hindustan’ has no wide circulation in country. On which 29.9.2015 was fixed giving opportunity to file objection. 11. On 29.9.2015, defendant-1 filed an application (75-C) for recalling order dated 5.8.2015, proceeding ex parte against him, which was allowed and 14.10.2015 was fixed for hearing application (67-C). On that day arguments were heard and 27.10.2015 was fixed for order. District Judge by order dated 27.10.2015 found that first of all the application (4-C) for leave to sue under Section 92 C.P.C. has to be decided. It is only when leave is granted and the plaintiffs are permitted to contest the suit, then the question would arise to adopt procedure and grant permission to the plaintiffs to contest in representative capacity. It is only when leave is granted and the plaintiffs are permitted to contest the suit, then the question would arise to adopt procedure and grant permission to the plaintiffs to contest in representative capacity. He further found that Ram Pratap (defendant-1) was resident of Rajsthan, Smt. Sushila (defendant-2) was resident of Ujjain (MP), Vinay Singh (defendant-6) was resident of East Mumbai, Uma Kant Tiwari (defendant-9) was resident of Ujjain (MP), Ram Ujagar Singh (defendant-10) was resident of Gudgaon, Vikram Prasad Mishra (defendant-11) was resident of Gwalior (MP) and Sushil Kumar (defendant-13) was resident of Gwalior (MP) as such publication of notice in Dainik Hindustan, which has local circulation, was not sufficient notice to them. As such he directed to publish fresh notice in a national daily newspaper Times of India fixing 28.11.2015. 12. The plaintiffs moved an application (96-C) on 19.11.2015 that by order dated 27.10.2015, service of notice on defendants-1, 6, 10, 11 and 13 were not found sufficient as such the order for fresh publication of notice was passed. After passing the order, defendants-1, 10, 11 and 13 have put appearance. Notices sent to defendant-6 through registered post two time were return with endorsement “not claimed” which shall be deemed as sufficient service. As such the plaintiffs be exempted from taking steps for publication as directed by order dated 27.10.2015. On this application (96-C), arguments were heard on 28.11.2015 and 18.12.2016 was the date fixed for order. On 3.12.2015, the plaintiffs filed another application (99-C) for interim injunction, restraining defendants-3 to 8 and 12 from constructing samadhi/temple of Swami Jai Gurudev Ji Maharaj, in the temple situated in western side of Delhi-Agra National High Way. On 18.12.2015, District Judge fixed 10.2.2016 for order, giving liberty to the parties to supply case law. 13. District Judge, by order dated 10.2.2016 held that notice to the defendants in application for leave to sue under Section 92 C.P.C. is a rule of caution. Leave to sue can be granted even without notice to the defendants under law. Interim injunction can be granted exercising powers under Section 151 C.P.C., even if circumstances as mentioned under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 C.P.C. are not satisfied. Leave to sue can be granted even without notice to the defendants under law. Interim injunction can be granted exercising powers under Section 151 C.P.C., even if circumstances as mentioned under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 C.P.C. are not satisfied. This Court in Vir Digambar Jain Dharamshala v. Shri Mahabir Jain Dharamshala, 2008 (2) ARC 848, held that even before granting leave to sue under Section 92 C.P.C. interim injunction can be passed to preserve and protect Trust Property. As such he fixed 18.3.2016 for disposal of application (99-C). Hence Petition No. 2960 of 2016 has been filed by Ram Krishna Yadav (defendant-8). 14. Sri V.K.Singh, Senior Advocate, submitted that Supreme Court in R.M. Narayana Chettiar v. N. Lakshmanan Chettiar, AIR 1991 SC 221 , held that leave of the Court is a condition precedent for the institution of a suit against a public trust under Section 92 C.P.C. for the reliefs set out in the said section; unless all the beneficiaries join in instituting the suit. If such a suit is instituted without leave, it would not be maintainable at all. Having in mind the objectives underlying Section 92 and the language thereof, Supreme Court held that, as a rule of caution, the Court should normally, unless it is impracticable or inconvenient to do so, give a notice to the proposed defendants before granting leave under Section 92 to institute a suit. The defendants could bring to the notice of the Court for instance that the allegations made in the plaint are frivolous or reckless. Apart from this, they could, in a given case, point out that the persons who are applying for leave under Section 92 are doing so merely with a view to harass the trust or have such antecedents that it would be undesirable to grant leave to such persons. He submitted that the present suit was filed on 15.4.2015. The Court issued notices to the defendants fixing 22.5.2015. The plaintiffs themselves filed an application (36-C) on 26.5.2015 to adopt the procedure of representative suit and issue notices of the suit through publications in newspapers as there had been more than crores of followers of Swami Jai Gurudev Ji Maharaj. District Judge, by order dated 29.5.2015, directed for publication of notice in national newspapers. Notices were published in newspaper ‘Dainik Hindustan’ on 1.7.2015, against the defendants in the suit, which has a local circulation. District Judge, by order dated 29.5.2015, directed for publication of notice in national newspapers. Notices were published in newspaper ‘Dainik Hindustan’ on 1.7.2015, against the defendants in the suit, which has a local circulation. As Such District Judge by order dated 27.10.2015 found that various defendants were residents of different part of country and publication of notice in Dainik Hindustan was not sufficient notice as Dainik Hindustan is a local newspapers and had no wide circulation in the country. As such he directed to publish fresh notice in a national daily newspaper ‘Times of India’ fixing 28.11.2015 for objection. This order has not been complied with by the plaintiffs. In the meantime, the petitioners moved an application for rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 C.P.C. Pankaj Kumar Yadav was nominated as the President by Swami Jai Gurudev Ji Maharaj, during his lifetime. After his death of 18.5.2012, Pankaj Kumar Yadav inherited the office of President. He formed a new Prabandhak Members. They are managing entire affairs of the Trusts, since then. The respondents, first of all tired to obtain interim order from this Court and filed Writ Petition No. 34416 of 2012. They also got a suit i.e. O.S. No. 595 of 2012 instituted in the Court of Civil Judge (SD) Mathura. When they failed to obtain any interim order either from this Court or from Civil Judge (SD) Mathura, then they filed present suit under Section 92 C.P.C., giving impression that they have been directed to file this suit by High Court/Supreme Court. The suit was mala fide and has been filed to harass the President and new Prabandhak Members. The suit is not in the interest of Trusts but against the interest of Trusts and has been filed only for vindication of personal interest. The defendants have now appeared before District Judge and filed their objections in the application for leave to sue. After about one year of the filing of the application for leave to sue, District Judge by impugned order has directed to hear the application for interim injunction, in stead of hearing the application for leave to sue, which is condition precedent for institution of the suit. After about one year of the filing of the application for leave to sue, District Judge by impugned order has directed to hear the application for interim injunction, in stead of hearing the application for leave to sue, which is condition precedent for institution of the suit. Supreme Court in Manohar Lal Chopra v. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal, AIR 1962 SC 527 and this Court in Sri Vir Digambar Jain Dharamshala v. Pramod Kumar Jain, 2008(6) ADJ 654 , have law laid down that Order 39 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not the sole repository of the power of the Court to grant injunction. Section 151 of the Code confers power upon the Court to grant injunction if the matter is not covered by Rules 1 and 2 of Order 39 of the Code. But in present case, the circumstances for invoking inherent power for grant of interim injunctions do not exist. From a period of four years, the petitioners have been managing entire affairs of the Trusts to the full satisfaction of the devotees and beneficiaries. No interim order could be obtained either from this Court or from Supreme Court or from Civil Court. Impugned order dated 10.2.2016 is illegal and liable to be set aside. He also relied upon judgments of Supreme Court in R. Venugopala Naidu v. Venkatarayulu Naidu Charities, AIR 1990 SC 444 and B.S. Adityan v. B. Ramachandran Adityan, (2004) 9 SCC 720 and judgments of Kerala High Court in P.V. Mathew v. K.V. Thomas, AIR 1983 Kerala 5 and Govindan v. Koovalassert Sree Mahadevar Kshetram Trust, AIR 2002 Kerala 47. 15. I have considered the arguments of the counsel for the parties and examined the record. Supreme Court in R.M. Narayana Chettiar v. N. Lakshmanan Chettiar, AIR 1991 SC 221 , held that leave of the Court is a condition precedent for the institution of a suit against a public trust under Section 92 C.P.C. for the reliefs set out in the said section; unless all the beneficiaries join in instituting the suit. If such a suit is instituted without leave, it would not be maintainable at all. If such a suit is instituted without leave, it would not be maintainable at all. Having in mind the objectives underlying Section 92 and the language thereof, Supreme Court held that, as a rule of caution, the Court should normally, unless it is impracticable or inconvenient to do so, give a notice to the proposed defendants before granting leave under Section 92 to institute a suit. This judgment has been followed in B.S. Adityan v. B. Ramachandran Adityan, (2004) 9 SCC 720 . 16. Supreme Court in Vidyodaya Trust v. Mohan Prasad R, AIR 2008 SC 1633 , held that the object of Section 92 CPC is to protect the public trust of a charitable and religious nature from being subjected to harassment by suits filed against them. Public trusts for charitable and religious purpose are run for the benefit of the public. No individual should take benefit from them. If the persons in management of the trusts are subjected to multiplicity of legal proceedings, funds which are to be used for charitable or religious purposes would be wasted on litigation. The harassment might dissuade respectable and honest people from becoming trustees of pubic trusts. Thus, there is need for scrutiny. Supreme Court in R.M. Narayana Chettiar v. N. Lakshmanan Chettiar, AIR 1991 SC 221 , held that the defendants could bring to the notice of the Court for instance that the allegations made in the plaint are frivolous or reckless. Apart from this, they could, in a given case, point out that the persons who are applying for leave under Section 92 are doing so merely with a view to harass the trust or have such antecedents that it would be undesirable to grant leave to such persons. Hearing the defendants at the time of grant of leave under Section 92 (1) C.P.C. is necessary unless it is impracticable or Court comes to the conclusion that urgent interim order is required to protect the properties of Trust. 17. In the present case, all the defendants were appeared or served. District Judge by order dated 27.10.2015 directed for publication of the notice as un-served defendants, who were residents of outside Uttar Pradesh. Thereafter, un-served defendants also appeared before District Judge. As such the application (4-C) for leave to sue under Section 92 (1) C.P.C. can be heard at present. 18. District Judge by order dated 27.10.2015 directed for publication of the notice as un-served defendants, who were residents of outside Uttar Pradesh. Thereafter, un-served defendants also appeared before District Judge. As such the application (4-C) for leave to sue under Section 92 (1) C.P.C. can be heard at present. 18. So far as grant of interim injunction, exercising powers under Section 151 C.P.C., is concerned, Supreme Court in Manohar Lal Chopra v. Seth Hiralal, AIR 1962 SC 527 , held that the Courts have inherent jurisdiction to issue temporary injunctions in circumstances which are not covered by the provisions of Order 39 CPC. There is no such expression in Section 94 which expressly prohibits the issue of a temporary injunction in circumstances not covered by Order 39 or by any rules made under the Code. It is well-settled that the provisions of the Code are not exhaustive, for the simple reason that the legislature is incapable of contemplating all the possible circumstances which may arise in future litigation and consequently for providing the procedure for them. The effect of the expression “if it is so prescribed” is only this that when the rules prescribe the circumstances in which the temporary injunction can be issued, ordinarily the Court is not to use its inherent powers to make the necessary orders in the interests of justice, but is merely to see whether the circumstances of the case bring it within the prescribed rule. If the provisions of Section 94 were not there in the Code, the Court could still issue temporary injunctions, but it could do that in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. No party has a right to insist on the Court’s exercising that jurisdiction and the Court exercises its inherent jurisdiction only when it considers it absolutely necessary for the ends of justice to do so. It is in the incidence of the exercise of the power of the Court to issue temporary injunction that the provisions of Section 94 of the Code have their effect and not in taking away the right of the Court to exercise its inherent power. 19. Supreme Court in K.K. Velusamy v. N. Palanisamy, (2011) 11 SCC 275 , summarized the principles relating to invoking inherent powers under Section 151 C.P.C. as follows: (a) Section 151 is not a substantive provision which creates or confers any power or jurisdiction on Courts. 19. Supreme Court in K.K. Velusamy v. N. Palanisamy, (2011) 11 SCC 275 , summarized the principles relating to invoking inherent powers under Section 151 C.P.C. as follows: (a) Section 151 is not a substantive provision which creates or confers any power or jurisdiction on Courts. It merely recognises the discretionary power inherent in every Court as a necessary corollary for rendering justice in accordance with law, to do what is “right” and undo what is “wrong”, that is, to do all things necessary to secure the ends of justice and prevent abuse of its process. (b) As the provisions of the Code are not exhaustive, Section 151 recognises and confirms that if the Code does not expressly or impliedly cover any particular procedural aspect, the inherent power can be used to deal with such situation or aspect, if the ends of justice warrant it. The breadth of such power is coextensive with the need to exercise such power on the facts and circumstances. (c) A Court has no power to do that which is prohibited by law or the Code, by purported exercise of its inherent powers. If the Code contains provisions dealing with a particular topic or aspect, and such provisions either expressly or by necessary implication exhaust the scope of the power of the Court or the jurisdiction that may be exercised in relation to that matter, the inherent power cannot be invoked in order to cut across the powers conferred by the Code or in a manner inconsistent with such provisions. In other words the Court cannot make use of the special provisions of Section 151 of the Code, where the remedy or procedure is provided in the Code. (d) The inherent powers of the Court being complementary to the powers specifically conferred, a Court is free to exercise them for the purposes mentioned in Section 151 of the Code when the matter is not covered by any specific provision in the Code and the exercise of those powers would not in any way be in conflict with what has been expressly provided in the Code or be against the intention of the legislature. (e) While exercising the inherent power, the Court will be doubly cautious, as there is no legislative guidance to deal with the procedural situation and the exercise of power depends upon the discretion and wisdom of the Court, and in the facts and circumstances of the case. The absence of an express provision in the Code and the recognition and saving of the inherent power of a Court, should not however be treated as a carte blanche to grant any relief. (f) The power under Section 151 will have to be used with circumspection and care, only where it is absolutely necessary, when there is no provision in the Code governing the matter, when the bona fides of the applicant cannot be doubted, when such exercise is to meet the ends of justice and to prevent abuse of process of Court. 20. In the present suit, about one year has passed. In the applications filed by the plaintiffs, no such urgency has been shown to grant interim order before hearing the application for leave to sue. No circumstance has been given to exercise powers under Section 151 C.P.C. for grant of interim injunction as such hearing of the application for interim injunction, before grant of leave to sue is not necessary. Otherwise Order 39 Rule 3 C.P.C. provides a mandatory provisions to issue notice to the defendants in the application for interim injunction and thus to provide opportunity of hearing except in case, by issuing notice the purpose would be frustrated. 21. So far as need for publication of the notice of the suit in national newspaper, is concerned, the plaintiffs themselves filed an application (36-C) on 26.5.2015 to adopt the procedure of representative suit and issue notices of the suit through publications in newspapers as there had been more than crores of followers of Swami Jai Gurudev Ji Maharaj, and they are interested in Trusts and beneficiaries of the Trust. However, this procedure is not required to be followed at the time of hearing the application (4-C) for leave to sue or at the time of hearing the applications for interim injunction. All the defendants have now appeared and served as such publication of notices at this stage in national newspapers is not necessary. 22. However, this procedure is not required to be followed at the time of hearing the application (4-C) for leave to sue or at the time of hearing the applications for interim injunction. All the defendants have now appeared and served as such publication of notices at this stage in national newspapers is not necessary. 22. In view of the aforesaid discussion both the petitions are disposed of, directing District Judge to hear and decide the application (4-C) for leave to sue under Section 92 C.P.C., either on the next date fixed in the suit or for any reason the case is adjourned on that day then within two weeks thereafter. If leave to sue is granted then he will hear and pass suitable order on the applications for interim injunction in the suit, within one month thereafter. The matter has been successfully adjourned for about one year, which is unreasonable delay, District Judge shall insure that no unnecessary adjournment will be granted to either of the parties, in future.