JUDGMENT Dama Seshadri Naidu, J. Facts: 1. The petitioner, being a member of the third respondent Bank, is a contesting candidate in the ensuing election to the managing committee of the Bank. In response to Exhibit P1 notification issued on 07.01.2016, many members have offered their candidature to contest the election and accordingly filed their nominations. 2. The second respondent, the Returning Officer, having processed all the nominations, published Exhibit P2 final list of contesting candidates. Before the Returning Officer could publish Exhibit P2, at the stage of scrutiny, the petitioner had filed his objections concerning the candidature of respondents 5 and 6, who have suffered a conviction, as can be seen from Exhibit P3 judgment of the appellate court. Though their sentence was suspended by this Court through Exhibit P4 in a revision, the petitioner has contended before the Returning Officer that in terms of Rule 44 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules (the Rules), respondents 5 and 6 have suffered a disqualification and their nominations should not be accepted. 3. As can be seen from the record, the Returning Officer passed Exhibit P5 order holding that the documents produced by the petitioner along with his objection are neither attested nor certified and that those documents are vague and 'ununderstandable'. Aggrieved, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition. Rival Submissions: Petitioner's: 4. Sri.P.C.Sasidharan, the learned counsel for the petitioner, has submitted that Rule 44(1)(c)(ii) of the Rules is categoric that unless the sentence is reversed, or the offence is pardoned, or three years has elapsed from the date of expiration of the sentence, no candidate who has been sentenced for an offence involving moral turpitude should be allowed to contest. According to him, Exhibit P4 suspension of sentence alone cannot absolve respondents 5 and 6 of the guilt or the conviction and that the stigma stands attached to them. 5. As regards the maintainability of the writ petition, the learned counsel has contended that in the light of the indisputable fact that respondents 5 and 6 have already earned a disqualification, accepting their nominations on any technicality is unconscionable. He has submitted that he has in presenti no alternative remedy, much less an efficacious one. 6. In elaboration of his submissions, the learned counsel has contended that the petitioner's remedy under Section 69 of the Act would come into picture only once the election is over. He has submitted that he has in presenti no alternative remedy, much less an efficacious one. 6. In elaboration of his submissions, the learned counsel has contended that the petitioner's remedy under Section 69 of the Act would come into picture only once the election is over. According to him, the petitioner's waiting till the election is over and then disputing the candidature of respondents 5 and 6 is a mere rigmarole. It is more so in the face of the indisputable fact that they did suffer the disqualification. Non-suiting the petitioner at this juncture, according to the learned counsel, only results in duplication of the election process and also needless expenditure to the respondent Bank, both of which are eminently avoidable. 7. In support of his submissions, the learned counsel has placed reliance on Damodaran v. Joint Registrar, 1989 (1) KLT 858 , Santhosh v. Joint Registrar, 1994 (2) KLT 141 , Nalinam v. Joint Registrar, 2011 (2) KLT 991 , Abraham v. Returning Officer, 1993 (1) KLT 548 and Pankajaksha Panicker v. Venugopalan Nair, 1993 (2) KLT 641 . Respondents 5 & 6's: 8. Sri.V.G.Arun, the learned counsel for respondents 5 and 6, has, on the contrary, submitted that Section 8 of the Representation of Peoples Act, 1951 ('the RP Act'), contains an analogous provision, but with a certain distinction. According to him, Section 8 of the RP Act has employed a particular expression `conviction', whereas Rule 44 of the Rules has only used the expression 'sentence'. 9. In elaboration of his submissions, the learned counsel has submitted that in terms of Section 8 of the RP Act, the Courts have rightly insisted and accordingly clarified that the stigma attached in the wake of conviction could be removed only by way of suspension of the very conviction, rather than the sentence. Put differently, the learned counsel has contended that since Rule 44 only speaks of a sentence, once the sentence is suspended, it has the same effect as the suspension of conviction under Section 8 of the RP Act has. The learned counsel, in this regard, has placed reliance on Lilly Thomas v. Union of India, ILR 2013 (3) Kerala 203 and Ravikant S. Patil v. Sarvabhouma S. Bagali, (2007) 1 SC 673. 10. The learned counsel has bemoaned that respondents 5 and 6 were charged in the year 1996. The learned counsel, in this regard, has placed reliance on Lilly Thomas v. Union of India, ILR 2013 (3) Kerala 203 and Ravikant S. Patil v. Sarvabhouma S. Bagali, (2007) 1 SC 673. 10. The learned counsel has bemoaned that respondents 5 and 6 were charged in the year 1996. Though nineteen years has elapsed, to this day, the proceedings have not been concluded: The revision is still pending. According to him, for about two decades, the respondents have been disqualified from participating in the democratic process of election. Unless a liberal interpretation is imparted to Rule 44 of the Rules, the salutary purpose of a member participating in the election process would stand defeated. In this regard, the learned counsel has also drawn my attention to Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 11. As regards the efficacious alternative remedy said to be available to the petitioner, the learned counsel has referred to Section 69 of the Act, which, according to him, the petitioner ought to have taken recourse to. The Department's: 12. Sri.D.Somasundarm, the learned Special Government Pleader, has drawn my attention to Rule 35A of the Rules. Laying specific emphasis on sub-rules(d)(iii) and 6(e)(ii) of the said Rule, he would contend that the Returning Officer is required to give reasons only in the event of his rejecting a nomination, but not while accepting one. He has further contended that Exhibit P5 is not a decision of the Returning Officer on the nominations of respondents 5 and 6; it is, according to him, only acknowledgment, which the petitioner has insisted on. 13. Further, drawing my attention to Rule 44 of the Rules, the learned Special Government Pleader has submitted that so long as a person suffers a sentence, he is disqualified. But once the sentence is suspended, it is deemed as if there were no sentence. And, in such an eventuality, without reference to any conviction, it can safely be concluded that the disqualification attached to the sentence stands removed, contends the learned Special Government Pleader. 14. Placing reliance on Subramanian v. Devicolam Taluk Plantation Workers Co-op. But once the sentence is suspended, it is deemed as if there were no sentence. And, in such an eventuality, without reference to any conviction, it can safely be concluded that the disqualification attached to the sentence stands removed, contends the learned Special Government Pleader. 14. Placing reliance on Subramanian v. Devicolam Taluk Plantation Workers Co-op. Credit Society, 2004 (3) KLT 145 , the learned Special Government Pleader has submitted that in the case of rejection of nominations, as it amounts to depriving an opportunity to contest at the threshold, this Court has time and again interfered with the election process, despite the availability of alternative remedy. According to him, in the case of acceptance of nominations, any aggrieved person would only take recourse to Section 69 of the Act and file an Election Petition, which is after the completion of the election. 15. Summing up his submissions, the learned Special Government Pleader has contended that acceptance of nominations of respondents 5 and 6 cannot be questioned at this stage by invoking Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Respondent Bank's: 16. The learned counsel for the respondent Bank, on the other hand, has submitted that out of thirteen seats, for nine there is no contest. According to him, as far as those nine members are concerned, this Court need not interdict the election, for they form the necessary quorum. Reply: 17. In reply, the learned counsel for the petitioner has further referred to clauses (iii) and (iv) of sub-rule (6)(e) of Rules 35A of the Rules to hammer home his contention that just because the Returning Officer is required to give reasons only in the event of his rejecting the nomination, it is no licence for him to accept the nomination with impunity despite the disqualification writ large on the face of the nomination, more particularly despite the objections filed by any other member of the society. 18. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner, the learned Special Government Pleader, the learned counsel for respondents 5 and 6, and the learned counsel for the respondent Bank, apart from perusing the record. Statutory Scheme: 19. Rule 44 deals with disqualification of membership on committee. 18. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner, the learned Special Government Pleader, the learned counsel for respondents 5 and 6, and the learned counsel for the respondent Bank, apart from perusing the record. Statutory Scheme: 19. Rule 44 deals with disqualification of membership on committee. It mandates, among other things, that no member of the society shall be eligible for being elected or appointed as a member of the committee of the society under Section 28 if he or she has been sentenced for any offence other than an offence of a political character or an offence not involving moral delinquency. The stigma, however, could be done away with if such sentence has been reversed, or the offence pardoned, or a period of three years has elapsed from the date of expiration of the sentence. 20. Rule 35A of the Rules prescribes the procedure for the conduct of election to the committee of the society by the State Co-operative Election Commission. Sub-rule (6) (d)(iii) mandates that no member shall be nominated as a candidate to fill a seat on the committee if he is disqualified to be a member under the provisions of the Act or rules. 21. In terms of sub-rule (6)(e)(ii) of Rule 35A, the Returning Officer shall examine all the nomination papers and satisfy himself that inclusion of the name of a contesting candidate is valid. He is also under a statutory obligation to consider the objection which may be made by any person in respect of any nomination and may, either on such objection or on his own motion and after such summary enquiry, if any, as he thinks necessary, reject any nomination. 22. Clause (iii) further mandates that the Returning Officer shall give all reasonable facilities to the contesting candidates or their proposers or seconders, as the case may be, to examine all the nomination papers and satisfy themselves that the inclusion of the name of the contesting candidate is valid. 23. Continuing in the same vein, if we further examine the statutory scheme, sub-rule (6)(e)(iv) of Rule 35A is to the effect that the Returning Officer shall endorse on each nomination paper his decision accepting or rejecting the same, as the case may be, and if the nomination paper is rejected, he shall record in writing a brief statement of his reasons for such rejection. 24. 24. Section 8 of the RP Act, as is evident, deals with the disqualification in any general election for membership of Parliament and the State legislatures. It is also further appropriate to examine the said provision, on which the learned counsel for respondents 5 and 6 has laid much emphasis. 25. Section 8, to the extent relevant, reads as follows: 8. Disqualification on conviction for certain offences--(1) A person convicted of an offence punishable under. * * * shall be disqualified, where the convicted person is sentenced to-- (i) only fine, for a period of six years from the date of such conviction; (ii) imprisonment, from the date of such conviction and shall continue to be disqualified for a further period of six years since his release. (2) A person convicted for the contravention of. * * * and sentenced to imprisonment for not less than six months, shall be disqualified from the date of such conviction and shall continue to be disqualified for a further period of six years since his release. (3) A person convicted of any offence and sentenced to imprisonment for not less than two years other than any offence referred to in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) shall be disqualified from the date of such conviction and shall continue to be disqualified for a further period of six years since his release. * Sub-section (4) has been declared ultra vires in Lily Thomas v. Union of India - (2013) 7 SCC 653 (4) Notwithstanding anything in sub-section (1), sub- section (2) or sub-section (3) a disqualification under either sub-section shall not, in the case of a person who on the date of the conviction is a member of Parliament or the Legislature of a State, take effect until three months have elapsed from that date or, if within that period an appeal or application for revision is brought in respect of the conviction or the sentence, until that appeal or application is disposed of by the court. Explanation.--In this section-- * * * (emphasis supplied) 26. Correspondingly, we may as well examine the statutory significance of Rule 44 of the Rules, which, to the extent relevant, reads as follows: "44. Disqualification of membership of committee:- (1) No member of the society shall be eligible for being elected, or appointed as a member of the committee of the society under S.28 if he: (a) . . Correspondingly, we may as well examine the statutory significance of Rule 44 of the Rules, which, to the extent relevant, reads as follows: "44. Disqualification of membership of committee:- (1) No member of the society shall be eligible for being elected, or appointed as a member of the committee of the society under S.28 if he: (a) . . . (b) (c) (i) (ii) has been sentenced for any offence other than an offence of a political character or an offence not involving moral delinquency such sentence no having been reversed or offence pardoned and a period of three years has not been elapsed from the date of expiration of the sentence; or ****" (emphasis supplied) 27. As can be seen, Section 8 of the RP Act mandates that a person convicted of an offence punishable under the penal provisions as have been mentioned therein and sentenced to imprisonment for not less than two years shall be disqualified from the date of such conviction. He shall continue to be disqualified for a further period of six years since his release. We need not advert to sub-section (4), for it has been declared by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Lily Thomas v. Union of India, (2013) 7 SCC 653 . 28. Section 397 of the Cr.P.C. deals with the revisional powers of the High Court or a Court of Sessions. The revisional court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings in any inferior criminal court situated within its local jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness, legality, or propriety of any finding or sentence or order, etc. While calling for such record, the revisional court may as well direct that execution of any sentence or order be suspended. The disqualification alleged against respondents 5 and 6: 29. It is evident from Exhibit P3 that the said respondents are two of the four accused in C.C.No.3/1997 on the file of the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Kattappana, for the alleged offences punishable under Sections 406, 420 and 468 of IPC. The charge levelled against them was that respondents 5 and 6 along with two other accused, being the Board Members of the Kattappana Block Labour Contract Co-operative Society Limited, have dishonestly misappropriated the funds of the society by forging documents and cheating the Government and the society as well. 30. The charge levelled against them was that respondents 5 and 6 along with two other accused, being the Board Members of the Kattappana Block Labour Contract Co-operative Society Limited, have dishonestly misappropriated the funds of the society by forging documents and cheating the Government and the society as well. 30. The Trail Court sentenced respondents 5 and 6 to undergo a simple imprisonment for two years and pay a fine of Rs.5000/- each for the offence under Section 406 IPC, apart from sentencing them similarly for one year each for the offence under Section 465 IPC. 31. Aggrieved, when respondents 5 and 6 filed an appeal, the Additional District and Sessions Court, Thodupuzha, in Crl.A.No.60.2004, through its judgment dated 26.07.2006, confirmed the conviction awarded by the trial court. Eventually, respondents 5 and 6 filed Crl.R.P. No.3741/2006 before this Court and obtained Exhibit P4 order of suspension of sentence on 27.10.2006. This Court in Exhibit P4 order made it clear that the sentence of imprisonment alone was suspended. It is pertinent to observe that respondents 5 and 6 have so far not served any part of the sentence. Nor have they earned reprieve under any of the exceptions provided in Rule 44 of the Rules. Issues to be determined: 32. In the light of the facts narrated above and with the application of law already adumbrated, this Court is called upon to decide the following issues: I. Whether the petitioner has an efficacious alternative remedy to hold that the writ petition is not maintainable? II. Whether the suspension of sentence removes the disqualification respondents 5 and 6 have suffered under Rule 44 of the Rules? Issue No.I: 33. We may, to begin with, examine the jurisdictional issue: the alternative remedy. Indisputably, Section 69 of the Act, beginning with a non obstante clause, mandates that if a dispute arises in connection with the election of the Board of Management or any office of the society, the Arbitration Court constituted under Section 70A shall decide such dispute and no other court or authority shall have the jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceedings in respect of such dispute. 34. It is trite to observe that Article 226 of the Constitution of India is a salutary remedial measure in the realm of public law. And it is quite expansive. 34. It is trite to observe that Article 226 of the Constitution of India is a salutary remedial measure in the realm of public law. And it is quite expansive. It behoves the High Court to strike at any illegality--either legislative or executive--wherever it is found. Indeed, in Ayya v. State of U.P., (1981) 1 SCC 374, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that the purpose of public-law and the public law courts is to discipline power and strike at the illegality and unfairness of the Government wherever it is found. 35. In Dwarka Nath v. WTO, AIR 1966 SC 81 , a Three-Judge of the Hon'ble Supreme Court has, per K. Subba Rao J (as his Lordship then was), declared that Article 226 is couched in comprehensive phraseology and it ex facie confers a wide power on the High Court to reach injustice wherever it is found. The Constitution designedly used a wide language in describing the nature of the power, the purposes for which and the person or authority against whom it can be exercised. It can issue writs in the nature of prerogative one as understood in England; but the scope of those writs also is widened by the use of the expression "nature", for the said expression does not equate the writs that can be issued in India with those in England, but only draws in analogy from them. That apart, High Courts can also issue directions, orders, or writs, other than the prerogative ones. It enables the High Courts to mould the relief to meet the peculiar and complicated requirements of this country. 36. In the end, the Apex Court has observed thus: "[A]ny attempt to equate the scope of the power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution with that of the English courts to issue prerogative writs is to introduce the unnecessary procedural restrictions grown over the years in a comparatively small country like England with a unitary form of Government to a vast country like India functioning under a federal structure. Such a construction defeats the purpose of the article itself. To say this is not to say that the High Courts can function arbitrarily under this Article. Some limitations are implicit in the article and others may be evolved to direct the article through defined channels." 37. Such a construction defeats the purpose of the article itself. To say this is not to say that the High Courts can function arbitrarily under this Article. Some limitations are implicit in the article and others may be evolved to direct the article through defined channels." 37. Continuing in a similar vein, I may observe that through judicial interpretations the courts have held that the High Court will be loath to entertain any dispute under Article 226 even in the name of a prerogative writ once the suitor has an efficacious alternative remedy. Two vital factors are required to be borne in mind as regards the remedial jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution: the restriction as to its jurisdiction under Article 226 is self-imposed; the remedy available to the suitor should not only be an alternative but also an efficacious one. Authorities Cited at the Bar: 38. Since the learned counsel on either side have cited certain decisions at the Bar, it may be appropriate to examine them. 39. In Damodaran (supra), a learned Single Judge of this Court has held that the Court does not generally entertain challenges at the stage of scrutiny of nominations for election to the committee of a Co-operative Society, as they are best left to be agitated in an election petition filed under Section 69 of Act. But, once the rejection of the nominations is so revolting as to the common sense and judicial conscience, the Court has to make exceptions. The fact of the matter in that case is the rejection of nomination. In Santhosh (supra), the same learned Single Judge as in Damodaran has reiterated the Court's earlier stand. 40. In Nalinam (supra), another learned Single Judge, having acknowledged the impact of the principle of alternative remedy on a discretionary remedy of judicial review, has nevertheless observed that if the decision of the Returning Officer, say rejection of the nomination, is patently bad, wrong, arbitrary, and perverse, this Court can interfere under Article 226 without relegating the party to the alternative remedy under Section 69 of the Act. 41. Indeed, as has been contended by the learned counsel for the respondents, in all the above three cases, the issue was as regards rejection of the nomination; in the present instance, the issue is on the converse. 42. 41. Indeed, as has been contended by the learned counsel for the respondents, in all the above three cases, the issue was as regards rejection of the nomination; in the present instance, the issue is on the converse. 42. In Subramanian (supra), relied on by the learned Special Government Pleader, the facts in brief are that on the date of scrutiny of the nomination papers the petitioner objected to the candidature of the contesting respondents on the ground that they were disqualified. Despite the petitioner's objections, the respondents' names were included in the final list of candidates. Aggrieved, the petitioner filed W.P.(C)No.24978/2004. The learned Single Judge, however, dismissed the writ petition observing, among other things, that in view of the dispute on factual issues, an election petition is a more appropriate remedy. In an intra-court appeal, a learned Division Bench has observed thus: [w]e do not find any illegality in the impugned judgment. The learned Single Judge was right in refusing to invoke his jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to interfere with the election process which had already commenced. Hydra-headed Alternative Remedy: Its Protean Proportions: 43. Though one can say that there is a cauldron of conflicting case law concerning the adjudicatory ambit of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, there is a thread of continuity stringing the seemingly conflicting judicial opinions together like a golden mean. Indeed, if a remedy is available as an alternative to a suitor proving to be efficacious, it cannot be ignored altogether. 44. There lies a further catch to this proposition: the remedy thus available ought to be subsisting in presenti, too. If we examine Section 69, it provides for what is in the usual terms called an election petition. The objector or an aggrieved person has necessarily to wait till the election is over. The Arbitration Court or the Tribunal, being a substitute for a civil court, is expected to adjudicate the issue after recording the evidence of the rival parties, both oral and documentary. Further, it cannot have any jurisdiction until the election is over. 45. We may visualise two types of situation as regards the election disputes. Sometimes the objections are so self-evident that they do not involve any disputed questions of fact requiring deep judicial deliberations based on oral and documentary evidence. Further, it cannot have any jurisdiction until the election is over. 45. We may visualise two types of situation as regards the election disputes. Sometimes the objections are so self-evident that they do not involve any disputed questions of fact requiring deep judicial deliberations based on oral and documentary evidence. In such an event, where an issue could be decided based on the affidavits and documents, it may not be improper to make an attempt to resolve the dispute in a summary manner under Article 226 of the Constitution. But the cause ought to be of such importance as brooking no further delay for its adjudication. 46. On the other hand, if the lis involves disputed questions of fact requiring deeper examination, especially after recording the oral and documentary evidence, as has been indicated above, it is inadvisable for this Court to venture to resolve the issue summarily. 47. Applying the above ratio to the facts of the present case, we may necessarily have to state that there are many admitted facts here: (i) that respondents 5 and 6 have suffered conviction/sentence; (ii) that the said conviction, if stands, results in their disqualification; (iii) that the offences for which respondents 5 and 6 have been convicted involve moral turpitude. Now, the only issue required to be resolved is whether the suspension of sentence removes the disqualification. It is, in my considered view, a pure question of law. 48. In the alternative, if this Court declines to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution deferentially on the principle of alternative remedy, we may as well examine the consequences: (a) The petitioner has to wait till the election is over; (b) the society has to hold election spending its precious resources; and (c) only after the conclusion of the election, the aggrieved person needs to approach the Arbitration Court under Section 69 of the Act. 49. 49. Put it differently, it is advisable to avoid the above consequences, at least, in certain defined circumstances: (1) A person may have his cause of action arisen even before the election process has been set in motion; (2) the resolution of dispute does not involve any disputed questions of fact requiring deep judicial deliberation in the form of recording and appreciating oral and documentary evidence; (3) further, the alternative forum is not an expert- body, to act in substitution of which this Court has no necessary wherewithal. Under those circumstances, the suitor can take recourse to summary remedies, including a public law remedy--to wit, a writ. 50. In the present instance, as I have already observed, what seeks judicial resolution is only a question of law, and it does not, to me, involve any disputed questions of fact, at that. It is always advisable that the issue be resolved thereby avoiding the procedural rigmarole, lest it should only result in duplication of the election process involving precious resources of the society. 51. Indeed, salutary is the principle of alternative remedy to ensure that the system of judicial dispensation of the constitutional courts is not clogged with the issues which can be resolved at lower adjudicatory echelons. At the same time, it is not a principle to be applied in a straight-jacket thereby emasculating Article 226 of its vitality even in the name of a self-imposed restriction--self- restriction is no self-infliction, nor should it degenerate into one. I, therefore, in conclusion hold that the alternative remedy thus being available to the petitioner is neither indispensable nor available in presenti. Issue No.II: 52. The learned counsel for respondents 5 and 6 has laid much emphasis on the semantic significance of the expressions 'conviction' and 'sentence'. According to him, the courts have--rightly--insisted that unless the conviction is suspended, the stigma of disqualification cannot be removed; because Section 8 of the RP Act has explicitly used the expression conviction. 53. On the contrary, since Rule 44 has used only the expression 'sentence', it cannot be insisted upon that even in this instance unless the very conviction is suspended, the disqualification is not removed. 54. It is commonplace to observe that sentencing is a consequence of conviction. As has been repeatedly held by the courts, suspension of a sentence does not affect the conviction, but only the consequences are put on hold. 54. It is commonplace to observe that sentencing is a consequence of conviction. As has been repeatedly held by the courts, suspension of a sentence does not affect the conviction, but only the consequences are put on hold. Lexical Determination: 55. Oxford Dictionary of Law (5th Edn.) defines Conviction thus: (1) (for the purposes of the Bail Act 1976) In criminal proceedings, a finding of guilty, or an acquittal on the ground of insanity. In a Magistrates' Court, a finding that the accused carried out the act for which he was charged. (2) (for the purposes of the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974) Any finding (except one of insanity), either in criminal proceedings or in care proceedings, that a person has committed an offence or carried out the act for which he was charged. The same lexicon defines 'Sentence' as the judgment of a court stating the punishment to be imposed on a defendant who has pleaded guilty to a crime or been found guilty by the jury. 56. Bloomsbury Dictionary of Law (4th Edn.) defines 'conviction' to be a decision that a person accused of a crime is guilty; sentence, on the other hand, as a legal punishment given by a court to a convicted person. 57. Black's Law Dictionary (9th Edn.) defines 'sentence' as the judgment that a court formally pronounces after finding a criminal defendant guilty; the punishment imposed on a criminal wrongdoer. Also termed judgment of conviction. The same lexicon defines 'conviction' to mean an act or process of judicially finding someone guilty of a crime; the state of having been proved guilty. It is a judgment (as by a jury verdict) that a person is guilty of a crime. 58. Drawing out the semantic niceties between blame, convict, doom, reprove, censure, denounce, reprobate, and sentence, English Synonyms and Antonyms James C. Fernald (9th Ed.) succinctly summaries thus: "To condemn is to pass judicial sentence or render judgment or decision against. We may censure silently; we condemn ordinarily by open and formal utterance. Condemn is more final than blame or censure; a condemned criminal has had his trial; a condemned building cannot stand; a condemned ship cannot sail. A person is convicted when his guilt is made clearly manifest to others; in somewhat archaic use, a person is said to be convicted when guilt is brought clearly home to his own conscience . . A person is convicted when his guilt is made clearly manifest to others; in somewhat archaic use, a person is said to be convicted when guilt is brought clearly home to his own conscience . . .; in legal usage one is said to be convicted only by the verdict of a jury. In stating the penalty of an offense, the legal word sentence is now more common than condemn; as, he was sentenced to imprisonment; but it is good usage to say, he was condemned to imprisonment. To denounce is to make public or official declaration against, especially in a violent and threatening manner." (emphasis supplied) 59. Difference Between.com Accessed on 17.02.2016 has felicitously recorded that the difference between conviction and sentence is something to which we rarely pay attention to. This is because we have a tendency, a habit almost, to use terms interchangeably or synonymously without actually paying close attention to their meaning. Indeed, identifying the difference between the two is simple. It only requires a clear and proper understanding of their definitions. The key to distinguishing the terms is to think of conviction as something that precedes a sentence. 60. In that process, it brings out the differences as follows: (1) A Conviction refers to the outcome of a criminal trial. It is the act of proving or declaring a person guilty of a crime. A Sentence, on the other hand, is the formal declaration by a court imposing a punishment on the person convicted of a crime. (2) A Conviction is a result of the verdict of a judge and/or jury. In contrast, a Sentence is typically ordered by a judge. (3) The court cannot order a Sentence unless the person has been found guilty or convicted. Therefore, a Conviction must precede a Sentence. 61. To wind up our discussion on the semantic nuances of the expressions 'conviction' and 'sentence', we may finally turn to Ramanath Aiyyer's Major Law Lexicon, in which the distinction between the two expressions has been brought out thus: "SENTNECE : CONVICTION. Therefore, a Conviction must precede a Sentence. 61. To wind up our discussion on the semantic nuances of the expressions 'conviction' and 'sentence', we may finally turn to Ramanath Aiyyer's Major Law Lexicon, in which the distinction between the two expressions has been brought out thus: "SENTNECE : CONVICTION. The ordinary legal meaning or "conviction'', when used to designate a particular stage of criminal prosecution tribal by a jury is the conviction of the accused in open Court or the verdict returned against him by the jury, which ascertains and publishes the fact of his guilt, while "judgment'' or "sentence'' is the appropriate term to denote the action of the Court before which the trial is had, declaring the consequence to the convict of the fact thus ascertained." The Object of Disqualification: 62. In Manoj Narula v. Union of India, (2014) 9 SCC 1 , in paragraph 27, a Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court has delineated the legislative purpose of Section 8 of the RP Act by observing that the scheme of disqualification upon the conviction laid down by 1951 Act clearly upholds the principle that a person who has been convicted for certain categories of criminal activities is unfit to be a representative of the people. Criminal activities that result in disqualification are related to various spheres pertaining to the interest of the nation, common citizenry interest, communal harmony, and prevalence of good governance. It is clear that 1951 Act lays down that commission of serious criminal offences renders a person ineligible to contest in elections or continue as a representative of the people. Such a restriction does provide the salutary deterrent necessary to prevent the criminal elements from holding public office thereby preserving the probity of representative government. The Impact of Suspension of Sentence/Conviction: 63. In Raghavendra Kumar v. Prabal Kumar, (2014) 13 SCC 354 , the sentence of a candidate convicted of an offence under Section 307 of IPC., was suspended, and he was released on bail. The High Court has granted a stay against the rejection of the candidature of the candidate. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that despite the suspension of sentence, the conviction remained intact. And the insistence on the acceptance of nomination is meritless. 64. The High Court has granted a stay against the rejection of the candidature of the candidate. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that despite the suspension of sentence, the conviction remained intact. And the insistence on the acceptance of nomination is meritless. 64. In the penultimate paragraph of Lily Thomas (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court, while declaring sub- section (4) of Section 8 ultra vires, has used the expressions 'conviction' and 'sentence' synonymously. The paragraph reads thus: "However, if any sitting member of Parliament or a State Legislature is convicted of any of the offences mentioned in Sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) of Section 8 of the Act and by virtue of such conviction and/or sentence suffers the dis- qualifications mentioned in Sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) of Section 8 of the Act after the pronouncement of this judg- ment, his membership of Parliament or the State Legislature, as the case may be, will not be saved by Sub-section (4) of Section 8 of the Act which we have by this judgment declared as ultra vires the Constitution notwithstanding that he files the appeal or revision against the conviction and/or sentence." (emphasis supplied) 65. Noting the precedential position on the issue, the Apex Court in Lalsai Khunte v. Nirmal Sinha, in paragraph , (2007) 9 SCC 330 , has observed that the appellate court has the power to stay the execution of the conviction, and if the appellate court has stayed the conviction, then, in that case, it will not operate as a disqualification. But simply an order of suspension of the sentence will not operate as a stay against the conviction. It was specifically mentioned that staying the order of conviction will mean it is temporarily non-operative. Application of Law: 66. If we get down to brass tacks, evidently Rule 44 has not only spelt out the disqualification in the face of conviction but also the exceptions that can be taken advantage of by the accused despite the conviction. As can be seen, the disqualification will be removed if the sentence is reversed, or the offence is pardoned, or a period of three years has elapsed from the date of expiration of sentence. It is further trite to observe that a provision has to be read compendiously in its entirety. As can be seen, the disqualification will be removed if the sentence is reversed, or the offence is pardoned, or a period of three years has elapsed from the date of expiration of sentence. It is further trite to observe that a provision has to be read compendiously in its entirety. But reading any particular part in isolation, no doubt, leads to incongruity and misinterpretation as well, thereby, mutilating the legislative will. 67. On a deeper consideration of the issue, I am of the opinion that absence of an expression conviction in Rule 44 of the Rules does not materially alter the position as far as the disqualification is concerned. The impact of the suspension of a conviction and that of the suspension of a sentence are matters of common law. 68. It is pertinent to observe that Section 8 of the RP Act does not spell out that suspension of the conviction avoids the disqualification. Nor does Rule 44 stipulates that suspension of sentence is sufficient. Further fortification for the view is supplied by the fact that Section 397 of CrPC., too, does not spell out the consequences of suspension of sentence or conviction, as the case may be. 69. To put it differently, the impact of suspension of conviction on one hand and that of the sentence on the other are the results of judicial interpretation and determination. Trite to observe that form of a provision is not a norm of statutory interpretation; its content is, however. 70. Even the absence of the expression conviction, to my mind, does not have any impact on the disqualification as has been provided in Rule 44 of the Rules. For the substratum of offence, i.e. conviction has to be removed once a person has to get rid of the stigma of disqualification. I am, therefore, of the considered view that so long as respondents 5 and 6 have suffered a conviction, mere suspension of the sentence does not absolve them of the very guilt, much less their disqualification. 71. Viewed from another perspective, merely because of the expression conviction is not employed in Rule 44, it cannot be said that respondents 5 and 6 have not suffered any conviction. 71. Viewed from another perspective, merely because of the expression conviction is not employed in Rule 44, it cannot be said that respondents 5 and 6 have not suffered any conviction. I am, in this context, certain that it cannot be the case of the respondents 5 & 6 that they have never suffered a conviction, but only a sentence, the suspension of which alone is sufficient. Such a plea, if taken, is only chimerical. 72. The conviction and sentence are the eventualities as have been contemplated under the penal enactments; only their consequences and ramifications have been thought of in the enactments such as Representation of People Act, 1951 and the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act or the Rules made thereunder. Conclusion: 73. In the facts and circumstances, this Court declares that respondents 5 and 6 are disqualified from contesting the election. It is further observed that the respondent Bank, after keeping aside the candidature of respondents 5 and 6, may further proceed with the election to be held on 21.02.2016. In the manner indicated above, the writ petition is allowed. No order as to costs.