JUDGMENT : Banwari Lal Sharma, J. 1. Petitioner- accused Mukesh Kumar Sharma has preferred this misc. petition u/s. 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing FIR No. 319/2016 registered at Police Station Shipra Path, Jaipur (South) for offence under Sections 376, 511 of IPC and Section 3(1)(X) of S.C./S.T. Protection of Atrocities Act. 2. The brief facts of the case are that respondent No. - 2-complainant lodged an FIR No. 319/2016 for the aforesaid offences against the present petitioner at Police Station Shipra Path, Jaipur (South) wherein she alleged that petitioner- accused tried to rape with her without her consent, matter is still under investigation. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that as per FIR, the alleged incident took place on 20.04.2016 at 3.45 p.m. while FIR was registered on 01.06.2016 i.e. after 40 days and no explanation was assigned for such an inordinate delay. He submits that petitioner and respondent No. 2- complainant- victim were in contact through whatsapp messages since long and same was supplied to Investigating Officer. Not only prior to alleged occurrence even after the alleged occurrence they were continue in contact through whatsapp messages. Since respondent No. 2-complainant is married and her husband was not liking to have messages from petitioner to his wife, therefore, he pursued respondent No. 2- complainant to lodge aforesaid false FIR. He submits that petitioner has been extended the benefit of pre arrest bail by the co-ordinate Bench of this Court and from the perusal of FIR offence u/s. 3(1) S.C./S.T. Act is not made out, therefore, the impugned FIR may be quashed. 4. Learned counsel relied on Dinesh @ Buddha v. State of Rajasthan reported in (2006) 3 SCC 771 and Nanga v. State of Rajasthan 2001 (1) R.Cr.D. 276 (Raj). 5. Learned PP Mr. Anil Yadav submitted factual report of the matter which is taken on record. He submits that offence under Section 354 IPC and 3(1)(XV)(W)(I) of S.C./S.T. Prevention of Atrocities Act, 1989 is made out, therefore, no question arises for quashing FIR. 6. Learned counsel for the respondent No. -2 - complainant Mr. Praveen Kumar Jain submits that after amendment with effected from 26.01.2016, the aforesaid offence of S.C./S.T. Act is made out. He submits that mere delay is not sufficient for quashing FIR. 6. Learned counsel for the respondent No. -2 - complainant Mr. Praveen Kumar Jain submits that after amendment with effected from 26.01.2016, the aforesaid offence of S.C./S.T. Act is made out. He submits that mere delay is not sufficient for quashing FIR. He also submits that since respondent No. 2- complainant victim was probationer Sub Inspector at the time of alleged offence and she had to go to join Bikaner, therefore, she could not lodge report promptly and delay has already been explained in her statement recorded u/s. 161 and 164 Cr.P.C. 7. I have considered the submissions made by learned counsel for the petitioner, learned PP and learned counsel for the respondent No. 2- complainant. 8. In the matter Nanga v. State of Rajasthan co-ordinate Bench of this Court while deciding an appeal against the judgment and order of conviction for offence u/s. 376 IPC considered the fact of delay in lodging report and observed that since delay has not been satisfactorily explained and there is material contradiction on the point of lodging of report, therefore, the same is fatal for the prosecution case but here in the case in hand since matter is under investigation, therefore, this case law does not help the present petitioner. 9. In the matter of Dinesh @ Buddha v. State of Rajasthan (Supra) while deciding the criminal appeal Hon'ble Supreme Court while interpreting provision of Section 3(2)(V) of S.C./S.T. Act observed that the offence in question must have been committed against a person on the ground that such person is a member of SC/ST which is not disputed but the same is the matter of appeal but here, in the present case, the matter is under investigation. 10. In the matter of State of Haryana & Ors. v. Ch. Bhajan Lal & Ors. [1992 Suppl (1) SCC 335], the Hon'ble Supreme court have framed seven grounds on the basis of which the FIR can be quashed. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in para No. 105, observed as under:- "105. 10. In the matter of State of Haryana & Ors. v. Ch. Bhajan Lal & Ors. [1992 Suppl (1) SCC 335], the Hon'ble Supreme court have framed seven grounds on the basis of which the FIR can be quashed. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in para No. 105, observed as under:- "105. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extra-ordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers Under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. 1. Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima-facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. 2. Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers Under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. 3. Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. 4. Where, the allegations in the F.I.R. do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated Under Section 155(2) of the Code. 5. Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. 6. 5. Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. 6. Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. 7. Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge." 11. In the present case, there is no prima facie animity between the respondent No. 2- complainant and petitioner-accused. Respondent No. 2- complainant in FIR clearly stated that first petitioner developed the relation as a brother, since victim was not having any brother, thereafter he visited the residence of complainant and when she was preparing tea for him he came in the kitchen and caught her when she cried he put his hand on her mouth and took her in the room and kissed her, after hearing cry of complainant, tenant came there who also supported the incident. It is true that FIR was lodged after 40 days but same cannot be made ground for quashing FIR and none of the above grounds exist for quashing FIR, therefore, this misc. petition devoids merit which is hereby dismissed.