JUDGMENT & ORDER : 1. Both the second appeals presented under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 were heard together on the prayer of learned counsel of both side and this common judgment is passed which shall govern both the appeals. 2. The appeals were admitted for hearing on the following common substantial question of law:- “Whether the first appellate court has declared title of the plaintiff over the entire suit land on the doctrine of adverse possession without evidence?” 3. Heard learned counsel, Mr. Debalay Bhattacharji for the appellant in both the appeals; learned Sr. counsel, Mr. S.M. Chakraborty assisted by learned counsel, Ms. P. Sen for the respondent Nos. (1a) to (1e) and learned Advocate General, Mr. B.C. Das assisted by learned Addl. G.A., Mrs. A. S. Lodh for the respondents 2 and 3, in both the appeals. 4. Radha Ballav Sutradhar, since deceased, the predecessor of respondent Nos. (1a) to (1e), as plaintiff, (herein-after mentioned as plaintiff) instituted Title Suit No.33/1998 in the Court of Civil Judge, Jr. Division, Udaipur, South Tripura seeking declaration of his title over the suit land, described in the schedule of the plaint, measuring .052 acres, by way of adverse possession and also prayed for perpetual injunction restraining the respondent Nos.2 and 3 who were arrayed as defendant Nos. 1 and 2 (herein-after mentioned as defendant Nos. 1 and 2) in the suit, from evicting the plaintiff and his tenants from the suit land. 5. On the prayer of Amar Ranjan Sarkar, the appellant herein, made before the trial Court, his name was arrayed as defendant No.3 in the suit (herein-after mentioned as defendant No.3) against whom the plaintiff sought no relief. 6. Shorn off unnecessary details, the case of the plaintiff is that the suit land measuring .052 acres was lying abandoned with jungle and the plaintiff reclaimed the same clearing the jungles in the last part of 1957 and had been possessing same growing seasonal crops etc. In the middle part of 1958 he constructed a shop hut with galvanized sheet roof in the northern-most part of the suit land and started a tea stall which was the only source of his income. In the middle part of 1958 he constructed a shop hut with galvanized sheet roof in the northern-most part of the suit land and started a tea stall which was the only source of his income. In the remaining part of the suit land i.e. to the southern side of the tea stall, he further constructed ‘Dokan viti’ shed in the year 1965 and let it on rent to different tenants namely Sukumar Das, Deshapremik Roy and Rabindra Bhattacharjee etc. He was collecting rent from those tenants and thereby enjoying the usufructs of the land and continuously possessing the same without any interference from any corner exercising all acts of right, title, interest and possession denying the claim of the rightful owner. The suit land was recorded in C.S. Khatian No.616, Plot No.1528 which was finally published on 01.02.1969 and in that Khatian in Column No.23 his name was recorded as unlawful occupier of the suit land. Subsequently, at the time of revisional survey the suit land was recorded in Khatian No.1/19, Hal Plot No.3789 measuring .030 acres and Khatian No.1/101, Hal Plot No.3790 measuring .021 acres. While he was in continuous and undisturbed possession of the suit land denying the right, title and interest of the rightful owner, on 27.04.1988 he was served with a notice by the Halka Officer (Settlement Officer) of Udaipur to establish his claim for allotment of the suit land recorded in Plot No.3789 and 3790. It is the case of the plaintiff that he is in continuous adverse possession of the suit land from the last part of 1957 and the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 made an attempt to evict him from the suit land and therefore, he filed the suit seeking declaration of his right, title and interest by way of adverse possession and injunction against defendant Nos. 1 and 2 from evicting him from the suit land. 7. Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 made an attempt to evict him from the suit land and therefore, he filed the suit seeking declaration of his right, title and interest by way of adverse possession and injunction against defendant Nos. 1 and 2 from evicting him from the suit land. 7. Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 submitted a joint written statement, inter alia, contending that the suit land is a public premises as defined under the Tripura Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants Act, 1982) and for the eviction of the plaintiff as well as the other occupiers namely Rabindra Bhattacharjee, Deshapremik Roy and Sukumar Das etc., separate proceedings under the Tripura Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act {for short, the TPP Act} were initiated by the Estate Officer vide Case No. 2 (TPP)/98; 3(TPP)/98; 4(TPP)/98 and 5(TPP)/98 and when the notices were served on the plaintiff and other occupiers of the suit land, they in collusion and in connivance with the plaintiff filed the present suit which is not maintainable and which is barred by the provisions of TPP Act. It is also contended by the defendants that the plaintiff acquired no right, title and interest in the suit land and the plaintiff is liable to be evicted from the suit land. 8. Defendant No.3, Amar Ranjan Sarkar, entered in the lis by filing a petition to array him as defendant which was allowed and he submitted written statement, inter alia, contending that the suit land along with other land originally belonged to one Chandrabali Mishra and it was purchased by mother of the defendant namely Smt. Subarnabala Sarkar and after the death of Subaranabala, the defendant No.3 got the suit land in his share. It is further contended by defendant No.3 that while the suit land was lying as Khas land in the year 1955 his father started occupying the suit land and constructed temporary shop houses. It is further contended by defendant No.3 that while the suit land was lying as Khas land in the year 1955 his father started occupying the suit land and constructed temporary shop houses. The father of the plaintiff was in good relation with father of the defendant and out of that good relation the plaintiff’s father approached the father of the defendant Nishi Kanta Sarkar to let his premises to the father of the plaintiff for running a tea stall and accordingly under an oral lease agreement, father of the defendant allowed the father of the plaintiff to occupy a part of the suit premises i.e. the shop hut on a monthly rental basis and after the death of father of the plaintiff, he had been possessing the same shop hut. In the rest part of the suit land i.e. to the southern side of the shop hut let out to the plaintiff’s father, more shop huts were constructed and those were let out to Rabindra Bhattacharjee, Deshapremik Roy and Sukumar Das. Lease agreements were signed between the defendant No.3 and those tenants time to time and while Rabindra Bhattacharjee was not abiding by the lease agreement, the defendant No.3 instituted Title Suit No. 3/1983 against Rabindra Bhattacharjee and that was decreed in his favour. Challenging the judgment and decree Rabindra Bhattacharjee filed Title Appeal No.3/1999 and the appeal was dismissed. He also filed another suit against Deshapremik Roy i.e. T.S. 2/2000 and that was pending. It is the contention of the defendant No. 3 that the suit land was Khas land under occupation of the defendant No.3 and his predecessors-ininterest and it was never absolute, hostile and uninterrupted possession of the plaintiff. The defendant contended that the plaintiff was not entitled to any decree as prayed for. 9. Considering the pleadings of the parties, the trial Court framed following issues on 09.06.1999:- 1. Whether the suit is maintainable in law? 2. Whether the suit is maintainable in its present form and nature? 3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to get a decree of his right, title, interest over the suit land by way of adverse possession? 4. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to get a decree for perpetual injunction restraining the defendants from evicting the plaintiff from the suit land? 5. Any other relief/reliefs the parties are entitled to? 10. 3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to get a decree of his right, title, interest over the suit land by way of adverse possession? 4. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to get a decree for perpetual injunction restraining the defendants from evicting the plaintiff from the suit land? 5. Any other relief/reliefs the parties are entitled to? 10. Thereafter on 27.09.1999 the trial Court also framed the following additional issue:- 1. Whether this Court has got jurisdiction to proceed with the suit in view of the T.P.P. Act? 11. The plaintiff examined himself as P.W.1 and another witness namely Nripendra Chakraborty as P.W.2. In support of his case, the plaintiff proved the following documents:- Exhibit 1 series-R.S. Khatian No.1/19 and 1/101 relating to the suit land. Exhibit 2 series-C.S. and R.S. Map relating to the suit land. Exhibit 3-Another Khatian No.661 of Mouja- Udaipur Town relating to the possession of the plaintiff in respect of the suit land. Exhibit 4-One notice issued by the Halka Officer inviting prayer of allotment form the plaintiff in respect of the suit land. 12. On behalf of defendant Nos. 1 and 2, one witness namely Sri Saradendu Choudhury, S.D.O. Udaipur was examined as D.W.1 but in his cross examination the witness has been mentioned as D.W.2. On behalf of defendant nos. 1 and 2 some photocopies of the Revenue Case Nos. 3/1998, 5/1998 and 4/1998 were proved as Exhibit C series. 13. Defendant No.3 examined himself in support of his case and he was numbered as D.W.1 and he also examined four more witnesses namely Kanu Dey as D.W.3; Sadhan Majumder as D.W.4; Sukumar Das as D.W.5 and Dastaram Reang as D.W.6. 14. In support of his case, he proved the following documents:- Exhibit A-Judgment in T.A. 3/1999. Exhibit B-Khatian No.67 of Mouja Udaipur town in the name of the defendant Amar Ranjan Sarkar. Exhibit C-Certified copy of registered Deed No.2379 of 1962 dated 08.04.1962 between Smt. Subarnabala Sarkar and Sri Chandrabali Mishra. Exhibit D-Certified copy of Lease Deed No.2673 dated 12.09.1984 between Amar Ranjan Sarkar and Sri Sukumar Das. Exhibit E-Certified copy of Lease Deed No.1-975 dated 26.04.2001 between Amar Rn. Sarkar and Sukumar Das. Exhibit F-Certified copy of registered Deed No.2026 dated 08.08.1991 between Amar Ranjan Sarkar and Deshapremik Roy. 15. Exhibit D-Certified copy of Lease Deed No.2673 dated 12.09.1984 between Amar Ranjan Sarkar and Sri Sukumar Das. Exhibit E-Certified copy of Lease Deed No.1-975 dated 26.04.2001 between Amar Rn. Sarkar and Sukumar Das. Exhibit F-Certified copy of registered Deed No.2026 dated 08.08.1991 between Amar Ranjan Sarkar and Deshapremik Roy. 15. The trial Court considering the pleadings and evidence on record by impugned judgment and decree dated 10.03.2004 and 12.03.2004 respectively partly decreed the suit i.e. to the extent of .023 acres in favour of the plaintiff. 16. Aggrieved, the plaintiff preferred Title Appeal No.7/2004 and the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 preferred Title Appeal No.6/2004. Defendant No. 3 filed Cross-objection and it was registered as Title Appeal (Cross-objection) 20/2004 before the District Judge, South Tripura, Udaipur and both the appeals and cross-objection were heard together and by a common judgment dated 03.07.2007, Title Appeal No.7/2004 and Title Appeal No.6/2004 filed by the plaintiff and defendant Nos. 1 and 2 were disposed of. The appeal filed by the plaintiff i.e. Title Appeal No.7/2004 was allowed and the appeal filed by defendant Nos. 1 and 2 i.e. T.A. 6/2004 was dismissed. Cross-objection filed by defendant No.3 was disposed of by a separate judgment but passed on the same date i.e. 03.07.2007 and that was also dismissed. 17. Aggrieved, the defendant No.3 i.e. the present appellant filed RSA 76/2007 challenging the common judgment dated 03.07.2007 passed in T.A. 6/2004 and T.A.7/2004 and also filed RSA 77/2007 challenging judgment dated 03.07.2007 passed in T.A.(Cross-objection) 20/2004. 18. Learned counsel, Mr. Bhattacharjee appearing for the appellant-defendant No.3 submitted that the plaintiff has failed to prove his adverse possession over the suit land. It is clearly established that Rabindra Bhattacharjee, Deshapremik Roy and Sukumar Das were the tenants of defendant No.3. Sukumar Das has been examined as D.W.5 and from his statement it is abundantly clear that he was a tenant inducted by the defendant No.3 in a part of the suit land. Exbt. A i.e. the judgment passed by the learned Addl. District Judge in T.A. 3/1999 shows that defendant No.3 instituted T.S. 3/1983 against his tenant Rabindra Bhattacharjee and that suit was decided in favour of the defendant No.3 against which Rabindra Bhattacharjee filed appeal but the appeal was dismissed and it was decided in favour of defendant no.3. Exbt. A i.e. the judgment passed by the learned Addl. District Judge in T.A. 3/1999 shows that defendant No.3 instituted T.S. 3/1983 against his tenant Rabindra Bhattacharjee and that suit was decided in favour of the defendant No.3 against which Rabindra Bhattacharjee filed appeal but the appeal was dismissed and it was decided in favour of defendant no.3. It is also brought on record that defendant No.3 instituted T.S. 2 of 2000 against Deshapremik Roy, the other tenant which shows that the plaintiff was only in occupation of a tea stall in the suit land and the rest of the land was never in his possession rather it was in the possession of the defendant No.3. The plaintiff’s claim of adverse possession has no basis and the trial Court as well as the appellate Court wrongly decreed the suit. 19. Learned Sr. counsel, Mr. Chakraborty appearing on behalf of respondent Nos. (1a) to (1e) i.e. the legal heirs of the plaintiff submitted that the plaintiff instituted the suit seeking declaration of his title by adverse possession. Plaintiff has proved that from the year 1957 he has/had been in possession of the suit land which was recorded in Khatian. It is an admitted position that the suit land is Khas land and plaintiff has/had been possessing the suit land without any interference from any corner and there was a proposal from the side of defendant Nos. 1 and 2 for allotment of the suit land in favour of the plaintiff. The plaintiff proved those documents which support the pleadings and oral evidence of the plaintiff and hence, the decree should be maintained. He has also submitted that while there is concurrent finding of two Courts, this Court in the second appeal is not required to disturb the finding of the trial Court and the appellate Court since there is no perversity at all. The true owner i.e. the defendant Nos.1 and 2 since did not challenge the appellate decree, the defendant No.3, who is an intervener has no right to challenge the decree. 20. Learned Advocate General has submitted that in view of the provisions contained in Order XLI, Rule 22(1) of CPC the defendant Nos. The true owner i.e. the defendant Nos.1 and 2 since did not challenge the appellate decree, the defendant No.3, who is an intervener has no right to challenge the decree. 20. Learned Advocate General has submitted that in view of the provisions contained in Order XLI, Rule 22(1) of CPC the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 though not filed an appeal have got a right to present their case in support of the appeal filed by defendant No.3 challenging the judgment and decree passed by the first appellate Court. He has also submitted that as per the provisions contained in Order XLI, Rule 33 of CPC the appellate Court can pass appropriate judgment and decree in the present set of appeals, in respect of the judgment and decree, passed by the trial Court and the appellate Court, irrespective of any appeal filed by the defendant Nos. 1 and 2. It is contended by learned Advocate General that burden heavily lies on the plaintiff to prove his case to show that the title of rightful owner has been extinguished. A trespasser cannot be encouraged to perfect his wrong by allowing a decree in his favour. Learned Advocate General in support of his contention has referred the decision of the Apex Court in the case of State of Haryana Vrs. Mukesh kumar & Ors. reported in AIR 2012 SC 559 and the case of Hemaji Waghaji Jat Vrs. Bhikhabhai Khengarbhai Harijan & Ors. reported in (2009) 16 SCC 517 . Referring to the appellate judgment, learned Advocate General submitted that the judgment passed by the learned District Judge cannot be legally termed as a judgment passed according to law. The learned District Judge simply noted the arguments advanced by both side and without considering the evidence on record has recorded his finding which is self-contradictory and not based on evidence. Referring to Para 7 of the judgment, learned Advocate General submitted that while the appellate Court found the plaintiff in possession of the suit land from 1960, he should not have allowed the appeal of the plaintiff decreeing the entire suit land. 21. Learned Sr. counsel, Mr. Referring to Para 7 of the judgment, learned Advocate General submitted that while the appellate Court found the plaintiff in possession of the suit land from 1960, he should not have allowed the appeal of the plaintiff decreeing the entire suit land. 21. Learned Sr. counsel, Mr. Chakraborty also contended that the appellate Court judgment is not a sound judgment according to law but an inference may be drawn from the appellate Court judgment that taking into account the documentary and oral evidence the appellate Court decreed the suit as per the prayer of the plaintiff. 22. The plaintiff instituted the suit seeking declaration of title by adverse possession. Burden heavily lies on the plaintiff to prove that he has been possessing the suit land for more than continuous 30 years denying the title of the rightful owner openly, with a hostile assertion which is adequate in continuity, in publicity and in extent. 23. It is an admitted position that the suit land described in the schedule of the plaint measuring .052 acres is a khas land belonged to the defendant No.1. The plaintiff claimed that the suit land was lying abandoned with jungle and he reclaimed it in the last part of 1957 and thereafter constructed a shop hut in the middle of 1958 and started a tea stall in that shop. Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 in their written statement did not dispute the fact that the plaintiff is in possession of a shop hut and running a tea stall. It is the contention of the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 that notice has been issued under the TPP Act to the plaintiff and other occupiers of the suit land and thereafter the plaintiff instituted the suit. There is a general denial that the plaintiff acquired no right, title and interest by way of adverse possession. S.D.O., Udaipur who appeared as D.W.1 in his examination-in-chief by affidavit in Para 3 stated that the plaintiff is/was unauthorized occupant over the suit land and while the notice was issued under TPP Act, he in connivance with other occupiers of the land instituted the title suit. S.D.O., Udaipur who appeared as D.W.1 in his examination-in-chief by affidavit in Para 3 stated that the plaintiff is/was unauthorized occupant over the suit land and while the notice was issued under TPP Act, he in connivance with other occupiers of the land instituted the title suit. The contention of defendant No.3 is that his father was occupying the land from the year 1955 and in the year 1962 after the entire land was purchased from Chandrabali Mishra his father constructed shop huts on the suit land and in the northern most part a galvanized sheet roof hut was constructed which was given to father of the plaintiff for running a tea stall out of good relation and the tea stall was set up as a tenant. 24. The plaintiff proved four documents in support of his case. Exbt.1 series contains a Khatian no.616 of Mouja Udaipur town finally published on 01.02.1969 wherein as against Plot No.1528 of the Khatian in Col. No.23, the unlawful occupation of the plaintiff was recorded for an area of .052 acres. This entry made in the Khatian published finally has a presumptive value as prescribed in Section 43 of the TLR and LR Act. It is, therefore, evident that the plaintiff was in occupation of .052 acres of land of Plot No.1528 of Khatian No.616 at the time when the Khatian was published finally i.e. on 01.02.1969 and according to the plaintiff he has/had been possessing it from the last part of 1957. Though there is no document to show that he had been possessing it from 1957 but his oral evidence which is supported by the entry in Khatian No.616 cannot be ruled out that he had been possessing Plot No.1528 of Khatian No.616 from 1957 onwards. In his deposition, the plaintiff clearly stated –“in the year 1958 in the middle part I constructed a shop hut in the northern side of the said land taking .023 acres of land. It was bamboo made and tin roofing hut. I used to run the tea stall in the said shop and have been continuing the said shop.” 25. In view of the above contention of the plaintiff his shop hut was standing over an area of .023 acres of land which is a part of suit land. In the revisional survey, C.S. Plot No.1528 was divided in two plots i.e. 3789 and 3790. In view of the above contention of the plaintiff his shop hut was standing over an area of .023 acres of land which is a part of suit land. In the revisional survey, C.S. Plot No.1528 was divided in two plots i.e. 3789 and 3790. Plot No.3789 was for an area of .030 acres and Plot No.3790 was for an area of .021 acres. The oral and documentary evidence adduced by defendant No.3 makes it abundantly clear that the tenants Rabindra Bhattacharjee, Deshapremik Roy and Sukumar Das were never inducted by the plaintiff rather they were inducted by defendant No.3. In 1969, Khatian No.616 was published finally showing the plaintiff in possession of .052 acres of land but the registered lease deeds and the judgment in title suit as well as the oral evidence of D.Ws examined by defendant No.3 makes it abundantly clear that the plaintiff was not in possession of the rest part of the suit land apart from the shop hut in which he was running business of tea stall measuring 0.23 acres. 26. Adverse possession means a hostile assertion i.e. a possession which is expressly or impliedly in denial of title of the true owner. A person who claims a title on adverse possession must show by clear and unequivocal evidence that the possession was hostile to the real owner and amounted to a denial of his title to the property claimed. In deciding whether the acts alleged by a person constitute adverse possession, regard must be had to animus of the person doing those acts which must be ascertained from the facts and circumstances of each case. 27. The unity of two elements, namely, occupation and animus possidendi is recognized as constituting “possession” in the eye of law. Possession is a flexible term and is not restricted to mere occupation. Legal possession is occupation with the intention of exercising the right of ownership in respect of it. Mere acts or user which do not interfere and are consistent with the owner’s title, are not sufficient to constitute dispossession of the owner or start adverse possession in favour of the occupant. 28. The plaintiff has proved the fact that he is in continuous possession of a shop hut on a part of the suit land doing business of tea stall and according to him the tea stall is from the year 1958. 28. The plaintiff has proved the fact that he is in continuous possession of a shop hut on a part of the suit land doing business of tea stall and according to him the tea stall is from the year 1958. The suit instituted by the plaintiff is in 1998. The defendant No.3 though claimed that the plaintiff was inducted in the suit land after 1962 as a tenant but could not produce any convincing evidence in support thereof whereas the plaintiff by adducing oral as well as documentary evidence has proved his possession long before. Exbt.4, a notice issued by the Halka Officer (Settlement Officer) shows that in respect of .030 acres of land of Plot No.3789, the plaintiff was noticed to appear on 11.05.1988 for the purpose of allotment of the suit land in favour of the plaintiff. This document rather shows that the plaintiff was in possession of part of the suit land for which notice was issued to him offering allotment of the part of suit land. The question now as to whether the plaintiff is entitled to get a decree declaring his title by adverse possession. 29. Section 27 of the Limitation Act prescribes thus:- “27. Extinguishment of right to property.-At the determination of the period hereby limited to any person for instituting a suit for possession of any property, his right to such property shall be extinguished.” 30. It is abundantly proved that the plaintiff is in peaceful, continuous and hostile possession of the part of the suit land i.e. portion of his shop hut denying title of the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 for more than 30 years. So, the right, title of the defendant No.1 has been extinguished because of such uninterrupted possession of the plaintiff. 31. A single bench of this Court in the case of Ratna Chakraborty & Ors. Vrs. Pranab Kanti Basu & Ors., reported in (2015) 1 TLR 96 relying on a three Judges bench decision of the Apex Court (Kshitish Chandra Bose Vrs. Commissioner of Ranchi, reported in (1981) 2 SCC 103 ) has arrived at a conclusion that the plaintiff is entitled to get a decree of declaration of his title by adverse possession. The observation of the learned single Judge of this Court as contained in Para 22 and 23 of the judgment reads as follows:- “22. Commissioner of Ranchi, reported in (1981) 2 SCC 103 ) has arrived at a conclusion that the plaintiff is entitled to get a decree of declaration of his title by adverse possession. The observation of the learned single Judge of this Court as contained in Para 22 and 23 of the judgment reads as follows:- “22. What has distinctly appeared is that in Balkrishna, a two- Judges’ Bench of the Apex Court has held that the plaintiff had acquired rights of bhumiswami (the owner) on the basis of the adverse possession of the suit land. In Kshitish Chandra Bose, a three-Judges of the Apex Court has held that if a person asserts a hostile title even to a tank which, as claimed by the municipality, belonged to it and despite the hostile assertion of title no steps were taken by the owner to evict the trespasser, his title by prescription would be complete after thirty years. In Des Raj and Ors., a two Judges Benchof the Apex Court again held that having regard to the peculiar fact obtaining the case, the Apex Court was of the opinion that the plaintiffrespondent had established that he acquired title by ousting the defendants-appellants by declaring hostile title in himself which was to the knowledge of the co-sharers. Such, declaration of title on adverse possession has got the approval of the Apex Court in that case. None of those precedents are considered in Gurduwara Sahib for holding that even if the plaintiff is found to be adverse possession, it cannot seek a declaration to the effect that such adverse possession has matured into ownership. The conflict between the decisions of Balkrishna, Kshitish Chandra Bose, Des Raj and Ors. in one side and Gurduwara Sahib on the other, has taken the centre stage in the controversy in this appeal. Even though the maintainability of a declaratory suit for title on adverse possession at the instance of the plaintiff has not been expressly considered by the Apex Court except in Gurduwara Sahib, but when the Apex Court observes that no infirmity is found in the decree declaring title on adverse possession of the plaintiff it is to be invariably inferred that it approves such declaration. 23. In Balkrishna, the Apex Court has decided that the plaintiff had acquired the rights of the owner on the basis of adverse possession over the suit land. 23. In Balkrishna, the Apex Court has decided that the plaintiff had acquired the rights of the owner on the basis of adverse possession over the suit land. Even in Kshitish Chandra Bose, the law has been positively stated that “title by prescription would be complete after 30 years.” In Des Raj and Ors., the title has been affirmed on adverse possession in favour of the ‘the plaintiffrespondent’. Adverse possession can never be used as the sword but as the shield is no doubt a moral convention but it was never tested on the touchstone of law. What Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. has observed is of considerable significance that it is almost tautologous to say that the protection which the law attaches by way of consequence to possession is as truly as a right in a legal sense as those consequences which are attached to the adverse holding for the period of prescription. Section 27 of the Limitation Act categorically provides that if within a period prescribed by law of limitation any person fails to institute suit for recovery of possession of any property ‘his right to such property shall be extinguished’. Such possession known as the adverse possession is not a mere fact, it creates a definite right in favour of the squatter on extinguishment of the right of the true owner. When the law recognizes that right the said right has to be considered as the right attached to it by way of legal consequences. Whether a person who had acquired such right should wait for infinite periods to be sued by a person whose interest in the property has been extinguished or the right as matured by way of adverse possession should be acknowledged as has been acknowledged in respect of registering a conveyance executed by a squatter, inasmuch as the Registrar does not have the right to question the title of the transferor cannot be held to be left in the lurch for stair decisions as referred. This aspect may require further dilation. But in view of the decision rendered by the three-Judges’ Bench in Kshitish Chandra Bose, this court would go by the decision of the larger Bench that ‘the title by prescription would be complete’ after the expiry of the period of limitation from the day when the possession becomes adverse. This aspect may require further dilation. But in view of the decision rendered by the three-Judges’ Bench in Kshitish Chandra Bose, this court would go by the decision of the larger Bench that ‘the title by prescription would be complete’ after the expiry of the period of limitation from the day when the possession becomes adverse. If the title by prescription becomes complete after expiry of the period of limitation there is no embargo for the civil court to declare such right. Apart that it would bury the uncertainty as to the title and nip the complex disputes at the bud.” 32. Learned Advocate General has referred the decision of the Apex Court in the case of State of Haryana (supra) and the case of Hemaji Waghaji jat (supra). In the case of State of Haryana (supra), the Apex Court referred the case of Hemaji Waghaji Jat (supra) also and we may gainfully refer here Para 35, 36 and 42 to 51 of the judgment which read thus:- “35. A person pleading adverse possession has no equities in his favour since he is trying to defeat the rights of the true owner. It is for him to clearly plead and establish all facts necessary to establish adverse possession. Though we got this law of adverse possession from the British, it is important to note that these days English Courts are taking a very negative view towards the law of adverse possession. The English law was amended and changed substantially to reflect these changes, particularly in light of the view that property is a human right adopted by the European Commission. This Court in Revamma ( AIR 2007 SC 1753 ) (supra) observed that to understand the true nature of adverse possession, Fairweather v. St Marylebone Property Co [1962] 2 WLR 1020 : [1962] 2 All ER 288 can be considered where House of Lords referring to Taylor v. Twinberrow [1930] 2 K.B. 16, termed adverse possession as a negative and consequential right effected only because somebody else's positive right to access the court is barred by operation of law. As against the rights of the paper-owner, in the context of adverse possession, there evolves a set of competing rights in favour of the adverse possessor who has, for a long period of time, cared for the land, developed it, as against the owner of the property who has ignored the property. 36. The right to property is now considered to be not only constitutional or statutory right but also a human right.Human rights have already been considered in realm of individual rights such as right to health, right to livelihood, right to shelter and employment etc. But now human rights are gaining a multi faceted dimension. Right to property is also considered very much a part of the new dimension.Therefore, even claim of adverse possession has to be read in that context. ……………………………………………………………………………. ……………………………………………………………………………. 42. We inherited this law of adverse possession from the British. The Parliament may consider abolishing the law of adverse possession or at least amending and making substantial changes in law in the larger public interest.The Government instrumentalities - including the police - in the instant case have attempted to possess land adversely. This, in our opinion, a testament to the absurdity of the law and a black mark upon the justice system's legitimacy. The Government should protect the property of a citizen - not steal it. And yet, as the law currently stands, they may do just that. If this law is to be retained, according to the wisdom of the Parliament, then at least the law must require those who adversely possess land to compensate title owners according to the prevalent market rate of the land or property in question. This alternative would provide some semblance of justice to those who have done nothing other than sitting on their rights for the statutory period, while allowing the adverse possessor to remain on property. While it may be indefensible to require all adverse possessors - some of whom may be poor - to pay market rates for the land they possess, perhaps some lesser amount would be realistic in most of the cases. The Parliament may either fix a set range of rates or to leave it to the judiciary with the option of choosing from within a set range of rates so as to tailor the compensation to the equities of a given case. 43. The Parliament may either fix a set range of rates or to leave it to the judiciary with the option of choosing from within a set range of rates so as to tailor the compensation to the equities of a given case. 43. The Parliament must seriously consider at least to abolish "bad faith" adverse possession, i.e., adverse possession achieved through intentional trespassing.Actually believing it to be their own could receive title through adverse possession sends a wrong signal to the society at large. Such a change would ensure that only those who had established attachments to the land through honest means would be entitled to legal relief. 44. In case, the Parliament decides to retain the law of adverse possession, the Parliament might simply require adverse possession claimants to possess the property in question for a period of 30 to 50 years, rather than a mere 12. Such an extension would help to ensure that successful claimants have lived on the land for generations, and are therefore less likely to be individually culpable for the trespass (although their forebears might). A longer statutory period would also decrease the frequency of adverse possession suits and ensure that only those claimants most intimately connected with the land acquire it, while only the most passive and unprotective owners lose title. 45. Reverting to the facts of this case, if the Police department of the State with all its might is bent upon taking possession of any land or building in a clandestine manner, then, perhaps no one would be able to effectively prevent them. 46. It is our bounden duty and obligation to ascertain the intention of the Parliament while interpreting the law. Law and Justice, more often than not, happily coincide only rarely we find serious conflict. The archaic law of adverse possession is one such. A serious re-look is absolutely imperative in the larger interest of the people. 47. Adverse possession allows a trespasser - a person guilty of a tort, or even a crime, in the eyes of law - to gain legal title to land which he has illegally possessed for 12 years. How 12 years of illegality can suddenly be converted to legal title is, logically and morally speaking, baffling.This outmoded law essentially asks the judiciary to place its stamp of approval upon conduct that the ordinary Indian citizen would find reprehensible. 48. How 12 years of illegality can suddenly be converted to legal title is, logically and morally speaking, baffling.This outmoded law essentially asks the judiciary to place its stamp of approval upon conduct that the ordinary Indian citizen would find reprehensible. 48. The doctrine of adverse possession has troubled a great many legal minds. We are clearly of the opinion that time has come for change. 49. If the protectors of law become the grabbers of the property (land and building), then, people will be left with no protection and there would be a total anarchy in the entire country. 50. It is indeed a very disturbing and dangerous trend. In our considered view, it must be arrested without further loss of time in the larger public interest. No Government Department, Public Undertaking, and much less the Police Department should be permitted to perfect the title of the land or building by invoking the provisions of adverse possession and grab the property of its own citizens in the manner that has been done in this case. 51. In our considered view, there is an urgent need for a fresh look of the entire law on adverse possession. We recommend the Union of India to immediately consider and seriously deliberate either abolition of the law of adverse possession and in the alternate to make suitable amendments in the law of adverse possession. A copy of this judgment be sent to the Secretary, Ministry of Law and Justice, Department of Legal Affairs, Government of India for taking appropriate steps in accordance with law.” 33. In a later decision i.e. in the case of Gurudwara Sahib Vrs. Gram Panchayat Village Sirthala & Anr., reported in (2014) 1 SCC 669 , the Apex Court in Para 8 of the judgment observed thus:- “8. There cannot be any quarrel to this extent the judgments of the courts below are correct and without any blemish. Even if the plaintiff is found to be in adverse possession, it cannot seek a declaration to the effect that such adverse possession has matured into ownership. Only if proceedings filed against the appellant and appellant is arrayed as defendant that it can use this adverse possession as a shield/defence.” 34. Even if the plaintiff is found to be in adverse possession, it cannot seek a declaration to the effect that such adverse possession has matured into ownership. Only if proceedings filed against the appellant and appellant is arrayed as defendant that it can use this adverse possession as a shield/defence.” 34. Legal position in respect of claim of title by adverse possession and/or extinguishment of title of the rightful owner because of not having in possession for a continuous period as prescribed in the Limitation Act has not yet been changed by making any amendment in the existing statute pursuant to the observation made by the Apex Court. The Single Bench of this court, therefore, referring to a three Judges Bench decision of the Apex Court has held that since the title of the rightful owner extinguished because of the continuous and uninterrupted possession, the person in possession will acquire the status of the rightful owner. 35. The appellate Court’s judgment as it appears while decreeing the suit for the entire .052 acres of land is based on a whimsical observation without referring to the evidence on record. The plaintiff has been able to prove his hostile possession only in respect of his shop hut which was standing over .023 acres of land according to his own statement which is found to be consistent and therefore, he is entitled to get declaration of title in respect of his shop hut over the land of .023 acres only. His claim over the entire .052 acres of land was rightly rejected by the trial Court. 36. Learned Sr. counsel, Mr. Chakraborty contended that the concurrent finding of two Courts may not be disturbed by this Court in the second appeal. I cannot agree with the submission of learned Sr. counsel, Mr. Chakraborty since the concurrent finding may be only in respect of .023 acres of land on which the plaintiff has his shop hut. The rest is not a concurrent finding rather a hopeless finding of the learned District Judge. 37. The substantial question of law formulated in the appeals demonstrate the question of perversity though the particular word has not been used and perversity itself is a substantial question of law to be decided in the second appeal. 38. In view of the discussions made above, the appeals are partly allowed. 37. The substantial question of law formulated in the appeals demonstrate the question of perversity though the particular word has not been used and perversity itself is a substantial question of law to be decided in the second appeal. 38. In view of the discussions made above, the appeals are partly allowed. The judgment and decree dated 03.07.2007 passed by learned District Judge in T.A. 6/2004 and T.A. 7/2004 (common judgment) is set aside. 39. The Judgment and decree dated 10.03.2004 and 12.03.2004 respectively passed by the trial Court in T.S. 33 of 1998 is affirmed. 40. Send back the L.C. records along with a copy of this judgment.