JUDGMENT : Jainendra Kumar Ranka, J. 1. Instant revision petition is directed against rejection of application under Order 7, Rule 11 of CPC read with section 151 CPC moved by the defendant-petitioner in a suit for partition and injunction filed by the plaintiff-respondent. 2. The brief facts necessary to resolve the controversy is that the plaintiff-respondent filed a suit for partition and injunction with respect to the suit property claiming that the suit property belongs to the adoptive mother of the plaintiff who expired on 05.12.1989 and as a consequence whereof plaintiff and defendant No. 1, adoptive father of the plaintiff became the co-owners of the suit property. It was further being alleged that the defendant No. 1 wrongly entered into a development agreement with defendant No. 2 who started construction upon the suit property whereas the plaintiff was co-owner to the extent of half share in the same and hence relief of partition and injunction was sought in the plaint. 3. An application under Order 7, Rule 11 read with section 151 CPC was moved in the suit by defendant No. 1/1 with the assertion that in a previously instituted suit titled as Lal Singh & Others v. Hawa Kanwar & Others bearing Civil Suit No. 18/1979 wherein the plaintiff of the instant suit Sumer Singh who was defendant No. 3 moved an application on 03.03.1987 asserting that he did not want to press the issue of adoption. It was further asserted that in another Suit No. 23/1980 for declaration and injunction with respect to Khasra No. 475, plaintiff, Sumer Singh presented an application which reads as under:- ^^mijksDr nkok eSaus Jh gfj flag iq= lR;nku flag dk nRrd iq= ?kksf"kr djus o vkjkth [kljk uEcj 475 esa cus dPps edkuksa ls u fudkyus ckcr+ is'k fd;k gSA eSa mijksDr nksuksa mtjkr ¼Dyse½ okil ysrk gwa vkSj nkok mBkuk pkgrk gwaA [kpkZ i{kdkjku viuk viuk ogu djsaxsaA** 4. Thus, it was asserted that once plaintiff has admitted in judicial proceedings that he is not the adopted son of Hari Singh, he was bound by the admission and hence no cause of action to institute the suit for partition and injunction again claiming himself to be the adopted son of Hari Singh and his wife Hawa Kanwar arose. Thus, it was asserted that once plaintiff has admitted in judicial proceedings that he is not the adopted son of Hari Singh, he was bound by the admission and hence no cause of action to institute the suit for partition and injunction again claiming himself to be the adopted son of Hari Singh and his wife Hawa Kanwar arose. It was further claimed that even if application under Order 7, Rule 11 was considered not to be fully applicable as the suit being frivolous and vexatious ought to have been rejected u/sec.151 CPC. 5. Plaintiff submitted his reply to the above application of defendant No. 1/1 and admitted that he filed a Suit No. 23/1980 titled as Sumer Singh v. Hari Singh before the Civil Judge, Jhunjhunu and withdrew the suit on the basis of compromise but asserted that the same was not decided on merit and hence was of no consequence. The other application dated.03.03.1987 moved in suit No. 18/1979 filed by defendant No. 1/1 was also not denied in the reply but it was asserted that this suit was also not decided on merit. It was further asserted that the issues were already framed in the suit and the application was misconceived at such stage. 6. Upon hearing the rival contention, the ld. Trial Court rejected the application under Order 7, Rule 11 read with section 151 CPC on the ground that as the adoption of the plaintiff was not decided on merit and the previous proceedings referred to in the application under Order 7, Rule 11 CPC was with respect to different property, application was not maintainable. 7. Learned counsel for the defendant-petitioner vehemently contended that the reasoning given by the ld. Trial Court was perverse, illegal and the impugned order if allowed to stand could cause grave injury to the rights of the petitioners. He contended that admission is the best evidence against the maker and admission in judicial proceedings stands at a much higher footing and pedestal. He contended that when once the plaintiff admitted that he was not the adoptive son of Hari Singh and Hawa Kanwar, he cannot wriggle back from his own admission after so many years and by his claim on the suit property again on the basis of adoption. He contended that when once the plaintiff admitted that he was not the adoptive son of Hari Singh and Hawa Kanwar, he cannot wriggle back from his own admission after so many years and by his claim on the suit property again on the basis of adoption. He further contended that the suit was frivolous and vexatious and the Trial Court committed a gross mistake in law in rejecting the application filed under Order 7, Rule 11 read with section 151 of CPC. He relied upon judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Amarendra Komalam & Another v. Usha Sinha & Another, 2005 DNJ (SC) 362 & the Judgments of this Court at Principal Seat, Jodhpur in the case of Gordhan Das Through His Legal Representatives v. Som Dutt, 2007 (6) WLC 56 & Hari Ram v. Lichmaniya & Others, 2003 (4) WLC (Raj.) 426 and the judgments of this Court in the case of Abdul Rahman & Others v. State of Rajasthan & Others, 2007 (5) WLC (Raj.) 235 & Dr. Abdul Wasi v. Shri Abdul Kadir & Others, 2015 (2) WLC 207 . 8. Per-contra, ld. Counsel for the respondent supporting the impugned order contended that there was no impropriety in the order and the factum of the adoption could only be settled after trial and disputed questions of fact were not required to be adjudicated at the stage of consideration of an application under Order 7, Rule 11 read with section 151 of CPC. He relied upon judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Vaish Aggarwal Panchayat v. Inder Kumar & Others, 2016 (1) RLW 608 (SC) and the judgment of this Court in the case of Smt. Prabhati Devi v. Balu & Others, 2011 (3) CCC 629 (Raj.). 9. I have heard the ld. Counsel for the parties and have carefully perused the record and have given may thoughtful consideration upon the rival contention raised at the bar. 10. 9. I have heard the ld. Counsel for the parties and have carefully perused the record and have given may thoughtful consideration upon the rival contention raised at the bar. 10. Before proceeding further, some of the judicial precedents with respect to rejection of plaint under Order 7, Rule 11 read with section 151 CPC are mentioned here under:- 10.1 The Apex Court in the case of Saleem Bhai and Others v. State of Maharashtra and Others, (2003) 1 SCC 557 held Order 7, Rule 11 CPC - Courts powers under the provisions can be exercised at any stage of the suit before conclusion of the Trial. 10.2 The Apex Court in the case of Hardesh Ores (P) Ltd. v. Hede and Company, (2007) 5 SCC 614 held Order 7, Rule 11 (d) Rejection of plaint on ground of limitation - "Law" within the meaning of Order 7, Rule 11 (d) must include the law of limitation. 10.3 The Apex Court in the case of Sopal Sukhdeo Sable and Others v. Assistant Charity Commissioner and Others, (2004) 2 WLC (SC) Civil 122 held for the purposes of deciding an application under Order 7, Rule 11 CPC, the averments in the plaint are germane. Pleas taken in the written statement would be wholly irrelevant at that stage. A duty is casted on Court to perform its obligation in rejecting the plaint hit by any of the infirmities under Clause (a) to Clause (d) even without intervention of the defendant. 10.4 The Apex Court in the case of ITC Limited v. Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal and Others, 1998 (2) SCC 70 held that Clever drafting creating illusion of cause of action is not permitted in law and a clear right to sue should be shown in the plaint. 10.5 T. Arivandandam v. TV Satyapal and Another, 1977 (4) SCC 467 held if on a meaningful not formal reading of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious and merit-less in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, power under Order 7, Rule 11 CPC should be exercised and if clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action, it ought to be nipped in the bud at the first hearing. 10.6 The term "cause of action" has also been defined and interpreted by a series of settled judicial precedents and some of them are mentioned here under:- 10.7 The Apex Court in the case of Om Prakash Srivastava v. Union of India an Another, (2006) 6 SCC 207 has held as follows: 9. By "cause of action" it is meant every fact, which, if traversed, it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to support his right to a judgment of the Court. In other words, a bundle of facts, which it is necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to succeed in the suit. (See Bloom Dekor Ltd v. Subhash Himatlal Desai and Others, 1994 (6) SCC 322 ). 10. In a generic and wide sense (as in Section 20 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908) "cause of action" means every fact, which it is necessary to establish to support a right to obtain a judgment (See Sadanandan Bhadran v. Madhavan Sunil Kumar, 1998 (6) SCC 514 ). 11. It is settled law that "cause of action" consists of bundle of facts, which give cause to enforce the legal inquiry for redress in a court of law. In other words, it is a bundle of facts, which taken with the law applicable to them, gives the plaintiff a right to claim relief against the defendant. It must include some act done by the defendant since in the absence of such an act no cause of action would possibly accrue or would arise. (See South East Asia Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Nav Bharat Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. and Others, 1996 (3) SCC 443 ). 12. The expression "cause of action has acquired a judicially settled meaning. In the restricted sense "cause of action" means the circumstances forming the infraction of the right or the immediate occasion for the reaction. In the wider sense, it means the necessary conditions for the maintenance of the suit, including not only the infraction of the right, but also the infraction coupled with the right itself. Compendiously, as noted above the expression means every fact, which it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, it traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the Court. Compendiously, as noted above the expression means every fact, which it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, it traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the Court. Every fact, which is necessary to be proved, as distinguished from every piece of evidence, which is necessary to prove each fact, comprises in "cause of action" (See Rajasthan High Court Advocates' Association v. Union of India and Others, 2001 (2) SCC 294 ). 13. The expression "cause of action" has sometimes been employed to convey the restricted idea of facts or circumstances which constitute either the infringement or the basis of a right and no more. In a wider and more comprehensive sense, it has been used to denote the whole bundle of material facts, which a plaintiff must prove in order to succeed. These are all those essential facts without the proof of which the plaintiff must fail in his suit. (See Gurdit Singh v. Munsha Singh, 1977 (1) SCC 791 ). 14. The expression "cause of action" is generally understood to mean a situation or state of facts that entitles a party to maintain an action in a court or a tribunal; a group of operative facts giving rise to one or more bases of suing; a factual situation that entitles one person to obtain a remedy in Court from another person. (See Black's Law Dictionary). In Stroud's Judicial Dictionary a "cause of action" is stated to be the entire set of facts that gives rise to an enforceable claim; the phrase comprises every fact, which if traversed, the plaintiff must prove in order to obtain judgment. In words and Phrases (4th Edn.) the meaning attributed to the phrase "cause of action" in common legal parlance is existence of those facts, which give a party a right to judicial interference on his behalf. (See Navinchandra N. Majitia v. State of Maharashtra and Others, 2000 (7) SCC 640 ). 15. In Halsbury's Laws of England (Fourth Edition) it has been stated as follows: "cause of action" has been defined as meaning simply a factual situation, the existence of which entitles one person to obtain from the Court a remedy against another person. (See Navinchandra N. Majitia v. State of Maharashtra and Others, 2000 (7) SCC 640 ). 15. In Halsbury's Laws of England (Fourth Edition) it has been stated as follows: "cause of action" has been defined as meaning simply a factual situation, the existence of which entitles one person to obtain from the Court a remedy against another person. The phrase has been held from earliest time to include every fact which is material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeeds, and every fact which a defendant would have a right to traverse. 'Cause of action' has also been taken to mean that particular act on the part of the defendant which gives the plaintiff his cause of complaint, or the subject matter of grievance founding the action, not merely the technical cause of action" 11. On a plain reading of the plaint, it is abundantly clear that the basis of plaintiff claim for partition and injunction of the suit property is his assertion with respect to being the adoptive son of Hari Singh and Hawa Kanwar. If he is found to be adoptive son of Hari Singh & Hawa Kanwar, his claim holds good but if his status as adoptive son is found false, his whole claim fails. The application moved by the plaintiff in a earlier Suit No. 23/1980 titled as Sumer Singh v. Hari Singh quoted herein above, amply demonstrate that there was a categorical admission on behalf of plaintiff that he was not the adoptive son of Hari Singh. Another application dated 03.03.1987 moved by the plaintiff and in another Suit No. 18/1979 titled as Lal Singh and Other v. Hawa Kanwar & Others is quoted verbatim:- mijksDr eqdnesa esa izfroknh l[a;k 3 gwaA eSa mijksDr eqdnek esa xksn dk mtz ugha pykuk pkgrk gwaA bls [kkfjt Qjek;k tkosA 12. The same also abundantly displays that the plaintiff in clear terms admitted himself of being not the adoptive son of Hari Singh and Hawa Kanwar. 13. Such being the position, this Court is of the view that once a person by declaration or admission made before a judicial authority confirms his status of not being an adoptive son and derives the benefits, he cannot after-words lay a claim in contradiction to his earlier stand. 13. Such being the position, this Court is of the view that once a person by declaration or admission made before a judicial authority confirms his status of not being an adoptive son and derives the benefits, he cannot after-words lay a claim in contradiction to his earlier stand. The plaintiff has not denied the existence of the above referred judicial proceedings but rather only asserts that the same were decided on the basis of compromise and not on merits. Such an assertion has no legal force for the reason that one admits that he was not an adoptive son and no adjudication was required to be made on the question of adoption. 14. The term "cause of action" not only incorporates infringement of legal right but the legal right itself as enshrined in the case laws discussed above. Once plaintiff is found not to be adoptive son of Hari Singh and Hawa Kanwar, it can safely be held that the plaint did not disclose any cause of action. 15. Looked from another angle, this Court is of the further view that frivolous and vexatious suits & litigation ought to be nipped in the bud at the earliest and even if not strictly covered under the provisions of Order 7, Rule 11 , the same ought to be rejected u/Sec.151 CPC. The frivolous and fictitious plea of adoption propounded by the plaintiff which is the foundation of the whole suit ought to be taken note of at the threshold. His categorical admission in judicial proceedings and that too long back cannot be brushed aside lightly. Admissions of fact before the judicial authorities are sacrosanct in nature and if they are not given due weightage there cannot be any end to litigation. Courts are flooded with false & frivolous pleas and the same are required to be dealt with firmness and with firm hands. Thus, the suit of plaintiff-respondent being frivolous and vexatious, was liable to be rejected even under section 151 CPC. 16. Consequently, in my view, the revision petition deserves to be allowed and is directed to be allowed and the plaint of the respondent-plaintiff is rejected, with no order as to cost.