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2016 DIGILAW 189 (RAJ)

Sarvar Khan v. State of Rajasthan

2016-02-01

KANWALJIT SINGH AHLUWALIA, PRAKASH GUPTA

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JUDGMENT : Ahluwalia, J. Sugra D/o Nazir Khan was married with appellant Sarvar Khan. On the intervening night of 13-14 October, 2005, Sugra was admitted in the Government Hospital, Sikar. During her admission in the hospital, she died and post mortem on her body was conducted on 15th October, 2005 at 10.20 A.M. vide Post Mortem Report (Ex.R13). Medical Board consisting of three doctors had sent the viscera for chemical analysis and kept the opinion regarding cause of death pending. State Forensic Laboratory, Rajasthan, Jaipur submitted report Ex.P.8 and came to the conclusion that cause of death was consumption of Organophosphorous insecticide. Thus, Sugra had died an unnatural death in her matrimonial home. Maternal uncle Basir Khan (PW.5) and mother Bano (PW.3) of Sugra submitted written report Ex.R3 before Rajesh Yadav (PW.15), Station House Officer, Police Station Laxmangarh (Sikar). The said report when translated into english reads as under :- "To, The Station House Officer, Police Station Laxmangarh (Sikar) Sir, It is submitted that Sugra @ Subhana daughter of Nazir Khan resident of village Tihawali, Tehsil Fatehpur, 2½/3 years was married with Sarvar Khan S/o Taju Khan in village Reenu, Tehsil Laxmangarh. After marriage, Sugra was harassed by her husband, mother-in-law, brother-in-law. They used to taunt her that she had brought less dowry from her parental house. The father of the girl being poor and sick was not in a position to fulfil repeated demands of the accused. They continuously used to quarrel with her. Parental side of the girl was feeling harassed. Meanwhile, 12 months ago, Sugra had given birth to a son before the birth, husband had told her to abort the child and for not doing so, she was subjected to cruelty. Two months ago, Sarvar Khan, husband had come on leave from the Army. He demanded Rs. 50,000/- and told her to bring the amount from her parental house. He had sent Sugra to her parental house along with his younger brother. Thereafter, the husband made a telephonic call at Tihawali and told that Sugra should bring Rs. 50,000/- and then she can return to her marital home. On 13th October, 2005 mother-in-law of Sugra made a telephonic call at Tihawali and informed that Sugra has been bitten by a snake. Thereafter, the husband made a telephonic call at Tihawali and told that Sugra should bring Rs. 50,000/- and then she can return to her marital home. On 13th October, 2005 mother-in-law of Sugra made a telephonic call at Tihawali and informed that Sugra has been bitten by a snake. I, mother of Sugra at about 1.00 PM on 13th October, 2005 reached at Reenu and when I saw Sugra, I did not find any marks of snake bite on Sugra. When I talked to Sugra she started weeping and told that the inlaws were asking to bring Rs. 50,000/- and that in case the amount is not given they will kill her. But due to poverty we could not arrange for the amount. When the mother of Sugra reached the house of accused Sarvar Khan, he left the house. On 14th October, 2005 mother-in-law of Sugra had again made a telephonic call and informed that Sugra had been admitted in Kalyan Hospital, Sikar. I (mother of Sugra) at about 12.00 reached at Sikar Hospital. Sugra was in unconscious condition. Doctor of Hospital referred Sugra to Jaipur. In-laws of Sugra were delaying to take her to Jaipur. This occurrence has taken place in front of Subedar Basir Khan, maternal uncle of Sugra. Taking into consideration all incidents which had taken place from marriage till today we have strong suspicion that Sarvar Khan husband of Sugra, father-in-law (Taju Khan), mother-in-law (Jaitoon) and brother-in-law (Anwar) had administered her poison. Husband Sarvar Khan up to 14th October, 2005 was present in the hospitai and not informed till today that he is going to join his duty and he stealthily left the hospital whereas no husband can leave his wife in this condition. We have belief that they have administered poison to Sugra. This fact be investigated fairly and legal action be taken against the accused. Dated : 15.10.2005 Sd/- Basir Khan thumb impression Bano. Sd/- Sikandar" 2. On basis of the written report formal FIR Ex.R 14 was registered. 3. It is apparent that deceased had died within three years of her marriage. Written report Ex.R3 is signed by Sikandar, brother (PW.2), Basir Khan, maternal uncle (PW.5) and it also bears thumb impression of Bano, mother (PW.3). 4. Prosecution, in order to secure conviction, examined 16 witnesses and produced on record documents Ex.R1 to P. 15. 3. It is apparent that deceased had died within three years of her marriage. Written report Ex.R3 is signed by Sikandar, brother (PW.2), Basir Khan, maternal uncle (PW.5) and it also bears thumb impression of Bano, mother (PW.3). 4. Prosecution, in order to secure conviction, examined 16 witnesses and produced on record documents Ex.R1 to P. 15. Thereafter the statement of accused was recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. Accused in his statement under Section 313 Cr.RC. has taken a stand that it is a case of snake bite. In defence, accused has examined eleven witnesses. Court of Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Sikar vide impugned judgment dated 9th October, 2009 had recorded conviction of appellant for offence under Section 498-A and 304-B IPC. However, the accused was acquitted for offence under Section 406 IPC. Having convicted for the aforesaid offences, the trial court vide a separate order of even date sentenced the appellant as under U/s. 498A IPC : to undergo years’ rigorous imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs. 1000/-. In default of payment of fine to undergo three months’ simple imprisonment; U/s. 304-B IPC : to undergo life imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs. 5,000/-. In default of payment of fine to undergo six months’ rigorous imprisonment. 5. Both the sentences have been ordered to run concurrently. 6. Aggrieved against his conviction and sentence, the present appeal has been filed by the appellant. 7. Record of the trial court was requisitioned. 8. Dr. Mohd. Farooq (PW. 14) on 15th October, 2005 along with Dr. S.S. Sharma and Dr. Gunjan Goswami had conducted autopsy on the dead body. In the court, the doctor deposed that after receipt of report of FSL he had opined that the cause of death was administration of Organophosphorous insecticide. In cross-examination, doctor denied that the snake poison contains Organophosphorous insecticide. 9. Shri Amin Ali Khan appearing for the appellant has not questioned the opinion of doctor regarding nature of poison in the right earnest. Therefore, there being no material, there is no other option for us except to hold that within seven years of marriage Sugra @ Subhana wife of appellant died of unnatural death. 10. There is also no dispute that Sugra was taken to the hospital from her matrimonial home. 11. Sabbir Khan PW.1 has deposited that on 15th October, 2005 the police prepared Panchayatnama/Inquest Report Ex.P.1. 10. There is also no dispute that Sugra was taken to the hospital from her matrimonial home. 11. Sabbir Khan PW.1 has deposited that on 15th October, 2005 the police prepared Panchayatnama/Inquest Report Ex.P.1. in his presence. 12. In cross-examination this witness admitted to be true that Basir Khan son of Bhole Khan is his brother in family. He had denied the fact that on 13th October, 2005 he came to learn that Sugra was bitten by a snake. 13. Sikandar PW.2, brother, Bano PW.3, mother, Bashir Khan PW.5 being maternal uncle, Balbir Singh (PW.6) being a neighbour of the complainant Bano, Kadim PW.7 brother of deceased have deposed regarding mal-treatment and harassment caused to deceased Sugra on account of demand of the dowry by accused appellant. Bhim Singh PW.8 being a co-villager of the complainant has also testified that he had learnt from the father of the deceased that the accused had mal-treated deceased during subsistence of marriage, we need not note whole testimony of other prosecution witnesses. 14. We have also taken note of the stand taken by accused appellant under Section 313 Cr.RC. that the deceased died due to snake bite. 15. Chuna Ram DW. 1, Sanwarmal DW.2, Tikuram DW.3, Rehmat DW.4, Samsher DW.5, Shishpal DW.6, Smt. Bhanwari DW.7, Mobina DW.8, Harlal DW.9 and Birbal DW.10 have propounded the theory of snake bite being the cause of death of the deceased. 16. Having heard the learned counsel for the appellant we cannot give any credence to the defence evidence and the statement recorded under Section 313 Cr.RC. as the report of FSL Ex.R8 belie the assertion made by defence. The report of FSL Ex.P.8 and opinion of Dr. Mohd. Farooq PW.14 conclusively prove that deceased died due to consumption of Organophosphorous insecticide. 17. Unable to assail the testimony of the relatives of the deceased which consists of two brothers, mother and maternal uncle and neighbours and co-villagers, Shri Amin Ali, learned counsel for the appellant has very fairly stated that he shall restrict his prayer to urge that in the fact and circumstances of the case, award of life imprisonment upon the appellant is I not warranted and it is a fit case for reduction of sentence. 18. 18. Counsel for the appellant has relied upon the judgment rendered by this Court (to which one of us Justice K.S. Ahluwalia was a member) in DB Criminal Appeal No. 1145/2007 (Puran v. State of Rajasthan) decided on January 29, 2015. 19. The Division Bench of this Court has observed and held as under:- "Considering the forceful and truthful testimonies given by the prosecution witnesses, Mr. Suresh Sahni, the learned counsel for the appellant, has frankly conceded that he is not in a position to argue this case on merits. Therefore, he has confined his arguments only to the quantum of punishment which should be meted out to the appellant. Relying on the case of Deen Mohammad @ Murli v. State of Rajasthan [D.B. Criminal Appeal No. 13/2005, decided on 25.11.2014], a case decided by us, the learned counsel has pleaded that sentencing cannot be left to the whims and caprices of the trial court. Although in a catena of cases the Hon’ble Supreme Court has dealt with the principles governing sentencing, although these principles generally relate to the cases of death penalty, but in the case of Sunil Dutt Sharma v. State (Government of NCT of Delhi) [ (2014) 4 SCC 375 ], the Hon’ble Supreme Court has expressed, its opinion that the principles governing sentencing in death penalty cases would equally apply to the offences of lesser punishment. Therefore, the maximum sentence prescribed by law for a given offence can be inflicted only in rarest of rare case. Thus while imposing punishment for an offence under Section 304B IPC, the court would have to consider the mitigating and aggravating circumstances before inflicting the maximum sentence of life imprisonment. Moreover, the court would have to give reasons for inflicting the maximum sentence of life imprisonment upon an accused while convicting him for offence under Section 304B IPC. In the present case, the learned Judge has not given any cogent reason for sentencing the appellant to life imprisonment. Moreover, there are hardly any aggravating circumstances for imposing life imprisonment upon the appellant. Instead, Kaila Devi had died of strangulation. She had committed suicide as she was unhappy with her married life. Further, the appellant has suffered the pains and agony of a trial and incarceration for about ten years. Thus, the sentence should be reduced from life imprisonment to ten years. Mr. Instead, Kaila Devi had died of strangulation. She had committed suicide as she was unhappy with her married life. Further, the appellant has suffered the pains and agony of a trial and incarceration for about ten years. Thus, the sentence should be reduced from life imprisonment to ten years. Mr. Aladeen Khan, the learned Public Prosecutor, has emphasised only upon the fact that the case falls under Section 304B IPC, but has not been able to raise any arguments against reduction of sentence. Heard the learned counsel for the parties, perused the record and examined the impugned judgment. In the case of Deen Mohammad @ Murli (supra), while relying on the case of Sunil Dutt Sharma (supra), we have held as under :- "Having affirmed the conviction of the appellants, we have been called upon to answer whether sentence of life imprisonment awarded by the learned Trial Court, in the facts and circumstances, is adequate and justified? Counsel for the appellant had relied upon case of Sunil Dutt Sharma (supra) wherein their Lordhsips referring to case law, had culled out the principles which till now had been applied for awarding death as sentence and thereafter had observed that application of same principles while determining sentence in the case of dowry death also make better sense. In a very erudite judgment by culling out the principles laid in Jagmohan Singh v. The State of U.P., (1973) 1 SCC 20 and Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 684 , it was held that since sentencing is an onerous exercise to be undertaken by the court, court should take note of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Their lordships in case of Sunil Dutt Sharma (supra) had also taken note of principles laid down in a recent pronouncement by Hon’ble Apex Court in Sangeet and Another v. State of Haryana, (2013) 2 SCC 452 . It was held that evolution of principles of sentencing policy are to be distinguished from judge centric to fair amount of certainty. It will be appropriate for us to extensively quote from the judgment rendered by Apex Court in Sunil Dutt Sharma’s case (supra) :- "10. Are we to understand that the quest and search for a sound jurisprudential basis for imposing a particular sentence on an offender is, destined to remain elusive and the sentencing parameters in this country are bound to remain judge centric? Are we to understand that the quest and search for a sound jurisprudential basis for imposing a particular sentence on an offender is, destined to remain elusive and the sentencing parameters in this country are bound to remain judge centric? The issue though predominantly dealt with in the context of cases involving the death penalty has tremendous significance to the Criminal Jurisprudence of the country inasmuch as in addition to the numerous offences under various special laws in force, hundreds of offences are enumerated in the Penal Code, punishment for which could extend from a single day to 10 years or even for life, a situation made possible by the use of the seemingly same expressions in different provisions of the Penal Code as noticed in the opening part of this order. 11. As noticed, the "net value" of the huge number of in depth exercises performed since Jagmohan Singh (supra) has been effectively and systematically culled out in Sangeet and Sankar Kisanrao Khade (supra). The identified principles could provide a sound objective basis for sentencing thereby minimising individualized and judge centric perspectives. Such principles bear a fair amount of affinity to the principles applied in foreign jurisdictions, a resume of which is available in the decision of this Court in State of Punjab v. Prem Sagar and Others, (2008) 7 SCC 550 . The difference is not in the identity of the principles; it lies in the realm of application thereof to individual situations. While in India application of the principles is left to the judge hearing the case, in certain foreign jurisdiction such principles are formulated under the authority of the statute and are applied on principles of categorisation of offences which approach, however, has been found by the Constitution Bench in Bachan Singh (supra) to be inappropriate to our system. The principles being, clearly evolved and securely entrenched, perhaps, the answer lies in consistency in approach. 12. To revert to the main stream of the case, we see no reason as to why the principles of sentencing evolved by this Court over the years though largely in the context of the death penalty will not be applicable to all lesser sentences so long as the sentencing judge is vested with the discretion to award a lesser or a higher sentence resembling the swing of the pendulum from the minimum to the maximum. In fact, we are reminded of the age old infallible logic that what is good to one situation would hold to be equally good to another like situation. Besides paragraph 163 (underlined portion) of Bachan Singh (supra), reproduced earlier, bears testimony to the above fact. 13. Would the above principles apply to sentencing of an accused found guilty of the offence under Section 304-B inasmuch as the said offence is held to be proved against the accused on basis of a legal presumption? This is the next question that has to be dealt with. So long there is credible evidence of cruelty occasioned by demands for dowry, any unnatural death of a woman within seven years of her marriage makes the husband or a relative of the husband of such woman liable for the offence of "dowry death" under Section 304-B though there may not be any direct involvement of the husband or such relative with the death in question. In a situation where commission of an offence is held to be proved by means of a legal presumption the circumstances surrounding the crime to determine the presence of aggravating circumstances (crime test) may not be readily forthcoming unlike a case where there is evidence of overt Criminal acts establishing the direct involvement of the accused with the crime to enable the Court to come to specific conclusions with regard to the barbarous or depraved nature of the crime committed. The necessity to combat the menace of demand' for dowry or to prevent atrocities on woman and like social evils as well as the necessity to maintain the purity of social conscience cannot be determinative of the quantum of sentence inasmuch as the said parameters would be common to all offences under Section 304-B of the Penal Code. The above, therefore, cannot be elevated to the status of acceptable jurisprudential principles to act as a rational basis for awarding varying degrees of punishment on a case to case basis. The search for principles to satisfy the crime test in an offence under Section 304-B of the Penal Code must, therefore, lie elsewhere. The above, therefore, cannot be elevated to the status of acceptable jurisprudential principles to act as a rational basis for awarding varying degrees of punishment on a case to case basis. The search for principles to satisfy the crime test in an offence under Section 304-B of the Penal Code must, therefore, lie elsewhere. Perhaps, the time spent between marriage and the death of the woman; the attitude and conduct of the accused towards the victim before her death, the extent to which the demand for dowry was persisted with and the manner and circumstances of commission of the cruelty would be a surer basis for determination of the crime test. Coupled with the above, the fact whether the accused was also charged with the offence under Section 302 of the Penal Code and the basis of his acquittal of the said charge would be another very relevant circumstance. As against this the extenuating/mitigating circumstances which would determine the "criminal test" must be allowed to have a full play. The aforesaid two sets of circumstances being mutually irreconcilable cannot be arranged in the form of a balance sheet as observed in Sangeet (supra) but it is the cumulative effect of the two sets of different circumstances that has to be kept in mind while rendering the sentencing decision. This, according to us, would be the correct approach while dealing with the question of sentence so far as the offence under Section 304-B of the penal Code is concerned." We may also notice that in the case of Sunil Dutt Sharma (supra), while reducing the sentence, it was noted that wife of Sunil Dutt Sharma died due to asphyxia, resulting from strangulation. Furthermore, in the case of Hari Om v. State of Haryana and Another [Cr. Appeal No. 1167/2011 decided on 31.10.2014], the Hon’ble Apex Court considering question of sentence for offence under Section 304-B IPC, took note of case law on this question, and after considering various judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court, held as under :- 22. In the case of Hem Chand v. State of Haryana, (1994) 6 SCC 727 , the courts below had awarded life term to the accused under Section 304-B read with Section 498-A but this Court reduced it to 10 years. This was also a case where the accused was a police officer who had suffered life imprisonment. In the case of Hem Chand v. State of Haryana, (1994) 6 SCC 727 , the courts below had awarded life term to the accused under Section 304-B read with Section 498-A but this Court reduced it to 10 years. This was also a case where the accused was a police officer who had suffered life imprisonment. This Court held as under :- "7. the accused-appellant was a police employee and instead of checking the crime, he himself indulged therein and precipitated in it and that bride-killing cases are on the increase and therefore a serious view has to be taken. As mentioned above, Section 304-B IPC only raises presumption and lay& down that minimum sentence should be seven years but it may extend to imprisonment for life. Therefore awarding extreme punishment of imprisonment for life should be in rare cases and not in every case. 8. Hence, we are of the view that a sentence of 10 years’ RI would meet the ends of justice. We, accordingly while confirming the conviction of the appellant under Section 304-B IPC, reduce the sentence of imprisonment for life to 10 years’ RI." 23. 24. 25. Applying the principle of law laid down in the aforementioned cases and having regard to the totality of facts and circumstances of this case. We are of the considered opinion that the ends of justice would meet, if we reduce the sentence of the appellant from the imprisonment to that of 10 years. In our view, this case does not fall in the category of a "rare case" as envisaged by this Court so as to award to the appellant the life imprisonment. That apart, we also notice that while awarding life imprisonment, the courts below did not assign any reasons." Having noted the principles of law governing sentencing, their Lordships held that since in the case of Sunil Dutt Sharma (supra) death was due to strangulation, it was appropriate to award sentence of ten years to the appellant in that case under Section 304-B IPC as same shall serve ends of justice." 20. Having heard learned counsel for the appellant we are of the view that besides the very fact that the death had taken place within seven years, there are allegations of demand of dowry soon before the death and further more in the present case, deceased had died an unnatural death. Having heard learned counsel for the appellant we are of the view that besides the very fact that the death had taken place within seven years, there are allegations of demand of dowry soon before the death and further more in the present case, deceased had died an unnatural death. Therefore, the ingredients of offence under Sections 304-B and 498-A IPC are indeed made out. Thus, conviction of the appellant for offence under Sections 304-B and 498A IPC is maintained. 21. However, for the reasons given by us in the case of Puran (supra), we find that there is no good ground to deviate from the reasonings recorded in the case of Puran (supra). 22. In the present case, occurrence had taken place in the month of October, 2005, appellant has already suffered pain and agony of a protracted trial and in the corridors of the court from last more than 11 years, borrowing the dictum of law laid in Sunil Dutt Sharma’s case (supra) and Hari Om’s case (supra), while upholding conviction of the appellant, Sarvar Khan, under Section 498A and 304-B IPC, we set aside sentence of life imprisonment awarded upon him for offence under Section 304-B IPC and reduce the same to ten years’ rigorous imprisonment. However, we maintain the sentence of fine and the default clause. We also maintain sentence of the appellant for offence under Section 498-A IPC. Sentence awarded on both the Counts shall run concurrently. 23. In view of modification in the sentence, the present appeal stands disposed of.