JUDGMENT : J.B PARDIWALA, J. By this application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the applicant - The North (Uttar) Gujarat University calls in question the legality and validity of the order dated 23/03/2000 passed by the Gujarat Universities Services Tribunal at Ahmedabad in the Application No. 5 of 1996 filed by the respondent no. 1 herein. 2. It appears from the materials on record that the respondent no. 1 herein was appointed by the University vide office order dated 11/04/1994 as a Sweeper purely on a temporary basis. The order of appointment dated 11/04/1994, Annexure-C to this application, Page-12 makes it abundantly clear that the appointment was temporary and it was also made clear that the service could be put to an end without any notice and at any point of time. It appears that after a period of one year, the services of the respondent no. 1 came to be terminated as the University felt that the services were not required. 3. Being dissatisfied, the respondent no. 1 preferred an application being Application No. 5 of 1996 before the Tribunal. 4. The Tribunal by order dated 23/03/2000 allowed the application. The operative part of the impugned order reads as under:- 42…………..In that case of the circumstances, it clearly appears to me that, action of the University, paying less remuneration to the applicant, is unjustified, and, therefore, University is required to be directed to remuneration, which normally is available to Class-IV employees, on minimum pay scale, to the applicant, after deducting the remuneration, already paid, for the period, for which applicant remained in job, except for one day, i.e. 1.3.95, the day, on which applicant was given artificial break, on which day, he has not worked, on the basis of principle of equal pay for equal work. It clearly appears that, appointment of applicant was against the post sanctioned. I have held in this order that, in absence of otherwise, appointment of the applicant was after following the proper procedure. It appears that, before terminating the services, as mandatory provision of Gujarat Universities Services Tribunal Act, 1983, in the form of section 14(1) is not followed, the termination requires to be held bad in law and is hereby held accordingly. 43. In view of above discussion in this order, the termination order, dtd. 8.12.95, passed by the University, is hereby quashed and set aside. 43. In view of above discussion in this order, the termination order, dtd. 8.12.95, passed by the University, is hereby quashed and set aside. Applicant is hereby ordered to be re-instated in the service by the Opponent-University, from which he was terminated. As it appears clearly from the oral evidence of the applicant that, after his services are terminated, he is not doing any work, and as nothing contrary to the same is established by the University, needless to say that, reinstatement to follow with full back-wages, which are directed to be paid this order. In view of discussion in this order, University is hereby directed to pay the difference of regular salary, to be paid to class-IV employees of opponent-University, at minimum pay scale, with change in the same from time to time after deducting the remuneration already paid to the applicant, from the date, from which applicant entered in the job with the University, except for one day, i.e. 1.3.95 University is hereby further directed permanently, not to make the change in conditions of service of applicant, as adjudicated by this order, till he remains in job, except in accordance with law. In view of above discussion, the matter is hereby allowed to the aforesaid extent. In the facts and circumstances of the case, no order as to costs. In view of section 7(2) of Gujarat Universities Services Tribunal Act, 1983, as the termination order of the applicant is declared as wrong, unlawful and otherwise unjustified by this order, University to comply the direction of reinstatement, given by this order forthwith. 5. Being dissatisfied, the University has come up with this application. 6. Mr. Shelat, the learned counsel appearing for the University submitted that the Tribunal committed a serious error of law in passing the impugned order. Mr. Shelat laid much emphasis on the fact that the appointment of the respondent no. 1 was purely on a temporary basis and as his services were no longer required, the same were put to an end by office order dated 08/12/1995. According to the learned counsel, the University committed a serious error of law in taking the view that the termination was contrary to the Section-14(1) of the Act. He submitted that being a temporary employee, the respondent no. 1 had no right to hold the post and his services could have been terminated at any time without notice. 7. According to the learned counsel, the University committed a serious error of law in taking the view that the termination was contrary to the Section-14(1) of the Act. He submitted that being a temporary employee, the respondent no. 1 had no right to hold the post and his services could have been terminated at any time without notice. 7. In such circumstances referred to above, the learned counsel prays that there being an error apparent on the face of the record, the same deserves to be quashed. 8. On the other hand this application has been vehemently opposed by Mr. Oza, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent no. 1. He submitted that no error, not to speak of any error of law, could be said to have been committed in passing the impugned order. According to him, no interference is warranted in exercise of the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Mr. Oza laid much emphasis on the fact that the Tribunal took notice of the unfair labour practice and rightly condemned the same. He further pointed out that although the appointment was termed as absolutely temporary yet having regard to the number of hours of work and also, the fact that he had worked for about more than one year, the respondent no. 1 could not be termed as a temporary employee. According to Mr. Oza, no interference is warranted and the application deserves to be rejected. 9. In support of his submission Mr. Oza has placed reliance on two decisions of this Court - (i) Mahuva Kelavani Sahayak Samaj v. Rasiklal K. Joshi reported in 1996 (2) G.L.H 269 and (ii) Satsangi Shishuvihar Kelvani Trust v. P.N Patel reported in (1977) 18 GLR 615. 10. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having considered the materials on record, the only question that falls for my consideration is whether the Tribunal committed any error in passing the impugned order. 11. It appears that the Tribunal laboured under a serious misconception of law that the termination of the respondent no. 1 was not in accordance with the Section-14 of the Act. This issue is no longer res-integra in view of the judgment passed by this Court dated 14/07/2016 rendered in the Special Civil Application No. 3199 of 2002. The observations made in paras-10 to 11 are relevant. 1 was not in accordance with the Section-14 of the Act. This issue is no longer res-integra in view of the judgment passed by this Court dated 14/07/2016 rendered in the Special Civil Application No. 3199 of 2002. The observations made in paras-10 to 11 are relevant. Those are elicited as under:- 10. Let me now look into Section 14(1) of the Act, 1983, which reads as under:- “14. (1) No University employee shall be discharged or removed from University service or reduced in rank nor shall his service be otherwise terminated by the University except after an inquiry in which the employee has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges: Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply to a University employee who is appointed temporarily for a period less than a year or an employee appointed temporarily on a leave vacancy for the period of such vacancy.” 11. In my view, the Tribunal fell in serious error in relying on Section 14(1) of the Act, 1983. This issue is squarely covered by a decision of this Court in the case of Gujarat Vidhyapith v. Becharbhai Nagajibhai Bharwad, reported in 2005 (1) G.L.H 236 , wherein a learned Single Judge of this Court has explained the true purport of the provisions of Section 14(1) of the Act, 1983. I may quote the relevant observations:- “10. From the reading of section 14(1) of the said Act, it is clear that it provides that no employee shall be dismissed or removed from University service or reduced in rank nor shall his service be otherwise terminated except after an inquiry in which he has been informed of the changes against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges. In sub-section (2) of section 14, it is provided that no penalty other than the penalty referred to in sub-section (1) shall be imposed unless the employee concerned is given a reasonable opportunity of being heard. Under sub-section (3) of section 14, an aggrieved employee by an order of penalty imposed on him under subsection (1) is permitted to make an appeal to the Tribunal within a period of 30 days from the date of the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority. Under sub-section (3) of section 14, an aggrieved employee by an order of penalty imposed on him under subsection (1) is permitted to make an appeal to the Tribunal within a period of 30 days from the date of the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority. 10.1 It can thus be seen that section 14 of the Gujarat Universities Services Tribunal Act deals with the penal actions of the University against the employee concerned. It is in this context provided that no such action of dismissal, removal from service, reduction in rank or otherwise that of termination be taken except after holding an inquiry informing the employee of the charges against him and giving him a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges. As noted earlier, sub-section (2) of section 14 of the Gujarat Universities Services Tribunal Act provides for penalty other than those envisaged under sub-section (1) of section 14. The order that may be passed by the University under sub-section (1) of section 14 has been made appealable to the Tribunal at the instance of the employee. The entire section, therefore, deals with the action of the University of taking penal action against the employee. While sub-section (1) of section 14 deals with the penal action of dismissal, removal from service or reduction in rank or otherwise terminating the service, sub-section (2) of section 14 deals with imposition of penalty other than those specified in sub-section (1) of section 14. Seen from this angle, in my view, the procedure prescribed under sub-section (1) of section 14 has relevance only for a penal action taken by the University and would not apply to a case where the services of the employee are sought to be terminated by way of simpliciter termination. The words “otherwise terminated” may however pose some difficulty. It can be urged, as has been done by the counsel for the respondent No. 1 that the term “otherwise terminated” must be construed as termination simpliciter and cannot be a penal action proposed by the University. 10.2 In service jurisprudence, term “termination” signifies severance of master and servant relation by an action of the master. When used in juxtaposition to the term “dismissed” or “removed”, it signifies simpliciter termination and not a penal termination. 10.2 In service jurisprudence, term “termination” signifies severance of master and servant relation by an action of the master. When used in juxtaposition to the term “dismissed” or “removed”, it signifies simpliciter termination and not a penal termination. Instances are, however, not unknown nor uncommon where termination is founded on allegations of misconduct and if such terminations are not preceded by an inquiry, have always been struck down by courts as being opposed to the principles of natural justice. Thus, it is not impossible to envisage the action of the employer to terminate the services of the employee by way of penalty. 10.3 In the decision of P.L Dhingra v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 36 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court had while discussing the question of nature of termination whether being simpliciter or punitive made the following observations: “The position may, therefore, be summed up as follows: Any and every termination of service is not a dismissal, removal or reduction in rank. A termination of service brought about by the exercise of a contractual right is not per se dismissal or removal, as has been held by this Court in Satish Chander Anand v. The Union of India (supra). Likewise the termination of service by compulsory retirement in terms of a specific rule regulating the conditions of service is not tantamount to the infliction of a punishment and does not attract Art. 311(2), as has also been held by this Court in Shyam Lal v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, 1995-I SCR 26: ( AIR 1954 SC 369 ). In either of the two abovementioned cases the termination of the service did not carry with it the penal consequences of loss of pay, or allowances under R. 52 of the Fundamental Rules. It is true that the misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualification may be the motive or the inducing factor which influences the Government to take action under the terms of the contract of employment or the specific service rule, nevertheless, if a right exists, under the contract or the rules, to terminate the service the motive, operating on the mind of the Government is, as Chagla C.J has said in Shrinivas Ganesh v. Union of India (supra), wholly irrelevant. In short, if the termination of service is founded on the right flowing from contract or the service rules then, prima facie, the termination is not a punishment and carries with it no evil consequences and so Art.311 is not attracted. But even if the Government has, by contract or under the rules, the right to terminate the employment without going through the procedure prescribed for inflicting the punishment of dismissal or removal or reduction in rank, the Government may, nevertheless, choose to punish the servant and if the termination of service is sought to be founded on misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualification, then it is a punishment and the requirements of Art. 311 must be complied with. As already stated if the servant has got a right to continue in the post, then, unless the contract of employment or the rules provide to the contrary, his services cannot be terminated otherwise than for misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other good and sufficient cause. A termination of the service of such a servant on such grounds must be a punishment and, therefore, a dismissal or removal within Art. 311, for it operates as a forfeiture of his right and he is visited with the evil consequences of loss of pay and allowances. It puts an indelible stigma on the officer affecting his future career. A reduction in rank likewise may be by way of punishment or it may be an innocuous thing.’ If the Government servant has a right to a particular rank, then the very reduction from that rank will operate as a penalty, for he will then lose the emoluments and privileges of that rank. If, however, he has no right to the particular rank, his reduction from an officiating higher rank to his substantive lower rank will not ordinarily be a punishment.” From the above observations, it can be seen that in service jurisprudence concept of penal termination is not unknown. In that view of the matter, one has to interpret the term “otherwise terminated” as appearing in sub-section (1) of section 14 of the Gujarat Universities Services Tribunal Act. Viewed in the context of Section 14 of the said Act, only possible view is that it refers to a penal action of the employer and has no reference to the simpliciter termination sought to be brought about by the University. Viewed in the context of Section 14 of the said Act, only possible view is that it refers to a penal action of the employer and has no reference to the simpliciter termination sought to be brought about by the University. Unless viewed from this angle, the subsequent words appearing in sub-section (1) of section 14 of the said Act, namely, “….. be otherwise terminated by the University except after an inquiry in which the employer has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges” cannot be reconciled. The procedure required to be followed as noticed earlier for dismissal, removal, reduction in rank or termination of the employee is to hold an inquiry in which the employee has been informed of the charges against him and give a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges. Thus, the action has to be preceded by an inquiry in which the employee has been informed of the charges against him and also of giving a reasonable opportunity of being heard with respect to such charges. In light of this clear language of sub-section (1) of section 14 of the said Act, words “otherwise terminated” used in the sub-section cannot be construed as a simpliciter termination and has to be understood as a termination sought to be brought about by the employer by way of a penalty to be imposed against the employee. Sub-section (2) of section 14 further fortifies this position when it provides for a somewhat different procedure to be followed for imposition of penalties other than those referred to in sub-section (1). Thus, reading of sub-section (2) of section 14 also makes it further clear that what is envisaged in sub-section (1) of section 14 of the said Act is a penal action of the employer. Sub-section (3) of section 14 once again provides for an appeal to the Tribunal to an employee who is aggrieved by an order of penalty imposed upon him under sub-section (1) of section 14. Thus, language of sub-section (3) of section 14 of the said Act further lends support to this interpretation since it refers only to the penal action imposed upon the employee under sub-section (1) of section 14. Thus, language of sub-section (3) of section 14 of the said Act further lends support to this interpretation since it refers only to the penal action imposed upon the employee under sub-section (1) of section 14. Viewed from this angle, I have no manner of doubt that the words “otherwise terminated” appearing in sub-section (1) of section 14 of the said Act refer to a penal action of termination proposed to be taken by the employee. 11. In the decision in the case of Reema Aggarwal v. Anupam, (2004) 3 SCC 199 : AIR 2004 SC 1418 , while discussing the principles of interpretation of statute, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has made following observations:- “24. In Reserve Bank of India v. Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd. ( (1987) 1 SCC 424 ) while dealing with the question of interpretation of a statute, this Court observed: “Interpretation must depend on the text and the context. They are the bases of interpretation. One may well say if the text is the texture, context is what gives the colour. Neither can be ignored. Both are important. That interpretation is best which makes the textual interpretation match the contextual. A statute is best interpreted when we know why it was enacted. With this knowledge, the statute must be read, first as a whole and then section by section, clause by clause, phrase by phase and word by word. If a statute is looked at in the context of its enactment, with the glasses of the statute-maker, provided by such context, its scheme, the sections, clauses, phrases and words may take colour and appear different than when the statute is looked at without the glasses provided by the contest. With these glasses we must look at the Act as a whole and discover what each section, each clause, each phrase and each word is meant and designed to say as to fit into the scheme of the entire Act. No part of a statute and no word of a statute can be construed in isolation. Statutes have to be construed so that every word has a place and everything is in its place.” 11.1 In the decision of Prakash Nath Khanna v. IT. Commr. No part of a statute and no word of a statute can be construed in isolation. Statutes have to be construed so that every word has a place and everything is in its place.” 11.1 In the decision of Prakash Nath Khanna v. IT. Commr. 2004 AIR SCW 3692, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that a heading of a section or marginal note may be relied upon to clear any doubt or ambiguity in interpretation of the provision and to discern the legislative intent. 12. Learned advocate for the petitioners has pointed out that in the decision in the case of Bhinka v. Charan Singh, AIR 1959 SC 960 , while considering the effect of the headings prefixed to section or set of sections, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that if there is any doubt in the interpretation of the words in the section, the headings certainly helps the Court to resolve that doubt. 12.1 On the basis of this principle also and considering the heading of Chapter III in which the said section 14 is to be found, one gets added support for the conclusion that section 14(1) of the said Act deals with only the penal actions of the University. 13. Keeping in mind the above judicial pronouncements on the interpretation of the statute, in my view it is now necessary to examine the contention of the learned counsel for the employees whether the provisions of section 14 of the Gujarat Universities Services Tribunal Act are in pari materia with the provisions of section 36 of the Gujarat Secondary Education Act and section 40B of the Bombay Primary Education Act. Section 36 of the Gujarat Secondary Education Act, reads as follows:- “36.(1) No person who is appointed as a headmaster, a teacher or a member of non-teaching staff of a registered private secondary school shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank nor shall his service be otherwise terminated by the manager until – (a) he has been given by the manager a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him, and (b) the action proposed to be taken in regard to him, has been approved in writing by an officer authorised in this behalf by the Board. Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply to any person who is appointed for a temporary period only. Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply to any person who is appointed for a temporary period only. (2) The officer referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (1) shall communicate his decision within a period of forty-five days, from the date of receipt by him of the proposal under the said clause (b) and if such decision is not communicated to the manager by the said officer within such period the action proposed to be taken under the said clause (b) shall be deemed to have been approved by the said officer. (3) Where a head master, a teacher or a member of non-teaching staff of a registered private secondary school is suspended by the manager of the school pending any inquiry proposed to be held against him, the fact of such suspension together with the grounds therefor, shall be immediately communicated by the manager to an officer authorised in this behalf by the Board, and such suspension shall be subject to ratification by the said officer within a period of forty five days from the date of receipt of the communication in this behalf by such officer and if such ratification is not communicated to the manager by the said officer within such period, the suspension under reference shall cease to have effect on the expiry of such period. (4) Where a head master, a teacher or a member of the non-teaching staff of a registered private secondary school desires to submit his resignation, the resignation shall be tendered by him in person to the District Education Officer concerned and shall not be accepted by the manager unless it is so tendered and forwarded to him by such officer duly endorsed. The acceptance of any such resignation tendered in contravention of this sub-section shall be ineffective. The acceptance of any such resignation tendered in contravention of this sub-section shall be ineffective. (5) Any person aggrieved by an order of the authorised officer under clause (b) of sub-section (1) may make an appeal to the Tribunal within a period of thirty days from the date of the decision of the authorised officer.” Section 40-B of the Bombay Primary Education Act reads as follows:- “40B.(1)(a) No teacher of a recognised private primary school shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank nor shall his service be otherwise terminated until – (i) he has been given by the manager an opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him, and (b) the action proposed to be taken in regard to him, has been approved in writing by the administrative officer of the school board in the jurisdiction of which the private primary school is situate: Provided that nothing in this clause shall apply to a teacher who is appointed temporarily for a period less than a year or a teacher appointed temporarily on a leave vacancy for a period less than a year. Explanation - A teacher who is appointed temporarily for a period of less than a year or a teacher who is appointed temporarily on a leave vacancy for a period of such vacancy shall not be deemed to be a teacher appointed temporarily for such period, if he has at any time prior to such appointment served as a teacher either in the same private primary school or in another private primary school under the same management and the aggregate of the period of such post service and the period of service for which he is appointed exceeds one year. (b) The administrative officer shall communicate to the manager of the school in writing his approval or disapproval of the action proposed, within a period of forty five days from the date of the receipt by the administrative officer of such proposal. (2) Where the administrative officer fails to communicate either approval or disapproval within a period of forty five days specified in clause (b) of sub-section (1) the proposed action shall be deemed to have been approved by the administrative officer on the date of the expiry of the said period. (2) Where the administrative officer fails to communicate either approval or disapproval within a period of forty five days specified in clause (b) of sub-section (1) the proposed action shall be deemed to have been approved by the administrative officer on the date of the expiry of the said period. (3) No penalty being the penalty other than that referred to in subsection (1) shall be imposed on a teacher of the private primary school unless such teacher has been given reasonable opportunity of being heard. (4) Where a teacher of a private primary school is suspended by the manager of the school pending any inquiry proposed to be held against him the fact of his suspension together with the grounds therefore shall be communicated within a period of seven days, after such suspension by the manager to the administrative officer of the school board in the jurisdiction of which the school is situate, and such suspension shall be subject to ratification by the administrative officer within a period of forty five days from the date of receipt of communication in this behalf by the administrative officer and if such ratification is not communicated to the manager by the administrative officer within such period, the suspension of such teacher shall cease to have effect on the expiry of the said period: Provided that a teacher shall, during the period of suspension, be entitled to such subsistence allowance, and on such terms and conditions as may be prescribed. (5) Any teacher aggrieved by the order of the administrative officer under sub-clause (ii) of clause (a) of sub-section (1) may make an appeal to the Tribunal within a period of thirty days from the date on which the administrative officer has approved or deemed to have approved the action. (5) Any teacher aggrieved by the order of the administrative officer under sub-clause (ii) of clause (a) of sub-section (1) may make an appeal to the Tribunal within a period of thirty days from the date on which the administrative officer has approved or deemed to have approved the action. Explanation — For the purposes of this section, and section 40C — (a) “manager” in relation to a private primary school means a person or body of persons in charge of the control or of management of the school; (b) “teacher” mans a teacher of a recognised private primary school; (c) “Tribunal” means a Tribunal constituted under section 40F.” One may notice that in sub-section (1) of section 36 of the Gujarat Secondary Education Act, it is provided that no person who is appointed as a head-master, a teacher, or a member of non-teaching staff of a registered private secondary school shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank nor his services be otherwise terminated until (a) he has been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken and (b) the action proposed to be taken has been approved in writing by an officer authorised in this behalf by the Board. Sub-section (5) of section 36 gives any person aggrieved by an order of the authorized officer under clause (b) of sub-section (1) a right to appeal to the Tribunal. 13.1 In clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 40B of the Bombay Primary Education Act, it is provided that no teacher of a recognised private primary school shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank nor his services be otherwise terminated until (a) he has been given an opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken and (b) the action proposed has been approved in writing by the Administrative Officer of the School-Board. Sub-section (5) of section 40B of the Bombay Primary Education Act gives a teacher aggrieved by the order of the Administrative Officer under sub-clause (ii) of clause (a) of sub-section (1) a right of appeal to the Tribunal 13.2 It can thus be seen that sub-section (1) of section 36 of the Gujarat Secondary Education Act and sub-section (1) of section 40B of the Bombay Primary Education Act unlike in the case of sub-section (1) of section 14 of the Gujarat Universities Services Tribunal Act do not refer to requirement of informing the employee of the charges against him nor does it provide for an opportunity of being heard being given in respect of those charges. In my view, the vital difference between the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 14 of the Gujarat Universities Services Tribunal Act on one hand and the relevant provisions of sub-section (1) of section 36 of the Gujarat Secondary Education Act and sub-section (1) of section 40B of the Bombay Primary Education Act on the other is the requirement of informing the employee of the charges against him and being given an opportunity of being heard with respect to those charges as found in sub-section (1) of section 14 of the Gujarat Universities Services Tribunal Act. In my view, this is a material difference and changes the entire complexion of the scheme of the said section. The words “otherwise terminated” have been used in section 14 of the said Act in entirely different context as compared to section 36 of the Gujarat Secondary Education Act and section 40B of the Bombay Primary Education Act. It is, therefore, not possible to interpret the said words ignoring the context in which they are used in the said Act. As noted above, the intention of the Legislature in my view is only to cover the penal actions of the employer under sub-section (1) of section 14 of the Gujarat Universities Services Tribunal Act. In view of this material difference, I find that the provisions of section 14 of the Gujarat Universities Services Tribunal Act are not in pari materia with the provisions of section 36 of the Gujarat Secondary Education Act or section 40B of the Bombay Primary Education Act. 14. In view of this material difference, I find that the provisions of section 14 of the Gujarat Universities Services Tribunal Act are not in pari materia with the provisions of section 36 of the Gujarat Secondary Education Act or section 40B of the Bombay Primary Education Act. 14. In the decision in the case of Babu Khan v. Nazim Khan, (2001) 5 SCC 375 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that “it is not a sound principle of construction to interpret a provision of an enactment following the decisions rendered on a similar provision of an enactment when two statutes are not in parimateria. In the decision in Jagatram Ahuja v. Commr. of Gift Tax, (2000) 8 SCC 249 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has made the following observations:- “23 We find that Kantilal Trikamlal case supports the view taken in Getty Chettiar case. Added to this, Section 2(15) of the Estate Duty Act, defining “property” came up consideration in Kantilal Trikamlal case. We may state here itself that the words and expressions defined in one statute as judicially interpreted do not afford a guide to construction of the same words or expressions in another statute unless both the statutes are pari materia legislations or it is specifically so provided in one statute to give the same meaning to the words as defined in other statute. The main and object of the two legislations, the Gift Tax Act and the Estate Duty Act are not similar.” 15. In view of the above judicial pronouncements and in view of the conclusions that I have reached to the effect that section 14 of the Gujarat Universities Services Tribunal Act is not in pari materia with the provisions of section 36 of the Gujarat Secondary Education Act or section 40B of the Bombay Primary Education Act, it is not possible to follow the decisions of the learned single Judge in the case of Chhaganbhai P. Oza (supra) and Mahuva Kelavani Sahayak Samaj (supra) since the said decisions are rendered in the background of the provisions of section 36 of the Gujarat Secondary Education Act and section 40-B of the Bombay Primary Education Act respectively. 16. 16. It may be noted that in a decision dated 8th March, 1979, rendered by the learned single Judge of this High Court in Special Civil Application No. 652 of 1979 in the case of Sharda Education Trust v. Kiritkumar Chimanlal Shelat, the learned single Judge of this High Court had taken a view that the procedure as laid down in section 36 of the Gujarat Secondary Education Act would have to be followed even in case where termination of a teacher is concerned on account of closure of the school. It may be also be noted that the decision of the learned single Judge was upheld by a Division Bench of this High Court in a decision dated 25.7.79 while dismissing the Letters Patent Appeal No. 174/79. One may also note that finding that the provisions of section 40-B of the Bombay Primary Education Act are in pari materia with the provisions of section 36 of the Gujarat Secondary Education Act, a learned single Judge of this High Court had while disposing of Special Civil Application No. 3271 of 1992 by a judgment dated 29th July, 1994 followed the said view in case of the provisions of section 40-B of the Bombay Primary Education Act also. 17 However, in view of my conclusion that the provisions of Gujarat Universities Services Tribunal Act cannot be compared in this regard with the provisions of other two statutes, it is not possible for me to follow the ratio laid down in the above mentioned decisions which have been rendered in the background of the respective provisions of the Gujarat Secondary Education Act and Bombay Primary Education Act. 18. At this stage, counsel for the employees pointed out from the impugned decision of the Tribunal that the Tribunal had adjudicated only upon a single point of violation of the provisions of section 14 of the said Act and rest of the contentions though raised by the applicants i.e. employees concerned, were not adjudicated upon and liberty was granted to those employees to raise the same in future if necessity arises. 19. 19. In view of my conclusion that the Tribunal had erred in holding that the action of termination of the employees was in violation of the procedure laid down in section 14 of the Gujarat Universities Services Tribunal Act and consequently since I am inclined to set aside the impugned judgment of the Tribunal and as noted above, the Tribunal had not adjudicated upon other contentions of the employees, the matter shall have to be remanded to the Tribunal for further consideration of the remaining surviving contentions raised by the employees.” 12. In view of the settled position of law, the Tribunal committed an error in holding that the action of termination of the respondent no. 1 by the University was in violation of the procedure laid down in Section 14 of the Gujarat Universities Services Tribunal Act. 13. The above takes me to consider whether the respondent no. 1 could be termed as a regular employee of the University. The order of appointment which is at Page-20, dated 11/04/1994 makes it abundantly clear that the same was absolutely temporary. The hours of duty were fixed between 10:30 a.m and 6:10 p.m It was also made clear that the services could be terminated at any point of time without any notice. It also appears that some artificial breaks were given and fresh appointment orders were passed. Ultimately, by office order dated 08/12/1995 the services of the respondent no. 1 were put to an end stating that they were no longer required. 14. In my view, having regard to the nature of the appointment, the respondent no. 1 could not be said to be a regular employee of the University. It is now well-settled that mere long service as an adhoc employee or contractual employee by itself would not confer any legal right to remain on a particular post or even claim regularization. I am conscious of the fact that I am looking into this application in exercise of my supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, but having noticed a very serious error of law, I am left with no other option but to disturb the same. The reliance placed by Mr. Oza on the two decisions referred to above are also of no avail having regard to the peculiar facts of the case and also, the error pointed out by this Court in the impugned order. The reliance placed by Mr. Oza on the two decisions referred to above are also of no avail having regard to the peculiar facts of the case and also, the error pointed out by this Court in the impugned order. 15. I also take notice of the fact that this petition was admitted in the year 2000 and the operation of the impugned order was stayed and has remain stayed till this date. In view of the above, this application succeeds and is hereby allowed. The impugned order passed by the Tribunal is quashed. Rule is made absolute.