Rajeshkumar Nirmalsinh Chauhan v. Chef Officer, Manavadar Nagarpalika
2016-09-01
K.M.THAKER
body2016
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : K.M THAKER, J. When the petitions are called out and taken up for hearing, learned advocate for the petitioner workman is not present. Mr. Devnani, learned advocate for the respondent Nagarpalika is present. 2. In this view of the matter, the Court would have ordinarily dismissed the petition for non-prosecution since final hearing is not attended by the petitioner, however, having regard to the fact that the petitions are pending since 2007, the Court deems it proper to decide the petitions on merits in absence of learned advocate for the petitioner. Therefore, the Court has taken into account the material available on record which includes the statement of claim filed by the workmen before the learned Labour Court, the award and other documents on which the petitioners have placed reliance. 3. In this group of petitions, the petitioners have prayed for identical relief. Therefore, illustratively, the relief prayed for in the lead petition i.e. in Special Civil Application No. 9129 of 2007 is taken into account. In the lead petition, the concerned petitioners have prayed, inter alia, that:- “20(B) The Hon'ble Court may be pleased to allow this Special Civil Application by issuing appropriate writ, order or directions by quashing and setting aside the judgment and order passed by the Ld. Industrial Tribunal in reference case nos. 30 of 2001 & 17 of 2003 dated 12/12/206, and further be pleased to give appropriate directions to the Nagar Palica to send the names of the petitioners for permanent employee of Nagar Palica in the facts and circumstances of the present case. (C) The Hon'ble Court may be pleased to permit the petitioners to file one page separate petition for each of the employees dispensed with the certified/copy of the judgment and annexures in each of the petitions, as the same is annexed in the present petition. (C) Pending admission, hearing and till final disposal of this Special Civil Application, the Hon'ble Court may be pleased to grant stay as to execution, implementation and operation of the judgment and order passed by the Ld. Labour Court, Junagadh in reference case nos. 30 of 2001 & 17 of 2003 in the facts and circumstances of the present case.” 4. At this stage, Mr. Malay Patel, learned advocate for Mr. Dagli, learned advocate for the petitioners, has appeared. The Court has heard learned counsel for the petitioners. 5.
Labour Court, Junagadh in reference case nos. 30 of 2001 & 17 of 2003 in the facts and circumstances of the present case.” 4. At this stage, Mr. Malay Patel, learned advocate for Mr. Dagli, learned advocate for the petitioners, has appeared. The Court has heard learned counsel for the petitioners. 5. By virtue of the relief prayed for in paragraph No. 20(C), the petitioners requested for permission to file formal (one page) petitions in respect of each employees and to dispense with the certified copy of the common award challenged by the petitioners. In pursuance of the said request and order, separate one page petitions came to be filed with identical relief against the same award dated.12.12.2006 6. From above quoted relief, it comes out that the petitioners are aggrieved by the award dated 12.12.2006 passed by the learned Labour Court, Junagadh in Reference No. 30 of 2001 and Reference No. 17 of 2003 whereby the learned Labour Court rejected the reference cases. 7. So far as factual background is concerned, it has emerged from the record and from the submissions by learned advocates that the petitioners herein i.e. original claimants had raised industrial dispute against present respondent Nagarpalika for the claim that their services should be regularized and status of permanent workmen should be conferred to them and benefits of regular and permanent workmen should be granted. The appropriate government referred the dispute for adjudication vide two separate but similar orders of reference dated 13.2.2001 and 30.6.2003 In the award, the learned Labour Court has reproduced the terms of the reference which reads thus:- “Whether the workmen working with the institute namely (1) Shri. Chauhan Rajeshkumar Nirmalsinh (2) Shri. Parmar Shivraj Tapubhai (3) Shri. Jani Vinod Prabhashankar (4) Shri. Jani Hareshkumar Venishankar (5) Shri. Alimohmmed Hajihusain Gajipara (6) C.P Thadani (7) J.M Mehta (8) J.B Jadav (9) N.N Parsania (10) R.A Batvia (11) Ranubha N. Jethva should be made permanent from the date they completed 240 days with retrospective effect and be paid benefit as permanent employees with arrears?” 8. In their statement of claim the workmen/claimants alleged that they were working with the opponent Nagarpalika since 1983 and they were working regularly and continuously without any break.
In their statement of claim the workmen/claimants alleged that they were working with the opponent Nagarpalika since 1983 and they were working regularly and continuously without any break. They also alleged that the work performed by them is of permanent nature, however, the opponent employer has not conferred status of permanent workmen though certain benefits of permanent workmen including salary at par with the permanent workmen are extended to them. On such premise and on such allegations the claimants raised dispute. 9. The opponent Nagarpalika opposed the reference and the demand by the claimants. The Nagarpalika filed its reply and opposed the demand on the ground that the claimants are not entitled for status of permanent workmen. It appears from the reply filed by the municipality that the workmen had filed civil suit wherein learned Labour Court had directed the Nagarpalika that it should not terminate service of the claimant without following prescribed procedure. The Nagarpalika also claimed that according to Section 47 of the Gujarat Municipalities Act, the decision with regard to appointment, superannuation, termination etc. of the employees has to be taken by the government and that the workmen were engaged without following procedure prescribed for recruitment which was followed in case of the claimants. It was also claimed that according to prescribed procedure the employee can be appointed only after inviting applications by issuing public advertisement and after proper selection/interview and the employee must undergo the process of selection, probation etc. It was claimed that the claimants have not undergone such procedure and that therefore they cannot be treated permanent workman or status of permanency cannot be conferred to them. It was also contended that the Nagarpalika has not issued any appointment orders to the claimants and they have failed to place any evidence on record to establish that they have been appointed by the competent authority of the panchayat. The claimants were engaged illegally and merely because they continued in service for long time they do not have any right to claim for status of permanent workmen. 10. At the time of hearing learned advocate for the petitioners submitted that he is recently informed that petitioner No. 7 died in April 2016 and that, therefore, the heirs/legal representatives of the said petitioner No. 7 are required to be impleaded as party respondent.
10. At the time of hearing learned advocate for the petitioners submitted that he is recently informed that petitioner No. 7 died in April 2016 and that, therefore, the heirs/legal representatives of the said petitioner No. 7 are required to be impleaded as party respondent. Learned advocate for the petitioners tendered copy of the Death Certificate issued by Nagarpalika in the name of Mr. J.M Mehta, i.e. petitioner No. 7. In view of the said submission by learned advocate for the petitioners, instead of adjourning final hearing of the petitions which are pending since 9 years it is clarified that the heirs/representatives are deemed to have been impleaded to this proceeding and for all practical purposes the proceedings are deemed to have been prosecuted by the heirs/legal representatives of petitioner No. 7 (since deceased). However, so as to complete the formality learned advocate for the petitioners is allowed time until 30.9.2016 to complete the procedure in accordance with the Rules for impleading the heirs of petitioner No. 7. 11. Learned advocate for the workmen submitted that the petitioners have been working with the Nagarpalika since more than 15 years. He also submitted that actually, the Nagarpalika has already extended the benefits to the petitioners at par with permanent employees and that almost all the benefits at par with permanent employees are made available to the petitioners, the benefit of status of permanent workmen is denied to the claimants/petitioners. He also submitted that actually, the Nagarpalika needs services of the claimants and therefore, the claimants have been continued in service. He also referred to Resolution No. 82 passed on 20.3.1983, wherein the Nagarpalika acknowledged the fact that there are vacancies on the sanctioned set up, wherein the services of the claimants can be regularized. He also submitted that the resolution passed by the Nagarpalika is even forwarded to the State Government, however, any final decision is not taken and in view of such delay in taking final decision, the benefit of status of permanent workmen is denied to the petitioners.
He also submitted that the resolution passed by the Nagarpalika is even forwarded to the State Government, however, any final decision is not taken and in view of such delay in taking final decision, the benefit of status of permanent workmen is denied to the petitioners. Learned advocate for the petitioners submitted that the petitioners are eligible as well as entitled for the status of permanent workman in service and the demand raised by the petitioners are justified, however, the learned Labour Court failed to appreciate the fact that the claimants are working with the Nagarpalika since more than 15 years and all benefits for permanent work are extended to them and now there is no justification to deny the said benefit. 12. Learned advocate for the Nagarpalika opposed the submissions by the claimants and also opposed the petitions. He supported the award passed by the learned Labour Court and submitted that the learned Labour Court has not committed any error in rejecting the reference. He, in particular, relied on the observations by the learned Tribunal in paragraph No. 14 of the award which are extracted from the decision by the Full Bench in the case of Amreli Nagarpalika v. G.P.M.E Union [ 2004 (3) GLR 33 ]. He also submitted that neither the appointments were made in accordance with the prescribed procedure nor the appointments are sanctioned by the Director of Municipalities. He also submitted that the learned Labour Court has taken into consideration the resolution on which the claimants relied and the fact that the resolution itself is disputed by the Nagarpalika and therefore, any benefit cannot be derived from the resolution nor any right can be created on strength of the resolution. 13. I have considered the submissions by learned advocates for the petitioners and the respondents. I have also considered the material available on record and I have also examined the award passed by the learned Labour Court. 14.
13. I have considered the submissions by learned advocates for the petitioners and the respondents. I have also considered the material available on record and I have also examined the award passed by the learned Labour Court. 14. At the outset, it is relevant to note and mention that in the reference case, the learned Labour Court had earlier passed an award on 1.5.2004 whereby the learned Labour Court at Junagadh had granted claim raised by the petitioners and the learned Labour Court had directed the petitioner Nagarpalika to treat the claimants-petitioners as permanent employees with effect from 1.4.1983 The said award dated 1.5.2004 passed by the learned Labour Court in Reference No. 30 of 2001 was challenged by the Nagarpalika in writ petition, i.e. Special Civil Application No. 10335 of 2004. This Court partly allowed the petition vide order dated 19.1.2006 The relevant part of the order reads thus: “2. The short facts of the case are that the respondents were working with the petitioner Nagarpalika. By way of charter of demands the respondents submitted demands to give all the benefits with retrospective effect and status of permanent servants. The respondents thereafter raised a dispute which was referred to the Labour Court and ultimately the Labour Court passed the aforesaid award. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that there is no permanent post vacant in the set up of the petitioner Municipality and the petitioner cannot employ any person without previous sanction of the appropriate authority. Learned counsel has also relied upon a decision of this Court in the case of Amreli Municipality v. G.P.M.E Union, reported in 2004 (2) GLH 692 wherein it is held that Labour Courts/Industrial Tribunals cannot issue direction conferring benefits of permanency or regularization when recruitment in the local body has been made dehors the recruitment rules. 5. As a result of hearing and perusal of the record, I am of the view that the Tribunal has not considered whether permanent posts are available or not. In view of the decision in the case of Amreli Municipality (supra) the impugned award is required to be quashed and set aside and the matter is required to be remanded to the Tribunal for fresh decision. 6. In the premises aforesaid, the impugned award is quashed and set aside.
In view of the decision in the case of Amreli Municipality (supra) the impugned award is required to be quashed and set aside and the matter is required to be remanded to the Tribunal for fresh decision. 6. In the premises aforesaid, the impugned award is quashed and set aside. The matter is remanded to the Labour Court for fresh decision in accordance with the principles laid down in the aforesaid decision. Since the matter is old, the Tribunal shall hear and decide the reference within a period of 9 months from the date of receipt of writ of this Court. It will be open to the parties to raise all the contentions including with regard to the Resolution of the Board in question. The status quo as on today will continue till the disposal of the Reference. Rule is made absolute accordingly with no order as to costs.” 15. Accordingly, the reference case was remanded by this Court and thereafter the learned Labour Court passed fresh award which is impugned in present petition. 16. The claimants demanded that they should be confirmed status of permanent workmen from the date when they completed services for 240 days i.e. with retrospective effect. The claimants also claimed consequential benefits with retrospective effect. 17. From the case put up by the claimants before the learned Labour Court, it appears that the Nagarpalika has already extended benefits (monetary benefits) of permanent workmen to the claimants and they are being paid salary and other benefits at par with permanent employees. The said fact is admitted by the claimants in paragraph No. 3 of their statement of claim. 18. From the material available on record, it appears that the claimants came to be appointed by virtue of the resolution said to have been passed on 28.3.1983 In view of the provisions under the Gujarat Municipalities Act, the employees on sanctioned/permanent set up of the Nagarpalika cannot be appointed merely by resolution and without following procedure prescribed under the Rules. It is an undisputed fact that the petitioners have not undergone and not passed through the selection process by competing with other suitable and eligible candidates. It also does not appear from the record that the Nagarpalika had invited applications for said posts (on which the claimants have been engaged and have been working since long time) for recruiting employees.
It is an undisputed fact that the petitioners have not undergone and not passed through the selection process by competing with other suitable and eligible candidates. It also does not appear from the record that the Nagarpalika had invited applications for said posts (on which the claimants have been engaged and have been working since long time) for recruiting employees. From the record it also does not come out that the Nagarpalika had invited names from the employment exchange by filling up the vacant posts on sanctioned establishment and that the names of the petitioners were sponsored by the employment exchange. 19. From the record, it also does not come out that the competent authority of the respondent Nagarpalika, who is duly authorized to grant appointment on any post in the Nagarpalika, had issued appointment orders. Differently put, there is nothing on record to demonstrate that the petitioners have been appointed by virtue of the appointment orders issued by the competent authority. 19.1 In this regard, the learned Labour Court has taken into account oral as well as documentary evidence available on record. 19.2 The learned Labour Court has recorded the submissions by the representative of the claimants. From the submissions made on behalf of the claimants, it appears that at one stage it was contended that they are appointed by way of resolution dated 28.3.1983, whereas at other stage the claimants had contended that the Nagarpalika passed resolution on 28.3.1983 to consider the claimants as permanent workmen from the date of joining. It is needless to mention that in view of the provisions under the Act, the resolution, of either nature/effect, is untenable and such resolution neither creates any right in favour of the employees nor any obligation to the Nagarpalika. 19.3 From the award, it has also emerged that the learned Labour Court has also taken into account the case of the claimants that since monetary benefits at par with permanent employees are already granted with the petitioners, if status of permanency is conferred, then the Nagarpalika will not have to bear any extra burden.
19.3 From the award, it has also emerged that the learned Labour Court has also taken into account the case of the claimants that since monetary benefits at par with permanent employees are already granted with the petitioners, if status of permanency is conferred, then the Nagarpalika will not have to bear any extra burden. 19.4 The learned Labour Court has also taken into consideration the submissions on behalf of the Nagarpalika including the submission that when the claimants were appointed, there was no sanctioned set up and at the time of demand or subsequently, any vacancy on permanent set up where the petitioners can be accommodated, does not exist. The learned Labour Court also took into consideration the submissions by the Nagarpalika that the petitioners are engaged as daily wagers and therefore, they do not have any right in law to claim permanency. The Nagarpalika heavily relied on the decision by the Full Bench in Amreli Nagarpalika (supra). The learned Labour Court took into consideration the observations by the Full Bench on the said judgment, more particularly the observation in paragraph No. 12 of the judgment. In paragraphs No. 15 to 18 of the award, the learned Labour Court has recorded and observed that: “15. Considering cross-examination of the workman examined by the union, it is admitted that the workmen were appointed as daily rated workmen. It is also stated during cross examination that the witness did not know that the sanction of the Director was necessary to recruit permanent employee. 16. It comes out from chief examination of the management witness examined at ex.24, that the workmen were daily rated employees prior to 1983 he has stated that a resolution was passed in the institute to make them permanent. However, a dispute arose due to the resolution passed. Therefore, disputes were raised in Civil Courts as well as High Court. He has stated that if the institute wishes to recruit, sanction of the director has to be sought. The workmen were not recruited according to rules. 17. Therefore, considering the evidence of both the parties it appears that the present workers' initial appointments were as daily rated. It is not the case of the workmen that their posts were sanctioned by the Director of the Municipalities previously.
The workmen were not recruited according to rules. 17. Therefore, considering the evidence of both the parties it appears that the present workers' initial appointments were as daily rated. It is not the case of the workmen that their posts were sanctioned by the Director of the Municipalities previously. Before creating a post of officer or a servant of the Municipality, previous sanction of Director of Municipalities is mandatory condition which is known as “sanctioned set up” of the Municipality. Therefore, initial recruitment of the present workmen was de hors of the rules and therefore, according to me, the appointments of the workmen is illegal per se. 18. I Therefore, the appointment of the workmen being illegal, it would amount to regularization of back door entries which had vitiated from the very inception. As held by the Apex Court in Ashwinkumar's case, services of employees who have continued for long time can be regularized provided the initial entry must be made against available vacancies by following rules and regulations governing such industry.” 19.5 The learned Labour Court also considered the resolution dated 20.3.1983 and recorded that the resolution itself is disputed. When the resolution itself is in dispute, it does not create any right in favour of the claimants. 19.6 At this stage, it would be appropriate to take into account the observations by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Umadevi [ (2006) 4 SCC 1 ], wherein Hon'ble Apex Court has observed that: “45. While directing that appointments, temporary or casual, be regularized or made permanent, courts are swayed by the fact that the concerned person has worked for some time and in some cases for a considerable length of time. It is not as if the person who accepts an engagement either temporary or casual in nature, is not aware of the nature of his employment. He accepts the employment with eyes open. It may be true that he is not in a position to bargain not at arms length since he might have been searching for some employment so as to eke out his livelihood and accepts whatever he gets. But on that ground alone, it would not be appropriate to jettison the constitutional scheme of appointment and to take the view that a person who has temporarily or casually got employed should be directed to be continued permanently.
But on that ground alone, it would not be appropriate to jettison the constitutional scheme of appointment and to take the view that a person who has temporarily or casually got employed should be directed to be continued permanently. By doing so, it will be creating another mode of public appointment which is not permissible. If the court were to void a contractual employment of this nature on the ground that the parties were not having equal bargaining power, that too would not enable the court to grant any relief to that employee. A total embargo on such casual or temporary employment is not possible, given the exigencies of administration and if imposed, would only mean that some people who at least get employment temporarily, contractually or casually, would not be getting even that employment when securing of such employment brings at least some succor to them. After all, innumerable citizens of our vast country are in search of employment and one is not compelled to accept a casual or temporary employment if one is not inclined to go in for such an employment. It is in that context that one has to proceed on the basis that the employment was accepted fully knowing the nature of it and the consequences flowing from it. In other words, even while accepting the employment, the person concerned knows the nature of his employment. It is not an appointment to a post in the real sense of the term. The claim acquired by him in the post in which he is temporarily employed or the interest in that post cannot be considered to be of such a magnitude as to enable the giving up of the procedure established, for making regular appointments to available posts in the services of the State. The argument that since one has been working for some time in the post, it will not be just to discontinue him, even though he was aware of the nature of the employment when he first took it up, is not (sic) one that would enable the jettisoning of the procedure established by law for public employment and would have to fail when tested on the touchstone of constitutionality and equality of opportunity enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution. 47.
47. When a person enters a temporary employment or gets engagement as a contractual or casual worker and the engagement is not based on a proper selection as recognized by the relevant rules or procedure, he is aware of the consequences of the appointment being temporary, casual or contractual in nature. Such a person cannot invoke the theory of legitimate expectation for being confirmed in the post when an appointment to the post could be made only by following a proper procedure for selection and in concerned cases, in consultation with the Public Service Commission. Therefore, the theory of legitimate expectation cannot be successfully advanced by temporary, contractual or casual employees. It cannot also be held that the State has held out any promise while engaging these persons either to continue them where they are or to make them permanent. The State cannot constitutionally make such a promise. It is also obvious that the theory cannot be invoked to seek a positive relief of being made permanent in the post.” 20. Subsequently, in the decision in the case of Hari Nandan Prasad v. Employer I/R to Management of FCI [ (2014) 7 SCC 190 : AIR 2014 SC 1848 ], Hon'ble Apex Court has observed that though the learned Labour Court can examine cases in light of the provisions under the Industrial Disputes Act and in cases where unfair labour practice is alleged and established, then in such cases the learned Labour Court may pass appropriate direction and the decision in the case of Umadevi (supra) would not come in way of the learned Tribunal in passing appropriate direction in such cases. In the said decision in the case of Hari Nandan Prasad (supra), Hon'ble Apex Court observed that: “22. It is clear from the above that the Court emphasized the underline message contained in Umadevi's case to the effect that regularization of a daily wager, which has not been appointed after undergoing the proper selection procedure etc. is impermissible as it was violative of Art.14 of the Constitution of India and this principle predicated on Art.14 would apply to the industrial tribunal as well inasmuch as there cannot be any direction to regularize the services of a workman in violation of Art.14 of the Constitution.
is impermissible as it was violative of Art.14 of the Constitution of India and this principle predicated on Art.14 would apply to the industrial tribunal as well inasmuch as there cannot be any direction to regularize the services of a workman in violation of Art.14 of the Constitution. As we would explain hereinafter, this would mean that the industrial court would not issue a direction for regularizing the service of a daily wage worker in those cases where such regularization would tantamount to infringing the provisions of Art.14 of the Constitution. But for that, it would not deter the Industrial Tribunals/Labour Courts from issuing such direction, which the industrial adjudicators otherwise possess, having regard to the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act specifically conferring such powers. This is recognized by the Court even in the aforesaid judgment.” (Emphasis supplied) 20.1 In the same decision, Hon'ble Apex Court further observed that: “25. Detailed reasons are given in support of the conclusion stating that the MRTU and PULP Act provides for and empowers the Industrial/Labour Courts to decide about the unfair labour practice committed/being committed by any person and to declare a particular practice to be unfair labour practice if it so found and also to direct such person ceased and desist from unfair labour practice. The provisions contained in Section 30 giving such a power to the Industrial and Labour Courts vis-? is the ratio of Uma Devi are explained by the Court in the following terms: “The power given to the Industrial and Labour Courts under Section 30 is very wide and the affirmative action mentioned therein is inclusive and not exhaustive. Employing badlis, casuals or temporaries and to continue them as such for years, with the object of depriving them of the status and privileges of permanent employees is an unfair labour practice on the part of the employer under Item 6 of Schedule IV. Once such unfair labour practice on the part of the employer is established in the complaint, the Industrial and Labour Courts are empowered to issue preventive as well as positive direction to an erring employer. The provisions of the MRTU and PULP Act and the powers of the Industrial and Labour Courts provided therein were not at all under consideration in Umadevi.
The provisions of the MRTU and PULP Act and the powers of the Industrial and Labour Courts provided therein were not at all under consideration in Umadevi. As a matter of fact, the issue like the present one pertaining to unfair labour practice was not at all referred to, considered or decided in Umadevi. Unfair labour practice on the part of the employer in engaging employees as badlis, casuals or temporaries and to continue them as such for years with the object of depriving them of the status and privileges of permanent employees as provided in Item 6 of Schedule IV and the power of the Industrial and Labour Courts under Section 30 of the Act did not fall for adjudication or consideration before the Constitution Bench. Umadevi does not denude the Industrial and Labour Courts of their statutory power under Section 30 read with Section 32 of the MRTU and PULP Act to order permanency of the workers who have been victims of unfair labour practice on the part of the employer under Item 6 of Schedule IV where the posts on which they have been working exist. Umadevi cannot be held to have overridden the powers of the Industrial and Labour Courts in passing appropriate order under Section 30 of the MRTU and PULP Act, once unfair labour practice on the part of the employer under Item 6 of Schedule IV is established.” 20.2 Having thus clarified legal position, Hon'ble Apex Court also added word with caution with the observation that: “34. On harmonious reading of the two judgments discussed in detail above, we are of the opinion that when there are posts available, in the absence of any unfair labour practice the Labour Court would not give direction for regularization only because a worker has continued as daily wage worker/ad hoc/temporary worker for number of years. Further, if there are no posts available, such a direction for regularization would be impermissible. In the aforesaid circumstances giving of direction to regularize such a person, only on the basis of number of years put in by such a worker as daily wager etc. may amount to backdoor entry into the service which is an anathema to Art.14 of the Constitution. Further, such a direction would not be given when the concerned worker does not meet the eligibility requirement of the post in question as per the Recruitment Rules.
may amount to backdoor entry into the service which is an anathema to Art.14 of the Constitution. Further, such a direction would not be given when the concerned worker does not meet the eligibility requirement of the post in question as per the Recruitment Rules. However, wherever it is found that similarly situated workmen are regularized by the employer itself under some scheme or otherwise and the workmen in question who have approached Industrial/Labour Court are at par with them, direction of regularization in such cases may be legally justified, otherwise, non-regularization of the left over workers itself would amount to invidious discrimination qua them in such cases and would be violative of Art.14 of the Constitution. Thus, the Industrial adjudicator would be achieving the equality by upholding Art. 14, rather than violating this constitutional provision.” 20.3 Thus, in the same decision, Hon'ble Apex Court also observed that unless regular vacancy exists on permanent and sanctioned set up of the Nagarpalika/Municipality the learned Labour Court would refrain from passing any order directing the Nagarpalika/Municipality to regularize services of the daily wagers. 21. When the final decision by the learned Labour Court is examined in light of the above quoted observations by Hon'ble Apex Court and also in light of the decision in the case of Umadevi (supra) and in the case of Amreli Nagarpalika (supra), then the final decision by the learned Labour Court cannot be faulted. 21.1 In this view of the matter, there is no reason or justification to interfere with the impugned award passed by the learned Labour Court in Reference No. 30 of 2001 and Reference No. 17 of 2003. The learned Labour Court has not committed any error or illegality in the award. 21.2 The observations and final conclusion by the learned Labour Court based on evidence available on record. The final decision by the learned Labour Court cannot be said to be perverse or contrary to evidence available on record. Learned advocate for the petitioners has failed to make out any ground to take different view than the view recorded by the learned Labour Court in the impugned award and/or to interfere with the final decision of the learned Labour Court. 21.3 Therefore, the petitions fail and deserve to be rejected and are accordingly rejected. The award passed by the learned Labour Court is confirmed. 22.
21.3 Therefore, the petitions fail and deserve to be rejected and are accordingly rejected. The award passed by the learned Labour Court is confirmed. 22. However, in light of facts discussed above all that this Court can observe, while dismissing the petitions, is that the award passed by the learned Labour Court or present judgment will not stand in way of Nagarpalika to consider the cases of the petitioners for permanency in accordance with the provisions under the Gujarat Municipalities Act and applicable Rules after taking into account the prescribed eligibility criteria for respective posts as and when vacancy on the permanent set up arises. It is further clarified that the above observations are not to be construed to mean that the Nagarpalika would be obliged to consider the cases of the claimants irrespective of the prescribed eligibility criteria and/or even if any vacancy on permanent posts/sanctioned set up does not exist. 23. With the aforesaid clarifications and observations, the petitions are disposed of. Orders accordingly. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent.