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2016 DIGILAW 190 (JHR)

Mahendra Nath Maity @ Satyendranath Maiti v. State of Jharkhand

2016-01-22

RONGON MUKHOPADHYAY

body2016
ORDER : 1. In this application, the petitioner has prayed for quashing the entire criminal proceedings in connection with B.F. Case No. 05 of 2004 (P.C. No. 69 of 2003-04) including the order dated 23.2.2004 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, Dhanbad, by which cognizance has taken for the offence punishable u/s 33 Indian Forest Act ('the Act' for short). 2. The allegation made in the prosecution report is to the effect that on account of storage of water by Damodar Valley Corporation (D.V.C.), Maithan as also increase of water level at a rapid speed, vast area of the forest land became submerged in the water, resulting in the plantation work and the trench fencing damaged. Pursuant to the offence report of the Forester and on making a survey it was detected that Plot No. 2345 of Dulalsol village and Plot No. 01 of Gagna village which was notified as forest land along with 15 acres of other notified forest land had been flooded. Based on the aforesaid allegations, B.F. Case No. 05 of 2004 was instituted against the petitioners for the offence punishable u/s 33 of the Indian Forest Act. 3. Heard Mr. Satish Kumar Ughal, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners and Mr. Arun Kumar Pandey, learned A.P.P. for the State. 4. Mr. Satish Kumar Ughal, learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the petitioners were the officials of the D.V.C., Maithan at the relevant point of time and there is no specific allegation that it was the petitioners who are responsible for getting the forest land submerged in water, causing damage to the plantation work as well as the trench fencing. Learned counsel further submits that in fact the land in question was acquired under the land Acquisition Act, 1894 for the D.V.C. vide memorandum of agreement dated 29.9.53 whereas the the Forest Department claims the submerged lands to have been declared and notified as a protected forest in the year 1964. Learned counsel further submits that since there is apparently a dispute between the D.V.C. and the Forest Department of the State Government, the appropriate course would have been to refer the case for for arbitration u/s 49 of the Damodar Valley Corporation Act 1948, but instead of taking recourse to such process the forest officials had hastely instituted a criminal case. It has further been submitted that the petitioners being the officials of the D.V.C. cannot be made vicariously liable for any omissions and commissions caused or with respect to a criminal offence under the Act as vicarious liability does not find place in Section 33 of the Act. It has therefore, been submitted that the entire criminal proceedings as against the petitioners deserves to be quashed and set aside. 5. At this Mr. Arun Kumar Pandey, learned A.P.P. appearing for the State has submitted that on account of flooding and storing of water by the D.V.C., plantations made and trench fencing done, has been totally damaged and since the area falls within the protected forest, the petitioners being the officials of the D.V.C. are directly responsible for such offence and therefore they be directed to face trial. 6. The question of vicarious liability has been given much emphasis by the learned counsel for the petitioners and to consider such contention it would be apt to refer to Section 33 of the Act which quoted hereunder:- "33. Penalties for acts in contravention of notification under section 30 or of rules under section 32.- (1) Any person who commits any of the following offences, namely:- (a) fells, girdles, lops, taps or burns any tree reserved under section 30, or strips off the bark or leaves from, or otherwise damages, any such tree; (b) contrary to any prohibition under section 30, quarries any stone, or burns any lime or charcoal or collects, subjects to any manufacturing process, or removes any forest-produce; (c) contrary to any provision under section 30, breaks up or clears for cultivation or any other purpose any land in any protected forest; (d) sets fire to such forest, or kindles a fire without taking all reasonable precautions to prevent its spreading to any tree reserved under section 30, whether standing fallen or felled, or to say closed portion of such forest; (e) leaves burning any fire kindled by him in the vicinity of any such tree or closed portion; (f) fells any tree or drags any timber so as to damage any tree reserved as aforesaid; (g) permits cattle to damage any such tree; (h) infringes any rule made under section 32; shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with both. (2) Whenever fire is caused willfully or by gross negligence in a protected forest, the State Government may, notwithstanding that any penalty has been inflicted under this section, direct that in such forest or any portion thereof the exercise of any right of pasture or to forest produce shall be suspended for such period as it thinks fit." A plain reading of Section 33 of the Act clearly discloses that there is no provision of vicarious liability present. In this context reference may be made to the case of Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Company Limited and Anr v. Datar Switchgear Limited and Ors. reported in 2010(1) SCC 479, wherein it was held as follows:- 30. It is trite law that wherever by a legal fiction the principle of vicarious liability is attracted and a person who is otherwise not personally involved in the commission of an offence is made liable for the same, it has to be specifically provided in the statute concerned. In our opinion, neither Section 192, IPC nor Section 199, IPC incorporate the principle of vicarious liability, and therefore, it was incumbent on the complainant to specifically aver the role of each of the accused in the complaint. It would be profitable to extract the following observations made in S.K. Alagh { (2008) 5 SCC 662 (p.667, Para 19)}." 19. As, admittedly, drafts were drawn in the name of the company even if the appellant was its Managing Director, he cannot be said to have committed an offence under Section 406 of the penal Code. If and when a statute contemplates creation of such a legal fiction, it provides specifically therefore. In absence of any provision laid down under the statute, a Director of a company or an employee cannot be held to be vicariously liable for any offence committed by the company itself." (Emphasis supplied) 7. Admittedly, the prosecution report reflects that on account of storage of water by the D.V.C., plantation work and trench fencing had been damaged. There is no specific allegation in the prosecution report against the petitioners. Admittedly, the prosecution report reflects that on account of storage of water by the D.V.C., plantation work and trench fencing had been damaged. There is no specific allegation in the prosecution report against the petitioners. In the absence of any specific provision u/s 33 of the Indian Forest Act with respect to vicarious liability and there being no specific allegation against the petitioners in the prosecution report in respect of a forest case taking of cognizance u/s 33 of the Indian Forest Act is totally illegal and the same cannot be sustained in the eyes of law. 8. Accordingly, as a cumulative result of the discussions made herein above, this application is allowed and the entire criminal proceedings in connection with B.F. Case No. 05 of 2004 (P.C. No. 69 of 2003-04) including the order dated 23.2.2004 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, Dhanbad, by which cognizance has taken for the offence punishable u/s 33 Indian Forest Act is hereby quashed and set aside.