JUDGMENT : Both the Original Petitions arise on similar circumstances, from two separate orders, both dated 21.01.2015; in appeals disposed of by the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Ernakulam (Kerala and Lakshadweep) (for brevity “DRT”), produced as Exhibit P5 in the respective Original Petitions; in Appeal Nos.4 of 2013 and 3 of 2013. The 1st petitioners in both the Original Petitions, borrowers from the very same Bank, are two different firms; represented by a husband and wife, who are 2nd and 3rd petitioners in both the Original Petitions and their son, the 4th respondent in O.P.(DRT) No.12 of 2015; being the partners of the two firms. The purchaser also is the very same individual, who is impleaded as the 2nd respondent in both the Original Petitions. 2. The sale challenged before the DRT arises from DRC Nos.395/SBT and 517/SBT, of three properties, all situated in Kunnamkulam Village, Thalappilly Taluk, Thrissur District. Three different properties were sold, one under DRC 395/SBT and the other two under DRC 517/SBT. But for the separate proceedings the proclamation of sale and the other proceedings leading to the sale were on identical dates and the facts are similar. The orders of the DRT produced in the respective Original Petitions, proceed on identical lines, detailing the entire facts, which indicate the identical circumstances under which the sale was proceeded with, and hence one of the said Original Petitions can be referred to for convenience. O.P.(DRT) No.11 of 2015, hence, is taken as the lead case, from which the facts and documents are referred to. 3. The preliminary issue raised by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Bank and the learned counsel appearing for the auction purchaser is as to the maintainability of the Original Petition for reason of there being an appellate remedy provided under the Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 [for brevity “RDDB Act”]. The respondents would rely on Punjab National Bank v. O.C. Krishnan ( (2001) 6 SCC 569 ) and United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tandon (2010) 8 SCC 110 to urge this Court to relegate the petitioners to the appellate remedy. 4. O.C. Krishnan (supra) was a case in which a suit filed by the creditor Bank was transferred to the DRT and the DRT decreed the same. 4. O.C. Krishnan (supra) was a case in which a suit filed by the creditor Bank was transferred to the DRT and the DRT decreed the same. On the Recovery Officer proceeding to sell the hyothecated plant and machinery, the guarantors, whose property was mortgaged, approached the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution and the High Court of Calcutta, finding that the properties are situated in Chennai, held the DRT to have no territorial jurisdiction. The Hon'ble Supreme Court found that the High Court ought not to have exercised the jurisdiction under Article 227 in view of the alternate remedy contained in the Act. Satyawati Tandon (supra) was a case in which the mortgagor/guarantor filed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution against a notice issued under Section 13(4) of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (or brevity “SARFAESI Act”). The Hon'ble Supreme Court found that the High Court has overlooked the settled law that a petition under Article 226 would not be entertained if an alternate remedy is available to the aggrieved person. 5. On a reading of the order cited first and the judgment second cited, no departure is discernible from the settled law as laid down by a three Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of H.P. v. Gujarat Ambuja Cement Ltd. ( (2005) 6 SCC 499 ). The Hon'ble Supreme Court had recognized and succinctly stated the instances where despite the alternate remedy, the High Court could invoke the extra-ordinary jurisdiction. “22. ... There are two well-recognised exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of statutory remedies. First is when the proceedings are taken before the forum under a provision of law which is ultra vires, it is open to a party aggrieved thereby to move the High Court for quashing the proceedings on the ground that they are incompetent without a party being obliged to wait until those proceedings run their full course. Secondly, the doctrine has no application when the impugned order has been made in violation of the principles of natural justice. We may add that where the proceedings itself are an abuse of process of law the High Court in an appropriate case can entertain a writ petition. 23. Secondly, the doctrine has no application when the impugned order has been made in violation of the principles of natural justice. We may add that where the proceedings itself are an abuse of process of law the High Court in an appropriate case can entertain a writ petition. 23. Where under a statute there is an allegation of infringement of fundamental rights or when on the undisputed facts the taxing authorities are shown to have assumed jurisdiction which they do not possess can be the grounds on which the writ petitions can be entertained. But normally, the High Court should not entertain writ petitions unless it is shown that there is something more in a case, something going to the root of the jurisdiction of the officer, something which would show that it would be a case of palpable injustice to the writ petitioner to force him to adopt the remedies provided by the statute. ...”. 6. Herein, it is to be noticed that the contention raised is with respect to the illegality occasioned in the proceedings for sale which goes to the root of the matter and if found favour with, would result in the sale itself being set aside. Such illegality is pointed out on the compelling grounds of violation of statutory provisions, and the sale having been conducted by an officer not empowered to so act. The allegation is with respect to a clear abuse of process and the tribunal which considered the initial appeal has dealt with the facts in a comprehensive manner, which does not raise any dispute or call for any resolution on facts. Further, it is to be noticed that the Appellate Tribunal at Chennai does not have a Presiding Officer and that at Bombay has temporary charge of the Tribunal at Chennai. This fortifies the contention that as of now there is no efficacious remedy available to the petitioners, who are the borrowers. The respondent-Bank also despairingly points out to this Court that a decree of the year 2000 is sought to be realized and it is with much difficulty that the respondent-Bank has now effectuated the recovery through the impugned sale proceedings. 7. The respondent-Bank also despairingly points out to this Court that a decree of the year 2000 is sought to be realized and it is with much difficulty that the respondent-Bank has now effectuated the recovery through the impugned sale proceedings. 7. Considering all these aspects as also looking at the order of the DRT, which elaborately discussed the matter after looking into the records of the Recovery Officer, and also keeping in mind the principles governing the deviation from the rule of self-restrain in invoking the power under Art 226 or 227, even in the context of an available efficacious alternate remedy; this Court is satisfied that this is a case were the same is necessitated. Essentially what is to be looked at is the interpretation of Rules under the Second Schedule to the Income Tax Act, 1961 [for brevity “Schedule II” and“IT Act”], which has been incorporated in the RDDB Act for purposes of recovery under Section 29. There are no disputed questions of facts and the Tribunal has scanned the proceedings of the sale proceeded with at the office of the Recovery Officer minutely and has also extracted it in its order. The relegation to the appellate remedy as of now is not efficacious, for reason of the Tribunal not regularly sitting and the expediency too warrants that this Court consider the issue, so that there can be a quietus. 8. The learned counsel for the petitioners would urge that the sale conducted is against the provisions of the Schedule II to the IT Act. He would rely on the decisions in M.V.Janardhan Reddy v. Vijaya Bank (2008) 7 SCC 738 and Mathew Varghese v. M.Amritha Kumar (2014) 5 SCC 610 to urge the mandatory nature of the proceedings as contemplated under Schedule II to the IT Act. 9. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent-Bank and the learned counsel appearing for the party respondent, the purchaser, contends that the DRT has gone into the entire facts and has also examined the proceedings threadbare, as revealed from the records of the Recovery Officer and has come to the conclusion that the sale is in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Schedule II. The learned counsel for the purchaser also would contend that he being a bonafide purchaser, cannot be interdicted from enjoying the fruits of the sale, especially since he has remitted the entire money, coming to about Rs.1,91,20,000/-, within the stipulated time as per Schedule II. The fee for registration as also the stamp duty having been paid, the property stands conveyed in the name of the 2nd respondent and, hence, there could be no interference caused, going by the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sadashiv Prasad Singh v. Harendar Singh and Others (2015) 5 SCC 574 . The Bank also would contend that in examining whether the procedure was followed and the adjournment of sale made was proper; the decision in Bhat v. Anugraha Charitable Trust ( 2008 (1) KLT 617 ) is apposite. The respondents also have a contention that the appeal was not filed within the time provided from the date of sale and that the appeal was filed only after the confirmation. 10. The contention is only of procedural irregularity and illegality and there is no dispute on facts which has to be resolved. The proceedings are very clear from the order of the Tribunal, which has extracted the proceedings recorded by the Recovery Officer and the Recovery Inspector, the latter of whom was authorized to conduct the sale; which authorization is the bone of contention. Essentially the contention raised by the petitioner is that the Recovery Inspector who conducted the sale was not competent to conduct the same and the authorization made was of no avail, going by the provisions regulating the sale. The respondent-Bank, however, contends that the authorization is permissible under Rule 13 of Schedule II and there cannot be any defect found in the sale conducted. The proclamation was made by the Recovery Officer and so was the confirmation and the sale, could be conducted by the Recovery Inspector who was duly authorized by the Recovery Officer, is the argument. One has to first look at the proceedings, which has been extracted by the Tribunal. 11. There is no dispute that the proclamations of sale, which are produced as Exhibit P1 in both the writ petitions, are made by the Recovery Officer, one P.Balasubramanian. The name of the incumbent is relevant as will be presently noticed. One has to first look at the proceedings, which has been extracted by the Tribunal. 11. There is no dispute that the proclamations of sale, which are produced as Exhibit P1 in both the writ petitions, are made by the Recovery Officer, one P.Balasubramanian. The name of the incumbent is relevant as will be presently noticed. Both the proclamations of sale were made on 19.11.2012 and the auction was notified on 05.02.2013. The auction was in the e-auction mode and a service provider was entrusted with the task of carrying out the auction. There is also a contention raised that the auction cannot be carried out by the service provider, since Schedule II specifically provides that the auction has to be conducted by the Recovery Officer. However, it is to be noted that when e-auctions are conducted, the service provider provides a platform on which the auction is conducted through the internet. It is also clarified by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent-Bank that e-auction is conducted and the sale effected by the Recovery Inspector himself from his office; ie: through the office Personal Computer. 12. The proceedings which occurred after the proclamation have been verified and extracted by the Tribunal. The affixture report dated 28.12.2012 was found in the DRC files and the borrowers were also served with the proclamation dated 19.11.2012, to which they have not chosen to file any objection as to material irregularity in the proclamation made or in the upset price fixed. The Tribunal has also found that the proclamation is not challenged by the borrowers, within 30 days as provided under Section 30(1) of the RDDB Act. 13. The next issue raised is with respect to the irregularity in the sale held on 26.03.2013, to which date the sale stood adjourned from the date, as notified in the sale proclamation. The sale was notified as per the proclamations, on 05.02.2013, on which date there were no tenders received. The Recovery Inspector adjourned the sale as per the proceedings recorded in the files of the DRC's . The auction was adjourned to 04.03.2013, on which date also no tenders were received. Again, the sale was adjourned to 26.03.2013, as is noticed from the records of the DRC. The said adjournment was also made by the Recovery Inspector. 14. The Recovery Inspector adjourned the sale as per the proceedings recorded in the files of the DRC's . The auction was adjourned to 04.03.2013, on which date also no tenders were received. Again, the sale was adjourned to 26.03.2013, as is noticed from the records of the DRC. The said adjournment was also made by the Recovery Inspector. 14. Subsequently, the auction was conducted on 26.03.2013, when there was only one bid for all the properties. The proceedings in both the DRC's are extracted by the Tribunal, in its order which is as follows: DRC 517/SBT “26.03.13: e-Auction conducted. Shri.Preman.V.G. has bid item No.1 for Rs.1,05,60,000/- and item No.2 for Rs.45,20,000/- Reports generated from the site of service provider are placed in file. File is placed before RO on 29.4.13”. 29.4.13 Reposted to 8.5.13”. DRC 395/SBT “26.03.13: E-Auction held. Report generated from the service provider is placed in file. Shri.Preman.V.G. Has been the highest bidder for a bid amount of Rs.40,40,000/-. File is placed before RO on 29.4.13”. 29.4.13 Reposted to 8.5.13”. The sole bidder with respect to the three items of property, two in the former and one in the latter, is the 2nd respondent in both the Original Petitions. 15. The further proceeding on 08.05.2013 in the respective appeals are as follows: DRC 517/SBT “08/5 Heard CHB. Property sold for Rs.15080000/-. Claims by CTO and EPF are on record. CHB agreed to pay the said claims. In the auction sale, there was only one bidder, who offered Rs.1,50,80,000/- for two properties. Considering the long pendency of the RC and the failure of earlier sales, in the interest of speedy recovery, the sole bid requires to be accepted. Accordingly accepted. Reported that there was no challenge to the sale. Sale is confirmed and made absolute. Issue order of sale confirmation. For further proceedings, adjd. To 13.5.13”. (emphasis supplied by me) DRC 395/SBT “8/5/13 L.O. of CHB present. Property sold for Rs.40.40 lakh. in E-auction. Auction report noted. Amount due under RC was Rs.95.60 lakh. There are claims made by CTO (Rs.23,70,322/-) and EPF (Rs.7,80,002.85/-for 2 A/cs.). CHB agreed for settlement of the said statutory dues. Further reported that no petition was filed u/r.60-62, challenging sale. In the auction sale, there was only one bidder, who offered the price of Rs.40,40,000/- vis-a-vis the RP of Rs.40,00,000/-. Amount due under RC was Rs.95.60 lakh. There are claims made by CTO (Rs.23,70,322/-) and EPF (Rs.7,80,002.85/-for 2 A/cs.). CHB agreed for settlement of the said statutory dues. Further reported that no petition was filed u/r.60-62, challenging sale. In the auction sale, there was only one bidder, who offered the price of Rs.40,40,000/- vis-a-vis the RP of Rs.40,00,000/-. It was submitted that the RC was pending for long time and that earlier auctions were failed for want of bidders. Considering the circumstances of the matter, the offer made by the sole bidder is accepted. Entire purchase price reported to have been deposited within statutory period. The sale is therefore confirmed and made absolute in favour of the sole bidder. Issue order confirming the sale. Adjd. To 13.05.13”. (emphasis supplied by me) 16. The defect pointed out by the petitioner as far as violation of the provisions of Schedule II are three fold; (I) the sale could not have been adjourned beyond thirty days, (ii) the Recovery Officer himself had to conduct the sale and he could not have authorized the Recovery Inspector (iii) there was no sale conducted on 26.02.2013 as the sale and confirmation were both done on 08.05.2013. The Bank relies on Rule 13 of Schedule II to contend that there was an authorization in favour of the Recovery Inspector and the same is permitted under Rule 13. The authorization relied on in both the cases is dated 05.05.2009: “OFFICE OF THE RECOVERY OFFICER DEBTS RECOVERY TRIBUNAL (KERALA AND LAKSHADWEEP) 8th Floor, K.S.H.B.Building, Panampilly, Cochin-682 036 05th May, 2009 ORDER All the auction sales and necessary orders regarding matters of payment to bank and Financial Institutions/prospective bidders etc./necessary orders in connection with issuance of certified copies, to be conducted/passed by the Recovery Officers are entrusted under Rule 19A of the Second Schedule of the Income tax Act, 1961 to Mr.Ranjith.R., Ld. Recovery Inspector w.e.f. 06.05.2009 till further orders. (VIJAY KUMAR PILLAI) RECOVERY OFFICER Copy to: Mr.Ranjith.R., Ltd. Recovery Inspector. 17. It is argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the authorization made is by one Vijay Kumar Pillai, Recovery Officer, in the year 2009, who died while in service. At the relevant time, when the proclamation of sale was made, there were two Recovery Officers; one of whom, P.Balasubramanian, issued the proclamation in both the above DRCs. 17. It is argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the authorization made is by one Vijay Kumar Pillai, Recovery Officer, in the year 2009, who died while in service. At the relevant time, when the proclamation of sale was made, there were two Recovery Officers; one of whom, P.Balasubramanian, issued the proclamation in both the above DRCs. It is first argued that Rule 19A authorization, as is seen from the above extract, can be made only with prior approval and there is no prior approval on record. The prior approval has to be obtained from the Commissioner, as referred to in Schedule II; but in the case of the Recovery Officer under the RDDB Act, it has to be either from the Government or from the DRT. In any event, no authorization could be made without prior approval under R 19A and, hence, the same cannot be relied on. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Bank, taking cue from the order of the DRT, attempts to substantiate the authorization on the basis of Rule 13. The further argument of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that there was no sale as such effected on 26.03.2013 and the sale was effected and the confirmation made on 08.05.2013 when a Recovery Officer who was holding temporary charge of the office came to Cochin on 08.05.2013. 18. In examining the issue, the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in C.N.Paramasivam v. Sunrise Plaza ( (2013) 9 SCC 460 ) assumes relevance. The Hon'ble Supreme Court was concerned with the interpretation of Section 29 of the RDDB Act, wherein the words “as far as possible” was used. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that Section 29 of the Act incorporates the Rules in Schedule II for purposes of realization of dues by the Recovery Officer under the RDDB Act. The expressions “as far as possible” and “with necessary modifications” appearing in Section 29 of the RDDB Act was found to have been used to take care of situations where certain provisions applicable to recovery of income tax would not be applicable on account of the scheme under the RDDB Act. For example, the recovery of arrears used in Schedule II would relate to arrears under the IT Act, whereas under the RDDB Act, it refers to the “amount of debt”. For example, the recovery of arrears used in Schedule II would relate to arrears under the IT Act, whereas under the RDDB Act, it refers to the “amount of debt”. Those rules under Schedule II which do not deal with recovery of debts under the RDDB Act, was found to have no application; for instance, Rules 86 and 87 under Schedule II. The argument that the words “as far as possible” used in Section 29 would lead to a discretion on the Recovery Officer under the RDDB Act to decide on the applicability of Schedule II to recovery under the RDDB Act was repelled. The words were found to be indicative only of a certain inbuilt flexibility and but for that the same was held to be mandatory in nature. The provisions of Schedule II incorporated under the RDDB Act would have the same effect as if it were an integral part of the statute. Hence, there is no doubt that the provisions with respect to recovery has to be applied with full effect, in the recovery effected under the RDDB Act. 19. The learned Senior Counsel for the respondent-Bank would take this Court through Rules 13 and 15 to contend that the sale proceedings as such could be entrusted to a Recovery Inspector, as authorized by the aforesaid Sections. Rule 13 and Rule 15 are extracted hereunder: “13. Officer entitled to attach and sell.- The attachment and sale of movable property and the attachment and sale of immovable property may be made by such persons as the Tax Recovery Officer may from time to time direct. xxx xxx xxx 15. Adjournment or stoppage of sale.-(1) The Tax Recovery Officer may, in his discretion, adjourn any sale hereunder to a specified day and hour; and the officer conducting any such sale may, in his discretion, adjourn the sale, recording his reasons for such adjournment: Provided that, where the sale is made in, or within the precincts of, the office of the Tax Recovery Officer, no such adjournment shall be made without the leave of the Tax Recovery Officer. (2) Where a sale of immovable property is adjourned under sub-rule (1) for a longer period than one calendar month, a fresh proclamation of sale under this Schedule shall be made unless the defaulter consents to waive it. (2) Where a sale of immovable property is adjourned under sub-rule (1) for a longer period than one calendar month, a fresh proclamation of sale under this Schedule shall be made unless the defaulter consents to waive it. (3) Every sale shall be stopped if, before the lot is knocked down, the arrears and costs (including the costs of the sale) are tendered to the officer conducting the sale, or proof is given to his satisfaction that the amount of such arrears and costs has been paid to the Tax Recovery Officer who ordered the sale”. The contention of the respondent-Bank is that the proviso to sub-rule (1) of Rule 15 specifically speaks of leave of the Recovery Officer, for purposes of adjournment, only if the sale is conducted in the precincts of the office of the Recovery Officer. Hence, a conjoint reading of Rules 13 and 15 would definitely indicate that there is power for such authorization. The said contention has to be analyzed with respect to the facts in the aforesaid case. 20. The authorization said to have been made on 05.05.2009, is by the earlier incumbent, i.e., one Vijay Kumar Pillai, who had authorized one Ranjith.R., the Recovery Inspector, to carry on the auction sale and necessary orders regarding matters of payment to bank and financial institutions/ prospective bidders, etc. and necessary orders in connection with the issuance of certified copies. The said authorization, extracted herein above, was specifically made under rule 19A and long prior to the proclamations in the instant DRC's. Rule 19A, as was noticed earlier, speaks of a prior approval. Going by the binding precedent in C.N.Paramasivam (supra), the provisions have to be applied as far as possible to the proceedings under the RDDB Act. The “Joint Commissioner” referred to under Schedule II as against the Tax Recovery Officer is the superior officer of the Tax Recovery Officer. The provisions of the RDDB Act indicates that the Tribunal could be interposed in the place of the Joint Commissioner as noticed in Rule 19A. Hence, the two interpretations possible insofar as the incorporation of Rule 19A of Schedule II to RDDB Act is as follows: If there could be no prior approval and there is no officer similar to the Joint Commissioner available as per the provisions of the RDDB Act, then there could be no such authorization made. Hence, the two interpretations possible insofar as the incorporation of Rule 19A of Schedule II to RDDB Act is as follows: If there could be no prior approval and there is no officer similar to the Joint Commissioner available as per the provisions of the RDDB Act, then there could be no such authorization made. If the Tribunal is found to take the place of the Joint Commissioner, then Rule 19A could be invoked only with prior approval of the DRT. In the present case, obviously, there is no such prior approval obtained. Hence, Rule 19A cannot have any application in the present case. It is also to be noticed that the respondent-Bank also does not rely on Rule 19A and relies on Rule 13, as has been done by the Tribunal. 21. Rule 13 indicates that attachment and sale of movable/immovable property has to be made by such persons as the Tax Recovery Officer may “from time to time direct”. This Court is inclined to hold that, no blanket authorization, as is evidenced in the present case, can be made. The authorization under Rule 13 has to be made “from time to time”, which clearly mandates that any particular sale made by any officer other than the Recovery Officer would have to be made on the specific authorization of the Recovery Officer, in that particular DRC. Herein, what assumes significance is that the Recovery Officer who was in office while the proclamations were made and subsequently retired never made such an authorization. An earlier incumbent made the authorization in the name of one of the Recovery Inspectors, in the year 2009. The said incumbent passed away, while in service. It is also an admitted fact that subsequently there were two Recovery Officers attached to the Tribunal when the proclamation of sale was made. At the point when the sale was conducted, there were none in office and the Recovery Officer who made the proclamation of sale had retired. In such circumstance, an authorization made by an earlier incumbent cannot be of any avail in conducting a sale by the Recovery Inspector even going by the words employed in Rule 13. 22. The proceedings in both DRC's on the date of the sale also are of significant import. As is extracted herein above, on 26.03.2013, the e-auction was conducted and the sole bid of the 2nd respondent was recorded. 22. The proceedings in both DRC's on the date of the sale also are of significant import. As is extracted herein above, on 26.03.2013, the e-auction was conducted and the sole bid of the 2nd respondent was recorded. The report generated from the service provider's site were placed in the file, which was placed before the Recovery Officer on 29.04.2013. Hence, no sale as such was conducted. If sale was conducted in favour of the sole bidder, then that had to be recorded and a communication also sent to that effect. The purchaser, being the 2nd respondent, also does not speak of any such communication being addressed to him. The records of the DRC's, which were called for, also does not reveal any such communication having been issued by the office of the Recovery Officer. The purchaser speaks of a communication from the Bank, who was not competent to conduct the sale. The deposit to be made on a sale conducted, as per the proclamation of sale, is said to have been made by the bidder, without any statement as to under what authority, that too with the respondent Bank directly and not through the Recovery Officer. 23. Further the proceedings on 08.05.2013, is the proceedings of the Recovery Officer himself, who is said to have come from Chennai on additional charge. Even according to the DRT, as seen from its order, the Recovery Officer from Chennai, had additional charge of Kerala between 01.05.2013 to 21.07.2013. The proceedings of the Recovery Officer extracted above shows that he conducted the sale on that day. The specific words employed was that “there was only one bidder, who offered Rs.1,50,80,000/- for two properties. Considering the long pendency of the RC and the failure of earlier sales, in the interest of speedy recovery, the sole bid requires to be accepted. Accordingly accepted”. Hence, the sale was only on 08.05.2013. Further, on the same day, by the very same proceedings, it was ordered that “Sale is confirmed and made absolute”. The proceedings in the other DRC also is similar as is evident from the extract herein above. Hence, though the auction was conducted on 26.03.2013, the sale and confirmation were made on the same day, i.e., on 08.05.2013. 24. Rule 52 of Part III of Schedule II speaks of proclamation of sale; on which there is no dispute in the instant case. Hence, though the auction was conducted on 26.03.2013, the sale and confirmation were made on the same day, i.e., on 08.05.2013. 24. Rule 52 of Part III of Schedule II speaks of proclamation of sale; on which there is no dispute in the instant case. The contents of the proclamation also cannot be challenged now, since the borrowers and the mortgagors have not objected to the same. The mode of proclamation as provided in Rule 54 also cannot now be disputed. Rule 55 prohibits sale of any immovable property under Schedule II without the consent, in writing of the defaulter, until the expiry of at least 30 days calculated from the date on which a copy of the proclamation of sale has been affixed on the property or in the office of the Tax Recovery Officer. It has to be read with the provision for adjournment under Rule 15, wherein sub-rule (2) specifically speaks of an adjournment under sub-rule (1) for a longer period than one calendar month, requiring a fresh proclamation of sale. Herein, though the initial sale date was with 30 days notice, the further adjournments are said to be within 30 days period and hence there is no requirement for a fresh proclamation, is the contention. 25. The original sale was on 05.02.2013, which was adjourned to 04.0-3.2013, within 30 days. Again on 04.03.2013, it was adjourned to 26.03.2013, within 30 days. The learned counsel for the respondent-Bank relies on a decision of this Court reported in Bhat (supra), to contend that a fresh proclamation is called for only when a single adjournment is made for a period longer than one calendar month, pushing the date of sale beyond a period of one month. With due respect, I am unable to agree with the said declaration and in the normal course this would have necessitated a reference to a Division Bench. However, the said procedure need not be adopted in view of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mathew Varghese (supra) wherein the application of Schedule II of the IT Act to the SARFAESI Act was considered. It was held so in paragraphs 52 and 53: “52. However, the said procedure need not be adopted in view of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mathew Varghese (supra) wherein the application of Schedule II of the IT Act to the SARFAESI Act was considered. It was held so in paragraphs 52 and 53: “52. Keeping the said basic principle in applying the above provisions in mind, when we refer to Rule 15 of Schedule II Part I of the Income Tax Act, 1961, in the first place it will have to be stated that a reading of the said Rule does not in any way conflict with either Section 13(8) of the SARFAESI Act or Rules 8 and 9 of the 2002 Rules. As far as sub-rule (1) of Rule 15 is concerned, it only deals with the discretion of the Tax Recovery Officer to adjourn the sale by recording his reasons for such adjournment. The said Rule does not in any way conflict with either Rules 8 or 9 or Section 13, in particular sub-section (1) or sub-section (8) of the SARFAESI Act. Therefore, to that extent there is no difficulty in applying Rule 15. As far as sub-rule (2) is concerned, the same is clear to the effect that a sale of immovable property once adjourned under sub-rule (1) for a longer period than one calendar month, a fresh proclamation of sale should be made unless the defaulter consents to waive it. The said sub-rule also does not conflict with any of the provisions of the SARFAESI Act, in particular Section 13 or Rules 8 and 9. In fact there is no provision relating to grant of adjournment or issuance of a fresh proclamation for effecting the sale after the earlier date of sale was not adhered to in the SARFAESI Act. The said sub-rule also does not conflict with any of the provisions of the SARFAESI Act, in particular Section 13 or Rules 8 and 9. In fact there is no provision relating to grant of adjournment or issuance of a fresh proclamation for effecting the sale after the earlier date of sale was not adhered to in the SARFAESI Act. In such circumstances going by the prescription contained in Section 37 of the SARFAESI Act, as we have reached a conclusion that the provision contained in Section 29 of the RDDB Act will be in addition to and not in derogation of the provisions of the SARFAESI Act, the provisions contained in Rule 15, which is applicable by virtue of the stipulation contained in Section 29 of the RDDB Act, whatever is stated in sub-rule (2) of Rule 15 should be followed in a situation where a notice of sale notified as per Rules 8 and 9(1) of the 2002 Rules, read along with Section 13(8) gets postponed. In our considered view such a construction of the provisions, namely, Sections 37, 13(8) and 37 of the SARFAESI Act, read along with Section 29 with the aid of Rule 15 could alone be made and in no other manner. 53. We, therefore, hold that unless and until a clear 30 days’ notice is given to the borrower, no sale or transfer can be resorted to by a secured creditor. In the event of any such sale properly notified after giving 30 days’ clear notice to the borrower did not take place as scheduled for reasons which cannot be solely attributable to the borrower, the secured creditor cannot effect the sale or transfer of the secured asset on any subsequent date by relying upon the notification issued earlier. In other words, once the sale does not take place pursuant to a notice issued under Rules 8 and 9, read along with Section 13(8) for which the entire blame cannot be thrown on the borrower, it is imperative that for effecting the sale, the procedure prescribed above will have to be followed afresh, as the notice issued earlier would lapse. In that respect, the only other provision to be noted is sub-rule (8) of Rule 8 as per which sale by any method other than public auction or public tender can be on such terms as may be settled between the parties in writing. As far as sub-rule (8) is concerned, the parties referred to can only relate to the secured creditor and the borrower. It is, therefore, imperative that for the sale to be effected under Section 13(8), the procedure prescribed under Rule 8 read along with Rule 9(1) has to be necessarily followed, inasmuch as that is the prescription of the law for effecting the sale as has been explained in detail by us in the earlier paragraphs by referring to Sections 13(1), 13(8) and 37, read along with Section 29 and Rule 15. In our considered view any other construction will be doing violence to the provisions of the SARFAESI Act, in particular Sections 13(1) and (8) of the said Act”. (emphasis supplied by me) 26. Going by the binding declaration of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the provision for 30 days notice is to protect the interest of the borrower and the mortgagor. There could be fluctuation in the market and there could also be changes in the circumstances of the borrower or the mortgagor, which would enable them to settle the matter. The Recovery Officer, who has the statutory duty to conduct the sale so as to effectuate speedy recovery of the amounts due to the Banks has an equal duty to the the mortgagor/owner to ensure that the maximum price is received for the property. To that extent, useful reference can be made to paragraphs 41, 42 and 43 of Mathew Varghese (supra): “41. Here again we find that even if there was some difference in the amount tendered by the borrower while exercising his right of redemption under Section 13(8), the question of difference in the amount should be kept open and can be decided subsequently, but on that score the right of redemption of the mortgagor cannot be frustrated. Here again we find that even if there was some difference in the amount tendered by the borrower while exercising his right of redemption under Section 13(8), the question of difference in the amount should be kept open and can be decided subsequently, but on that score the right of redemption of the mortgagor cannot be frustrated. Elaborating the statement of law made therein, we wish to state that the endeavour or the role of a secured creditor in such a situation while resorting to any sale for the realisation of dues of a mortgaged asset, should be that the mortgagor is entitled for some lenience, if not more to be shown, to enable the borrower to tender the amounts due in order to ensure that the constitutional right to property is preserved, rather than it being deprived of. 42. In Ram Kishun ( (2012) 11 SCC 511 ), paras 13, 14 and 28 are relevant for our purpose, which are as under: (SCC pp. 519 & 522) “13. Undoubtedly, public money should be recovered and recovery should be made expeditiously. But it does not mean that the financial institutions which are concerned only with the recovery of their loans, may be permitted to behave like property dealers and be permitted further to dispose of the secured assets in any unreasonable or arbitrary manner in flagrant violation of the statutory provisions. 14. A right to hold property is a constitutional right as well as a human right. A person cannot be deprived of his property except in accordance with the provisions of a statute. (Vide Lachhman Dass v. Jagat Ram ( (2007) 10 SCC 448 ) and State of M.P. v. Narmada Bachao Andolan ( (2011) 7 SCC 639 ) Thus, the condition precedent for taking away someone’s property or disposing of the secured assets, is that the authority must ensure compliance with the statutory provisions. XXX XXX XXX 28. In view of the above, the law can be summarised to the effect that the recovery of the public dues must be made strictly in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law. The liability of a surety is coextensive with that of the principal debtor. In case there are more than one surety the liability is to be divided equally among the sureties for unpaid amount of loan. The liability of a surety is coextensive with that of the principal debtor. In case there are more than one surety the liability is to be divided equally among the sureties for unpaid amount of loan. Once the sale has been confirmed it cannot be set aside unless a fundamental procedural error has occurred or sale certificate had been obtained by misrepresentation or fraud.” (emphasis added) 43. The above principles laid down by this Court also make it clear that though the recovery of public dues should be made expeditiously, it should be in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law and that it should not frustrate a constitutional right, as well as the human right of a person to hold a property and that in the event of a fundamental procedural error occurred in a sale, the same can be set aside”. 27. The prohibition of sale being adjourned beyond 30 days, without the consent of the owner is with the specific intent of protecting the rights over the property and to ensure that such valuable rights are not deprived of unless by procedure established by law. The Recovery Officer cannot be allowed to adjourn the sale for every 20 days and then conduct it after one year. Apposite would be a reference to the oft-quoted principle that when the statute prescribes for something to be done in a particular manner, it shall be done in that manner or not at all (Taylor v. Taylor ((1875) 1 Ch.D 426). Herein, the first sale was on 05.02.2013. It was adjourned to 04.03.2013 and then to 26.03.2013, clearly beyond the 30 days period prescribed. Hence, the sale, if any, conducted on 26.03.2013 would be bad for reason of the same running contrary to the provisions of Schedule II, specifically Rule 15. 28. There is also no sale conducted on 26.03.2013. This Court has already found that the authorization on 05.05.2009 cannot at all be relied on, to clothe the Recovery Inspector with the power to conduct the sale. Even if such authorization had been properly made, the proceedings in the DRC would not indicate any sale having been conducted. Rule 56 of Schedule II mandates that the sale shall be by public auction to the highest bidder and shall be subject to confirmation by the Recovery Officer. Here, a public auction is seen to have been conducted, but no sale effected. Rule 56 of Schedule II mandates that the sale shall be by public auction to the highest bidder and shall be subject to confirmation by the Recovery Officer. Here, a public auction is seen to have been conducted, but no sale effected. Reference can be made to the decision of Mathew Varghese (supra), wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court says so: “Unfortunately, the fourth respondent Bank stated to have effected the sale on 28.12.2007 by accepting the tender of the appellant and by way of further process, directed to deposit the balance amount within 15 days, which was deposited by the appellant on 11.1.2008”. [para 55] The extract is made not to state a principle, but only to understand as to how a process of sale has to be effected in auction. In auction, the sale has to be effected by “accepting the tender” and the purchaser has to be directed to deposit the amounts as directed in the proclamation for sale. On compliance of such directions, there will be a sale proper. Here, the auction alone was conducted through the service provider and there was only one bid, which has not been accepted by the Recovery Inspector. The acceptance has been made specifically on 08.05.2013, on which date itself the confirmation was also made. 29. Rule 60 of Schedule II provides for an application to set aside the sale of immovable property on deposit, by which the defaulter or any person affected by the sale could, within 30 days from the date of sale, apply to the Recovery Officer to set aside the sale on his depositing the amounts as specified in clause (a) and clause (b). Rule 61 speaks of an application to set aside sale of an immovable property on the ground of non-service of notice or irregularity, in the event of which, no deposit has to be made. Rule 62 provides for an application to set aside the sale, by the purchaser, within 30 days of such sale on the ground that the defaulter has no sale-able interest. The confirmation mandated by Rule 63 is only when no such application has been made or when such an application is made and disallowed by the Recovery Officer. Hence, a conjoint reading of Rules 60, 61, 62 and 63 would indicate that the confirmation shall be made only after 30 days of the sale. The confirmation mandated by Rule 63 is only when no such application has been made or when such an application is made and disallowed by the Recovery Officer. Hence, a conjoint reading of Rules 60, 61, 62 and 63 would indicate that the confirmation shall be made only after 30 days of the sale. The bid herein was accepted on 08.05.2013 and was confirmed on the very same day. This is also against the provisions of Schedule II. 30. The question remaining is the third party rights acquired by a bonafide purchaser. Sadashiv Prasad Singh v. Harendar Singh and Others (2015) 5 SCC 574 was in a circumstance when the brother of the deceased mortgagor approached the High Court; when an objection raised before the Recovery Officer against the proclamation, by the same person, was not prosecuted. The case arose from two appeals, one filed by the objector before the Recovery Officer and the other filed by the purchaser. The proceedings were taken by the creditor-Bank against a firm and on the basis of the Recovery Certificate issued by the DRT, the Recovery Officer took steps for sale of the property. The brother, of one of the partners who owned the mortgaged property, was before the Recovery Officer contending that his brother had executed an agreement for sale with him and he had a claim over the properties attempted to be sold. Though such an objection was filed before the Recovery Officer, subsequently it was abandoned. Recovery proceedings were taken, auction was conducted, the highest bidder purchased the property and the sale was confirmed; after which the objector approached the High Court in a writ petition. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition. In appeal, the objector took up a contention that the property was sold for Rs.13.20 lakhs and offered a sum of Rs.39 lakhs. The creditor-Bank had a total dues of Rs.75,75,562/-. An offer was made by the Bank to settle the matter finally on being paid an amount of Rs.45 lakhs. Somehow, the compromise did not fructify. 31. Later, when the matter was finally disposed of, the Division Bench took note of the earlier offer and directed that the appellant pay Rs.15 lakhs to the auction purchaser and Rs.30 lakhs to the Bank, upon which the sale would be set aside. Somehow, the compromise did not fructify. 31. Later, when the matter was finally disposed of, the Division Bench took note of the earlier offer and directed that the appellant pay Rs.15 lakhs to the auction purchaser and Rs.30 lakhs to the Bank, upon which the sale would be set aside. The Hon'ble Supreme Court found that the Division Bench could not have passed such an order without considering the valuable rights available to the auction purchaser. Paragraph 12 is extracted hereunder: “12. Learned counsel for the auction purchaser Sadashiv Prasad Singh, in the first instance vehemently contended, that in terms of the law declared by this Court, property purchased by a third party auction purchaser, in compliance of a Court order, cannot be interfered with on the basis of the success or failure of parties to a proceeding, if auction purchaser had bonafidely purchased the property. In order to substantiate his aforesaid contention, learned counsel representing Sadashiv Prasad Singh p emphatic reliance, firstly, on a judgment rendered by this Court in Ashwin S. Mehta and Another v. Custodian and Others, ( (2006) 2 SCC 385 ). Our attention was drawn to the following observations recorded therein : "In that view of the matter, evidently, creation of any third - party interest is no longer in dispute nor the same is subject to any order of this Court. In any event, ordinarily, a bona fide purchaser for value in an auction - sale is treated differently than a decree - holder purchasing such properties. In the former event, even if such a decree is set aside, the interest of the bona fide purchaser in an auction - sale is saved. (See Nawab Zain - ul - Abdin Khan v. Mohd. Asghar Ali Khan, 1887 (15) IA 12) The said decision has been affirmed by this Court in Gurjoginder Singh v. Jaswant Kaur 1994 (2) SCC 368 ." (emphasis is ours) On the same subject, and to the same end, learned counsel reliance on another judgment rendered by this Court in Janatha Textiles and Others v. Tax Recovery Officer and Another, (2008) 12 SCC 582 , wherein the conclusions drawn in Ashwin S. Mehta's case (supra) came to be reiterated. In the above judgment, this Court relied upon the decisions of the Privy Council and of this Court in Nawab Zain - Ul - Abdin Khan v. Mohd. In the above judgment, this Court relied upon the decisions of the Privy Council and of this Court in Nawab Zain - Ul - Abdin Khan v. Mohd. Asghar Ali Khan, 1887-88 (15) IA 12; Janak Raj v. Gurdial Singh, AIR 1967 SC 608 ; Gurjoginder Singh v. Jaswant Kaur, (1994) 2 SCC 368 ; Padanathil Ruqmini Amma v. P. K. Abdulla, (1996) 7 SCC 668 , as also, on Ashwin S. Mehta (supra) in order to conclude, that it is an established principle of law, that a third party auction purchaser's interest, in the auctioned property continues to be protected, notwithstanding that the underlying decree is subsequently set aside or otherwise. It is, therefore, that this Court in its ultimate analysis observed as under: "20. Law makes a clear distinction between a stranger who is a bona fide purchaser of the property at an auction - sale and a decree -holder purchaser at a Court auction. The strangers to the decree are afforded protection by the Court because they are not connected with the decree. Unless the protection is extended to them the Court sales would not fetch market value or fair price of the property." (emphasis is ours) On the issue as has been dealt with in the foregoing paragraph, this Court has carved out one exception. The aforesaid exception came to be recorded in Velji Khimji and Company v. Official Liquidator of Hindustan Nitro Product (Gujarat) Limited and Others, (2008) 9 SCC 299 , wherein it was held as under : "30. In the first case mentioned above i.e. where the auction is not subject to confirmation by any authority, the auction is complete on the fall of the hammer, and certain rights accrue in favour of the auction - purchaser. However, where the auction is subject to subsequent confirmation by some authority (under a statute or terms of the auction) the auction is not complete and no rights accrue until the sale is confirmed by the said authority. Once, however, the sale is confirmed by that authority, certain rights accrue in favour of the auction - purchaser, and these rights cannot be extinguished except in exceptional cases such as fraud. 31. In the present case, the auction having been confirmed on 30/07/2003 by the Court it cannot be set aside unless some fraud or collusion has been proved. Once, however, the sale is confirmed by that authority, certain rights accrue in favour of the auction - purchaser, and these rights cannot be extinguished except in exceptional cases such as fraud. 31. In the present case, the auction having been confirmed on 30/07/2003 by the Court it cannot be set aside unless some fraud or collusion has been proved. We are satisfied that no fraud or collusion has been established by anyone in this case." (emphasis is ours) It is, therefore, apparent that the rights of an auction - purchaser in the property purchased by him cannot be extinguished except in cases where the said purchase can be assailed on grounds of fraud or collusion”. It has to be emphasized that the decisions referred to in the above extracts were cases in which there was a proper auction conducted. Only in such circumstances the auction purchaser gets a legal interest, which has to be protected notwithstanding anything, but a fraud or collusion having been occasioned. In the instant case, the thrust is on the very legality of the procedure of sale and not on the third-party interest. 32. In the context of the instant case, more apposite would be reference to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in M.V.Janardhan Reddy (supra). That was a case in which the Recovery Officer, sought permission from the Company Court to sell the property; since the Company Court had appointed an Official Liquidator for the borrower Company. The permission granted was for the sale to be conducted, subject to final orders of the Company Court. The sale was confirmed by the Recovery Officer and the owner of the property was before the Company Judge, who set aside the sale. Before the Supreme Court, it was submitted that after confirmation of sale no order setting aside the sale could have been passed by the Court. It was urged that, after the sale was confirmed, it could be set aside only on grounds of fraud or irregularity in conducting the sale. The Supreme Court found that the order of the Company Judge specifically and unequivocally stated that permission of the Court should be obtained before the sale was confirmed or finalized. It was urged that, after the sale was confirmed, it could be set aside only on grounds of fraud or irregularity in conducting the sale. The Supreme Court found that the order of the Company Judge specifically and unequivocally stated that permission of the Court should be obtained before the sale was confirmed or finalized. The same was found to be an express condition imposed by the Company Court and as such it was not open to the Recovery Officer to confirm the sale and such confirmation had no authority of law. It was held so in paragraph 25:- “25. It is true that the Recovery Officer confirmed the sale in favour of the appellant. But as we have already noted, in view of the condition imposed by the Company Court, the Recovery Officer did not have the power to confirm sale. An order passed by an officer having no authority of law has no effect. It neither creates any right in favour of a party for whom such order is made nor imposes any obligation on the opposite party against whom it was passed”. 33. In the present case also, irregularity in the conduct of the sale is pointed out with reference to the violation of the provisions of Schedule II, which is applicable for the sale conducted by the Recovery Officer under the RDDB Act. As was found by this Court, the proclamations of sale in both the Original Petitions cannot be assailed by the borrower. The same was issued by the Recovery Officer, who was competent to do so and there was no objection filed as to any procedural irregularity or with respect to the determination of the upset price. The sale was also posted to 05.02.2013, giving clear 30 days notice. However, the adjournments made thereafter went beyond the 30 days period and the auction is said to have been conducted on 26.03.2013. This court has already found, on the basis of the binding precedent of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, that the provision with respect to the adjournment without a fresh proclamation beyond 30 days, is not one merely prohibiting a single adjournment pushing the date beyond 30 days. This court has already found, on the basis of the binding precedent of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, that the provision with respect to the adjournment without a fresh proclamation beyond 30 days, is not one merely prohibiting a single adjournment pushing the date beyond 30 days. Adjournments for short-term periods, but eventually leading to the date being pushing beyond 30 days, would be clearly illegal and in the present case the sale, by two adjournments, was pushed beyond 30 days attracting the prohibition under Schedule II. It is also found that no sale was actually conducted on 26.03.2013 and the conduct of the auction was recorded and the files placed before the Recovery Officer as seen from the proceedings in both the DRCs. The Recovery Officer-in-charge on 08.05.2013 having gone through the proceedings in the files of the DRCs, accepted the auction and confirmed the sale. The acceptance of the auction is the action which results in the sale having been effected. The sale having been effected, the confirmation should have been 30 days thereafter; going by the provisions of Schedule II, as found by this Court. The fact that the sale was confirmed does not at all result in any consequence. The sale having been found to be irregular and illegal cannot create any rights on the purchaser merely because of the confirmation, which is also against the provisions of Schedule II. The sale effected on the purchaser, hence, has to be necessarily set aside. 34. Yet another irregularity in the conduct of the sale is that, the Recovery Inspector definitely is not competent to conduct the sale on the basis of the authorization dated 05.05.2009, since the person who made the authorization is no more and there was another person in the post of Recovery Officer who had made the proclamation for sale. The said Recovery Officer had also retired and as on date there was no person occupying the office of the Recovery Officer. Hence, the Recovery Inspector, in any case, could not have conducted the sale on the basis of an authorization of the year 2009. 35. Now, the question is as to how the purchaser will be compensated. The purchaser has remitted Rs.1,91,20,000/- (Rupees one crore, ninety one lakhs and twenty thousand only) on 09.04.2013. Hence, the Recovery Inspector, in any case, could not have conducted the sale on the basis of an authorization of the year 2009. 35. Now, the question is as to how the purchaser will be compensated. The purchaser has remitted Rs.1,91,20,000/- (Rupees one crore, ninety one lakhs and twenty thousand only) on 09.04.2013. It is pertinent that the said deposit was made before the sale was effected and the purchaser is unable to produce any communication from the office of the Recovery Officer to substantiate that he was communicated of the sale having been effected. However, the purchaser cannot be found fault with, since the sole bid being of the purchaser, in his over anxiety to comply with the conditions in the proclamation for sale, the purchaser would have made the deposit even on a communication from the Bank. But, that does not in any manner confer any rights on the purchaser and would only enable him to claim the amounts to be refunded; with interest and just compensation. The factum of the registration having been effected and the stamp duty and registration charges paid cannot also create any right on the purchaser; but for just compensation. 36. The Bank had the proceeds of the alleged sale deposited by the purchaser from 09.04.2013 onwards, but it was kept in fixed deposit. When the sale is set aside even on illegality, on the application of the borrower/mortgagor/owner, the liability to interest in the loan account revives from the date on which the deposit was made. Hence, the compensation payable to the purchaser could be granted from the interest payable in the loan account as per the agreement between the borrower and the creditor-Bank. It is submitted by the respondent-Bank that the interest rate is 17.33% with quarterly rests. 37. The 2nd respondent-purchaser is said to have deposited a total of Rs.1,91,20,000/- (Rupees one crore, ninety one lakhs and twenty thousand) on 09.04.2013, being the total bid amount; in respect of both the DRCs. In addition, the 2nd respondent has also expended Rs.13,38,430/- (Rupees thirteen lakhs, thirty eight thousand, four hundred and thirty) being the stamp duty, the registration charges as also the poundage fees. In addition, the 2nd respondent has also expended Rs.13,38,430/- (Rupees thirteen lakhs, thirty eight thousand, four hundred and thirty) being the stamp duty, the registration charges as also the poundage fees. The learned Senior Counsel for the respondent-Bank would submit that the amounts deposited in the Bank, being Rs.1,91,20,000/-, was kept in a Fixed Deposit account, which has, as of now, generated an interest of Rs.40,56,120/- (Rupees forty lakhs, fifty six thousand, one hundred and twenty) (at the rate of 6% per annum). The entire amounts along with interest at the rate of 6% has to be paid to the 2nd respondent. A further interest at the rate of 4% for the amount of Rs.1,91,20,000/- (Rupees one crore, ninety one lakhs and twenty thousand) would be just compensation for the deprivation of such amount caused to the 2nd respondent by reason of the irregular sale. The 2nd respondent would also be entitled to approach the registration authorities for cancellation of the sale deeds; the refund of such amount being permissible in the name of the 2nd respondent. The additional 4% interest granted by this Court would also take care of the poundage fees and registration charges, which cannot be refunded. The respondent-Bank would not charge any of these amounts on the petitioners, since the additional interest granted of 4% would be comprised within the interest levy on the petitioners/borrowers from the date of sale till refund made to the 2nd respondent. The Bank shall comply with the aforesaid directions within a period of one month and the interest shall be calculated up to the date of such payment. The sale conducted on 08.05.2013 and confirmed on the said date would stand set aside. The proceedings for sale would have to commence with a fresh proclamation of sale, since the proclamations produced in the above Original Petitions, though were held to be proper, can not be pressed into service at this distance of time. The Original Petitions are allowed, setting aside the confirmation of sale, at Exhibit P2 in both the cases. The parties are directed to suffer their respective costs.