ORDER 1. This petition has been filed under section 482 CrPC for quashing the criminal complaint No.486/2015 pending before the JMFC, Mhow. 2. Brief facts of the case are that respondent-complainant filed a private complaint under sections 420 and 409 of the IPC alleging that money was due towards the accused-applicant for which applicant had given cheque No.000957 dated 30.10.2014 of Rs.5 lacs. Respondent-complainant submitted the cheque in ICICI Bank, Branch Rau for encashment but the same has been dishonoured with the note 'insufficient funds', thus the applicant-accused has committed cheating with the respondent-complainant. After recording the statement under section 200 CrPC learned Magistrate took cognizance against the applicant under section 420 IPC and directed issuance of summons to the applicant, being aggrieved with this the present petition has been filed. 3. Learned counsel for applicant submits that private complaint is not maintainable because as per the allegation, applicant had issued the cheque to the respondent and same was dishonoured, therefore respondent should have filed the complaint under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. As per the complaint, money was to be received by the respondent from the applicant thereafter applicant issued cheque to the respondent, therefore applicant neither committed offence of cheating or deceiving nor dishonestly induced the respondent. He further submits that ingredients of section 420 of the IPC are absent, hence continuance of proceedings would be abuse of process of law. It is prayed that Criminal Complaint No.486/2015 be quashed. 4. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent submits that applicant had issued the cheque and same has been dishonoured, hence prima facie the applicant has committed the offence of cheating. 5. I have considered the submission of learned counsel and perused the record. 6. It is not disputed that in the complaint filed by the respondent it is averred that some amount was due for payment towards the applicant and applicant gave a cheque assuring payment of dues but when the cheque was submitted for encashment the same was dishonoured with a note of 'insufficient funds'. 7. The offence of cheating has been defined in section 415 IPC which reads as under :- “415. Cheating. 7. The offence of cheating has been defined in section 415 IPC which reads as under :- “415. Cheating. -- Whoeer, by deceivin any person, fradulently or dishonestly induces the person so deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to cnsent that any person shall retain any property, or intentionally induces the person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived, any which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damae or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property, is to ‘cheat’. Explanation - A dishonest concealment of facts is a deception within the meaning of this section.” The ingredients of section 420 of the Penal Code are as follows : (i) Deception of any person, (ii) Fraudulently or dishonestly inducing any person to deliver any property; or (iii) To consent that any person shall retain any property and finally intentinally inducing that person to do or omit to do anything which would not do or omit. 8. In Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma v. State of Bihar [ (2000)4 SCC 168 ’, Hon'ble apex Court held :- “On a reading of the section it is manifest that in the definition there are set forth two separate classes of acts which the person deceived may be induced to do. In the first place he may be induced fraudulently or dishonestly to deliver any property to any person. The second class of acts set forth in the section is the doing or omitting to do anything which the person deceived would not do or omit to do if he were not so deceived. In the first class of cases the inducing must be fraudulent or dishonest. In the second class of acts, the inducing must be intentional but not fraudulent or dishonest. In determining the question it has to be kept in mind that the distinction between mere breach of contract and the offence of cheating is a fine one. It depends upon the intention of the accused at the time of inducement which may be judged by his subsequent conduct but for this subsequent conduct is not the sole test. In determining the question it has to be kept in mind that the distinction between mere breach of contract and the offence of cheating is a fine one. It depends upon the intention of the accused at the time of inducement which may be judged by his subsequent conduct but for this subsequent conduct is not the sole test. Mere breach of contract cannot give rise to criminal prosecution for cheating unless fradulent or dishonest intention is shown right at the beginning of the transaction that is, the time when the offence is said to have been committed. Therefore it is the intention which is the gist of the offence. To hold a person guilty of cheating it is necessary to show that he had fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making the promise. From his mere failure to keep up promise subsequently such a culpable intention right at the beginning, that is, when he made the promise cannot be presumed." 9. In view of aforesaid discussion, in the opinion of this Court that only because the applicant had issued Cheque which was dishonoured by itself, would not mean that he had cheated the complainant. 10. In Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre [1988(I) MPWN 225=(1988) SCC 692], a three Judges Bench of Hon’ble apex Court has laid down the law as to quashment of proceedings under section 482 CrPC as follows: “7. The legal position is well settled that when a prosecution at the initial stage is asked to be quashed, the test to be applied by the Court is as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made prima facie establish the offence. It is also for the Court to take into consideration any special features which appear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue. It is also for the Court to take into consideration any special features which appear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue. This is so on the basis that the Court cannot be utilised for any oblique purpose and where in the opinion of the Court chances of an ultimate conviction are bleak and, therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to continue, the court may while taking into consideration the special facts of a case also quash the proceeding even though it may be a preliminary stage.” In Inder Mohan Goswami v. State of Uttranchal [(2008) SCC (cri) 259], Hon’ble apex Court in paras 25 and 46 has observed as under : “25. Reference to the following cases would reveal that the courts have consistently taken the view that they must use this extraordinary power to prevent injustice and secure the ends of justice. The English Courts have also used inherent power to achieve the same objective. It is generally agreed that the Crown Court has inherent power to protect its process from abuse. In Connelly v. Director of Public Prosecutions Lord Devlin stated that where particular criminal proceedings constitute an abuse of process, the Court is empowered to refuse to allow the indictment to proceed to trial. Lord Salmon in Director of Public Prosecution v. Humphrys stressed the importance of the inherent power when he observed that it is only if the prosecution amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court and it is oppressive and vexatious that the Judge has the power to intervene. He further mentioned that the Court's power to prevent such abuse is of great constitutional importance and should be jealously preserved. 46. The Court must ensure that criminal prosecution is not used as an instrument of harassment or for seeking private vendetta or with an ulterior motive to pressurise the accused. On analysis of the aforementioned cases, we are of the opinion that it is neither possible nor desirable to lay down an inflexible rule that would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. On analysis of the aforementioned cases, we are of the opinion that it is neither possible nor desirable to lay down an inflexible rule that would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. Inherent jurisdiction of the High Courts under section 482 CrPC though wise has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when it is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the statute itself and in the aforementioned cases. In view of the above settled legal position, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained.” 11. In view of the above discussion, in the facts and circumstances of the case, I am of the opinion that from the contents of the complaint, it is nowhere reflected that complainant was deceived, therefore, continuance of the proceeding is nothing, but it amounts to abuse of process of law, hence, the proceedings deserves to be quashed. 12. Consequently, the petition is allowed. Proceedings on the basis of which criminal complaint bearing No.486/2015 is pending before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Mhow is hereby quashed. 13. Petition is disposed of accordingly. Nilesh Sharma for applicant; Gaurav Verma for respondent.