JUDGMENT Hon’ble Kaushal Jayendra Thaker, J.—Heard Sri Vikash Rana, learned counsel for the appellant-Netra Pal, Sri Rajesh Kumar Verma, learned counsel for the accused respondents, namely Lachhman, Nekpal and Dhanpal and Sri Rajeev Gupta, learned Standing Counsel for the State. 2. Both these appeals arise out of the same incident. Criminal Appeal No. 257 of 1984 is filed by Netra Pal son of Luchhman who was convicted under Section 307 read with Section 34 Indian Penal Code ( in short ‘IPC’) to undergo four years rigorous imprisonment. In the Government Appeal three accused respondents, namely, Lachhman, Nekpal and Dhanpal were acquitted and, therefore the State of U.P. Has filed Government Appeal No. 1303 of 1984 (Under Section 378 Cr.P.C.) 3. The case of the prosecution was that Luchhman and his three sons namely, Nekpal, Netrapal and Dhanpal and one Chandra Pal are neighbours. Chandra Pal used to supply milk to Luchhman who is one of the accused. On 12.3.1981 at about 4 p.m. Accused Lachhman went to the residence of Chandra Pal and complained that milk supplied by him was not very pure. On this Chandra pal went on saying that the milk was pure which resulted into exchange of abuse between them. Hearing this, Jamuna Prasad who lived in the nearby of the house arrived there. Jamuna Prasad came there on the scene of the offence alongwith Raghubir Singh and Rampal. They tried to pacify the matter but were not successful. At that point of time three sons of Lachhman also arrived there and immediately returned to the place of offence. Netra Pal had a pistol and Dhanpal and Nekpal were armed with lathi. On seeing this Jamuna Prasad further tried to pacify the accused by telling them not to beat/assault Chandra Pal. This fact enraged the accused and Netra Pal opened fire on Jamuna Prasad which caused injuries to him. On the very same day at 6.30 p.m. an F.I.R. at Police Station Aonla was registered. The investigation commenced after recording the statements of the witnesses after preparing the fareed bayan and panchnama. 4. The charge-sheet was laid before the Court of competent Magistrate. The competent Magistrate under Section 209 committed the case for trial as it was an offence under Section 307 read with Section 34 IPC. 5. The investigation commenced after recording the statements of the witnesses after preparing the fareed bayan and panchnama. 4. The charge-sheet was laid before the Court of competent Magistrate. The competent Magistrate under Section 209 committed the case for trial as it was an offence under Section 307 read with Section 34 IPC. 5. The learned Sessions Judge after accused were summoned framed the charges which reads as follows : “to which all the accused pleaded not guilty. The prosecution which was lodged against Lachhman, Netra Pal, Dhanpal and Nekpal was sought to be proved by the three eye-witnesses and the Investigating Officer, namely, PW-1-Jamuna Prasad, informant, PW-2-Chandrapal, eye witness, PW-3 Raghubeer Singh, eye witness and PW-4- Vinod Vihari Sharma, S.O. Who was the Investigating Officer”. 6. The prosecution also tried to prove the case by filing the documentary evidence, namely F.I.R. Ex. Ka-2, Written Report- Ex.Ka 1, Recovery Memo of Blood Stained Clothes Ex. Ka-6, Inquiry report, Charge framed by V.A.S.J., Note framed by V.A.S.J., Note framed by V.A.S.J., Examination of Acc. Lachman, Examination of Acc. Nekpal, Examination of Acc. Netrapal, Examination of Acc. Dhanpal, Judgemnt of Vth A.S.J., Order of Vth A.S.J., Note of Vth A.S.J., Ground of Appeal, Hon’ble Court Order and Site Plan with index Ex. Ka-4. 7. At the end of trial, only Netra Pal was convicted by the learned judge. The prosecution evidence was not believed and other three accused namely, Lachhman, Nekpal and Dhanpal were acquitted. 8. While hearing this matter, the learned counsel for the accused Netra Pal mainly submitted that the incident which happened in 1984 shows that these were superficial injuries. The incident occurred on the spur of the moment. There was a cross case filed by Netra Pal. He has tried to submit that in the FIR it is shown that it was Nekpal not Netra Pal having Tamancha. He has confined his argument to show that the incident occurred before 32 years. The accused is a government servant and he had no intention to commit murder. The incident occurred on the spur of moment and, therefore, he has submitted that this case may be considered in the light of injuries and the factual scenario, as it emerges, that the case did not fall within the purview of Section 307, it would fall within the purview of Sections 323, 325 or at the most Section 308 IPC. 9. 9. The learned counsel for the appellant has not disputed the place of incident only certain minor contradictions in the evidence of the three eye witnesses are sought to be brought on record. However, after reading the entire evidence and judgment he has prayed that Netra Pal even if believed is to have Tamancha had no intention to commit murder. The parties who are neighbour may have no grievance by now. 10. As against this, the learned counsel for the State in the appeal preferred by Netra Pal has submitted that the offence would fall within Section 307 IPC. It is submitted that the learned Judge has rightly convicted under Section 307 and the version of Jamuna Prasad-injured would prove that Netpal came with pistol with whom his brother came with lathi, therefore, he cannot be said to have no motive to commit the said offence or that he did not had knowledge that firing the pistol would cause death. 11. As per Government Appeal No. 1303 of 1984 , he has contended that Netra Pal, his brother and his father all four came with common intention to commit crime under Section 307 IPC and that being rebuked by the injured complainant Netrapal, fired pistol at him and his brother also came and assaulted him. 12. It is further submitted that he has heavily relied upon the grounds urged in the memo of appeal and submitted that the acquittal is bad and is contrary to the weight of evidence on record. 13. The prosecution witnesses have proved their presence which cannot be doubted. The only submission made by the learned counsel for the accused appellant is that the injuries are superficial, they have not been proved. The incident occurred on the spur of the moment on provocation and it is submitted that, at the most, the case would fall within Section 308 or Sections 324, 323, 325 or 236 of the IPC. 14. The further submission is that there was no earlier enmity between the parties. The incident also occurred on the spur of the moment. It is submitted that he had no intention as can be culled out from the oral testimony of Jamuna Prasad who was the injured eye witness. 14. The further submission is that there was no earlier enmity between the parties. The incident also occurred on the spur of the moment. It is submitted that he had no intention as can be culled out from the oral testimony of Jamuna Prasad who was the injured eye witness. The learned Judge has charged “that you all in furtherance of your common intention on 12.3.1981 at about 4 p.m. In village Madhupuri, P.S. Aonla, District Bareilly caused gun shot injures to Jamuna Prasad with such intention or knowledge and under such circumstances you thereby caused his death, you would have been guilty of murder and you thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 307 read with Section 34 I.P.C. and within my cognizance”. 15. The fact that all the four accused were present, is proved from oral testimony of Jamuna Prasad. There is no question of identification of the accused. It is clear that he knows all the four accused Netrapal, the appellant was selling milk and used to purchase milk from the village and sell it at Aonla. On the fateful day, the incident occurred between Chandra Pal and Lachhman and that point of time Netrapal shot the injured. He gave the report to one teacher Rajendra Prasad which he has proved. He was sent to Aonla Hospital. Doctor was unavailable, therefore, he was sent to Bareilly hospital. He was admitted for about 17 to 18 days. He has admitted in his cross examination that he had no enmity with any of the accused. They were on very good terms with Shyam Pal who is real brother. The other cross examination is not very important. He has admitted in his cross examination that the incident occurred due to hot discussion about the quality of milk after he reached the place of offence after 6 and 7 minutes. He has accepted the fact that in his F.I.R. he has not mentioned that Netra Pal was armed with Tamancha. In his F.I.R., he has mentioned that Nekpal was armed with Tamancha, which according to him, may be a mistake on the part of scribe. It is true that he has accepted in fareed bayan that he has not mentioned that Nekpal had Tamancha in his hand. In his F.I.R., he has mentioned that Nekpal was armed with Tamancha, which according to him, may be a mistake on the part of scribe. It is true that he has accepted in fareed bayan that he has not mentioned that Nekpal had Tamancha in his hand. He tried to stop the accused from beating Chandra Pal who was the main person but as there was provocation, Netra Pal fired at him. Dhanpal, Nekpal and Lachhman did not do anything nor any overt act was committed by them which is accepted by him in his cross examination. The other persons tried to catch all the accused but could not catch. He has denied that they had burnt the house of Lachhman and he was beaten. 16. PW- Chandra Pal reiterates these facts and in his chief, he accepts that Netra Pal had come with Tamancha, PW-Jamuna Prasad had tried to pacify them but they were not able to pacify them. Netrapal had instituted a criminal case against PW-2 Chandrapal. 17. It is admitted by PW-3 that he was present at the time of incident and when incident occurred, at that point of time, Dhanpal came with lathi, Nekpal came with pistol and Lachhman came with Basula and Netrapal came with Tamancha when they were trying to beat at that point of time, Jamuna Prasad tried to pacify them but at that point of time Netrapal shot on Jamuna Prasad and they ran away. In his cross examination also three facts emerge one when incident occurred Chandrapal was on left of Jamuna Prasad and Dhanpal did no receive any injury who burnt the house of Lachhman is not known to him. The Police Officer, Vinod Vihari Sharma-PW-4 who has carried out the investigation and has collected evidence, the police officer was confronted with the factual aspect whether it was Nekpal with Tamancha or it was Netrapal but it is not found in the statement of PW-2 and PW-3 or PW-1. These contradictions go to the root of the matter. The fact that Netrapal was involved in this occurrence is proved beyond reasonable doubt. We concur with the said finding of the learned trial judge that Netrapal was the only person who was involved in the incident. The medical evidence has been accepted and is exhibited by the defence. 18. These contradictions go to the root of the matter. The fact that Netrapal was involved in this occurrence is proved beyond reasonable doubt. We concur with the said finding of the learned trial judge that Netrapal was the only person who was involved in the incident. The medical evidence has been accepted and is exhibited by the defence. 18. The Doctor found multiple gun shot wounds 0.2 cm x 0.2 cm in an area of 15 cm x 8 cm on the front of fore head. One abrasion and one gun shot wound on the ear were also found by the doctor. The genuineness of injury report was admitted by the defence. So the doctor was not examined. The opening of fire from the pistol on the face or on the head itself presupposes intention or knowledge to cause death. Although there is a cross version as well as the cross case and the accused filed copies of injury reports of Lachhman and Dhanpal, nobody came from the defence side in the witness box to narrate the story alleged by the defence. The copies of injury report of Lachhman Ex. Kha 4 shows that his injuries were found one day old. His examination was done on 13.3.1981 at 5.15 p.m.. The examination of Dhanpal was done on 12.3.1981 at 9.30 p.m. His injuries were found fresh. Gun shot wounds are noted the injury report of Dhanpal. There is no reason why injuries of Luxman were not examined on the same day. It cannot be said that they were caused at the time of this occurrence. Nothing could be asked about them because the doctor was not examined by the defence. There was no question for Jamuna Prasad to assault Lachhman etc. at their house because he is in no way connected with Chandrapal. Admittedly, dispute and quarrel is alleged by defence between the accused and Chandra Pal. Jamuna Prasad was never a party to that dispute. As such the injuries of Dhan Pal and Lachhman were not required to be explained by the prosecution. 19. The first aspect which will have to be looked into would be whether Netrapal had the intention to cause death and if the injured died he would be guilty of murder. The provisions of Section 299 IPC cannot be brought into play here. 19. The first aspect which will have to be looked into would be whether Netrapal had the intention to cause death and if the injured died he would be guilty of murder. The provisions of Section 299 IPC cannot be brought into play here. The intention must be to cause death, by no stretch of imagination, it can be said that Netrapal had grudge and had any intention of causing death. The totality of injuries caused to the victim would not support the finding of the learned Judge that the accused inflected injuries which were such which would be the cause of death. This has to be determined in the facts and circumstances of each case. The ingredient intention is to be seen and to prove the sufficiency of injury to cause death is very important. None of the illustrations given under Section 307 would make it a offence under Section 307 IPC. It is not the injury but the intention to cause death which has to be seen. In this case the facts would show that offence under Section 308 IPC is committed as it would have amounted to culpable homicide if the injured had died. The Section 308 of IPC read as follows : - “308. Attempt to commit culpable homicide.—Whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge and under such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty of culpable homicide not amounting to murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both; and, if hurt is caused to any person by such act, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, or with fine, or with both. Illustration A, on grave and sudden provocation, fires a pistol at Z, under such circumstances that if he thereby caused death he would be guilty of culpable homicide not amounting to murder. A has com­mitted the offence defined in this Section.” 20. The act of Netrapal is an act which he committed with knowledge that had the injured died it would amount to culpable homicide, therefore, we hold that accused Netrapal is guilty of offence punishable under Section 308 IPC and not of Section 307 IPC. 21. A has com­mitted the offence defined in this Section.” 20. The act of Netrapal is an act which he committed with knowledge that had the injured died it would amount to culpable homicide, therefore, we hold that accused Netrapal is guilty of offence punishable under Section 308 IPC and not of Section 307 IPC. 21. The learned Trial Judge has heavily relied on the omission in the FIR and in the statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. All the four accused had come with common intention and assaulted Jamuna Prasad after he rebuked him and tried to pacify the matter. 22. The complainant found all the four accused on the spot when he reached there hearing the noise. He tried to intervene then three accused sons of Lachhman went to their house and after some time came back armed with lathi and pistol. Thereafter on the repeated request of Jamuna Prasad, Netrapal opened fire on him. This story is now consisting of two parts. The story of the three accused going to their house to bring lathi and pistol is not available in the first information report. The complainant Jamuna Prasad has admitted that before this occurrence, he was on friendly terms with the accused and he had no enmity with them. It is clear that even according to prosecution, Jamuna Prasad was made the victim of fire of the accused while he was trying to intervene. Now P.W. 1 has said that when he reached the spot, the three sons of Lachhman had nothing in their hands while Lachhman had a Basula with him. After few minutes Luxman moved aside and the 3 accused went to their house. They came back with lathi and pistol and the firing took place thereafter. This sequence of events is not the same given in the report Ex. Ka 1. In the report it is mentioned by Jamuna Prasad that Nekpal accused came with a pistol in his hand. In the Court, in his oral deposition according to PW 1 it was Netrapal who came with lathi alone. 23. While considering state’s appeal the criminal appeal against the acquittal, principles which have been enunciated by the Apex Court are elaborately discussed and it has been held by the Apex Court time and again that appeal against acquittal should not be easily interfered with if the trial Court’s view is plausible or possible view. 23. While considering state’s appeal the criminal appeal against the acquittal, principles which have been enunciated by the Apex Court are elaborately discussed and it has been held by the Apex Court time and again that appeal against acquittal should not be easily interfered with if the trial Court’s view is plausible or possible view. It is settled legal position that there is presumption of innocence and that presumption is further fortified by the acquittal of the accused by the trial Court. The judgment be reversed only if trial Court’s judgment is utterly perverse, on the basis of evidence and no other view is plausible or possible. The Apex Court in the case of State of U.P. v. Ram Sajeevan reiterated these in 2007 SCC 738. Hence, it is submitted by the learned counsel for the respondents that the learned Judge has rightly held that there was no common intention of causing such injuries which may have caused death of Jamuna Prasad. 24. We have heard learned APP appearing for the appellant State as well as learned advocate appearing for the respondent. At the outset it is required to be noted that the principles which would govern and regulate the hearing of appeal by this Court, against an order of acquittal passed by the trial Court, have been very succinctly explained by the Apex Court in a catena of decisions. In the case of M.S. Narayana Menon @ Mani v. State of Kerala and anther, 2006(6) SCC 39 , the Apex Court has narrated about the powers of the High Court in appeal against the order of acquittal. In para 54 of the decision, the Apex Court has observed as under: “54. In any event the High Court entertained an appeal treating to be an appeal against acquittal, it was in fact exercising the revisional jurisdiction. Even while exercising an appellate power against a judgment of acquittal, the High Court should have borne in mind the wellsettled principles of law that where two view are possible, the appellate Court should not interfere with the finding of acquittal recorded by the Court below.” 25. Further, in the case of Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, 2007(4) SCC 415 , the Apex Court laid down the following principles; “42. Further, in the case of Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, 2007(4) SCC 415 , the Apex Court laid down the following principles; “42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: (1) An appellate Court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate Court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc. are not intended to curtain extensive powers of an appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasis the reluctance of an appellate Court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the Court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate Court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent Court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial Court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court.” 26. Thus, it is a settled principle that while exercising appellate power, even if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court. 27. Even in the case of State of Goa v. Sanjay Thakran and another, 2007(3) SCC 755 , the Apex Court has reiterated the powers of the High Court in such cases. In para 16 of the said decision, the Court has observed as under; “16. 27. Even in the case of State of Goa v. Sanjay Thakran and another, 2007(3) SCC 755 , the Apex Court has reiterated the powers of the High Court in such cases. In para 16 of the said decision, the Court has observed as under; “16. From the aforesaid decisions, it is apparent that while exercising the powers in appeal against the order of acquittal the Court of appeal would not ordinarily interfere with the order of acquittal unless the approach of the lower Court is vitiated by some manifest illegality and the conclusion arrived at would not be arrived at by any reasonable person and, therefore, the decision is to be characterized as perverse. Merely because two views are possible, the Court of appeal would not take the view which would upset the judgment delivered by the Court below. However, the appellate Court has a power to review the evidence if it is of the view that the conclusion arrived at by the Court below is perverse and the Court has committed a manifest error of law and ignored the material evidence on record. A duty is cast upon the appellate Court, in such circumstances, to reappreciate the evidence to arrive to a just decision on the basis of material placed on record to find out whether any of the accused is connected with the commission of the crime he is charged with.” 28. Similar principle has been laid down by the Apex Court in the cases of State of U.P. v. Ram Veer Singh and others, 2007 AIR (SCW) 5553 and in Girja Prasad (Dead) by LRs. v. State of M.P., 2007 AIR (SCW) 5589. Thus, the powers, which this Court may exercise against an order of acquittal, are well settled. 29. In the case of Luna Ram v. Bhupat Singh and others, 2009(3) SCC 749 , the Apex Court in para 10 and 11 has held as under: “10. The High Court has noted that the prosecution version was not clearly believable. Some of the socalled eye witnesses stated that the deceased died because his anke was twisted by an accused. Others said that he was strangulated. It was the case of the prosecution that the injured witnesses were thrown out of the bus. The High Court has noted that the prosecution version was not clearly believable. Some of the socalled eye witnesses stated that the deceased died because his anke was twisted by an accused. Others said that he was strangulated. It was the case of the prosecution that the injured witnesses were thrown out of the bus. The doctor who conducted the postmortem and examined the witnesses had categorically stated that it was not possible that somebody would throw a person out of the bus when it was in running condition. 11. Considering the parameters of appeal against the judgment of acquittal, we are not inclined to interfere in this appeal. The view of the High Court cannot be termed to be perverse and is a possible view on the evidence.” 30. Even in a recent decision of the Apex Court in the case of Mookkiah and another v. State, rep. by the Inspector of Police, Tamil Nadu, AIR 2013 (SC) 321 , the Apex Court in para 4 has held as under: “4. It is not in dispute that the trial Court, on appreciation of oral and documentary evidence led in by the prosecution and defence, acquitted the accused in respect of the charges leveled against them. On appeal by the State, the High Court, by impugned order, reversed the said decision and convicted the accused under Section 302 read with Section 34 of IPC and awarded RI for life. Since counsel for the appellants very much emphasized that the High Court has exceeded its jurisdiction in upsetting the order of acquittal into conviction, let us analyze the scope and power of the High Court in an appeal filed against the order of acquittal. This Court in a series of decisions has repeatedly laid down that as the first appellate Court the High Court, even while dealing with an appeal against acquittal, was also entitled, and obliged as well, to scan through and if need be reappreciate the entire evidence, though while choosing to interfere only the Court should find an absolute assurance of the guilt on the basis of the evidence on record and not merely because the High Court could take one more possible or a different view only. Except the above, where the matter of the extent and depth of consideration of the appeal is concerned, no distinctions or differences in approach are envisaged in dealing with an appeal as such merely because one was against conviction or the other against an acquittal. (Vide State of Rajasthan v. Sohan Lal and others, 2004 5 SCC 573 )” 31. It is also a settled legal position that in acquittal appeal, the appellate Court is not required to rewrite the judgment or to give fresh reasonings, when the reasons assigned by the Court below are found to be just and proper. Such principle is laid down by the Apex Court in the case of State of Karnataka v. Hemareddy, AIR 1981 (SC) 1417 , wherein it is held as under: “... This Court has observed in Girija Nandini Devi v. Bigendra Nandini Choudhary, 1967 1 SCR 93 that it is not the duty of the Appellate Court on the evidence to repeat the narration of the evidence or to reiterate the reasons given by the trial Court expression of general agreement with the reasons given by the Court the decision of which is under appeal, will ordinarily suffice.” 32. Similar principle has been laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Shivasharanappa and others v. State of Karnataka, 2013(7) JT 66 . 33. It is held that in case the appellate Court agrees with the reasons and the opinion given by the lower Court, then the discussion of evidence is not necessary. 34. Recently the Apex Court has held in the case of State of U.P. v. Damodar Das, (2015) 11 SCC 238 and reiterated the duties assigned to the Appellate Court on the principles relating to the jurisdiction of the High Court while deciding the appeal against acquittal wherein in the case of Vinod Kumar v. State of Haryana, AIR 2015 SC 1032 has held and has reiterated that Court of appeal would not ordinarily interfere with order of acquittal unless approach is vitiated by manifest illegality of evaluation of evidence unless it is found that there are substantial and compelling reasons to show that the acquittal should not be reversed in appeal. The conclusion drawn by the trial Court should not be apparently against weight of evidence which can be said to be perverse and where such view would not be taken by any reasonable man. The conclusion drawn by the trial Court should not be apparently against weight of evidence which can be said to be perverse and where such view would not be taken by any reasonable man. Similar view is taken by the Apex Court in the Case of Golbar Hussain v. State of Assam, (2015) 11 SCC 242 hence we will have to consider the case of the acquitted accused from the touchstone of the decisions of the Apex Court. 35. We have gone through the judgment and order passed by the trial Court. We have also perused the oral as well as documentary evidence led before the trial Court and also considered the submissions made by learned advocate for the appellant state. It appears from the record that all four witnesses who are crucial to the prosecution case, had been withheld and not examined. We find that the close relatives of the injured have supported the prosecution case but their versions are different. 36. It is rightly held by the learned Judge that the story of the prosecution becomes very doubtful because of the contradiction and omissions and, therefore, the Government appeal stands dismissed. 37. The finding of fact of learned Judge holding that the deceased, accused and the other two accused were not involved does not appear to be perverse and as discussed herein above the evidence of the witnesses except Netrapal are inconsistent. There were several discrepancies as has rightly been held. It is held that there are material contradictions and, therefore, the presence of the three other accused are doubtful. We concur with the finding of facts of learned judge that on these aspect it cannot be said that they are perverse. The prosecution witnesses have changed their stand and have improved their stand. 38. The finding of fact of learned Judge holding that the deceased, accused and the other two accused were not involved does not appear to be perverse and as discussed herein above the evidence of the witnesses except Netrapal are inconsistent. There were several discrepancies as has rightly been held. It is held that there are material contradictions and, therefore, the presence of the three other accused are doubtful. We concur with the finding of facts of learned judge that on these aspect it cannot be said that they are perverse. The prosecution witnesses have changed their stand and have improved their stand. 39. It is held that there are material contradictions and, therefore, the presence of the three other accused are doubtful. We concur with the finding of facts of learned judge that on these aspect it cannot be said that they are perverse. The prosecution witnesses have changed their stand and have improved their stand. 39. Thus, the State appeal fails and is dismissed. 40. The appeal No. 257 of 1984 is partly allowed. Netrapalis held guilty under Section 308 IPC and ordered to undergo imprisonment which he has already undergone during trial and after he was convicted. We are even forfeited in our view of reducing the sentence on the recent decision of the Apex Court reported in the case of Vinay v. State of Karnataka, (2015) 11 SCC 612 it has been held that the occurrence was more than 13 years before considering the totality of facts and circumstances of the case and the relationship between the parties, interest of justice would be met by reducing the sentence and imposing fine instead and in the said case the Apex Court while reducing the sentence to period already undergone had directed but additional fine/compensation was imposed on each of the appellant accused so as to compensate the injured witnesses. We are also relying on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Jage Ram v. State of Haryana, (2015) 11 SCC 366 wherein also the Apex Court reduced the sentence to already undergone and granted substantial compensation. We also direct Netra Pal to pay fine/compensation of Rs. 20,000/- to the injured within a period of eight weeks from today, failing which he shall undergo one year rigorous imprisonment. . 41. In the final result, the appeal of the Netrapal is partly allowed whereas the State’s Appeal stands dismissed. —————