JUDGMENT : A.J. Shastri, J. By way of present petition petitioner has invoked extra ordinary jurisdiction of this Court for challenging the legality and validity of the award passed by the learned Presiding Officer of the labour Court, Vadodara, in Reference LCV No. 539/2000. 2. The brief facts are as under; 2.1 The case of the petitioner is that the petitioner is a Charitable Trust registered under the provision of Bombay Public Trust Act which is set up in vicinity of Vadodara. The object of the petitioner Trust is to treat and look after the welfare and upliftment of the persons affected, by Leprosy and consequently help them for rehabilitation in their lives. With this avowed approach, the Trust has imparted its activity to the needy persons, who are affected by Leprosy disease. In the context of this activity, the respondent herein since was affected of Leprosy approached the petitioner's Trust, and thereby, was given the adequate training for his rehabilitation. Wile imparting such assistance to the respondent what was expecting from him that he would similarly help and train other Leprosy affected persons. In fact, in reality, the petitioner has submitted that instead of helping such persons has ceased to come to the establishment after March 1995 just after securing an amount of Rs. 5000/-. On 27.03.1995 towards the interest free loan for cobblers job for which he was trained by the establishment. It is the case of the petitioner that this assistance provided by way of Rs. 5000/- of interest free loan from the establishment, but the said sympathy was found undue to him as he stop coming from March 1995. It is stated by the petitioner that, though respondent himself ceased to come to the establishment has raised an industrial dispute on the false premise that he was orally terminated from the service with effect from 01.04.1995, and thereby raised the demand for reinstatement with back wage and other incidental benefit. The said Reference was registered as a Reference LCV No. 900/95, which was initially decided ex-parte. Later on, upon an application filed by the petitioner under Rule 26A of Industrial Disputes Act (Gujarat Rules). The said ex-parte award was set aside and Reference was re-numbered after restoration as LCV No. 539/2000. The said Reference was registered as a Reference LCV No. 900/95, which was initially decided ex-parte. Later on, upon an application filed by the petitioner under Rule 26A of Industrial Disputes Act (Gujarat Rules). The said ex-parte award was set aside and Reference was re-numbered after restoration as LCV No. 539/2000. 2.2 It is upon adjudication of the said Reference, the learned Presiding Officer has passed an award on 24.01.2000 by directing the petitioner to reinstate the respondent to his original post with all consequential benefits and full backwages and a cost of Rs. 500 came to be inflicted upon. It is against this award passed by the learned Presiding Officer, the petitioner has approached to this Court by way of present petition. On 24.07.2006, the petition came to be entertained by this Court and it appears from the record that after hearing, the Court passed a detailed order on 23.11.2007, which order worth to be taken note of, hence, reproduce hereinafter. “Heard learned advocate Mr. N.M Shah for the petitioner and Shri Rakesh Makwana, General Secretary of Gujarat General Kamdar Panchayat, appearing on behalf of respondent. Learned advocate Mr. Shah for the petitioner submitted that respondent workman is already reinstated by the petitioner in service w.e.f. 22.2.2007 This fact is not disputed by Shri Rakesh Makwana, General Secretary appearing on behalf of respondent workman. The respondent workman is also personally remained present before this Court and has not disputed this fact that w.e.f 22.2.2007, he is working with the petitioner. However, the only grievance the respondent workman is that last drawn wages is paid by the petitioner to the extent of Rs. 30.per day. Therefore, Shri Rakesh Makwana, General Secretary submitted that respondent workman is entitled the minimum wages as per Minimum Wages Act as notified by the State Government. For that, it is open for the respondent workman to file necessary application under the provisions of the Minimum Wages Act against the petitioner. Learned advocate Mr. Shah submitted that even fellow employee in the petitioner establishment is receiving only Rs. 40/- per day, who is working since more than 15 years. He also submitted that petitioner is a Charitable Trust working for rehabilitation of the leprosy affected persons. Considering the entire matter and submissions and factual aspects and the fact that reinstatement is implemented by the petitioner, therefore, adinterim relief in terms of Para. 40/- per day, who is working since more than 15 years. He also submitted that petitioner is a Charitable Trust working for rehabilitation of the leprosy affected persons. Considering the entire matter and submissions and factual aspects and the fact that reinstatement is implemented by the petitioner, therefore, adinterim relief in terms of Para. 7(c) qua back wages is granted subject to reinstatement order is already passed by petitioner in favour of respondent workman. Notice as to interim relief returnable on 14.12.2007 In view of the ad-interim relief granted by this Court in main SCA No. 10346 of 2006, Civil Application No. 12286 of 2007 does not survive. Accordingly, Civil Application No. 12286 of 2007 is disposed of.” 3. Later on 14.12.2007, since the respondent-workman was already said to have been reinstated and was working, the adinterim relief granted qua backwages is confirmed till the matter is finally decided and hence in the background of this fact the present proceedings are taken up for final disposal. 4. From the record, it appears that a Reference is referred under Section 10(1)(c) of Industrial Disputes Act to the labour court, Vadodara, and dealing an industrial dispute raised by the respondent a relief of reinstatement with all backwages in the said Reference proceedings claimed at Exh.3 The respondent-workman has filed a claim statement inter-alia submitting that he was working in the petitioner's establishment with effect from 01.07.1988 and was discharging his duty as permanent employee dealing in shoes/footwear making activity. It was submitted that on 18.03.1990 even respondent-workman was awarded a national medal and has time and again raised the grievance against the petitioner's establishment that no minimum wages prescribed under the Act were paid nor even special dearness allowance paid. In addition to other incidental benefits attached to the service conditions not paid and thereby, contended that there is sheer exploitation executed by petitioner establishment, and it is the case of the respondent-workman that when such demand was pressed he was discontinued from the service orally on 01.04.2005 As against the said plea of respondent-workman, it appears that the petitioner establishment has submitted a detail reply vide Exh.23 inter-alia contending that there is no employer and employee relationship exists between respondent and petitioner establishment and therefore Reference itself is required to be dismissed as untenable. It is submitted that petitioner establishment is a Charitable Trust registered before the Office of the Charity Commissioner of Vadodara, and imparting a laudable activity of helping the persons affected by Leprosy disease and with the said avowed object of rehabilitating them in the society Trust is functioning. It was also submitted that by the establishment that the Chappals (Footwear), which are being made in the institute are essentially meant for the persons affected by Leprosy which are popularly known as MCR Chappals (Footwear). These essentially are provided to various hospitals and the establishments, which are dealing in this kind of activity and there is no profit motive behind this activity, and therefore, contended that it does not even be termed as an industry. It was also contended that various activities are being undertaken and for that purpose, the activity of Shoes making for which some financial assistance in the form of loan is being provided, but the respondent has mis-utilized the sympathy showed to him and raised a frivolous industrial dispute. During the course of adjudication vide Exh.5-16, 36, 37, the documentary evidence came to be led by respondent, whereas, the petitioner establishment has submitted a list containing documents vide Exh.50 The respondent has tendered his deposition vide Exh.6 and as against that one of the Trustees Viz. Purshottam Panchal came to be examined by the petitioner vide Exh.27 and vide Exh.38 the petitioner establishment has tendered its closer purshis, both the parties to the References have led their respective written arguments, and after considering the overall materials on record as stated above the learned Presiding Officer of the labour court on 24.01.2005 passed an award, allowing the reference and consequently directed the petitioner establishment to reinstate the respondent to his original post with all consequential benefits and backwages and awarded Rs. 500/- by way of cost. This background has led the petitioner to approach to this Court. 5. Mr. A.K. Clerk, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner with Mr. Nilesh Shah, learned advocate has submitted that the petitioner establishment is an establishment which is not set up for profit motive, it is merely a Charitable Trust set up solely with a view to help the people who are suffering from Leprosy disease and therefore these persons like respondents are not the employees of the Trust. Nilesh Shah, learned advocate has submitted that the petitioner establishment is an establishment which is not set up for profit motive, it is merely a Charitable Trust set up solely with a view to help the people who are suffering from Leprosy disease and therefore these persons like respondents are not the employees of the Trust. Therefore, the petitioner being a Charitable Institute cannot be even termed as an industry. Mr. Clerk, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has drawn the attention of this Court to various documents to indicate that the Trust is set up not for the profit motive nor for any commercial goal and has drawn the attention about the object and activities of the Trust as reflected from page 21 of the petition compilation. It was also submitted by the counsel for the petitioner that the respondent has been financially assisted in the form of interest free loan of Rs. 5000/- for rehabilitating him in the society and has submitted that after taking such loan on 27.03.1995, he on his own has not come back to this establishment. Learned counsel for the petitioner has drawn attention to the receipt attached to the petition compilation at page 37. It was also brought to the notice that one of the Trustees of the petitioner's Trust has specifically deposed before the learned Presiding Officer that Trust is not getting any grant from the Government, it is imparting its activity solely on the assistance of donation which are received. It was also brought to the notice that the respondent was merely a trainee, getting training of footwear making and he was not an employee of the Trust. It was also drawn the attention from the examination of the said Trustees that respondent has demanded the loan for rehabilitating himself in the society and the same was provided, and after getting said amount he on his own left the petitioner's Trust and, Trust has not prevented or discontinued him from coming in any manner to the Trust. Mr. A.K. Clerk, learned counsel has further drawn the attention that the respondent and his wife both were suffering from this disease of Leprosy and in the similar way to mis-utilize the sympathy by filling simultaneous proceedings. The wife has also raised industrial dispute before the learned Presiding Officer of labour court, Vadodara. Mr. A.K. Clerk, learned counsel has further drawn the attention that the respondent and his wife both were suffering from this disease of Leprosy and in the similar way to mis-utilize the sympathy by filling simultaneous proceedings. The wife has also raised industrial dispute before the learned Presiding Officer of labour court, Vadodara. The Counsel for the petitioner has also drawn the attention to the said Reference which came to be decided on 24.06.2005, which was filed by wife of respondent and has submitted that the said Reference upon due examination of material on record of similar nature came to be dismissed and against that no further proceedings appear to have been carried on and therefore this being identical situation, this litigation in the form of Reference generated by respondent deserves to be dismissed on the similar way. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that the Trust activities are valuable service to the needy people in society and the Trust is running solely on the basis of donations, and not running on other financial assistance and therefore if such kind of situation is allowed to be operated upon, it was contended that very object of the Trust will be frustrated and the Trust would lead to a situation of closure, and therefore, the learned counsel has submitted that since the activities of the Trust are smoothly being monitored, and the accounts are being regularly audited and the Trust is imparting its valuable service of this nature may not be allowed to be mis-utilized by the persons like respondents and therefore requested the Court to quash and set aside the impugned award passed by the learned Presiding Officer. Learned counsel has contended that while dealing with Reference the learned Presiding Officer has ignored the ratio laid down by well known decision reported in AIR 1997 SC 548 precisely in paragraph 132 at page 586 of the said decision and has committed grave error in exercising jurisdiction, since the petitioner's Trust is based on philanthropic, devotion and wholehearted dedicated mission service to the society. The work of the respondent in the Trust for sometime may not be treated as an employment and therefore contended that the learned Presiding Officer has seriously committed an error of jurisdiction in passing the impugned award. The work of the respondent in the Trust for sometime may not be treated as an employment and therefore contended that the learned Presiding Officer has seriously committed an error of jurisdiction in passing the impugned award. Looking to the material on record since the serious error of jurisdiction as stated above is committed by the learned Presiding Officer, the counsel has requested the Court to set aside the impugned award. 6. To oppose the petition, the learned counsel Ms. G.R. Vijayalaxmi appearing on behalf of the respondent no. 1 has contended that the order passed by the learned Presiding Officer is a well reasoned order based upon appreciation of material on record and also upon analysis of deposition adduced before it, and thereby contended that no interference be made. It was also contended by the learned counsel that, infact in reality, the respondent-workman right from July 1988 has worked as permanent employee as a Shoe Maker and his services have been all throughout remained appreciable. It was also pointed out that the Central Government has on the contrary appreciated the service of the respondent as a workman as an employee in the petitioner institute, and therefore, in view of the said certificate of appreciation dated 18.03.1990 which is part of the record of the Reference, it is established that there was an employee employer relationship existed. The learned counsel has submitted that, on the contrary, since the Minimum Wages Act was not observed, the salary as per the standard prescribed by German Leprosy Mission was not being paid, the Dearness Allowance has also not been paid other incidental benefits attached to the service conditions are also not paid. Resultantly, the respondent had raised a demand before the petitioner institute and it is against that demand a consequential step of discontinuance has been taken against the respondent with effect from 01.04.2005, and therefore, the learned counsel has submitted that the award passed by the learned Presiding Officer is just and proper. It was also submitted by the counsel that it is incorrect on the part of the petitioner to contend that footwears were being manufactured solely for the benefit of the persons suffer on account of Leprosy. On the contrary, there was voluminous record to indicate that by selling the footwears meant for a regular persons were being manufactured and sold, and thereby, a sizable amount of profit was generated. On the contrary, there was voluminous record to indicate that by selling the footwears meant for a regular persons were being manufactured and sold, and thereby, a sizable amount of profit was generated. It was also contended that there is an organized activity going on in a systematic manner which tantamounts to suggest that the petitioner establishment is an industry as defined under Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The learned counsel has stated that simply because the profit element is stated to have been missing, it cannot be said that it is not an industry. The profit generating element is not the sole criteria to define whether the establishment is an industry or not, and therefore, this being the position looking to the organized and systematic activity of the petitioner establishment, the learned counsel submitted that it is an industry which would attract the provisions of the Act, and therefore, the counsel submitted that since the entire material was considered by the learned Presiding Officer, the award substantiated by valid reason and does not call for any interference. The learned counsel has submitted that there is a specific finding arrived at by the learned Presiding Officer that about a breach of statutory provisions of the Act and such finding of fact! is based upon an appreciation of material, and therefore in extra ordinary jurisdiction, the said finding may not disturbed or substituted. It was also contended by the counsel that there is a systematic design adopted by the petitioner that initially the original award was allowed to be passed ex-parte by not remaining present, thereafter, the recalling of order application came to be submitted under Rule 26A and after renumbering the same present Reference came before the Court, and therefore, there is a systematic manner on the part of the petitioner establishment to keep itself away from the consequential statutory responsibilities and issue being dragged on. It was also submitted by the counsel that no financial assistance was provided to the respondent-workman, and when the respondent-workman joined the service, he was not suffering from Leprosy. It was prior in point of time that the respondent had Leprosy. When the respondent joined the institute he was in perfect state of health. On the contrary, as a skilled employee, the Central Government has awarded the certificate which is undisputed fact emerging from the record. It was prior in point of time that the respondent had Leprosy. When the respondent joined the institute he was in perfect state of health. On the contrary, as a skilled employee, the Central Government has awarded the certificate which is undisputed fact emerging from the record. It was also contended by the counsel that there was a staff list position produced before the learned Presiding Officer by way of document remarks 16/16, where there is a reference to the name of the respondent. It was also pointed out that the award which has been received was at the instance and recommendation of the petitioner establishment and therefore now simply because an Industrial Disputes Act came to be raised, it is not open for petitioner establishment to contend that respondent was not working as an employee. The learned counsel further submitted that in cross-examination of the witness on behalf of the petitioner establishment viz. Mr. Purshottam Panchal has admitted that he is not aware about the fact that whether respondent was stop coming on his own or not? It was salso admitted by the said witness that the respondent was not served with any notice as a trainee in the institute. It was coming out from the examination of witness that there is no notice prior to discontinue service nor any inquiry conducted during a period of 7 years. Undisputably, the respondent is discharged from his service. Learned counsel further submitted that prior to discontinuance, a specific violation has taken place of statutory provision under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act and this being a mandate of the statute, the learned Presiding Officer has rightly exercised the discretion. It was pointed out that the specific finding which has been arrived at in award dated 21.01.2005 which is based upon appreciation and analysis of material evidence on record, and therefore, contended that even if another view is possible, this Court may not exercise extra ordinary jurisdiction to substitute such findings. The learned counsel has drawn the attention to certain documents which are part of the record of the learned Presiding Officer and has stated before the Court to dismiss the petition. It appears from the overall consideration that the petitioner establishment whether is an industry or not? The learned counsel has drawn the attention to certain documents which are part of the record of the learned Presiding Officer and has stated before the Court to dismiss the petition. It appears from the overall consideration that the petitioner establishment whether is an industry or not? No detail submissions made either of the learned advocates representing the respective parties, and therefore, the Court is proceedings on the premise that there may not be any serious dispute with regard to the fact that petitioner is an industry as defined under Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, and therefore, what is left open for the Court is to adjudicate and examine whether the award passed by the learned Presiding Officer in the context of aforesaid circumstances is just and proper or not, and from the background of that fact, this Court is now dealing with the contentions raised by the respective counsels. 7. Having heard the learned counsels appearing for the respective parties and having perused the material on record and examine the evidence led before the learned Presiding Officer, Court found that the fact of finding authority viz., learned Presiding Officer of the labour court on the basis of documentary as well as oral evidence came to the following conclusion in exercise of its discretion vested in law. 8. The first conclusion is on the issue of a definition of industry defined under Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short the “Act”). The learned Presiding Officer on the basis of material on record and in view of the decision delivered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Bangalore Water Supply Sewerage Board Vs. A. Rajappa, reported in (1978) 2 SCC 213 : AIR 1978 SC 548 has examined and found that the petitioner-Trust is falling within the purview of definition of industry as defined under Section 2(j) of the Act and for arriving at such conclusion the learned Presiding Officer has examined the documents adduced before it in the form of staff list produced at Exh.17/16, has also examined the annual budget papers vide Exh. 16/17, and has also considered the material related to footwear workshop information and keeping in mind the criteria laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case referred to above came to the conclusion that the petitioner establishment is having a systematic activity and therefore simply because the profit element is missing as stated, it cannot exclude itself from the definition of industry and therefore after analyzing the material on record the specific conclusion is arrived at that the petitioner establishment is an industry as defined under Section 2(j) of the Act. So far as another issue, whether the respondent herein has worked as an employee in the petitioner establishment or not. The learned Presiding Officer has come to the conclusion specifically that the respondent herein was working as a Shoe Maker in the petitioner establishment. It is born out from the record that the learned Presiding Officer has considered the evidence at length and found that prior to joining the petitioner establishment, the respondent had already taken training at Madras for seven months. It was also considered by the learned Presiding Officer that at the time when the respondent-workman joined the establishment, he was not suffering from serious disease of Leprosy. The learned Presiding Officer found, this position of respondent has remained undisputed. It was also noticed by the learned Presiding Officer that the respondent herein had received a national award as “Skilled Employee”, and therefore, he was not merely a trainee. It was also noticed by the learned Presiding Officer that in the staff list prepared by the petitioner establishment, the respondent was at a serial no. 5 and his date of joining as Shoe Maker is 01.07.1988 and salary received Rs. 1000/- per month, which document is signed by the Director of petitioner institute produced on record at Exh.16/16, and this document of staff list at Exh.16/16 is not disputed by the witness of petitioner establishment in cross-examination. Nowhere, the respondent was shown as a trainee. In the qualification column, it is stated that respondent has taken a special training for “MCR Sandal”, and therefore, on the basis of this material produced on record, the leaned Presiding Officer has specifically come to the conclusion that respondent was working in fact as Shoe Maker. Nowhere, the respondent was shown as a trainee. In the qualification column, it is stated that respondent has taken a special training for “MCR Sandal”, and therefore, on the basis of this material produced on record, the leaned Presiding Officer has specifically come to the conclusion that respondent was working in fact as Shoe Maker. It is worth to be noted here that to dislodge this stand of the respondent and the conclusion, which is arrived at there is no material contrary is produced by the petitioner establishment, and therefore, undisputedly, it appears that this conclusion of the learned Presiding Officer is based upon the material produced before it. So far as another issue which is framed by the learned Presiding Officer as to whether respondent was orally discontinued from the service or not by the petitioner establishment and qua that the learned Presiding Officer has categorically come to the conclusion that there is no evidence any nature produced by the petitioner establishment to prima-facie suggest that respondent has abandoned the service, and therefore, it is established as found by the learned Presiding Officer that respondent was orally discontinued from the service. To arrive at this conclusion, it appears from the record that the learned Presiding Officer has analyzed the evidence of the witness of petitioner establishment itself viz., Purshottam Panchal and after analyzing this evidence, more particularly cross-examination, it was found by the learned Presiding Officer that respondent whether on his own has stop coming is not within his personal knowledge. It was also found by the learned Presiding Officer that to substantiate that respondent was simply a trainee therefore no notice was required and to justify this stand, no document or any evidence is available with Mr. Purshottam Panchal. It was undisputedly found by the learned Presiding Officer that there is no notice issued by the petitioner establishment, no inquiry was conducted, no misconduct was alleged and no material or notice served if respondent-workman has really abandoned the service. From the material on record, it was found by the learned Presiding Officer, that for a long period of 7 years right from 1988-95, the respondent has worked in the petitioner establishment and during that work, respondent was a recipient of national award. From the material on record, it was found by the learned Presiding Officer, that for a long period of 7 years right from 1988-95, the respondent has worked in the petitioner establishment and during that work, respondent was a recipient of national award. It was found by the learned Presiding Officer that, for discontinuance, no requirement is observed as provided under Section 25-F of the Act, and thereby, has found that there appears to be a sheer violation of condition precedent of Section 25-F of the Act. It was also noticed by the learned Presiding Officer that to dislodge the case of the respondent, the petitioner establishment has not provided on record any cogent evidence. The fact of loan of Rs. 5000/- is taken note of, but it appears to have been found of no consequence by the learned Presiding Officer, and therefore, a specific conclusion came to be arrived at to indicate that the petitioner establishment has orally discontinued the respondent. So far as forth and the last issue as to in this set of circumstance what should be the effective order whether the reinstatement with backwages? The issue no. 4 has been dealt with by the learned Presiding Officer and has found that since the petitioner establishment fall within the purview of Section 2(j) of the Act, and is an industry, and since the respondent-workman has served for more than a period of 6 years and more, the oral discontinuance is found by the learned Presiding Officer as illegal and as a consequent of it, the learned Presiding Officer found to reinstate with arrears of salary, which ultimately ordered by the learned Presiding Officer. It was noticed by the learned Presiding Officer that conduct on the part of the petitioner establishment to throw away such kind of employee, who is recipient of national award, the action is found to be not just and proper and ultimately by arriving at such kind of specific finding based upon record an award came to be passed on 24.01.2015, ordering reinstatement of respondent-workman to his original post with continuity of service and with full backwages and other incidental benefits and a cost of Rs. 500/- is awarded, and therefore, while passing the order impugned in the petition on the basis of overall material on record, the aforesaid finding of fact specifically came to be arrived at by the learned Presiding Officer in exercise of its due discretion vested in the law. This finding of fact, which is assailed by the petitioner establishment by way of present petition under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. 9. Before dealing with the respective contentions of the counsels appearing for the parties, the few propositions of law found to be necessary to deal with, and therefore, the same is being considered to deal with present controversy in the following premises. 10. The law is by now well settled as to under which circumstance the jurisdiction under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India can be exercised. Since long, time and again, the Hon'ble Apex Court has propounded that what is to be looked into is the decision making process whether the authority or the Court below has exercised the powers well within the scope of its authority or not and it is settled principle of law that High Court in exercise of extra ordinary jurisdiction is not sitting as an appeal over the decision and it is not the function of the High Court to substitute the finding of fact arrived at by the Court or the Tribunal below unless it is so perverse or reflecting manifest injustice. Few parameters are spelt out by the Apex Court on the issue of exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. One of such decisions is in case of Sameer Suresh Gupta TR PA Holder Vs. Rahul Kumar Agarwal, reported in (2013) 9 SCC 374 , it is held in Para.7 and 8 as under: “7. In our view, the impugned order is liable to be set aside because while deciding the writ petition filed by the respondent the learned Single Judge ignored the limitations of the High Court's jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. The parameters for exercise of power by the High Court under that Article were considered by the two Judge Bench of this Court in Surya Dev Rai Vs. Ram Chander Rai, (2003) 6 SCC 675 . The parameters for exercise of power by the High Court under that Article were considered by the two Judge Bench of this Court in Surya Dev Rai Vs. Ram Chander Rai, (2003) 6 SCC 675 . After considering various facets of the issue, the two Judge Bench culled out the following principles: “(1) Amendment by Act No. 46 of 1999 with effect from 01-07-2002 in Section 115 of Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. (2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by the CPC Amendment Act No. 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in, and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court. (3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction, i.e. when a subordinate court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction - by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none, or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction - by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified, and thereby occasioning failure of justice. (4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the subordinate courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When the subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (i) the error is manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law, and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident, i.e. which can be perceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the subordinate court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the abovesaid two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a subordinate court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the lis. (8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not covert itself into a Court of Appeal and indulge in re-appreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct errors of mere formal or technical character. (9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercised by the High Courts in India unlike English courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the subordinate courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the subordinate courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the subordinate court as to the manner in which it would act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the subordinate court as the court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.” 8. The same question was considered by another Bench in Shalini Shyam Shetty Vs. Rajendra Shankar Patil, (2010) 8 SCC 329 , and it was held: “(a) A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is different from a petition under Article 227. The mode of exercise of power by the High Court under these two articles is also different. (b) In any event, a petition under Article 227 cannot be called a writ petition. The history of the conferment of writ jurisdiction on High Courts is substantially different from the history of conferment of the power of superintendence on the High Courts under Article 227 and have been discussed above. (c) High Courts cannot, at the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the orders of tribunals or courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a court of appeal over the orders of the court or tribunal subordinate to it. In cases where an alternative statutory mode of redressal has been provided, that would also operate as a restrain on the exercise of this power by the High Court. (d) The parameters of interference by High Courts in exercise of their power of superintendence have been repeatedly laid down by this Court. In this regard the High Court must be guided by the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam Singh and the principles in Waryam Singh have been repeatedly followed by subsequent Constitution Benches and various other decisions of this Court. In this regard the High Court must be guided by the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam Singh and the principles in Waryam Singh have been repeatedly followed by subsequent Constitution Benches and various other decisions of this Court. (e) According to the ratio in Waryam Singh, followed in subsequent cases, the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction of superintendence can interfere in order only to keep the tribunals and courts subordinate to it, “within the bounds of their authority”. (f) In order to ensure that law is followed by such tribunals and courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested in them and by not declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them. (g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and (f), High Court can interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of the tribunals and courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted. (h) In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than the one taken by the tribunals or courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised. (i) The High Court's power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any statute. It has been declared a part of the basic structure of the Constitution by the Constitution Bench of this Court in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India and therefore abridgment by a constitutional amendment is also very doubtful. (j) It may be true that a statutory amendment of a rather cognate provision, like Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999 does not and cannot cut down the ambit of High Court's power under Article 227. At the same time, it must be remembered that such statutory amendment does not correspondingly expand the High Court's jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227. (k) The power is discretionary and has to be exercised on equitable principle. In an appropriate case, the power can be exercised suo motu. At the same time, it must be remembered that such statutory amendment does not correspondingly expand the High Court's jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227. (k) The power is discretionary and has to be exercised on equitable principle. In an appropriate case, the power can be exercised suo motu. (l) On a proper appreciation of the wide and unfettered power of the High Court under Article 227, it transpires that the main object of this article is to keep strict administrative and judicial control by the High Court on the administration of justice within its territory. (m) The object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under this article is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and courts subordinate to the High Court. (n) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of relief in individual cases but should be directed for promotion of public confidence in the administration of justice in the larger public interest whereas Article 226 is meant for protection of individual grievance. Therefore, the power under Article 227 may be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline pointed out above. (o) An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be counterproductive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality.” 11. In addition to the aforesaid proposition of the Apex Court, the recent pronouncement in a decision in case of Jasmeer Singh Vs. State of Haryana reported in (2015) 4 SCC 458 also relied upon the earlier decision. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that no interference be made in the finding recorded by the Industrial Court or the labour court as the case may be. “18. The said award is challenged by the respondent employer in Civil Writ Petition No. 9532 of 2001 urging untenable contentions. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that no interference be made in the finding recorded by the Industrial Court or the labour court as the case may be. “18. The said award is challenged by the respondent employer in Civil Writ Petition No. 9532 of 2001 urging untenable contentions. In the said writ petition, the High Court exercised its jurisdiction contrary to the judgment of this Court in Syed Yakoob v. K.S Radhakrishnan and also the judgment, which was referred to in Harijinder Singh v. Punjab State Warehousing Corpn. The learned counsel for the appellant has aptly placed reliance upon another judgment of Anoop Sharma v. Public Health Division in support of her legal submissions that both the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court have erred in exercising their supervisory power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India in setting aside the finding of the fact recorded on the facts based on the pleadings and evidence on record.” 19. Further in Harijinder Singh v. Punjab State Warehousing Corpn., wherein this Court opined on the exercise of power by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India as under:(SCC p.205, para 21) “21. Before concluding, we consider it necessary to observe that while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution in matters like the present one, the High Courts are duty-bound to keep in mind that the Industrial Disputes Act and other similar legislative instruments are social welfare legislations and the same are required to be interpreted keeping in view the goals set out in the Preamble of the Constitution and the provisions contained in Part IV thereof in general and Articles 38, 39(a) to (e), 43 and 43-A in particular, which mandate that the State should secure a social order for the promotion of welfare of the people, ensure equality between men and women and equitable distribution of material resources of the community to sub-serve the common good and also ensure that the workers get their dues. More than 41 years ago, Gajendragadkar, J., opined that: ‘10… The concept of social and economic justice is a living concept of revolutionary import; it gives sustenance to the rule of law and meaning and significance to the to the ideal of welfare State.’ (State of Mysore v. Workers of Gold Mines, AIR p.928, para 10) 20. More than 41 years ago, Gajendragadkar, J., opined that: ‘10… The concept of social and economic justice is a living concept of revolutionary import; it gives sustenance to the rule of law and meaning and significance to the to the ideal of welfare State.’ (State of Mysore v. Workers of Gold Mines, AIR p.928, para 10) 20. In view of the aforesaid statement of law the setting aside of the award by the learned Single Judge which is affirmed by the Division Bench is vitiated in law as the same is contrary to the judgments of this Court referred to supra, upon which the learned counsel for the appellant has rightly placed reliance in support of the correctness of the finding recorded by the Labour Court on the various issue, particularly the finding of fact that the workman has worked for more than 240 days in a calendar year and termination order is void ab initio in law for noncompliance with Sections 25-F clauses (a) and (b), 25-G and 25-H of the Act, therefore, the Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court has rightly set aside the order of termination of service of the workman and awarded the order of reinstatement with continuity of service and full back wages. 12. Reiterating the said scope of interference, the Hon'ble Apex Court in a decision in case of Pepsico India Holding Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Krishna Kant Pandey, reported in (2015) 4 SCC 270 , has propounded that finding of fact is not to be interfered with once the court below has arrived at based upon the evidence on record. The relevant extract of the said decision are in Para. 14, 15 and 16 which deserve to be taken note of, hence reproduced as under: “14. While discussing the power of the High Court under Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution interfering with the facts recorded by the courts or the tribunal this Court in Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao v. Ashalata S. Guram, held as under: (SCC pp.458-59, para 17) ‘17. In case of finding of facts, the Court should not interfere in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. In case of finding of facts, the Court should not interfere in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. Reference may be made to the observations of this Court in Bathutmal Raichand Oswal v. Laxmibai R. Tarta where this Court observed that the High Court could not in the guise of exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227 convert itself into a court of appeal when the legislature has not conferred a right of appeal. The High Court was not competent to correct errors of facts by examining the evidence and re-appreciating. Speking for the Court, Bhagwati, J. as the learned Chief Justice then was, observed at AIR p.1301 of the Report as follows: (SCC p.864, para 7) ‘7. The special civil application preferred by the appellant was admittedly an application under Article 227 and it is, therefore, material only to consider the scope and ambit of the jurisdiction of the High Court under that article. Did the High Court have jurisdiction in an application under Article 227 to disturb the findings of fact reached by the District Court? It is well settled by the decision of this Court in Waryam Singh v. Amarnath (AIR p. 217, para 14) that the “power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 is, as pointed out by Harries, C.J, in Dalmia Jain Ariways Ltd. v. Sukumar Mukharjee, to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors”. This statement of law was quoted with approval in the subsequent decision of this Court in Nagendra Nath bora v. Commr. Of Hills Division and it was pointed out by Sinha, J., as the then was, speaking on behalf of the Court in that case: (AIR p.413, para 30) “30….It is, thus, clear that the powers of judicial interference under Article 227 of the Constitution with orders of judicial or quasi-judicial nature, are not greater than the power under Article 226 of the Constitution. Under Article 226, the power of interference may extend to quashing an impugned order on the ground of a mistake apparent on the face of the record. But under Article 227 of the Constitution, the power of interference is limited to seeing that the tribunal functions within the limits of its authority.” 15. In Birla Corpn. Under Article 226, the power of interference may extend to quashing an impugned order on the ground of a mistake apparent on the face of the record. But under Article 227 of the Constitution, the power of interference is limited to seeing that the tribunal functions within the limits of its authority.” 15. In Birla Corpn. Ltd. v. Rajeshwar Mahato, the question of validity of termination of services of the respondent by the appellant corporation was referred to the Industrial Tribunal. On evidence, the Industrial Tribunal found that the duties of the respondent were mainly managerial or administrative. The Tribunal held that the respondent was not a workman and the reference was therefore not maintainable against the decision of the Tribunal. The High Court relying on Section 2(s)(iv) (as amended in West Bengal) held that as the respondent was drawing salary less than Rs. 1600 per month, he had to be regarded as a workman. The Corporation moved this Court against the order of the High Court. This Court while setting aside the decision of the High Court held as under: (SCC pp.612-14, paras 4 & 11-12) “4. It was not in dispute that at the time of the termination of services of respondent 1, he was receiving Rs. 1185 per month by way of salary. The Tribunal recorded the evidence as well as took into consideration documentary evidence which was produced by the parties. On the basis of the evidence which was adduced before it the Tribunal observed that: The main duties of Shri Rajeshwar Mahato were both supervisory and administrative in nature. In the instant case, Shri Mahato's functions were mainly of a managerial nature. He had control as well as supervision over the work of the jute mill workers working under him.’ 11. As we have also noticed hereinabove, the Tribunal had given a categorical finding to the effect that Respondent 1's function was mainly of managerial nature. His duties were both supervisory and administrative and therefore he was regarded as not being a workman. Though the Tribunal did not specifically state so, it is evident that it is because of Section 2(s)(iii) that Respondent 1 was regarded as not being a workman. 12. Neither the Single Judge nor the Division Bench of the High Court, as we have already noticed, referred to this aspect of the matter. Though the Tribunal did not specifically state so, it is evident that it is because of Section 2(s)(iii) that Respondent 1 was regarded as not being a workman. 12. Neither the Single Judge nor the Division Bench of the High Court, as we have already noticed, referred to this aspect of the matter. Even assuming that the West Bengal amendment was applicable, that would still not help to hold Respondent 1 as a workman if the finding of the Tribunal with regard to the nature of the duties performed by him, as arrived at by the Tribunal, is not set aside as being frivolous or without any evidence. As long as the finding of the Tribunal stands, namely, that the respondent was an employee mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity, the award of the Tribunal could not have been set aside. As we have already observed the Single Judge or even the Division Bench could have come to the conclusion that the finding so arrived at by the Tribunal was either frivolous or not based on any evidence. But this aspect of the case was completely overlooked by the High Court. The emphasis of the Single Judge as well as the Division Bench was only with regard to applicability of the amendment of the State of West Bengal to Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act. In our opinion, therefore, the High Court erred in allowing on its ground the writ petition filed by Respondent 1. The decision of the High Court is set aside and the writ petition filed therein by the respondent stands dismissed.” 16. In Indian Overseas Bank v. Staff Canteen Workers' Union, this Court considered a similar question with regard to the power of the High Court under Article 226 against the findings recorded by the Industrial Tribunal. Reversing the decision of the Single Judge and restoring the fact-finding decision of the Tribunal, this Court held: (SCC pp. 259-60 para 17) “17. The learned Single Judge seems to have undertaken an exercise, impermissible for him in exercising writ jurisdiction, by liberally re-appreciating the evidence and drawing conclusions of his own on pure questions of fact, unmindful, though aware fully, that he is not exercising any appellate jurisdiction over the awards passed by a tribunal, presided over by a judicial officer. The learned Single Judge seems to have undertaken an exercise, impermissible for him in exercising writ jurisdiction, by liberally re-appreciating the evidence and drawing conclusions of his own on pure questions of fact, unmindful, though aware fully, that he is not exercising any appellate jurisdiction over the awards passed by a tribunal, presided over by a judicial officer. The findings of fact recorded by a fact-finding authority duly constituted for the purpose and which ordinarily should be considered to have become final, cannot be disturbed for the mere reason of having been based on materials or evidence not sufficient or credible in the opinion of the writ court to warrant those findings, at any rate, as long as they are based upon some material which are relevant for the purpose or even on the ground that there is yet another view which can reasonably and possibly be taken. The Division Bench was not only justified but well merited in its criticism of the order of the learned Single Judge and in ordering restoration of the award of the Tribunal. On being taken through the findings of the Industrial Tribunal as well as the order of the learned Single Judge and the judgment of the Division Bench, we are of the view that the Industrial Tribunal had overwhelming materials which constituted ample and sufficient basis for recording its findings, as it did, and the manner of consideration undertaken, the objectivity of approach adopted and reasonableness of findings recorded seems to be unexceptionable. The only course, therefore, open to the writ Judges was to find out the satisfaction or otherwise of the relevant criteria laid down by this Court, before sustaining the claim of the canteen workmen, on the facts found and recorded by the fact-finding authority and not embark upon an exercise of reassessing the evidence and arriving at findings of one's own, altogether giving a complete go-by even to the facts specifically found by the Tribunal below.” 13. Therefore, in view of aforesaid consistent proposition of law on the issue of interference by the High Court, the scope is well defined by the Apex Court, and therefore keeping in mind this scope, the case on hand is required to be dealt with. 14. Therefore, in view of aforesaid consistent proposition of law on the issue of interference by the High Court, the scope is well defined by the Apex Court, and therefore keeping in mind this scope, the case on hand is required to be dealt with. 14. In the present case, no doubt the petitioner establishment is a Trust registered under the provision of Bombay Public Trust Act and is essentially catering and nourishing the need of persons suffering from Leprosy. For time being it can also be assumed that Trust is not essentially set up for profiteering and the income generated by the activity is being utilized for the persons suffering from this kind of disease, but fact remains that the circumstance under which the respondent is dealt with is also requires consideration. Few facts which are emerging from the record indicates that the petitioner establishment is engaged in a systematic activity, and its also engaged in various kinds of activities viz., Shoe making, Agarbatti making and other incidental material being made out by the persons, who are engaged in it. It appears from the set up for the petitioner establishment that for the purpose of training the persons, who are suffering from this ailment of Leprosy, some staff is engaged by the petitioner to train them and the document in the form of staff list produced on record of the case at Exh.16/16 indicates that respondent name is figuring at serial no. 5, for the purpose of establishing that respondent was not merely engaged as a trainee. No iota of evidence is produced by the petitioner establishment as against to indicate that no staff in the form of employees are engaged. No material is produced by the petitioner even the witness of petitioner establishment has not thrown any light to indicate contrary to what has been stated by the respondent-workman. Looking to this systematic activity which is being conducted in a regular manner is establishing that the petitioner establishment is rightly understood by the learned Presiding Officer as an industry, as held by series of decision only no profit element is not sufficient enough to oust the establishment from the purview of definition of industry defined under Section 2(J) of the Act. An attempt is made by the learned counsel for the petitioner relying upon a decision of in case of Bangalore Water Supply and Sewage Board (supra) and contended that the petitioner establishment is not to be construed as an industrial undertaking, but an establishment having a philanthropic devotion with sole object of charity to the society. Learned counsel has drawn the attention to paragraph 132 of the said decision and contended that, in no case the petitioner establishment can be set to be an industry. The predominant character of the institute and the nature of relation deserves to be looked into and the straight way earning employees do not shape up soul of institution to industry. To deal with such contention, the very next paragraph of the said decision also worth to be taken note of, and therefore, the same is reproduced hereinafter: “133. It now remains to make a brief survey of the precedents on the point. One case which is germane to the issue is Bombay Panjrapole, (1972) 1 SCR 202 : ( (1971) 3 SCC 349 : AIR 1971 SC 2422 ). A bench of this Court considered the earlier case-law, including the decisions of the High Courts bearing on humane activities for the benefit of sick animals. Let there be no doubt that kindness to our dumb brethern, especially invalids, springs from the highest motives of fellow feeling. In the land of the Buddha and Gandhi no one dare argue to the contrary. So, let there be no mistaking our compassionate attitude to suffering creatures. It is laudable and institutions dedicated to amelioration of conditions of animals deserve encouragement from the State and affluent philanthropists. But these considerations have no bearing on the crucial factors which invoke the application of the definition in the Act as already set out elaborately by us. “The manner in which the activity in question is organised or arranged, the condition of the co-operation between the employer and the employee necessary for its success and its object to render material service to the community” is a pivotal factor in the activity-oriented test of an ‘industry’. The compassionate motive and the charitable inspiration are noble but extraneous. Indeed, medical relief for human beings made available free by regular hospitals, run by Government or philanthropists, employing doctors and supportive staff and business-like terms, may not qualify for exemption from industry. The compassionate motive and the charitable inspiration are noble but extraneous. Indeed, medical relief for human beings made available free by regular hospitals, run by Government or philanthropists, employing doctors and supportive staff and business-like terms, may not qualify for exemption from industry. Service to animals cannot be on a higher footing than service to humans. Nor is it possible to contend that love of animals is religious or spiritual any more than love of human-beings is. Therefore, without going into the dairying aspects, income and expenditure and other features of Bombay Panjrapole, one may hold that the institution is an industry. After all, the employees are engaged on ordinary economic terms and with conditions of service as in other business institutions and the activities also have organisational comparability to other profit-making dairies or Panjrapoles. What is different is the charitable object. What is common is the nature of the employer-employee relations. The conclusion, notwithstanding the humanitarian overtones, is that such organisations are also industries. Of course, in Bombay Panjrapole the same conclusion was reached but on different and, to some extent faulty reasoning. For the assumption in the judgment of Mitter J: is that if the income were mostly from donations and the treatment of animals were free, perhaps such charity, be it a hospital for humans or animals, may not be an industry. We agree with the holding, not because Panjrapoles have commercial motives but because, despite compassionate objectives, they share business-like orientation and operation. In this view, Section 2(j) applies. 15. Even in this very judgment, few paragraphs are also to be taken into consideration to arrive at the fact whether petitioner establishment is coming within the purview of industry or not? The relevant extract of the said judgment is reproduced hereinafter: “Whether there is: (i) systematic activity, (ii) Organised by co-operation between employer and employee (the direct and substantial element is chimerical), and (iii) for the production and/or distribution of goods and service calculated to satisfy human wants and wishes (not spiritual or religious but inclusive of material things or services geared to celestial bliss), prima-facie, there is an industry in the enterprise.” 16. Yet in another paragraph, the observations are also worth to be taken note of, hence, reproduce hereinafter: “While applying the tests laid down in determining whether an activity falls, within “industry” it is necessary to remember that the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is a legislation intended to bring about peace and harmony between management and labour in an ‘industry’ so that production does not suffer and at the same time, labour is not exploited and discontented and, therefore, the tests must be so applied as to give the widest possible connotation to the term ‘industry’. Whenever a question arises whether a particular concern is an “industry”, the approach must be broad and liberal and not rigid or doctrinaire. The interpretation should be such as would advance the object and purpose of IDA, 1947 and give full meaning and effect to it in the achievement of its avowed social objective. Also as much as it is difficult to enumerated the possible attributes or features which make an undertaking analogous to trade or business, it would not be prudent to do so. So infinitely varied and many-sided is human activity and with the incredible growth and progress in all branches of knowledge and ever widening areas of experience at all levels, it is becoming so diversified and expanding in so many directions hitherto unthought of, that no rigid and doctrinaire approach can be adopted in considering this question. The Court should, therefore, as far as possible avoid formulating or adopting generalisations and hesitate to cast the concept of industry in a narrow rigid mould which would not permit of expansion as and when necessity arises. Only some working principle may be evolved which would furnish guidance in determining what are the attributes or characteristics which would ordinarily indicate that an undertaking is analogous to trade or business. A workman can be regarded as one employed in an industry only if he is following one of the vocations mentioned in conjunction with his employers engaged in the vocations mentioned in relation to the employers. Thus, a basic requirement of ‘industry’ is that the employers must be carrying on any business, trade, undertaking, manufacture or calling of employers. If they are not, there is no industry as such. Thus, a basic requirement of ‘industry’ is that the employers must be carrying on any business, trade, undertaking, manufacture or calling of employers. If they are not, there is no industry as such. Therefore, an activity can be regarded as an “industry” only if there is relationship of employer and employees and the former is engaged in ‘business, trade, undertaking, manufacture or calling of employers’ and the latter ‘in any calling, service, employment, handicraft or industrial occupation or avocation’. Though ‘undertaking’ is a word of large import and it means anything undertaken or any project or enterprise, in the context in which it occurs, it must be read as meaning an undertaking analogous to trade or business, it must be “organised or arranged in a manner in which trade or business is generally organised or arranged”. It must not be casual nor must it be for oneself nor for pleasure. And it must rest on cooperation between employer and employees who associate together with a view to production, sale or distribution of material goods or material services. It is entirely irrelevant whether or not there is profit motive or investment of capital in such activity. Even without these two features an activity can be an undertaking analogous to trade or business.” 17. Even a Reference is also required to be made of one of the decisions delivered by Hon'ble Apex Court reported in (1975) 2 SCC 847 : AIR 1976 SC 145 , wherein in paragraph 11, the Hon'ble Apex Court has opined the circumstances to be taken into consideration to ascertain whether a particular establishment is coming within the purview of definition of industry. Para 11 of the said decision referred hereinafter: An activity can be regarded as an ‘industry’ within the meaning of Section 2(j) only if, there is relationship of employer and employees and the former is engaged in ‘business, trade, undertaking, manufacture or calling of employers’ and the later, ‘in any calling, service, employment, handicraft or industrial occupation or avocation’. Though ‘undertaking’ is a word of large import and it means anything undertaken or any project or enterprise, in the context in which it occurs, it must be read as meaning an undertaking analogous to trade or business. Though ‘undertaking’ is a word of large import and it means anything undertaken or any project or enterprise, in the context in which it occurs, it must be read as meaning an undertaking analogous to trade or business. In order that an activity may be regarded as an undertaking analogous to trade or business, it must be “organised or arranged in a manner in which trade or business is generally organised or arranged”. It must not be casual nor must it be for oneself nor for pleasure. And it must rest on co-operation between employer and employees who associate together with a view to production, sale or distribution of material goods or material services. It is entirely irrelevant whether or not there is profit motive or investment of capital in such activity. It is also immaterial that its objects are charitable or that it does not make profits or even where profits are made, they are not distributed amongst the members, or that its activity is subsidised by the Government. Again it is not necessary that the employer must always be private individual. The Act, in terms, contemplates cases of industrial disputes where the Government or a local authority or a public utility service may be the employer. It also makes no difference that the material services rendered by the undertaking are in public interest, whether an activity is carried on in public interest or not can, therefore, never be a criterion for determining its character as an industry. Case law discussed.” 18. Now, if we see the material led before the parties to the proceedings on the record of case on hand in aforesaid context, it is found that the petitioner establishment is satisfying some of the criteria laid down by the said decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court. The petitioner establishment is engaged in a systematic activity, it is also having on set up some of the employees as reflected from the staff list mentioned above and is also having some business out of the Shoe making. The petitioner establishment is engaged in a systematic activity, it is also having on set up some of the employees as reflected from the staff list mentioned above and is also having some business out of the Shoe making. Initially, it was contended that only footwears belonging to and meant for Leprosy affected persons are being prepared and made out in the petitioner establishment, but the evidence on record has come to that extent that the petitioner set systematic activity viz., footwears are also being made out in the establishment and are also sold to some of the persons in the market and to controvert this the petitioner establishment has not led any evidence. Therefore, simply because the establishment missing an element of profit making, the same would not be permitted. The Court held that there is no contrary material produced to dislodge the finding arrived at by the learned Presiding Officer, the learned Presiding Officer has specifically held after examining the material on record and considering the ratio laid down by the decision of Hon'ble Apex Court (Supra) and then came to the conclusion, which is not called for any interference in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. The parameters of exercise of such jurisdiction by this Court are not permitting in the background of this case to come to a different conclusion or to substitute the finding arrived at by the learned Presiding Officer, and therefore, since the petitioner establishment being an industry as defined under Section 2(j) of the Act is under an obligation to comply with statutory provisions contained under the Industrial Disputes Act. 19. Now to deal with another issue, as to whether the respondent was an employee or not. 19. Now to deal with another issue, as to whether the respondent was an employee or not. Few circumstances are worth to be taken note of that respondent herein was appointed with effect from 01.07.1988 as Shoe Maker, it is evidently clear from the record that at the time of engaging respondent in the establishment, respondent was not suffering from Leprosy and it is also established that such kind of training which is being imparted by petitioner establishment has already been taken at Madras by respondent prior to the employment, and therefore undisputedly, it is come out from the record that the respondent was not engaged for a training purpose, but must have been engaged as an employee to train the persons, who are suffering from Leprosy. The evidence on record also suggest that, the petitioner Trust itself has recommended the respondent for “Skilled Employee”, and resultantly, on 18.03.1990, the respondent was awarded a national award as “Skilled Employee”. Had there been any status of trainee this might not have even recommended by petitioner establishment as a “Skilled Employee”, and therefore, evidence on record suggest that there was a relationship of employee and employer existed. To ascertain this, national award is not the solitary evidence to arrive at a decision whether he is a workman or not, but the other material which is available on record, is also examined by learned Presiding Officer in detail which is also suggesting sufficient enough to hold that respondent was not merely a trainee. Specific staff list is produced vide Exh.16/16 which indicates that it is issued under the signature of the Director of petitioner establishment, wherein at serial no. 5, this respondent shown as a Shoe Maker with effect from 01.07.1988 and monthly salary of Rs. 1000/- per month is mentioned, and therefore, there is sufficient material on record in addition to National Award to indicate that the petitioner was not merely a trainee, and therefore, the conclusion which has been arrived at by the learned Presiding Officer that the respondent was a workman in the petitioner establishment appears to be correct. 1000/- per month is mentioned, and therefore, there is sufficient material on record in addition to National Award to indicate that the petitioner was not merely a trainee, and therefore, the conclusion which has been arrived at by the learned Presiding Officer that the respondent was a workman in the petitioner establishment appears to be correct. This inevitable conclusion is arrived at substantially on the ground that to dislodge this finding the petitioner establishment has not led any evidence nor produced any material which can justify even remotely that respondent was not a workman/employee, but was merely a trainee, and therefore, it appears that there is no other option left open for the learned Presiding Officer but to come to this conclusion on basis of undisputed material on record. Hence, in the background of this finding of fact arrived at by the learned Presiding Officer is not worth to be set at naught as conclusion appears to be based on record, and there is no perversity is found by this Court while examining the award impugned in the petition. As stated earlier, the finding of fact which is arrived at is well within the scope of authority by the court/Tribunal below is not permissible to be substituted in exercise of extra ordinary jurisdiction, more particularly, there is no material irregularity nor any perversity or manifest error, and therefore, the petitioner establishment for not leading contrary material to dislodge the case of the respondent has to accept the finding of the learned Presiding Officer. 20. While dealing the case on hand, the Court is releasing, no doubt that the petitioner establishment is a charitable establishment is set up for delivering good services to the society, but at the same time the fact remains that the establishment has not come out with any cogent material or even additional oral evidence to substantiate its case that respondent was merely a trainee. On the contrary, more material has placed on record to indicate that respondent was not merely a trainee, he was shown in the staff list, that he was drawing salary and he was not suffering from Leprosy at the time when kept in the employment. It is also emerging that at the instance of petitioner establishment itself the respondent has achieved the national award as a “Skilled Employee”. It is also emerging that at the instance of petitioner establishment itself the respondent has achieved the national award as a “Skilled Employee”. Though sympathy to the petitioner establishment, but the hard reality appearing on the record is not possible to be ignored at all, and therefore, with this undisputed position emerging from the record the only course now left open for the Court is to examine minutely, as to whether the award passed by the learned Presiding Officer deserves to be confirmed or not to grant award of reinstatement with full backwages with continuity. As stated earlier, learned Presiding Officer has specifically found on the basis of material on record that respondent has worked in the petitioner establishment right from 1988-95 for period of 7 years practically and has specifically found that while discontinuance the services a specific violation has taken place at the instance of petitioner establishment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. If we look at the wording of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, it presupposes a retrenchment compensation which is a mandate of statute to which the establishment has to comply with this requirement of Section 25-F as condition precedent, and here in this case on hand, it is established in unequivocal terms that the petitioner establishment has not led any evidence that they have even remotely attempted to comply with the requirement of Section 25-F of the Act, and therefore, the learned Presiding Officer has specifically come to the conclusion that there is a violation of Section 25-F which lead to pass the impugned award. Here, once again, the Court has to consider and analyse from catena of decision ‘delivered by Hon'ble Apex Court that what would be the natural consequence if there is a clear violation of Section 25-F of the Act. No doubt, the wording of the Section itself is clear, but to arrive at a just decision, law declared by the Hon'ble Supreme Court worth to be taken note of. 21. In the recent past, some of the decisions have taken the view that in a given case the Court can award lump sum compensation in lieu of reinstatement by modifying or substituting the award of reinstatement and backwages, but this trend depends upon case to case as can be seen from the recent pronouncement. 22. 21. In the recent past, some of the decisions have taken the view that in a given case the Court can award lump sum compensation in lieu of reinstatement by modifying or substituting the award of reinstatement and backwages, but this trend depends upon case to case as can be seen from the recent pronouncement. 22. In a decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan Development Corporation Vs. Gitam Singh, reported in (2013) 5 SCC 136 , wherein the Court has come to the conclusion that in every wrongful termination no reinstatement should follow, however, before exercising judicial discretion the labour court was required to keep in mind all relevant factors including mode and manner of appointment, the nature of employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has taken place and the delay in raising an industrial dispute before granting relief to a workman in another decision reported in (2014) 15 SCC 353 . Even if, it was found from the record that the termination by the employer was on the face of it bad, but looking to the prevailing circumstances of that case on record, the Hon'ble Apex Court modified the award of reinstatement with continuity without backwages by giving lump sum compensation of Rs. 1 lakh. However, the facts of those cases might have led the Hon'ble Apex Court, but later on this Court while considering the issue on hand is conscious about the recent pronouncement on this very issue, and therefore, has to take into consideration some of the decisions on the issue one of which is in case of Mackinnon Mackenzie and Company Limited Vs. Mackinnon Employees Union, reported in (2015) 4 SCC 544 wherein, the Hon'ble Apex Court has specifically observed that while moulding relief the Court cannot sympathies with party which gambles in litigation to put off the evil day and when that day comes prays to be saved from its own gamble, and therefore, while dealing with the case of award pertaining to reinstatement and backwages the Court has to consider the condition precedent of Section 25-F of the Act and non compliance of it renders such discontinuance as invalid. Now, if that be the situation, a question arose whether the said relief of reinstatement and backwages can be moulded by giving lump sum compensation. Now, if that be the situation, a question arose whether the said relief of reinstatement and backwages can be moulded by giving lump sum compensation. The Apex Court while dealing with such a situation has held that moulding of relief could not be permissible and thereby directed the company to comply with award passed by the labour court. The relevant extract of the said decision worth to be taken note of, hence paragraph 53, 54, 55 is reproduced hereinafter: “53. Further, it is urged by the learned Senior Counsel on behalf of the appellant company that there is no question of reinstatement of the workmen concerned and payment of back wages to them since the department/unit concerned of the appellant company in which they were employed no longer exists and therefore, requested this Court this Court to mould the relief granted by the Courts below. The contention is rightly rebutted by the learned Senior Counsel on behalf of the respondent union by placing reliance on Workmen of Sudder Workshop, wherein this Court held that the Court cannot sympathise with the party which gambles in litigation to put off the evil day and when that day comes prays to be saved from its own gamble. The said contention urged on behalf of the respondent Union must be accepted by us as the same is well founded. Therefore, we hold that moulding of the relief is not permissible in this case at this stage when the matter has reached this Court keeping in mind the legal principle laid down by this Court on this aspect of the matter in the case referred to supra. 54. Further, with regard to reinstatement of the workmen concerned and back wages to be paid to them, the learned Senior Counsel on behalf of the workmen has rightly placed reliance upon Anoop Sharma v. Public Health Division, Haryana, wherein it was held that since termination of employment is in breach or violation of the mandatory provisions of Chapter V-A or V-B of the ID Act is void ab initio in law and ineffective and suffers from nullity, in the eye of law and in the absence of very strong and compelling circumstances in favour of the employer, the Court must grant a declaration that the termination was non est and therefore the employees should continue in service with full back wages and award all the consequential benefits. Further, with respect to payment of back wages and consequential benefits, reliance was rightly placed on the decisions of this Court in Deepali Gandu Surwase v. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya and Bhuvnesh Kumar Dwivedi v. Hindalco Industries Ltd. 55. This Court opined thus in Deepali Gundu Surwase. (SCC p.344 para 22) “22. The very idea of restoring an employee to the position which he held before dismissal or removal or termination of service implies that the employee will be put in the same position in which he would have been but for the illegal action taken by the employer. The injury suffered by a person, who is dismissed or removed or is otherwise terminated from service cannot easily be measured in terms of money. With the passing of an order which has the effect of severing the employer-employee relationship, the latter's source of income gets dried up. Not only the employee concerned, but his entire family suffers grave adversities. They are deprived of the source of sustenance. The children are deprived of nutritious food and all opportunities of education and advancement in life. At times, the family has to borrow from the relatives and other acquaintance to avoid starvation. These sufferings continue till the competent adjudicatory forum decides on the legality of the action taken by the employer. The reinstatement of such an employee, which is preceded by a finding of the competent judicial/quashi-judicial body or court that the action taken by the employer is ultra vires the relevant statutory provisions or the principles of natural justice, entitles the employee to claim full back wages. If the employer wants to deny back wages to the employee or contest his entitlement to get consequential benefits, then it is for him/her to specifically plead and prove that during the intervening period the employee was gainfully employed and was getting the same emoluments. The denial of back wages to an employee, who has suffered due to an illegal act of the employer would amount to indirectly punishing the employee concerned and rewarding the employer by relieving him of the obligation to pay back wages including the emoluments.” 23. Yet in another decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Jasmer Singh Vs. The denial of back wages to an employee, who has suffered due to an illegal act of the employer would amount to indirectly punishing the employee concerned and rewarding the employer by relieving him of the obligation to pay back wages including the emoluments.” 23. Yet in another decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Jasmer Singh Vs. State of Harnaya, reported in (2015) 4 SCC 458 , the Apex Court held that, once termination held to be void-ab-initio, the relief which came to be granted is to award reinstatement with full backwages and while dealing with the said issue in paragraph 21 and 22, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, after considering the other decision, held that if the order of termination is void-ab-initio, the workman is entitled to get full backwages. Relevant Para 21 of the said decision reads, thus; “21. The said relief in favour of the appellant workman, particularly the full back wages is supported by the legal principles laid down by this Court in Deepali Gundu Surwase v. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalay, wherein the Division Bench of this Court to which one of us was a member, after considering three-Judge Bench decision, has held that if the order of termination is void ab initio, the workman is entitled to full back wages.” 24. The Hon'ble Apex Court in para. 22 of the said decision referred to a decision which is already stated in earlier decision, and therefore, not reproduced. However, it has been held that the denial of backwages to an employee, who has suffered due to illegal act of employer, would amount to indirectly punishing the employee concerned and rewarding the employer by relieving him of the obligation to pay backwages including the emoluments, and thereby, the Hon'ble Apex Court directed the company to comply with the award of that case and thereby, in substance, the proposition of law, that moment termination is held to be bad, a natural consequence is to award backwages and the moulding of relief in such kind of situation would tantamount to give an advantage to an establishment on his own wrong. There are large number of cases in which the Hon'ble Apex Court has awarded full backwages, when It has been found that there is violation of Section 25-F of the Act. In a decision in case of Ajaypal Singh Vs. There are large number of cases in which the Hon'ble Apex Court has awarded full backwages, when It has been found that there is violation of Section 25-F of the Act. In a decision in case of Ajaypal Singh Vs. Haryana Warehousing Corporation, reported in (2015) 6 SCC 321 , the same view is taken by the Hon'ble Apex Court in a decision in case of Rajkumar Dixit Vs. Vijay Kumar Gauri Shanker reported in (2015) 9 SCC 345 , more particularly Para 20, 21, 27 and therefore, the Court is bound by the pronouncement of the Apex Court. In another decision delivered by Apex Court in case of Gauri Shankar Vs. State of Rajasthan reported in (2015) 12 SCC 754, wherein relying upon several other decisions. The Hon'ble Apex Court has propounded that modification of award by awarding compensation in lieu of reinstatement by the High Court is contrary to well settled principle of law laid down in catena of decision, and therefore the error committed by the High Court was corrected by the Hon'ble Apex Court. Relevant extract of the said decision worth to be taken note of, hence reproduce herein para nos. 23 & 24. 23. The learned Single Judge of the High Court has exceeded his jurisdiction under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India as per the legal principles laid down by this Court in Harijinder Singh wherein this Court has held thus: (SCC p.205, para 21) “21. Before concluding, we consider it necessary to observe that while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution in matters like the present one, the High Courts are duty-bound to keep in mind that the Industrial Disputes Act and other similar legislative instruments are social welfare legislations and the same are required to be interpreted keeping in view the goals set out in the Preamble of the Constitution and the provisions contained in Part IV thereof in general and Articles 38, 39(a) to (e), 43 and 43-A in particular, which mandate that the State should secure a social order for the promotion of welfare of the people, ensure equality between men and women and equitable distribution of material resources of the community to sub-serve the common good and also ensure that the workers get their dues. More than 41’ years ago, Gajendragadkar, J. opined that: ‘10… The concept of social and economic justice is a living concept of revolutionary import; it gives sustenance to the rule of law and meaning and significance to the ideal of welfare State’ (State of Mysore v. Workers of Gold Mines AIR p.928, para 10) The said principle has been reiterated by this Court in Jasmer Singh v. State of Haryana. 24. Therefore, in view of the abovesaid case, the learned Single Judge in exercise of its powers under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India erroneously interfered with the award of reinstatement and future salary from the date of award till date of reinstatement as rightly passed by the Labour Court recording valid and cogent reasons in answer to the points of dispute holding that the workman has worked from 01.01.1987 to 01.04.1992 and that non-compliance with the mandatory requirements under Section 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Act by the respondent Department rendered its action of termination of the services of the workman as void ab initio in law and instead the High Court erroneously awarded a compensation of Rs. 1,50,000 in lieu of reinstatement. The learned Single Judge and the Division Bench under their supervisory jurisdiction should not have modified the award by awarding compensation in lieu of reinstatement which is contrary to the well-settled principles of law laid down in a catena of cases by this Court. 25. Therefore, considering above principle in mind no other lenient view possible to be taken especially when petitioner establishment itself has not discharged its onus to disbelieve the case of respondent. 26. It is trite law that burden to prove that termination is legal and valid, is always on the employer, and not on the employee, so much so that whether during the passage of time, the respondent-workman was gainfully employed or not, the same is to be proved by the employer and that onus lies on the employer which is to be discharged by the employer. This proposition of law can be culled out from a decision in case of Gaurav Kumar Bansal Vs. Union of India reported in (2015) 2 SCC 130 as well as in another decision in case of Sudarshan Rajpoot Vs. Uttar Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation reported in (2015) 2 SCC 317 . This proposition of law can be culled out from a decision in case of Gaurav Kumar Bansal Vs. Union of India reported in (2015) 2 SCC 130 as well as in another decision in case of Sudarshan Rajpoot Vs. Uttar Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation reported in (2015) 2 SCC 317 . Since the issue is almost similar, relevant paragraphs from the decision reported in (2015) 2 SCC 317 paras 27, 28, 29 are reproduced hereinafter: “27. Further, the conditions precedent to the retrenchment of the workmen under Section 6-N of UPID Act have not been satisfied before terminating the services of the appellant workman in the case on hand. Section 6-N of the UPID Act states as follows: “6-N Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman- No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer, shall be retrenched by the employer untill- (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice wages for the period of notice: Provided that no such notice shall be necessary if the retrenchment is under an agreement which specifies a date for the termination of service. (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay for every completed year of service or any part thereof in excess of six months; and (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the State Government.” Thus, non-compliance with the mandatory provisions under Section 6-N of the UPID Act rendered the retrenchment of the workman void ab initio in law. 28. This position of law is well settled by this Court in Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co. Ltd. Vs. Shambhu Nath Mukherji which state as under: (SCC p.420, paras 13-14) “13. On the face of it, the order striking off the name of the workman from the rolls on 24.08.1965, is clearly erroneous. No order, even under Section 27(c) of the Standing Orders, could have been passed on that date. The clause in the Standing Orders reads as follows: ‘If any workman absent for more than eight consecutive days his service shall be terminated and shall be treated having left the service without notice.’ 27. No order, even under Section 27(c) of the Standing Orders, could have been passed on that date. The clause in the Standing Orders reads as follows: ‘If any workman absent for more than eight consecutive days his service shall be terminated and shall be treated having left the service without notice.’ 27. The workman last attended work on 14.08.1965 15th August was a public holiday. He was, therefore, absent from work only from 16th of August. So even, under the Standing Orders the workman was not absent for ‘more than eight consecutive days’ on 24.08.1965. The order is, therefore, clearly untenable even on the basis of the Standing Orders. It is not necessary to express any opinion on this appeal whether ‘eight consecutive days’ in the Standing Orders mean eight consecutive working days. 14. Striking off the name of the workman from the rolls by the management is termination of his service. Such termination of service is retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Act. There is nothing to show that the provisions of Section 25-F(a) and (b) were complied with by the management in this case. The provisions of Section 25-F(a), the proviso apart and clause (b) are mandatory and any order of retrenchment, in violation of these two peremptory conditions precedent, is invalid.” (emphasis supplied) This position of law was also reiterated in L. Robert D'Souza v. Southern Railway and approved by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corpn. Ltd. 29. Therefore, the Labour Court has rightly set aside the order of termination by the respondent Corporation while adjudicating the point of dispute which has been referred to it by the State Government, the same is perfectly legal and valid and therefore it should not have been interfered with by the High Court in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction.” 28. This being the position if the case on hand is to be examined the material which is available on record has clearly spelt out as stated above with this burden is not being discharged by the petitioner establishment. This being the position if the case on hand is to be examined the material which is available on record has clearly spelt out as stated above with this burden is not being discharged by the petitioner establishment. There is no material led on the issue whether the petitioner has complied with statutory requirement of Section 25-F of the Act or not, and in addition thereto, it has not been established in any manner that whether the respondent was gainfully employed or not and therefore under the circumstances, there is no alternate left to the Court but to accept the conclusion arrived at by the learned Presiding Officer of the labour court. The situation is on one hand that there is a Charitable Trust, which is going to face the consequence of the award impugned in the petition and the other hand the legality appears to be lean in favour of the respondent-workman, and therefore, the Court had minutely examine whether the conclusion arrived at by the learned Presiding Officer is just and proper, and therefore, while dwelling into such an issue in depth, yet another decision is to be taken note of in case of Executive Engineer Vs. Hareshbhai Bhurabhai Vala C/o D.D. Chhaya reported in 2016 (2) GLR 1064 , in which the coordinate bench of this Court has also propounded the proposition wherein the issue related to a plea of voluntary abandonment service was considered and in that context relying upon several decisions related to the issue, the Hon'ble Court has propounded that decision the employer, who is required to give an opportunity of hearing to workman before treating it as voluntary abandonment service of workman and in addition to it the employer is required to give workman notice/intimation duty to report for workman. It would entail consequence if the principle of natural justice not followed by the employer, voluntary abandonment would amount to retrenchment and the provision of Section 25-F require to be complied with. The decision delivered by this Court in the case referred to above is applicable in the background of present fact as well and therefore relevant paragraphs contained in the said judgment are worth to be taken note of. “21.7. The decision delivered by this Court in the case referred to above is applicable in the background of present fact as well and therefore relevant paragraphs contained in the said judgment are worth to be taken note of. “21.7. When the employer resorts to the conclusion or inference that the workman has voluntarily abandoned the service, the said conclusion or inference by the employer results into not only civil consequences but dire consequences for the concerned employee inasmuch as he stands to lose his service, his livelihood. 21.8 Therefore, such inference or conclusion and action based thereon ought not be taken lightly or casually and certainly not in violation of principles of natural justice. 21.10 When the employer raises the plea of voluntary abandonment of service by the workman, the employers conduct should support and justify the inference and such inference can be justified by employer only by demonstrating the steps taken by him to ascertain as to whether the workman had actually abandoned the service or for some circumstances he was unable to report for duty. In such circumstances, the employer would, ordinarily, give an intimation to the workman calling him to report for work or he would intimate the workman that his conduct of remaining absent without permission amounts to misconduct and will entail appropriate action or he would give an intimation to the workman that if the workman did not immediately resume his duty, then he will be deemed to have abandoned the service. 21.11 In the decision in the case of D.K. Yadav Vs. J.M.A. Industries Ltd., (1993) 3 SCC 259 , Hon'ble Apex Court observed, inter alia, that: “9. It is a fundamental rule of law that no decision must be taken which will affect the right of any person without first being informed of the case and be given him/her an opportunity of putting forward his/her case. An order involving civil consequences must be made consistently with the rules of natural justice. In Mohinder Singh Gill Vs. The Chief Election Commissioner, 1978 (2) SCR 272 at 308F the Constitution Bench held that ‘civil consequence’ covers infraction of not merely property or personal right but of civil liberties, material deprivations and non-pecuniary damages. In its comprehensive connotion every thing that affects a citizen in his civil life inflicts a civil consequence. In Mohinder Singh Gill Vs. The Chief Election Commissioner, 1978 (2) SCR 272 at 308F the Constitution Bench held that ‘civil consequence’ covers infraction of not merely property or personal right but of civil liberties, material deprivations and non-pecuniary damages. In its comprehensive connotion every thing that affects a citizen in his civil life inflicts a civil consequence. Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Edition, page 1487 defined civil rights are such as belong to every citizen of the state or country they include rights capable of being enforced or redressed in a civil action. In State of Orrisa Vs. Dr. (Miss) Binapani Dei, AIR 1967 SC 1269 , this Court held that even an administrative order which involves civil consequences must be informed of the case, the evidence in support thereof supplied and must be given a fair opportunity to meet the case before an adverse decision is taken. Since no such opportunity was given it was held that superannuation was in violation of principles of natural justice. 11. The law must therefore be now taken to be well-settled that procedure prescribed for depriving a person of livelihood must meet the challenge of Art. 14 and such law would be liable to be tested on the anvil of Art. 14 and the procedure prescribed by a statute or statutory rule or rules or orders effecting the civil rights or result in civil consequences would have to answer the requirement of Art.14. So it must be right just and fair and not arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive. There can be no distinction between a quasi-judicial function and an administrative function for the purpose of principles of natural justice. The aim of both administrative. inquiry as well as the quasi-.judicial enquiry is to arrive at a just decision and if a rule of natural justice is calculated to secure justice or to put it negatively, to prevent miscarriage of justice, it is difficult to see why it should be applicable only to quasi-judicial enquiry and not to administrative enquiry. It must logically apply to both. It must logically apply to both. 21.12 When an employer does not treat the workman's absence from duty as misconduct but treats workman's absence from duty as act of voluntary abandonment of service without complying the principles of natural justice, then his decision and action would, in light of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corporation Limited v. Presiding Officer as well as the law laid down by the decision in the case of State Bank of India v. N. Sundermani, amount to and fall within the purview of retrenchment. This would entail obligation to comply the requirement prescribed under section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 21.13 In the cases where the employer raises defence and plea of abandonment of service and fails to establish that either of the above mentioned procedure, i.e. he complied principles of natural justice or the requirement under section 25-F was followed, such action and plea or defence would not be sustainable.” 29. The aforesaid situation prevailing on the case on hand would lead to a situation where no alternate is left to the Court, but to accept the finding and the award of the learned Presiding Officer. It appears from the record that, though the respondent-workman has availed financial assistance from the petitioner establishment, the failure on the part of the petitioner to indicate a lawful exercise to deal with discontinuance of the respondent has resulted into a situation, where though petitioner is not inclined to take back the respondent on the job still it is under an obligation to take him back. By mere filling an affidavit and by attaching certain documents in the form of award, which was even not part of the subject matter of main Reference, the petitioner cannot improve the case. It is hardly felt to the learned Presiding Officer, if on the basis of this additional material which was not forming part of the original record if we set aside the order and in any case still this Court has examined the said award dated 24.06.2005 passed in Reference (LCV) No. 541 of 2000 filed by the wife of the respondent. There is no co-relation of similarity in the said particular case, the wife of the respondent viz., Laxmiben had clearly admitted in her deposition that she has on his own abstained from work and was also faced with a notice which is not the case here on hand, and therefore simply because she asserted in her deposition that she and her husband both went away and abandoned the work which circumstance alone cannot be utilized to distort the version which is available on record of the present case. Further more, the evidence which is reflected from the said award is quite different from the evidence of present case i.e. deposition of respondent, and therefore, even if assuming that it is open for the petitioner to improve the case by citing such award. The aforesaid circumstance is not in any way helpful to the respondent. On the contrary, further fact is revealed from the said award that there also the learned Presiding Officer has categorically held that petitioner establishment is an industry and that finding is not challenged by the present petitioner, and therefore, on the contrary, the finding recorded to an issue of Section 2(j) is confirming in the present case, and therefore, the said Reference and the award dated 24.06.2005 is not possible to be placed into service to withstand the finding arrived at by the learned Presiding Officer. 30. In the backdrop of aforesaid situation if the claim statement is seen, there is a specific case that when the respondent demanded regular salary and attached benefits, the petitioner has discontinued the services without issuing notice, without granting any opportunity and without given opportunity to explain. In the deposition led by the respondent at Exh.6, a specific assertion has been made that the respondent after discontinuance from the service has made an attempt to search for an employment, but has not got the employment, and has expressed his willingness to resume the duty in the petitioner establishment. In the deposition led by the respondent at Exh.6, a specific assertion has been made that the respondent after discontinuance from the service has made an attempt to search for an employment, but has not got the employment, and has expressed his willingness to resume the duty in the petitioner establishment. It was in addition to it further substantiated by the respondent that the training has already been taken by him as well as the certificate is also produced to indicate that he was relieved from the disease of Leprosy and then stated in the deposition more particularly in cross examination that when the respondent joined the petitioner establishment he was not suffering from Leprosy and in cross-examination has specifically deposed that he was not a trainee, but working as a skilled trained employee. The record indicates that as against this the petitioner management has led the evidence of one Mr. Purshottam, wherein it has been admitted in paragraph 6 that national award which is received by the respondent at the recommendation of the petitioner establishment and it was also tried to submit that loan amount remained outstanding from the respondent and has tried to contend that petitioner establishment has not prevented respondent from coming. Now if this evidence of management witness is to be examined further from his cross-examination, this very witness pleading ignorance that he does not know whether the respondent on his own stop coming or discontinued. It was also admitted by this witness that the training, stipend and salary is to be given to the respondent. He tried to depose that no salary was being paid to the respondent, but at the same time in subsequent part of the cross-examination after looking at marked 37/32 document, this witness stated and admitted that a salary sheet is produced by the petitioner establishment, in which, the name of the respondent figuring at serial no. 3, and has also admitted that the respondent is not given any notice of any nature for misconduct or any act of that nature and at the same time has conveyed in deposition that the petitioner establishment is not willing to take the respondent back in the service. Now, if this deposition led before the learned Presiding Officer is to be taken into consideration, it would quite clear that the name of the respondent is figuring in salary sheet produced by the petitioner management. Now, if this deposition led before the learned Presiding Officer is to be taken into consideration, it would quite clear that the name of the respondent is figuring in salary sheet produced by the petitioner management. It is also evident from the deposition that the recipient of best employee is received at the recommendation of the management itself and the management is not sure about the fact whether the respondent has gone away or discontinued. If this be the evidence admitted to be led to dislodge the claim, the said appears to be a very weak piece of material on it, and not believable that it is sufficient to distract the stand of respondent. 31. It is also found from the record of the Special Civil Application that before the learned Presiding Officer an attempt is made to drag the issue as long as possible by the petitioner establishment and the case has been tried to be developed in the writ petition by filing affidavit as well as other documentary material which were not made available for the learned Presiding Officer to examine and therefore an attempt is made to improve the case which was not available at an appropriate stage, when the same was put up for adjudication, and therefore, it is very difficult for this Court to examine the material produced in the form of affidavit and arrive at a conclusion different from that of the learned Presiding Officer as specially stating in extra ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. 32. An attempt is made by the petitioner to contend that wife of the respondent also raised the same issue before the learned Presiding Officer who has dismissed the Reference, which was simultaneously filed, and thereby contended that the same view be taken in the case of respondent herein. 32. An attempt is made by the petitioner to contend that wife of the respondent also raised the same issue before the learned Presiding Officer who has dismissed the Reference, which was simultaneously filed, and thereby contended that the same view be taken in the case of respondent herein. A bare perusal of the said award of the wife of the respondent produced at page 69 of the petition compilation at Exh.52, the same was also referred to the learned Presiding Officer on 27.09.1995 and the petitioner was very much aware about the said Reference, but to the surprise the perusal of the present case established that no reliance appears to have been placed by the respondent or the petitioner before the learned Presiding Officer in the present Reference, and therefore, this unexplained circumstance cannot be taken into consideration more particularly, when no reliance is placed by the very petitioner. However, the deposition of the present Reference appears to be quite distinct from the stand being taken by the wife of the respondent in that another Reference being Reference (LCV) No. 541/2000. Had there been any attempt would have been made by the petitioner, probably the learned Presiding Officer might have taken into consideration, but now at this stage, to allow the petitioner to contend and place reliance is not possible to be accepted. A bare look of the petition, the averments made by the petitioner and submitted before this Court in the month of October 2005, the averments also do not indicate a word about the said Reference being dismissed by the very same learned Presiding Officer in case of wife of the respondent. A bare look of the petition, the averments made by the petitioner and submitted before this Court in the month of October 2005, the averments also do not indicate a word about the said Reference being dismissed by the very same learned Presiding Officer in case of wife of the respondent. It is only, by way of affidavit, an attempt is made to improve the case by giving a Reference to the award and therefore it appears that an attempt is made to improve the case, which was otherwise not improved at an appropriate stage, however, for considering whether it may help in any manner to the petitioner establishment or not, this Court has seen the relevant portion of the said award, wherein, in that case a notice was given for misconduct on 30.01.1995 and further in cross-examination, it was admitted that wife of the respondent viz., Laxmiben was being paid salary from the petitioner establishment and there was no material to produce to indicate that she was a trainee, and therefore, simply because in that particular circumstance the wife of respondent has chosen not to come for employment would not make any difference. So far as the present case is concerned, here undisputedly, no such notice of any nature was given to the respondent, and therefore, even if that Reference or some of the extract can be looked into the same would not be helpful to the petitioner in any manner, and therefore, from this overall analysis of the material on record, it is quite clear that the case of abandonment of service by the respondent is not believable. There is ample material on record to indicate that the respondent was on the staff list of the establishment was working for more than 7 years. In the establishment, the respondent was discontinued with effect from 01.04.1995 without any notice, compensation or any disciplinary action and in addition thereto from the petitioner has recommended for national award as a “Skilled Employee”, not a trainee. Therefore, this material is sufficient enough to indicate that there is a violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, and then undisputed position emerging from the record would lead to a conclusion that no error is committed by the learned Presiding Officer to pass the award impugned in the petition. Therefore, this material is sufficient enough to indicate that there is a violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, and then undisputed position emerging from the record would lead to a conclusion that no error is committed by the learned Presiding Officer to pass the award impugned in the petition. One added factor is also to be looked into as drawn by the learned counsel for the petitioner representing the respondent, wherein, in a petition bearing Special Civil Application No. 9627 of 2010 by an order dated 26.11.2010, the amount of gratuity was disbursed to the respondent, of course the same was treated as subject to the outcome of the petition, but this factor is also a relevant consideration to indicate that whatever conclusion arrived at by the learned Presiding Officer is not perverse to the record, and there appears to be no manifest error committed by the learned Presiding Officer and therefore looking to the proposition of law stated hereinabove, there is no escape for the petitioner establishment to find out any way from the impugned award, and therefore, considering the facts and circumstances of the present case on overall appreciation of material on record, there appears to be no error committed by the learned Presiding Officer in passing the award impugned in the petition. As stated above, there is self-restraint by the Court, wherein, even error of law at times cannot be corrected in exercise of power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India nor it is open for the High Court to substitute the finding what has been arrived at even if another view is possible on the basis of said material and therefore, keeping this peripheral limit of exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction, the Court is left with no option but to accept the award passed by the learned Presiding Officer as just and proper. To arrive at, this Court has to take into consideration the limits prescribed by series of decisions while exercising extra ordinary jurisdiction. In addition to the aforesaid proposition of law propounded by series of decisions, a Reference is also further required to be made to one of the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Mohd. Yunus Vs. Mohd. In addition to the aforesaid proposition of law propounded by series of decisions, a Reference is also further required to be made to one of the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Mohd. Yunus Vs. Mohd. Mustaqim, reported in (1983) 4 SCC 566 : AIR 1984 SC 38 , wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court has stated in clear terms that a mere wrong decision without anything more is not sufficient enough to attract the jurisdiction of High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India., it is held in Para. 7 as under: “7. The supervisory jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 227 of the Constitution is limited “to seeing that an inferior Court or Tribunal functions within the limits of its authority” and not to correct an error apparent on the face of the record, much less an error of law. In this case there was in our opinion, no error of law much less an error apparent on the face of the part of the learned Subordinate Judge to exercise jurisdiction nor did he act in disregard of principles of natural justice. Nor was the procedure adopted by him not in consonance with the procedure established by law. In exercising the supervisory power under Article 227, the High Court does not act as an Appellate Court or Tribunal. It will not review or reweigh the evidence upon which the determination of the inferior court or tribunal purports to be based on to correct errors of law in the decision.” 33. Yet in another decision in case of SJ. Ebenezer Vs. Velayudhan, reported in (1998) 1 SCC 633 : AIR 1998 SC 746 , wherein, it has been culled out by the Hon'ble Apex Court that, Court cannot substitute its view in place of the views taken by the statutory authority while exercising the power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The relevant extract of the said decision reads as under: “16. The above narration of facts is totally incorrect and contrary to the pleadings and evidence. A reading of the order of the High Court will show that it has substituted its view in the place of the view taken by the statutory authority which is not within the jurisdiction of the High Court while exercising powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. A reading of the order of the High Court will show that it has substituted its view in the place of the view taken by the statutory authority which is not within the jurisdiction of the High Court while exercising powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Apart from the above, it is now an admitted fact that the alleged acquisition initiated in the year 1987 must be deemed to have been either given up or lapsed due to efflux of time. This position is not disputed by the learned counsel for the first respondent-landlord. If this is so, the principal groundi on which the application for eviction was presented before the Rent Controller is not available to the landlord. This is yet another ground for allowing this appeal.” 34. Looking to this well defined scope of Article 227 of the Constitution of India as well as looking to the scope even of Article 226 of the Constitution of India, there appears to be no way for the Court to come to a different conclusion on the basis of same material on record. Even, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India what has to be seen is the decision making process by the Court below or the authority and here the Court found no infirmity of any nature of the learned Presiding Officer of the labour court while exercising jurisdiction vested under the statute, and therefore, it makes no difference if this very controversy is to be seen from the scope of Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India. 35. In view of aforesaid situation contentions raised by the counsel for the petitioner are not possible to be accepted and each of the same are dealt with and answered appropriately in above discussion and after giving conscious consideration in view of the above discussion same are rejected. 36. 35. In view of aforesaid situation contentions raised by the counsel for the petitioner are not possible to be accepted and each of the same are dealt with and answered appropriately in above discussion and after giving conscious consideration in view of the above discussion same are rejected. 36. Therefore, keeping in view the overall facts and circumstances and upon examination of evidence on record and the material produced by the respective parties, and keeping in view the proposition of law on the various issues as stated hereinabove, it appears to this Court that the award in question does not called for any interference, and therefore in the background of this fact, the petition being devoid of merits, dismissed/hereby, and consequently the award passed by the learned Presiding Officer dated 24.01.2005 passed in Reference (LCV) No. 539 of 2000 (old) LCV No. 995 is hereby confirmed. Rule is discharged. Interim relief if any vacated.