JUDGMENT : Indira Banerjee, J. This appeal is against a judgment and order dated 30th August, 2005 whereby the accused appellant, Md. Firoz @ Tinku has been held guilty and convicted of murder of his wife under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and an order of sentence dated 31st August, 2005 whereby the accused appellant has been sentenced to imprisonment for life and fine of Rs.5,000/-. It is the case of the prosecution as made out in the charge sheet that on 26th February, 2005 at about 15 Hours the accused appellant Tinku set his wife, Bhuia Bibi @ Guria on fire at 66, D.C. Dey Road, Kolkata – 700015. Guria was moved to NRS Medical College and Hospital by the neighbours. In the hospital she made a dying declaration in the presence of Dr. Nishit Chandra Karmakar, Assistant Professor, Department of Surgery of NRS Medical College and Hospital. On the basis of the dying declaration, Tangra P.S Case No. 32 dated 26th February, 2005 was started against the accused appellant, Md. Firoz @ Tinku under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. The Officer-in-Charge, Tangra P.S endorsed the case for investigation to Sub-inspector, Supra Chakraborty. The Sub-inspector, Supra Chakraborty took up the investigation and on completion of investigation submitted charge sheet against the accused appellant, Md. Firoz @ Tinku. The accused appellant, Md. Firoz @ Tinku was charged with committing murder intentionally and causing the death of Bhuia Bibi @ Guria by pouring kerosene and setting her on fire. The dying declaration was in the form of questions put by the Investigating Officer to the deceased, Bhuia Bibi @ Guria and the answers thereto given by Bhuia Bibi @ Guria. Some of the relevant questions and answers are set out herein below. “……………….. Q. What is the name of your husband ? A. My husband’s name is Md. Firoz @ Tinku. Q. What happened to you ? A. My husband set me on fire. Q. Where did the incident occur ? A. I reside at my in laws house at 66, D.C. Dey Road, Muslim Camp. The incident occurred there. Q. How did they set you on fire ? A. My husband poured kerosene on my body and set me on fire. At that time I was sleeping after consuming rice. It was 3 in the afternoon. Q. Who were present at home at that time ? The incident occurred there. Q. How did they set you on fire ? A. My husband poured kerosene on my body and set me on fire. At that time I was sleeping after consuming rice. It was 3 in the afternoon. Q. Who were present at home at that time ? A. At that time no one except me and my husband was present. Q. Why were you set on fire ? A. My husband suspects me. My mother in law and sisters in law always quarrel with me. This is why I was set on fire. ………………… Q. What is your age now ? A. My age is 18 years or 19 years. Q. How long is your married life ? A. It is 4-5 months that I am married. ………………….” On behalf of the prosecution about 20 witnesses were examined. Two witnesses were examined on behalf of the accused appellant in his defence. The accused appellant was himself examined under Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The Prosecution Witness No. 1, Dr. Nisith Chanda Karmakar stated that on 26th February, 2005 he had been posted at NRS Medical College and Hospital. On that day the statement of Bhuia Bibi @ Guria was recorded by Sub-Inspector, S. Chakraborty in his presence. In the margin of the statement, he had made an endorsement that the patient was fit to give statement and that she was not under the effect of sedation. He further endorsed that the patient could not give thumb impression as her finger was burnt. In Court, this witness identified his endorsement as also his signature. In cross-examination, this witness stated that the deceased, Bhuia Bibi @ Guria had been admitted to the hospital with 85% burns. This witness had examined her at about 3 P.M and prescribed medicines. In cross-examination, he categorically denied that he had made his endorsement in the margin of the letter without proper examination of B. Devi @ Guria. The evidence of the Prosecution Witness No. 2, Bikash Chandra Majee, a Police Constable who only prepared a sketch map of the place of occurrence, and the Prosecution Witness No. 4, Susanta Ganguli, an Assistant Sub-inspector of Police of Kolkata who made over samples for forensic examination are not material to the question of guilt of the accused appellant. The Prosecution Witness No. 3, Ravi Bibi, wife of Sk. The Prosecution Witness No. 3, Ravi Bibi, wife of Sk. Anwar deposed that she along with others had taken Guria to NRS Hospital. At the time of transportation, Guria had told her that the accused appellant, Md. Firoz @ Tinku had set her on fire. This witness also stated that Guria had told her that her husband suspected her fidelity. The Prosecution Witness No. 5, Akhtari Bibi, mother of the deceased, Bhuia Bibi @ Guria was also a resident of 66, D.C. Dey Road. She stated that after marriage her daughter used to say that her husband often threatened her with dire consequences. This witness also stated that on the day of the incident she heard her daughter shout. She came out and seeing that her daughter had caught fire, she rushed to her. When she asked her daughter how she had caught fire, her daughter told her that the accused appellant, Tinku had set her on fire after pouring kerosene on her. In cross-examination, this witness reiterated that her daughter had often been threatened by the accused appellant, Tinku, as he had suspected her fidelity. In cross-examination, Akhtari Devi admitted that before Guria got married to Tinku, there were other marriage negotiations and her marriage had been fixed with someone else. The ceremony of ‘Gaye Holud’ had also been held. However, the marriage never materialized. She stated that the marriage had been negotiated through a marriage broker. There are no materials at all to show that there was any perceptible connection between the marriage negotiations of Guria before she got married to Tinku or of the ‘gaye holud’ that had been held. Earlier marriage negotiations or even the engagement of Guria to someone else, before she married Tinku, is in no way related to her death 4 or 5 months after her marriage to Tinku. There is no evidence of any reluctance or aversion of Guria to marry the appellant, Tinku. Nor is there any evidence that the deceased Guria could not accept the accused appellant as her husband. Even assuming that before Guria got married to Tinku, her mother had asked her to marry someone else, that in itself cannot be reason for her to commit suicide 4 or 5 months after her marriage, as suggested in cross-examination. Nor is there any evidence that the deceased Guria could not accept the accused appellant as her husband. Even assuming that before Guria got married to Tinku, her mother had asked her to marry someone else, that in itself cannot be reason for her to commit suicide 4 or 5 months after her marriage, as suggested in cross-examination. The evidence of the Prosecution Witness No. 6, Rajendra Prasad Shaw, is of no relevance since he was not an eye witness. Nor could he throw any light on how the death of Bhuia Bibi @ Guria had taken place. The Prosecution Witness No. 7, Md. Islam, is only a seizure witness. The Prosecution Witness No. 8, Md. Jaggu who was also a neighbour deposed that Guria often told him and his wife that the accused appellant Tinku used to misbehave with her. He deposed that the incident had taken place at about 2:30 p.m. on 26th February, 2005. He had heard cries of ‘agun agun’. This witness on hearing the cries rushed out, to see the accused appellant Md. Firoz @ Tinku standing by the side of his house and some people rushing towards the house of Tinku. He also accompanied them and saw Guria in flames. His wife had also rushed to the place of occurrence. She took a blanket and wrapped the deceased and tried to put out the fire. At that time this deponent asked Guria how she caught fire whereupon Guria told her that her husband Tinku had set her on fire. This deponent stated that the deceased Guria used to call him Mama and his wife Mami. The Prosecution Witness No. 9, Asha Bibi, is the wife of the 8th Prosecution Witness, Guria. She more or less corroborated what her husband had said. The Prosecution Witness No. 10, Md. Shiraj, said that he did not know anything about the incident. As such his evidence is not of relevance. The evidence of the Prosecution Witness No. 11, Md. Yusuf, worker of a leather factory and resident of 66, D.C. Dey Road, who is a neighbour, is based on hearsay. He denied having made any statements to the police in course of investigation. The Prosecution Witness No.12, Noorzahan Bibi, sister of the deceased Guria also deposed that she had accompanied her sister to hospital. Yusuf, worker of a leather factory and resident of 66, D.C. Dey Road, who is a neighbour, is based on hearsay. He denied having made any statements to the police in course of investigation. The Prosecution Witness No.12, Noorzahan Bibi, sister of the deceased Guria also deposed that she had accompanied her sister to hospital. On the way to hospital Guria had told her that the accused Tinku had set fire on her body. The Prosecution Witness No.13, Md. Khazamuddin, brother-in-law of the deceased Guria only stated that he had put his left thumb impression on the inquest report of the deceased Guria at NRS Hospital. His evidence is not much relevance. The Prosecution Witness No.14, a constable of Kolkata Police with training in photography, took some photographs at the place of occurrence. His evidence is also not of much relevance. Similarly, the evidence of Prosecution Witness No.15, Ashok Kr. Rakshit, Assistant of NRS Medical College and Hospital, who had only handed over the bed ticket of the deceased containing seven pages to the Sub-inspector of Police who seized the same, is also not of much relevance. The Prosecution Witness No.16, Dr. Narendra Nath Dutta, a doctor in the Emergency Section of NRS Medical College and Hospital, deposed that on 26th February, 2005 he was posted at NRS Medical College and Hospital in the same post. He deposed that on that day, the deceased Bhuia Bibi, wife of Md. Firoz, who was aged about 19 years, was brought to the hospital by her husband Md. Firoz. She was admitted in the Surgery Emergency Ward. This deponent stated that he had examined her and then admitted her. On examining her, this deponent found that she was conscious. Her pulse rate at 112 per minute was feeble and she had suffered nearly 100 percent burns. He identified the report prepared by him which was marked as Exhibit 9. He stated that the serial number of the Medical Report was 605. He also identified the death report of the deceased, issued from the hospital on 27th February, 2005. In cross-examination, this deponent deposed that if a patient who had suffered burn injuries was not unconscious, the patient would be able to speak. He deposed that, in this case, the patient was capable of speaking. He also stated that he had got smell of kerosene from the body of the deceased. In cross-examination, this deponent deposed that if a patient who had suffered burn injuries was not unconscious, the patient would be able to speak. He deposed that, in this case, the patient was capable of speaking. He also stated that he had got smell of kerosene from the body of the deceased. The Prosecution Witness No.17. Nityananda Mondal, prepared the inquest report over the dead body of the deceased and directed that the body be sent for post mortem examination. The Prosecution Witness No.18, Dr. Rabindranath Karmokar, is the doctor who held the post mortem examination over the dead body of the deceased. This deponent deposed that he found :- (i) First and second degree burn injuries over whole of face including forehead, neck etc. (ii) First and second degree burn injuries over both the arms and forearms all around both dorsums and palms of hands including both axillae. (iv) First and second degree burn injuries over whole of chest wall including both the breasts. (v) First and second degree burn injuries over both the thighs and legs all around including dorsums of both feet and left sole of foot. He opined that the death was due to the effects of burn injuries ante mortem in nature. The evidence of Prosecution Witness No.19, Sub Inspector Sajid Mallick, who arrested the accused appellant Md. Firoz @ Tinku is not of much relevance. The Prosecution Witness No.20, Supra Chakroborty, is the Sub-Inspector of Police, who had investigated the case. Two witnesses have been examined on behalf of the defence, one Md. Abid, who claims to be a cycle repair mechanic and one Mehmood, brother of the accused appellant in an attempt to establish that the accused appellant Tinku was not at home when the unfortunate incident took place. The Defence Witness No.1, Md. Abid claims that he had gone to one Kalu’s welding shop for the purpose of repairing a cycle at about 12 noon. There he met the accused Tinku. He stayed at the shop along with the accused, Tinku, till 2:30, after which he went to a tea stall along with the accused Tinku to have tea. While they were having tea, Tinku’s elder brother came to the tea stall and informed Tinku that his wife had got burnt, after which Tinku went home. He stayed at the shop along with the accused, Tinku, till 2:30, after which he went to a tea stall along with the accused Tinku to have tea. While they were having tea, Tinku’s elder brother came to the tea stall and informed Tinku that his wife had got burnt, after which Tinku went home. The evidence of the Defence Witness No.1 does not inspire confidence of this Court and in any case cannot be placed on a higher pedestal than a dying declaration made by the victim herself. Significantly in cross-examination this witness stated that Tinku was not known to him before 26th February, 2005. It is surprising that two people who did not even know each other should go to the tea stall together to have tea. Moreover, this Md. Abid stated that he was a resident of Narkeldanga and the shop of Kalu was at a half an hour’s motorable distance from his place of business. He further stated that he had no shop, but only a footpath. The Defence Witness No.2, Mehmood, elder brother of the accused appellant Tinku, claimed that he worked in Kalu’s shop as mistri. He deposed that at 12/12:30 p.m. the accused appellant Tinku went to the shop for repairing the frame of his cycle. On that day apart from his brother one Abid had also come to their shop for repairing his cycle. He claimed that he had seen the accused and Abid in the shop till 1 p.m. Thereafter he left the shop for delivering goods at Beliaghata. At about 2 p.m. he went back home. Exactly at that time he saw Bhuia Bibi comingout of her room and his grandmother asking her to sit for a while. According to him, Bhuia Bibi told his grandmother that she was going to her mother’s house. This witness did not say anything of what happened between 2:00 and 2:30 p.m. At 2:30 p.m. he heard ‘agun agun’ after which he noticed some persons removing Bhuia Bibi from her room. Thereafter he went to the welding shop at about 2:45 p.m. and informed his brother about the incident at a tea stall. After that he went to the hospital to see his sister-in-law. He claimed he knew Abid. His brother went to the hospital but he was arrested by the police at the hospital. Thereafter he went to the welding shop at about 2:45 p.m. and informed his brother about the incident at a tea stall. After that he went to the hospital to see his sister-in-law. He claimed he knew Abid. His brother went to the hospital but he was arrested by the police at the hospital. In cross-examination he stated that his house was situated about 5 minutes walking distance from Kalu’s shop. He stated that he had gone to Beliaghata as per direction of his employer. He delivered a repaired cycle frame but did not get any receipt or any repairing charge. There was no one else in the tea stall except his brother and Md. Abid. The defence witness No.2, brother of the accused appellant worked as a mistri at the same welding shop which was about five minutes away from his home. He allegedly left the welding shop to go to Beliaghata to deliver a cycle frame for which he neither got any receipt nor payment. Just when he was entering home he found the deceased, Guria coming out of her room and talking to his grandmother. His grandmother asked Guria to sit for a while but Guria told her she was going to her mother’s place. However, at about 2:30 there were shouts of ‘agun agun’ and people were bringing the deceased out of her own room not from her mother’s room. No one saw her go to or come out from her mother’s room. It is also something surprising that instead of taking his sister-in-law to hospital he should go to Kalu’s welding shop to look for his brother. It is equally surprising that the Defence Witness No.1, who was a regular customer of Kalu’s welding shop should have tea with the accused appellant Tinku who he did not even know. It is curious that the defence witness No.2 knew exactly where to find the accused appellant Tinku. The evidence of this witness does not inspire confidence of this Court. In any case the evidence of the defence witnesses cannot outweigh the evidence in the form of a Dying Declaration made by the deceased herself in the hospital in the presence of a doctor. Mr. The evidence of this witness does not inspire confidence of this Court. In any case the evidence of the defence witnesses cannot outweigh the evidence in the form of a Dying Declaration made by the deceased herself in the hospital in the presence of a doctor. Mr. Jayanta Narayan Chatterjee, appearing on behalf of the appellants submitted that there was no cogent evidence on the basis of which the appellants could have been convicted of murder under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. Mr. Chatterjee submitted that the accused appellant had in his examination under Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code categorically stated that he was not at home when the incident took place and that he was innocent. His statement was supported by two defence witnesses. Mr. Chatterjee, argued that there was no evidence at all, except for the purported Dying Declaration, which was not admissible at all, in law. Mr. Chatterjee strenuously argued that conviction under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, cannot be based on the purported Dying Declaration which is suspect. He submitted that admittedly the deceased had suffered 85% burns. He argued that a person who had suffered 85% burns could not have been in a position to speak coherently and make a Dying Declaration. Mr. Chatterjee submitted that the judgment and order of conviction under appeal which is based on a Dying Declaration, which is inadmissible in evidence, and the order of sentence are liable to be set aside by this Court. Mr. Chatterjee further argued that there were patent discrepancies in the evidence given by the different witnesses appearing on behalf of the prosecution. We have not found any such discrepancies in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses which casts doubts with regard to the credibility of the evidence of the prosecution witnesses. Minor discrepancies are inconsequential. Mr. Chatterjee attacked the dying declaration inter alia contending that the deceased had sustained almost 100 percent burn and was, therefore, not in a position to make a detailed statement. It was next contended that the prescription of the attending doctor indicates that she was to be put under pethidine. The doctor, however, deposed that she was not under sedation. The doctor certified that Guria was fit to make a statement. In support of his submission that the conviction ought not to have been based on the dying declaration, Mr. It was next contended that the prescription of the attending doctor indicates that she was to be put under pethidine. The doctor, however, deposed that she was not under sedation. The doctor certified that Guria was fit to make a statement. In support of his submission that the conviction ought not to have been based on the dying declaration, Mr. Chatterjee cited the following judgments : 1. Deepak Baliram Bajaj and Anr. Vs. State of Maharashtra reported in 1993 Cri.L.J. 3269. 2. Kajal Sen and Ors. Vs. State of Assam reported in 2002 SCC (Cri) 452. 3. State (Delhi Administration) Vs. Laxman Kumar and Ors. reported in (1985) 4 SCC 476 . 4. Meera Vs. State of Rajasthan reported in (2004) 11 SCC 231 . 5. Dalip Singh and Ors. Vs. State of Punjab reported in (1979) 4 SCC 332 . 6. Ram Nath Madhoprasad and Ors. Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in AIR 1953 SC 420 . 7. Panchdeo Singh Vs. State of Bihar reported in 2002 SCC (Cri) 211. 8. Darshan Singh alias Bhasuri and Ors. Vs. State of Punjab reported in (1983) 2 SCC 411 . 9. Balak Ram Vs. State of U.P reported in 1974 SCC (Cri) 837. 10. Paparambaka Rosamma And Ors. Vs. State of A.P. reported in 1999 SCC (Cri) 1361. There can be no doubt that conviction can be based solely on a Dying Declaration. This proposition finds support from the judgment of the Supreme Court in Ramavati Devi Vs. State of Bihar reported in AIR 1983 Supreme Court 164. Ofcourse, for conviction to be based on only an uncorroborated Dying Declaration, the Court must satisfy itself that, what is stated in the Dying Declaration, is unalloyed truth and that it is absolutely safe to act upon it. The Court is obliged to satisfy itself that the Dying Declaration is of such a nature as to inspire confidence of its correctness. The court must carefully examine whether the deceased was in a fit state of mind and health to narrate distinctly and accurately what exactly had happened to him/her. A Dying Declaration is accepted as evidence sufficient for conviction on the principle “nemo moriturus praesumitur mentire” i.e., a man will not meet his Maker with a lie in his mouth. In other words when a man is dying, he is not likely to lie. A Dying Declaration is accepted as evidence sufficient for conviction on the principle “nemo moriturus praesumitur mentire” i.e., a man will not meet his Maker with a lie in his mouth. In other words when a man is dying, he is not likely to lie. Once the court is satisfied that the deceased was fit enough to make a valid declaration and the declaration made was true and voluntary it can undoubtedly base its conviction on such Dying Declaration, without any further corroboration. As argued by Mr. Chatterjee, before convicting the accused on the basis of dying declaration only, the Court should be extremely careful. The Court is required to scrutinize a Dying Declaration carefully to ensure that the declaration is not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination and the deceased was in a fit mental and physical state to make a Dying Declaration. Where a Dying Declaration is suspicious, or suffers from any infirmity, it cannot form the basis of a conviction without corroborative evidence. In this case there was no one to tutor the deceased. We also find no reason why a newly married bride should, without cause, falsely implicate her husband. Mr. Ranabir Roychoudhury, has cited the judgment of the Supreme Court in Gulam Hussain : Shabnam Vs. State of Delhi reported in (2000) 7 SCC 254 where the Supreme Court held:- “8. Section 32 of the Evidence Act is an exception to the general rule of exclusion of hearsey evidence and the statement made by a person written or verbal of relevant facts after his death is admissible in evidence if it refers to the cause of his death or any circumstances of the transactions which resulted in his death. To attract the provisions of Section 32, the prosecution is required to prove that the statement was made by a person who is dead or who cannot be found or whose attendance cannot be procured without any amount of delay or expense or he is incapable of giving evidence and that such statement had been made under any of the circumstances specified in sub-sections (1) to (8) of Section 32 of the Evidence Act. It cannot be disputed that Islamuddin who made a statement PW22/B has died and in his deposition he has referred to the circumstances which ultimately proved to be the cause of his death. It cannot be disputed that Islamuddin who made a statement PW22/B has died and in his deposition he has referred to the circumstances which ultimately proved to be the cause of his death. Nothing has been pointed out by the defence side which could create any doubt in our mind regarding the making or admissibility in evidence of the statement Exhibit PW22/B.” In Koli Chunilal Savji & Anr. Vs. State of Gujarat reported in 1999 (8) Supreme 717 where the Supreme Court held that the requirements of the presence of a doctor and certification that the deceased had been conscious, in senses and in a fit condition to make a statement were rules of prudence, and the ultimate test was whether the Dying Declaration could be held to be a truthful one and voluntarily given. In Laxman Vs. State of Maharashtra reported in 2002 (5) Supreme 557 a Five Judge Bench overruled the judgement of the Supreme Court in Paparambaka Rosamma & Ors. Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh 1999 (7) SCC 695 and affirmed Koli Chunilal Savji & Anr. Vs. State of Gujarat (supra). In Deepak Baliram Bajaj And Anr. Vs. State Of Maharashtra reported in 1993 Cri.L.J. 3269 cited by Mr. Chatterjee, the Bombay High Court found on facts that the dying declaration in that case did not inspire confidence so as to make it the sole basis for upholding the order of conviction and sentence recorded against the appellants. In Kajal Sen and Ors. Vs. State of Assam reported in 2002 SCC (Cri) 452 cited by Mr. Chatterjee, the Supreme Court disbelieved the prosecution’s story notwithstanding the existence of a dying declaration. The judgment in Kajal Sen (supra) was, however, rendered in the particular facts of the case before the Supreme Court. In the aforesaid case there were many attendants surrounding the patient and they were talking with the deceased. Furthermore, the Dying Declaration has not been taken down verbatim. The person who had recorded the Dying Declaration had stated that he had first heard the entire statement of the deceased in Bengali, kept the same in memory and then written down the Dying Declaration in English. This was not mentioned in the Dying Declaration. In State (Delhi Administration) Vs. Laxman Kumar and Ors. heard with Indian Federation of Women Lawyers and Ors. Vs. Smt. Shakuntala And Ors. This was not mentioned in the Dying Declaration. In State (Delhi Administration) Vs. Laxman Kumar and Ors. heard with Indian Federation of Women Lawyers and Ors. Vs. Smt. Shakuntala And Ors. reported in (1985) 4 SCC 476 , the Supreme Court doubted the correctness of the certificate of the doctor that the deceased had been in a fit condition to give a statement. In the aforesaid case the Supreme Court held that a dying declaration enjoys almost a sacrosanct status as a piece of evidence as it comes from the mouth of a person who is about to die and at that stage of life he is not likely to make a false statement. Ordinarily, a document as valuable as a dying declaration is supposed to be foolproof and is to incorporate the particulars which it is supposed to contain. However, in the facts of the case it was found that the doctor concerned in whose presence the dying declaration was rendered had not endorsed the statement but merely attested the statement. The document was not signed by the deceased and only partial impression of the figure tip said to be of the deceased was taken without showing any reasons. The dying declaration was found to be unacceptable. In Laxman Kumar and Ors. (supra) the dying declaration was not in question and answer form. In this case the statement is in question answer form. The statement contains an endorsement of the attending doctor certifying that the patient was conscious and fit to make a statement, and that her thumb impression could not be taken because of burns. In Meera Vs. State of Rajasthan reported in (2004) 11 SCC 231 , the dying declaration was disbelieved as the witnesses had disclosed the dying declaration for the first time one year after the occurrence. In this case, the dying declaration was the basis of the FIR and the charges were based on the dying declaration. In Dalip Singh and Ors. Vs. State of Punjab reported in 1979 SCC (Cri) 968 the Supreme Court held:- “8. There were two dying declarations of Ram Singh one oral and the other written which was recorded by the Assistant Sub Inspector of Police, PW 28 on 12-12-75. The oral dying declaration was made to PW 11 Tara Singh. In Dalip Singh and Ors. Vs. State of Punjab reported in 1979 SCC (Cri) 968 the Supreme Court held:- “8. There were two dying declarations of Ram Singh one oral and the other written which was recorded by the Assistant Sub Inspector of Police, PW 28 on 12-12-75. The oral dying declaration was made to PW 11 Tara Singh. Neither of the dying declarations was relied upon by the High Court because he had named Baldev Singh also. We may also add although a dying declaration recorded by a Police Officer during the course of investigation is admissible under Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act in view of the exception provided in Sub-section (2) of Section 162 of the CrPC, 1973, it is better to leave such dying declaration out of consideration until and unless the prosecution satisfies the court as to why it is not recorded by a Magistrate or by a Doctor. As observed by this Court in Munnu Raja and Anr v. The State of Madhya Pradesh the practice of the Investigating Officer himself recorded a dying declaration during the course of investigation ought not to be encouraged. We do not mean to suggest that such dying declarations are always untrustworthy, but, what we want to emphasize is that better and more reliable methods of recording a dying declarations of an injured person should be taken recourse to and the one recorded by the Police Officer may be relied upon if there was no time of facility available to the prosecution for adopting any better method.” In Ram Nath Madhoprasad And Ors. Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in AIR 1953 SC 420 , the Supreme Court held that it was settled law that it was not safe to convict an accused person merely on the evidence furnished by a dying declaration without further corroboration, because such a statement is not made on oath and is not subject to cross-examination and because the maker of the statement might be mentally and physically in a state of confusion and might well be drawing upon his imagination while he was making the declaration. In this case, it cannot be said that there is no corroboration at all of the dying declaration. Atleast four witnesses have deposed that the victim had told them that she had been set on fire by the accused appellant. In this case, it cannot be said that there is no corroboration at all of the dying declaration. Atleast four witnesses have deposed that the victim had told them that she had been set on fire by the accused appellant. Furthermore the attending doctor certified her fitness to make a statement. In the case of Panchdeo Singh Vs. State of Bihar reported in 2002 SCC (Cri) 211 cited by Mr. Chatterjee the Supreme Court held that dying declaration itself could be treated as a sensitive piece of evidence and thus could be the basis of an order of conviction and sentence without there being any corroboration, provided, however, the same brought forth a sense of confidence and trustworthiness in the mind of the Court. The main issue is whether the dying declaration is able to inspire confidence of the Court, whether it is trustworthy or whether such a dying declaration is merely an attempt to cover up the laches of investigation. It must allure to the satisfaction of the Court that reliance ought to be placed on the dying declaration. If there were some infirmities whatsoever negligible the Court unless otherwise satisfied about its credibility would have to look for corroboration. If, however, it was otherwise, question of requirement of a corroboration would not arise. The Supreme Court further held that there was no format as such for a dying declaration, neither the declaration need to be longish in nature or neatly structured; the wordings might not be perfect. A statement should be believable though the narration of events might not be with mathematical precision. However, in the aforesaid case there was not even any certificate of doctor of the fitness of the mind of the deceased to make a dying declaration. The dying declaration was not relied upon by the Supreme Court. We do not find any such infirmity in the Dying Declaration, which raises any doubt with regard to its credibility. The attending doctor in whose presence the Dying Declaration was taken, certified that Guria was fit to make a statement. In Darshan Singh Alias Bhasuri and Ors. Vs. State of Punjab reported in 1983 SCC (Cri) 523 the Supreme Court found that the dying declaration unreliable, having regard to the condition of the deceased when he is stated to have made the dying declaration. In Darshan Singh Alias Bhasuri and Ors. Vs. State of Punjab reported in 1983 SCC (Cri) 523 the Supreme Court found that the dying declaration unreliable, having regard to the condition of the deceased when he is stated to have made the dying declaration. The vital organs had completely been smashed and the doctors saw remote changes of his remaining conscious after receiving the injury. The judgement is distinguishable on facts. The judgment in Balak Ram Vs. State of U.P. reported in 1974 SCC (Cri) 837 the Supreme Court did not accept the dying declaration recorded by the investigating officer having regard to the doctor’s evidence with regard to the critical condition in which the deceased had been got into the hospital. The dying declaration was not taken in the hospital in the presence of a doctor but in the car while the deceased was being transported from the place of occurrence to the hospital. The Supreme Court observed that investigating officers were keenly interested in the fruition of their efforts and though no assumption could be made against their veracity, it would not be prudent to base the conviction on a dying declaration made to an investigating officer. In Pararambaka Rosamma and Ors. Vs. State of A.P. reported in 1999 SCC (Cri) 1361 the Supreme Court did not accept the dying declaration in the absence of a medical certificate considering that the deceased had sustained 90% burn injuries. In this case there is medical certification as observed above. In any case Pararambaka Rosamma and Ors. Vs. State of A.P. (supra) has been overruled by a five Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Laxman Vs. State of Maharashtra reported in 2002 (5) Supreme 557 . As argued by Mr. Ranabir Roychowdhury, appearing on behalf of the State, Section 32 of the Evidence Act is an exception to the general rule of exclusion of hearsay evidence and the statement made by a person in his death bed is admissible in evidence if it refers to cause of his death or any circumstances which resulted in his death. There is also no rule of law or rule of prudence that dying declaration can not be accepted unless there is corroboration. In support of his submission Mr. Roychowdhury cited Gulam Hussain : Shabnam Vs. State of Delhi reported in 2000 (5) Supreme 381 , (2000) 7 SCC 254 . There is also no rule of law or rule of prudence that dying declaration can not be accepted unless there is corroboration. In support of his submission Mr. Roychowdhury cited Gulam Hussain : Shabnam Vs. State of Delhi reported in 2000 (5) Supreme 381 , (2000) 7 SCC 254 . In Kanti Lal Vs. State of Rajasthan reported in (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 593, the Supreme Court held :- “32. It is well settled that one of the important tests of the credibility of the Dying Declaration is that the person, who recorded it, must be satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind. For placing implicit reliance on Dying Declaration, the court must be satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind to narrate the correct facts of occurrence. If the capacity of the maker of the statement to narrate the facts is found to be impaired, such Dying Declaration should be rejected, as it is highly unsafe to place reliance on it. The Dying Declaration should be voluntary and should not be prompted and physical as ell as mental fitness of the maker is to be proved by the prosecution.” In Mohd. Islam Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) reported in (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 673, the Supreme Court found that a Dying Declaration not containing any specific certification of the doctor that the deceased was in a fit state of mind and health to make a statement of that nature, could not form the basis of conviction. The judgment has, however, been rendered in the particular facts of the case, and is distinguishable. In this case the doctor certified that Guria was fit to make a statement. The proposition of law which emerges from the judgments referred to above is that Section 32 is an exception to the general rule against hearsay evidence. A dying declaration, which is a statement of the deceased before his death with regard to the cause of his death is admissible in evidence. There is no prescribed form for such a statement. It does not necessarily have to be recorded before a Magistrate. If the Court is satisfied that the dying declaration is credible, conviction can be based solely thereon. However, when there are infirmities in the dying declaration which raises doubts with regard to its correctness the Court should be circumspect. There is no prescribed form for such a statement. It does not necessarily have to be recorded before a Magistrate. If the Court is satisfied that the dying declaration is credible, conviction can be based solely thereon. However, when there are infirmities in the dying declaration which raises doubts with regard to its correctness the Court should be circumspect. The Court should ordinarily examine a dying declaration to ascertain whether the dying declaration was made voluntarily by a person who had the mental and physical capacity to make such a dying declaration. We have carefully perused the dying declaration which as observed above is in the form of questions and answers. The answers to the questions are distinct. The dying declaration was taken down by the investigating officer in the presence of the attending doctor who made an endorsement in the dying declaration that the patient was conscious, not under sedatives and in a fit condition to make a dying declaration. May be, as argued by Mr. Chatterjee, pethidine had been prescribed. However, there is no evidence at all that the pethidine had been administered at the time when the deceased made the dying declaration or that her faculties were blurred in any way. On the other hand, two different doctors, the first being the Medical Officer of the Emergency Department, where the deceased had first been taken and then the surgeon under whom the deceased had been admitted, have both given evidence in Court. Prosecution Witness No. 1, Dr. Nishit Chanda Karmakar, clearly stated that the deceased was in a fit condition to make a dying declaration, she was not under sedation, she was conscious. The other doctor being Prosecution Witness No.16, Dr. Narendra Nath Dutta, also stated that when she was admitted to the hospital she was conscious although she was severely burnt. The burn injuries almost 100 percent. This doctor deposed that a patient with burn injuries who is conscious and in a position to speak is capable of giving dying declaration. The dying declaration inspires the confidence of the Court. It is believable. There is no reason why two doctors of NRS Hospital who are public servants, as well as the investigating officer should give incorrect evidence to implicate the accused appellant. There is no reason why the civil surgeon and the investigating officer should hatch a conspiracy to bring into existence a false dying declaration. It is believable. There is no reason why two doctors of NRS Hospital who are public servants, as well as the investigating officer should give incorrect evidence to implicate the accused appellant. There is no reason why the civil surgeon and the investigating officer should hatch a conspiracy to bring into existence a false dying declaration. Moreover what was stated in Guria’s dying declaration with regard to the incident which caused her death was told to atleast four witnesses by Guria herself. We do not find any infirmity in the judgment and order of conviction and the order of sentence that calls for interference in appeal. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed. Photostat certified copy of this judgment, if applied for, be supplied to the parties expeditiously, subject to compliance with the requisite formalities. Sahidullah Munshi, J. : I Agree.