JUDGMENT : J.B. Pardiwala, J. By this writ-application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the writ-applicants, serving as Drivers in the Border Wing of Home Guards, have prayed for the following reliefs: “(A) This Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue a writ of mandamus or a writ in the nature of mandamus, or any other writ, order or directions directing the respondent authorities to grant the revised pay scale of Rs. 950-1500 to the present petitioners with effect from the date of appointment with all incidental benefits of service and with interest at the rate of 18 percent per annum till the date of actual payment. (AA) This Hon'ble Court may kindly be issued a writ of mandamus and/or a writ in the nature of mandamus and/or any other appropriate writ, order or direction, quashing and setting aside the impugned decision taken by the first respondent dt. 15th of February 1996 vide Annexure: N to this petition. (AAA) Be pleased to direct the respondent authorities to comply as per the recommendations made by the Pay Anomaly Committee dated 10.5.2000 and be pleased to quash and set aside the report of the Cabinet Sub-Committee dated 24.5.2005, rejecting the report of the Pay Anomaly Committee and be pleased to declare that the report of the Cabinet Sub-Committee along with resolution passed by the Government dated 23.11.2011 are contra to the principle of natural justice, perplexing and bad in law. (B) Pending admission, hearing and final disposal of this petition, this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to direct the respondents, their agents and servants to grant the revised pay scale of Rs. 950-1500 with effect from 1st January, 1986 with all incidental benefits of service and with interest at the rate of 18 percent per annum till the date of actual payment. (C) This Hon'ble Court be pleased to grant any other appropriate relief as the facts and circumstances of the case may require.” 2. The case of the writ-applicants may be summarised as under: The writ-applicants are serving as the Drivers in the Battalion Nos. 1 and 2 under the Battalion Commandants of the Banaskantha District and Kutch District respectively in the Border Wing of Home Guards of the State of Gujarat. They were appointed in the pay-scale of Rs. 200-260 which, later on, came to be revised to Rs. 825-1150. 1 and 2 under the Battalion Commandants of the Banaskantha District and Kutch District respectively in the Border Wing of Home Guards of the State of Gujarat. They were appointed in the pay-scale of Rs. 200-260 which, later on, came to be revised to Rs. 825-1150. The grievance of the writ-applicants is that they are being discriminated with the other Drivers serving in the various departments of the State of Gujarat like Director General of Police, Commandant General, Home Guards of Gujarat State, Inspector General of Police, Director of Information, Director of Transport, Government Transport Service, Gujarat Vigilance Commissioner, etc. so far as the salary is concerned. The writ-applicants are claiming the pay-scale of Rs. 950-1500 which is being paid to the Drivers serving with the various other departments of the State Government referred to above. 3. Hence, this writ-application invoking the doctrine of ‘equal pay for equal work’. 4. Mr. Hemang Shah, the learned counsel appearing for the writ-applicants, vehemently submitted that the claim put forward by his clients for pay at par with the pay of the other Drivers working in the various departments of the State Government deserves to be accepted considering the fact that the duties and functions performed by the writ-applicants are similar to those performed by the other Drivers. He would submit that the duties and functions of his clients are more onerous than the other Drivers serving with the State Government. He pointed out that during the pendency of this writ-application, the issue raised was considered by the Pay Anomaly Committee constituted by the State Government The Pay Anomaly Committee, after due consideration of the matter, recommended that the Drivers of the Border Wing of Home Guards be granted the pay-scale of Rs. 950-1500 with effect from 1.1.1986 However, the Cabinet Sub-Committee refused to act in accordance with the recommendations of the Pay Anomaly Committee. Mr. Shah submitted that the Government ought to have accepted the recommendations of the Pay Anomaly Committee being an expert body. He, therefore, prays that there being merit in the claim put forward by his clients, the writ-application may be allowed and an appropriate writ be issued. 5. On the other hand, this writ-application has been vehemently opposed by Mr. Goutam, the learned AGP appearing for the State Government. He, therefore, prays that there being merit in the claim put forward by his clients, the writ-application may be allowed and an appropriate writ be issued. 5. On the other hand, this writ-application has been vehemently opposed by Mr. Goutam, the learned AGP appearing for the State Government. He has put forward the following submissions: “The petitioners came to be appointed as ‘Drivers and Dispatch Riders’, they were recruited under the Border Wing Home Guard Recruitment Rules, 1983 (For brevity ‘Recruitment Rules, 1983’). These rules came to be passed the virtue of the proviso of Article 309 of the Constitution of India for appointment of Drivers in the Border Wing Home Guard; (See: Page 76) The appointment of the Driver is based on the scheme which is formulated and floated by the Government of India, Bharat Sarkar, Ministry of Home Affairs, to raise two Border Wing Home Guards Battalions in the State of Gujarat. The scheme was communicated in form of a letter dated 29th June, 1979 addressed to the Chief Secretary, raising of two Border Wing Horne Guards and Battalion in the State of Gujarat. At this juncture, it is clarified that the said Border Wing Home Guard Battalion is totally different and separate from the Home Guard Battalion which is established under The Bombay Home Guard Ac 1947. The Border Wing Home Guard Battalion is a full-time establishment consisting of Platoon Head Quarters, Companies Head Quarters and Battalion Head Quarters and the employee appointed therein are to be paid at the scale of pay and allowances as admissible to the State Army Police. The petitioners are being paid pay scale in light and in consonance to scheme of central government duly adopted by the state government. (See Page 102). At this juncture, it is clarified that the Border Wing Home Guard Drivers are paid Rs. 825-1200. Equivalent to the Constable at the State Armed Police Force Constable Driver. Non-secretariat Drivers are appointed in the State under the Driver Class-III Recruitment Rules, 2009. (For brevity “Civilian Drivers Recruitment Rules”) (Page 95); The petitioners raised the grievance after the implementation of 4thPay Commission in State of Gujarat to pay them at par with the Civilian Drivers. At that time, the petitioners were getting Rs. 825-1200 whereas, Drivers at civilian Rs. 950-1500. (For brevity “Civilian Drivers Recruitment Rules”) (Page 95); The petitioners raised the grievance after the implementation of 4thPay Commission in State of Gujarat to pay them at par with the Civilian Drivers. At that time, the petitioners were getting Rs. 825-1200 whereas, Drivers at civilian Rs. 950-1500. For brevity tabular chart explaining the pay scale difference in non secretariat Drivers and Drivers of Border Wing Home Guard; Border Wing Home Guard Drivers Civilian Drivers (4th Pay Commission) Rs. 825-1200 Rs. 950-1500 (5th Pay Commission) Rs. 2750-4400 Rs. 3050-4590 (6th Pay Commission) Rs. 5200-20200 1800 (Grade Pay) Rs. 5200-20200 1900 (Grade Pay) The petitioners made representations to the government on 20thMach, 1988, to remove the anomaly. Further representations were made time and again. The Government referred the same to the Pay Anomaly Committee, (For brevity ‘Anomaly Committee’) on 20th July, 1988. The Anomaly Committee on 10.05.2000 recommended in positive after considering the request of the petitioners by report dated 10.05.2000 (See, Page 85) The Ministerial Sub Committee, on 24th May 2005, refused to accept the recommendation of the anomaly committee, that there is difference in education qualification is SSC in Border Wing Home Guard but as such there is no requirement in the recruitment of Civilian driver. The Driver of Border Wing Home Guard is treated at par with SRPF, and they are paid pay scale 825-1200 in 4th Pay Commission, and Rs. 2750-4400 in 5th Pay Commission. (See Pp 93-94 relevant noting at pg.94); Its respectfully submitted that distinguishing features are as under in tabular chart for ready reference: Duties of the Border Wing Home Guard Drivers. Duties of the Civilian Drivers. A driver posted in the Border Wing to wear uniforms mandatorily It is not mandatory to wear uniform. Drivers are trained not only for driving purpose, but for defense purposes too, in case of urgent situation Civilian Driver are not trained for any such casualty, they are not performing any duty except what they are required by virtue of rules. Recruitment Condition in Border Wing Home Guard for Driver's post Recruitment condition in Non-secretary Driver's post (Civilian Driver) To be appointed as Driver in Border Wing requirement is must possess VIIIth Standard Pass. Only 2 years experience in driving (See pg.76) To be appointed as Driver on Non-secretary Driver post, requirement is secondary or higher secondary compulsory. Recruitment Condition in Border Wing Home Guard for Driver's post Recruitment condition in Non-secretary Driver's post (Civilian Driver) To be appointed as Driver in Border Wing requirement is must possess VIIIth Standard Pass. Only 2 years experience in driving (See pg.76) To be appointed as Driver on Non-secretary Driver post, requirement is secondary or higher secondary compulsory. By promotion of a person of proved merit and efficiency from amongst the person who have worked not less than 5 years in cadre of Class IV in the inferior service in the secretariat and/or non-secretariat office of the government of Gujarat (See Pg.96) Commandant General for Border Wing Home Guard and Home Guard Civil Defense, Gram Rakshak Dal there is only one HOD i.e. Commandant General. The driver who is placed with Commandant General is in general. For instance, if the driver recruited under Border Wing Home Guard Rules is placed with the Commandant General as a driver he will get same pay scale of Rs. 825-1200. If the driver recruited under Home Guard, specifically under civilian recruitment rules, 2009 he will get Rs. 950-1500. There is no special pay or any type of benefit It is respectfully submitted that there is applicability of doctrine of ‘equal pay for equal work’ in the instant case. Therefore, the decision of the Ministerial Committee is just and proper.” 6. On 30th November 1995, the following order was passed: “The eight petitioners are serving as drivers in the Border Wing of Home Guards under respondent no. 2 who is officer of respondent no. 1 herein State of Gujarat Through this petition, the petitioners have ventilated their grievance regarding discrimination in the matter of pay scale. The petitioners contend that the drivers in other Departments under the State Government including the drivers in the Police Department as well as the drivers in the other Wing of the Home Guards are being paid salary in the pay scale of Rs. 950-1500 but the petitioners are being paid salary in the pay scale of Rs. 825-1150. The, petitioners have also produced alongwith the memo of petition, the representations made by the petitioners from time to time since January 1988. 950-1500 but the petitioners are being paid salary in the pay scale of Rs. 825-1150. The, petitioners have also produced alongwith the memo of petition, the representations made by the petitioners from time to time since January 1988. There is no dispute about the fact that said representations are not yet decided by the respondents, although the Senior Staff Officer of the Home Guards, Gujarat State had made positive recommendation in this behalf as far back as in January and April 1990, as is clear from the letters dt 6th January 1990 (Annexure-g to the petition) and dt. 26th April 1990 (Annexure-H to the petition). The petitioners again submitted their representations to the respondents in the month of May 1990 and March 1994 pointing out that their duties in border districts are more arduous and onerous than the duties of other drivers serving under the respondents. The petitioners have not received any reply except a communication from Battalion Commandant Bhuj, in April 1994 to the effect that the Government's decision on the petitioners' representations is awaited. The petitioners have thereafter again made a representation dt. 1st May 1995 (Annexure-M to the petition) to the Government at higher levels. When the petition came up for hearing, this court issued notice to the respondents on 1st September, 1995. Thereafter again on 16thNovember 1995 matter was adjourned at the request made on behalf of the respondents. When the matter has come up for hearing today, Mr. Bhambhania, learned Solicitor to the Government states that the issue regarding the Pay Scale of the petitioners i.e. of the drivers of the Border Wing of the Home Guards is not yet decided by the State Government. In view of the fact that the petitioners' representations are pending since January 1988 and inaction on the part of the respondents has been hurting the petitioners every month, it appears to be a fit and proper case for directing respondent no. 1 State of Gujarat to decide at the earliest the representations made by the petitioners, which pertain to their claim for salary in the pay scale of Rs. 950-1500, when the drivers in all other Departments under the State of Gujarat including the drivers in other Wings of the Home Guards under respondent no. 2 are being paid salary in the pay scale of Rs. 950-1500. Respondent no. 950-1500, when the drivers in all other Departments under the State of Gujarat including the drivers in other Wings of the Home Guards under respondent no. 2 are being paid salary in the pay scale of Rs. 950-1500. Respondent no. 1 is, therefore, directed to decide the petitioners' representations for being granted the pay scale of Rs. 950-1500 as expeditiously as possible and latest by 15th February 1996. The respondents shall produce a copy of the decision on the aforesaid representations before the Court on 19th February 1996. Direct service is permitted.” 7. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having considered the materials on record, the only question that falls for my consideration is, whether the writ-applicants are entitled to the reliefs as prayed for in this writ-application. 8. The Supreme Court, in the case of Official Liquidator Vs. Dayanand, (2008) 10 SCC 1 , has explained the concept of ‘equal pay for equal work’. The observations of the Supreme Court as contained in paragraphs 93 to 98 are relevant. Those are elicited as under: “93. The respondents' claim for fixation of pay in the regular scale and grant of other monetary benefits on a par with those appointed against the sanctioned posts has been accepted by the High Courts on the premise that their duties and functions are similar to those performed by regular employees. In the opinion of the High Courts, similarity in the nature of work of the company-paid staff on the one hand and regular employees on the other hand, is by itself sufficient for invoking the principle of equal pay for equal work. In our view, the approach adopted by the High Courts is clearly erroneous and directions given for bringing about parity between the company-paid staff and regular employees in the matter of pay, allowances, etc. are liable to be upset. 94. The principle of equal pay for equal work for men and women embodied in Article 39(d) was first considered in Kishori Mohanlal Bakshi Vs. Union of India, AIR 1962 SC 1139 and it was held that the said principle is not capable of being enforced in a court of law. After 36 years, the issue was again considered in Randhir Singh Vs. Union of India, AIR 1962 SC 1139 and it was held that the said principle is not capable of being enforced in a court of law. After 36 years, the issue was again considered in Randhir Singh Vs. Union of India, (1982) 1 SCC 618 , and it was unequivocally ruled that the principle of equal pay for equal work is not an abstract doctrine and can be enforced by reading it into the doctrine of equality enshrined in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. 95. The ratio of Randhir Singh was reiterated and applied in several cases - Dhirendra Chamoli Vs. State of UP, (1986) 1 SCC 637 , Surinder Singh Vs. CPWD, (1986) 1 SCC 639 , Daily Rated Casual Labour Vs. Union of India, (1988) 1 SCC 122 , Dharwad Distt. PWD Literate Daily Wage Employees Assn. Vs. State of Karnataka, (1990) 2 SCC 396 and Jaipal Vs. State of Haryana, (1988) 3 SCC 354 and it was held that even a daily-wage employee who is performing duties similar to regular employees is entitled to the same pay. However, in Federation of All India Customs and Central Excise Stenographers Vs. Union of India, (1988) 3 SCC 91 , Mewa Ram Kanojia Vs. AIIMS, (1989) 2 SCC 235 , V. Markendeya Vs. State of A.P., (1989) 3 SCC 191 , Harbans Lal Vs. State of H.P., (1989) 4 SCC 459 , State of U.P. Vs. J.P. Chaurasia, (1989) 1 SCC 121 , Grih Kalyan Kendra Workers' Union Vs. Union of India, (1991) 1 SCC 619 , GDA Vs. Vikram Chaudhary, (1995) 5 SCC 210 , State of Haryana Vs. Jasmer Singh, (1996) 11 SCC 77 , State of Haryana Vs. Surinder Kumar, (1997) 3 SCC 633 , Union of India Vs. K.V. Baby, (1998) 9 SCC 252 , State of Orissa Vs. Balaram Sahu, (2003) 1 SCC 250 , Utkal University Vs. Jyotirmayee Nayak, (2003) 4 SCC 760 , State of Haryana Vs. Tilak Raj, (2003) 6 SCC 123 , Union of India Vs. Tarit Ranjan Das, (2003) 11 SCC 658 , Apangshu Mohan Lodh Vs. State of Tripura, (2004) 1 SCC 119 , State of Haryana Vs. Charanjit Singh, (2006) 9 SCC 321 , Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. Vs. Dan Bahadur Singh, (2007) 6 SCC 207 , Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan Vs. L.V. Subramanyeswara, (2007) 5 SCC 326 and Canteen Mazdoor Sabha Vs. Metallurgical & Engg. State of Tripura, (2004) 1 SCC 119 , State of Haryana Vs. Charanjit Singh, (2006) 9 SCC 321 , Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. Vs. Dan Bahadur Singh, (2007) 6 SCC 207 , Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan Vs. L.V. Subramanyeswara, (2007) 5 SCC 326 and Canteen Mazdoor Sabha Vs. Metallurgical & Engg. Consultants (India) Ltd., (2007) 7 SCC 710 , the Court consciously and repeatedly deviated from the ruling of Randhir Singh Vs. Union of India, (1982) 1 SCC 618 and held that similarity in the designation or quantum of work are not determinative of equality in the matter of pay scales and that before entertaining and accepting the claim based on the principle of equal pay for equal work, the Court must consider the factors like the source and mode of recruitment/appointment, the qualifications, the nature of work, the value judgment, responsibilities, reliability, experience, confidentiality, functional need, etc. 96. In State of Haryana Vs. Jasmer Singh, (1996) 11 SCC 77 , the two-Judge Bench laid down the following principle: (SCC p. 81, para 8) “8. It is, therefore, clear that the quality of work performed by different sets of persons holding different jobs will have to be evaluated. There may be differences in educational or technical qualifications which may have a bearing on the skills which the holders bring to their job although the designation of the job may be the same. There may also be other considerations which have relevance to efficiency in service which may justify differences in pay scales on the basis of criteria such as experience and seniority, or a need to prevent stagnation in the cadre, so that good performance can be elicited from persons who have reached the top of the pay scale. There may be various other similar considerations which may have a bearing on efficient performance in a job. This Court has repeatedly observed that evaluation of such jobs for the purposes of pay scale must be left to expert bodies and, unless there are any mala fides, its evaluation should be accepted.” 97. In Harbans Lal Vs. State of H.P, (1989) 4 SCC 459 , the Court held that the claim of carpenters employed by an incorporated company for parity in wages payable to their counterparts in government service is unsustainable. 98. In Jawaharlal Nehru Technological University Vs. In Harbans Lal Vs. State of H.P, (1989) 4 SCC 459 , the Court held that the claim of carpenters employed by an incorporated company for parity in wages payable to their counterparts in government service is unsustainable. 98. In Jawaharlal Nehru Technological University Vs. T. Sumalatha, (2003) 10 SCC 405 , it was held that the respondents who were employed under a scheme known as National Technical Manpower Information System, which was sponsored by the then Ministry of Education and Culture, cannot claim parity with the regular government employees in the matter of pay scale.” 9. I am of the view that although the Pay Anomaly Committee recommended the pay-scale of Rs. 950-1500 with effect from 1.1.1986, yet the same by itself cannot be said to be binding to the State Government. It is true that the State Government constituted a committee of experts to look into the pay anomalies and ordinarily the recommendations should be respected being the recommendations of an expert body, but it would be too much to say that such recommendations are binding to the State Government. If the State Government has any good ground to disagree with the recommendations of the Pay Anomaly Committee, then it can always act accordingly. Prima facie, it appears that the sole ground for rejecting the recommendation is the educational qualification. According to the recruitment rules framed for the civilian drivers, a candidate should fulfill the following criteria: (1) Be not more than 35 years of age; (2) Have passed Standard-X examination; (3) Should possess the civilian motor driving licence for car, light and heavy transport vehicles and atleast three years driving experience; (4) Passed a practical test in driving, general knowledge or servicing of motor vehicles, traffic signs and hand signals, etc. 10. On the other hand, the recruitment rules of the Border Wing Home Guards provides that a candidate should fulfill the following criteria: (1) Be above 21 years and below 25 years of age; (2) Be physically fit according to the norms laid down in the Appendix-A; (3) Have passed Standard-VIII examination; (4) Have a valid driving licence for heavy or light vehicles or motorcycle for about two years; (5) Five years of work experience. 11. The pay-scale given to the civilian drivers at the relevant point of time was Rs. 11. The pay-scale given to the civilian drivers at the relevant point of time was Rs. 825-1200 which was equivalent to the pay-scale given to the Constables in the State Reserve Police and also equivalent to the pay-scale given to the Constables in the Border Wing of the Home Guards. It has been pointed out that a driver in the Border Wing of Home Guards is a trained driver who is supposed to possess five years of work experience of driving a vehicle. In the State Reserve Police, a candidate is appointed as a Constable and is given the pay-scale as admissible to a Constable and then made to perform the duty of a driver. 12. Mr. Shah laid much emphasis on the fact that the Cabinet Sub-Committee rejected the recommendations of the Pay Anomaly Committee only considering the educational qualifications. The Cabinet Sub-Committee failed to consider the onerous duties and functions being discharged by the drivers in the Border Wing of Home Guards. 13. In Randhir Singh (supra), the Supreme Court unequivocally ruled that the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ is not an abstract doctrine and can be enforced by reading it into the doctrine of ‘equality’ enshrined in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in the case of Official Liquidator (supra), the ratio of Randhir Singh (supra) was followed for some period of time. Later on, in many decisions of the Supreme Court the ruling of Randhir Singh (supra) has been diluted taking the view that similarity in the designation or quantum of work are not determinative of equality in the matters of pay-scales and the Court must consider many other factors like the source and mode of recruitment/appointment, the qualifications, the nature of work, the value judgment, responsibilities, reliability, experience, confidentiality, functional need, etc. If the Cabinet Sub-Committee thought fit not to accept the recommendat of the Pay Anomaly Committee having regard to the qualifications prescribed for the two posts, then, in my view, it cannot be said that the State Government acted highhandedly or arbitrarily. It cannot be said that such decision is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 14. The Pay Anomaly Committee, in its report, does not seem to have dealt with the issue at length. It cannot be said that such decision is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 14. The Pay Anomaly Committee, in its report, does not seem to have dealt with the issue at length. It has only said that since the pay-scale of the regular drivers from 1.1.1986 is Rs. 950-1500, the drivers serving with the Border Wing of Home Guards should also be paid the same pay scale. 15. On the other hand, the Cabinet Sub-Committee took the view that only by virtue of the fact that the educational qualification is S.S.C pass, the same by itself would not be sufficient to claim Rs. 950-1500. The writ-applicants have been put at par with the Constables of the State Reserve Police. The pay-scales of the Constables of the State Reserve Police is Rs. 825-1200.Rs. 2750-4400 and, accordingly, the same scale has been provided to the drivers of the Border Wing of Home Guards. 16. In my view, the educational qualifications prescribed in the two sets of rules which differ from each other is sufficient to take the view that the doctrine of ‘equal pay for equal work’ would not apply in the case in hand. 17. In Shyam Babu Verma Vs. Union of India, (1994) 2 SCC 521 , the Supreme Court in paragraphs 9 and 10 ruled as under: “9. It was then urged on behalf of the petitioners that on principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ they were entitled to pay scale of Rs. 330-560. It was pointed out that they have been performing the same nature of work, which was being performed by other Pharmacists Grade-B who have been given the scale of Rs. 330-560. The nature of work may be more or less the same but scale of pay may vary based on academic qualification or experience which justifies classification. The principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ should not be applied in a mechanical or casual manner. Classification made by a body of experts after full study and analysis of the work should not be disturbed except for strong reasons which indicate the classification made to be unreasonable. Inequality of the men in different groups excludes applicability of the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ to them. The principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ has been examined in State of M.P. Vs. Inequality of the men in different groups excludes applicability of the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ to them. The principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ has been examined in State of M.P. Vs. Pramod Bhartiya, (1993) 1 SCC 539 , by this Court. Before any direction is issued by the Court, the claimants have to establish that there was no reasonable basis to treat them separately in matters of payment of wages or salary. Then only it can be held that there has been a discrimination, within the meaning of Article 14 of the Constitution. 10. In the facts of present case there is no scope for applying the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ when the petitioners belong to a separate category of Pharmacists with reference to the qualifications prescribed under the Act. According to us, there is no element of arbitrariness in the decision of the respondents to implement two scales of pay for two categories of Pharmacists Grade-B. It does not violate any of the provisions of the Constitution calling for interference by this Court.” 18. In U.P. State Sugar Corporation Limited Vs. Sant Raj Singh, (2006) 9 SCC 82 : AIR 2006 SC 2296 , the Supreme Court has explained the doctrine of ‘equal pay for equal work’ at length. I may quote the observations made in paragraphs 17 to 29 as under: “17. The doctrine of equal pay for equal work, as adumbrated under Article 39(d) of the Constitution of India read with Article 14 thereof, cannot be applied in a vacuum. The constitutional scheme postulates equal pay for equal work for those who are equally placed in all respects. Possession of a higher qualification has all along been treated by this Court to be a valid basis for classification of two categories of employees. 18. In The State of Jammu and Kashmir Vs. Shri. Triloki Nath Khosa, (1974) 1 SCC 19 , the validity of such a classification came to be considered before this Court. Chandrachud, J., (as the learned Chief Justice then was), opined: “Formal education may not always produce excellence but a classification founded on variant educational qualifications is, for purposes of promotion to the post of an Executive Engineer, to say the least, not unjust on the face of it and the onus therefore cannot shift from where it originally lay.” 19. Chandrachud, J., (as the learned Chief Justice then was), opined: “Formal education may not always produce excellence but a classification founded on variant educational qualifications is, for purposes of promotion to the post of an Executive Engineer, to say the least, not unjust on the face of it and the onus therefore cannot shift from where it originally lay.” 19. Krishna Iyer, J. supplemented stating: “……….The social meaning of Articles 14 to 16 is neither dull uniformity nor specious “talentism”. It is a process of producing quality out of larger areas of equality extending better facilities to the latent capabilities of the lowly. It is not a methodology of substitution of pervasive and slovenly mediocrity for activist and intelligent - but not snobbish and uncommitted - cadres. However, if the State uses classification casuistically for salvaging status and elitism, the point of no return is reached for Articles 14 to 16 and the Court's jurisdiction awakens to deaden such manoeuvres. The soul of Article 16 is the promotion of the common man's capabilities, over-powering environmental adversities and opening up full opportunities to develop in official life without succumbing to the sophistic argument of the elite that talent is the privilege of the few and they must rule, wriggling out of the democratic imperative of Articles 14 and 16 by the theory of classified equality which at its worst degenerates into class domination.” 20. In State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Pramod Bhartiya, (1993) 1 SCC 539 , referring to the provisions of Section 2(h) of the Equal Remuneration Act, 1976, this Court stated: “13. It would be evident from this definition that the stress is upon the similarity of skill, effort and responsibility when performed under similar conditions. Further, as pointed out by Mukharji, J. (as he then was) in Federation of All India Customs and Excise Stenographers the quality of work may vary from post to post. It may vary from institution to institution. We cannot ignore or overlook this reality. It is not a matter of assumption but one of proof. The respondents (original petitioners) have failed to establish that their duties, responsibilities and functions are similar to those of the non-technical lecturers in Technical Colleges. It may vary from institution to institution. We cannot ignore or overlook this reality. It is not a matter of assumption but one of proof. The respondents (original petitioners) have failed to establish that their duties, responsibilities and functions are similar to those of the non-technical lecturers in Technical Colleges. They have also failed to establish that the distinction between their scale of pay and that of non-technical lecturers working in Technical Schools is either irrational and that it has no basis, or that it is vitiated by mala fides, either in law or in fact (see the approach adopted in Federation case)” 21. Yet again in Shyam Babu Verma Vs. Union of India, (1994) 2 SCC 521 , a 3-Judge Bench of this Court opined: “……….The nature of work may be more or less the same but scale of pay may vary based on academic qualification or experience which justifies classification. The principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ should not be applied in a mechanical or casual manner. Classification made by a body of experts after full study and analysis of the work should not be disturbed except for strong reasons which indicate the classification made to be unreasonable. Inequality of the men in different groups excludes applicability of the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ to them.” 22. In Government of W.B. Vs. Tarun K. Roy, (2004) 1 SCC 347 , it was clearly laid down that the holders of a higher qualification can be treated to be a separate class, holding: “20. Question of violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India on the part of the State would arise only if the persons are similarly placed. Equality clause contained in Article 14, in other words, will have no application where the persons are not similarly situated or when there is a valid classification based on a reasonable differentia….” 23. The said decision has been noticed by another Bench of this Court in M.P. Rural Agriculture Extension Officers Association v. State of M.P., (2004) 4 SCC 646 , stating: “22. Furthermore, as noticed hereinbefore, a valid classification based on educational qualification for the purpose of grant of pay has been upheld by the Constitution Bench of this Court in P. Narasinga Rao.” 24. The First Respondent admittedly did not possess the requisite qualification. Furthermore, as noticed hereinbefore, a valid classification based on educational qualification for the purpose of grant of pay has been upheld by the Constitution Bench of this Court in P. Narasinga Rao.” 24. The First Respondent admittedly did not possess the requisite qualification. He merely claimed a higher sale of pay only because Shri. B.P. Srivastava and Shri. Shyam Sunder Shukla had been paid. It has not been disputed before us that the case of Shri. Srivastava stood on different footing and his scale of pay had to be protected in terms of Section 16 of the Ac. So far as Shri. Shyam Sunder Shukla is concerned, we may proceed on the basis that the Corporation took a wrong decision. The said decision, however, was not questioned by the First Respondent before the High Court. No foundational facts had been placed before the High Court in relation thereto. We would not like to enter into the controversy as to whether his case could have been considered by the Committee or on what basis the Committee considered the cases of seven candidates and granted higher scales of pay to four candidates as the validity thereof is not in question. Assuming that the Corporation was wrong, the same by itself would not clothe the First Respondent even legal right to claim a higher scale of pay. On what basis the Selection Committee selected four employees out of the seven is not known. Three persons admittedly were not selected. If the plea put forward by the Respondent is accepted, these employees also would be entitled to the same scale of pay as given to the said Shri. Shukla, although they have been found to be not fit therefor. Educational qualification was made the basis for a valid classification in the matter of payment of salary in a particular scale of pay by the Wage Board itself. Only in the year 1989, such a classification was obliterated. The First Respondent had been granted the benefit of the recommendations of the Third Wage Board also. It was a matter of policy decision for the Corporation to consider as to whether a particular category of employees should be taken outside the purview of the pay scales recommended by the Wage Board and place them in a higher scale of pay. It was a matter of policy decision for the Corporation to consider as to whether a particular category of employees should be taken outside the purview of the pay scales recommended by the Wage Board and place them in a higher scale of pay. We, therefore, cannot accept the contention of Shri. Dwivedi that only because no such qualification was prescribed at the time of recruitment, the classification made on that basis would be bad in law. Even otherwise the said contention is not correct as scale of pay was determined by the award of the Wage Board. 25. Yet again the validity or otherwise of the said policy decision is not in question. The said policy decision has been taken as far back in 1984. It cannot be assumed that the First Respondent was not aware of the same. 26. Despite knowledge, he did not question the validity of such a policy decision. The matter relating to grant of scale of pay may be based upon a policy decision of the State. 27. In State of Orissa Vs. Balaram Sahu, (2003) 1 SCC 250 , this Court opined: “……Though “equal pay for equal work” is considered to be a concomitant of Article 14 as much as “equal pay for unequal work” will also be a negation of that right equal pay would depend upon not only the nature or the volume of work, but also on the qualitative difference as regards reliability and responsibility as well and though the functions may be the same, but the responsibilities do make a real and substantial difference.” 28. Yet again in Union of India Vs. International Trading Co., (2003) 5 SCC 437 , this Court opined: “…..A party cannot claim that since something wrong has been done in another case direction should be given for doing another wrong. It would not be setting a wrong right, but would be perpetuating another wrong. In such matters there is no discrimination involved. The concept of equal treatment on the logic of Article 14 of the Constitution of India (in short “the Constitution”) cannot be pressed into service in such cases. What the concept of equal treatment presupposes is existence of similar legal foothold. It does not countenance repetition of a wrong action to bring both wrongs on a par. The concept of equal treatment on the logic of Article 14 of the Constitution of India (in short “the Constitution”) cannot be pressed into service in such cases. What the concept of equal treatment presupposes is existence of similar legal foothold. It does not countenance repetition of a wrong action to bring both wrongs on a par. Even if hypothetically it is accepted that a wrong has been committed in some other cases by introducing a concept of negative equality the respondents cannot strengthen their case……” 29. Moreover, Article 14 has a positive concept. Nobody can claim equality in illegality.” 19. In M.P. Rural Agriculture Extension Officers Association Vs. State of M.P., (2004) 4 SCC 646 , the Supreme Court ruled that the Pay Commissions are constituted for evaluating the duties and functions of the employees and the nature thereof vis-a-vis the educational qualifications required therefor. Although the Pay Commission is considered to be an expert body, yet the State, in its wisdom and in furtherance of a valid decision, may or may not accept its recommendations. The findings recorded by the Supreme Court in paragraphs 13 to 26 are relevant. Those are elicited as under: “13. Pay Commissions are constituted for evaluating the duties and functions of the employees and the nature thereof vis-a-vis the educational qualifications required therefor. Although the Pay Commission is considered to be an expert body, the State in its wisdom and in furtherance of a valid policy decision may or may not accept its recommendations. The State in exercise of its jurisdiction conferred upon it by the proviso appended to Article 309 of the Constitution of India can unilaterally make or amend the conditions of service of its employees by framing appropriate rules. The State in terms of the said provision is also entitled to give a retrospective effect thereto. A policy decision had been adopted by the State that the post of Extension Officers shall be filled up only by graduates. Such a policy decision ex facie cannot be termed to be arbitrary or irrational attracting the wrath of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. A dying scale was provided by the State for the non-graduates. Fresh recruitments were to be made only from amongst the persons who held the requisite educational qualification. Such a policy decision ex facie cannot be termed to be arbitrary or irrational attracting the wrath of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. A dying scale was provided by the State for the non-graduates. Fresh recruitments were to be made only from amongst the persons who held the requisite educational qualification. With a view to avoid any discrimination between the new recruits and the serving employees who possessed the same qualification, the State cannot be said to have acted illegally in granting a higher scale of pay also for the existing degree-holders. 14. Article 14, it is trite, does not forbid a reasonable classification. 15. Article 14 forbids class legislation but permits reasonable classification subject to the conditions that it is based on an intelligible differentia and that the differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved. (See Saurabh Chaudri Vs. Union of India, (2003) 11 SCC 146 ) 16. Constitutional interpretation is a difficult task Its concept varies from statute to statute, fact to fact, situation to situation and subject-matter to subject-matter. A classification based on educational qualification has been applied by a Constitution Bench of this Court as far back as in 1968 in State of Mysore Vs. P. Narasinga Rao, AIR 1968 SC 349 , wherein it was observed: (AIR p. 351, para 4) “It is well settled that though Article 14 forbids class legislation, it does not forbid reasonable classification for the purposes of legislation. When any impugned rule or statutory provision is assailed on the ground that it contravenes Article 14, its validity can be sustained if two tests are satisfied. The first test is that the classification on which it is founded must be based on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things grouped together from others left out of the group, and the second test is that the differentia in question must have a reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved by the rule or statutory provision in question. In other words, there must be some rational nexus between the basis of classification and the object intended to be achieved by the statute or the rule. As we have already stated, Articles 14 and 16 form part of the same constitutional code of guarantees and supplement each other. In other words, there must be some rational nexus between the basis of classification and the object intended to be achieved by the statute or the rule. As we have already stated, Articles 14 and 16 form part of the same constitutional code of guarantees and supplement each other. In other words, Article 16 is only an instance of the application of the general rule of equality laid down in Article 14 and it should be construed as such. Hence, there is no denial of equality of opportunity unless the person who complains of discrimination is equally situated with the person or persons who are alleged to have been favoured; Article 16(1) does not bar a reasonable classification of employees or reasonable tests for their selection.” 17. The said dica was applied by this Court in Mewa Ram Kanojia Vs. All India Institute of Medical Sciences, (1989) 2 SCC 235 , stating: (SCCp. 239, para 5) “5. While considering the question of application of principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ it has to be borne in mind that it is open to the State to classify employees on the basis of qualifications, duties and responsibilities of the posts concerned. If the classification has reasonable nexus with the objective sought to be achieved, efficiency in the administration, the State would be justified in prescribing different pay scales but if the classification does not stand the test of reasonable nexus and the classification is founded on unreal, and unreasonable basis it would be violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Equality must be among the equals. Unequal cannot claim equality.” 18. The principle was reiterated in V. Markendeya Vs. State of A.P., (1989) 3 SCC 191 , observing: (SCC p. 201, para 13) “13. In view of the above discussion we are of the opinion that where two classes of employees perform identical or similar duties and carrying out the same functions with the same measure of responsibility having same academic qualifications, they would be entitled to equal pay. If the State denies them equality in pay, its action would be violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, and the court will strike down the discrimination and grant relief to the aggrieved employees. If the State denies them equality in pay, its action would be violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, and the court will strike down the discrimination and grant relief to the aggrieved employees. But before such relief is granted the court must consider and analyse the rationale behind the State action in prescribing two different scales of pay. If on an analysis of the relevant rules, orders, nature of duties, functions, measure of responsibility, and educational qualifications required for the relevant posts, the court finds that the classification made by the State in giving different treatment to the two classes of employees is founded on rational basis having nexus with the objects sought to be achieved, the classification must be upheld. Principle of equal pay for equal work is applicable among equals, it cannot be applied to unequals. Relief to an aggrieved person seeking to enforce the principles of equal pay for, equal work can be granted only after it is demonstrated before the court that invidious discrimination is practised by the State in prescribing two different scale's for the two classes of employees without there being any reasonable classification for the same. If the aggrieved employees fail to demonstrate discrimination, the principle of equal pay for equal work cannot be enforced by court in abstract. The question what scale should be provided to a particular class of service must be left to the executive and only when discrimination is practised amongst the equals, the court should intervene to undo the wrong, and to ensure equality among the similarly placed employees. The court however cannot prescribe equal scales of pay for different classes of employees.” 19. A Bench of three Judges in which two of us were parties reiterated the same principle in Govt. of W.B. Vs. Tarun K. Roy, (2004) 1 SCC 347 . 20. The aforementioned decisions are authorities for the proposition that despite the fact that the employees have been performing similar duties and functions and their posts are interchangeable, a valid classification can be made on the basis of their educational qualification. The observation of Krishna Iyer, J. in Col. A.S Iyer Vs. V. Balasubramanyam, (1980) 1 SCC 634 , although is interesting but it appears that the fact of the matter involved therein did not warrant application of the said principle. 21. The view of Subba Rao, J. in Lachhman Dass Vs. The observation of Krishna Iyer, J. in Col. A.S Iyer Vs. V. Balasubramanyam, (1980) 1 SCC 634 , although is interesting but it appears that the fact of the matter involved therein did not warrant application of the said principle. 21. The view of Subba Rao, J. in Lachhman Dass Vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 222 , was a minority view. Venkatarama Aiyar, J. therein speaking for the majority held: (AIR pp. 232-33 ata para 22) “The law is now well settled that while Article 14 prohibits discriminatory legislation directed against one individual or class of individuals, it does not forbid reasonable classification, and that for this purpose even one person or group of persons can be a class. Professor Willis says in his Constitutional Law, p. 580 ‘a law applying to one person or one class of persons is constitutional if there is sufficient basis or reason for it’. This statement of the law was approved by this Court in Charanjit Lal Chowdhury Vs. Union of India, AIR 1951 SC 41 . There the question was whether a law providing for the management and control by the Government, of a named company, the Sholapur Spinning & Weaving Company Ltd. was bad as offending Article 14. It was held that even a single company might, having regard to its features, be a category in itself and that unless it was shown that there were other companies similarly circumstanced, the legislation must be presumed to be constitutional and the attack under Article 14 must fail. In Ram Krishna Dalmia Vs. Justice S.R. Tendolkar, AIR 1958 SC 538 (SCR at p. 297: AIR at p. 547) this Court again examined in great detail the scope of Article 14, and in enunciating the principles applicable in deciding whether a law is in contravention of that article observed. ‘that a law may be constitutional even though it relates to a single individual if on account of some special circumstances or reasons applicable to him and not applicable to others that single individual may be treated as a class by himself.” 22. Furthermore, as noticed hereinbefore, a valid classification based on educational qualification for the purpose of grant of pay has been upheld by the Constitution Bench of this Court in P. Narasinga Rao, AIR 1968 SC 349 . 23. In State of Mysore Vs. Furthermore, as noticed hereinbefore, a valid classification based on educational qualification for the purpose of grant of pay has been upheld by the Constitution Bench of this Court in P. Narasinga Rao, AIR 1968 SC 349 . 23. In State of Mysore Vs. B. Basavalingappa, 1986 Supp SCC 661, a two-Judge Bench of this Court did not notice the earlier binding precedents of this Court. In fact one of them, K.N Singh, J., as the learned Chief Justice then was, was a party to the subsequent decision in Mewa Ram Kanojia, (1989) 2 SCC 235 . In that case no material was brought on record on the basis of which it could be contended that there was any substantial difference at that time between the two classifications although they were described differently. It was in that situation observed: (SCC pp. 662-63, para 6) “It was argued that a diploma is a higher qualification than a certificate. But neither there is any curriculum on record nor any other material to draw that inference. On the contrary this circumstance that at the time when respondent was recruited a diploma-holder or a certificate-holder both were entitled to be recruited as Instructors on the same pay scale indicates that in those days the two were considered to be alike.” 24. In State of M.P. Vs. Pramod Bhartiya, (1993) 1 SCC 539 , Jeevan Reddy, J. categorically held that burden to prove that a discrimination has been committed is upon the petitioners. In that case the petitioners failed to discharge their burden. 25. Yet again in Shyam Babu Verma Vs. Union of India, (1994) 2 SCC 521 , N.P Singh, J. speaking for a three-Judge Bench observed: (SCC p. 525, para 9) “9. The nature of work may be more or less the same but scale of pay may vary based on academic qualification or experience which justifies classification. The principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ should not be applied in a mechanical or casual manner. Classification made by a body of experts after full study and analysis of the work should not be disturbed except for strong reasons which indicate the classification made to be unreasonable. Inequality of the men in different groups excludes applicability of the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ to them.” 26. Classification made by a body of experts after full study and analysis of the work should not be disturbed except for strong reasons which indicate the classification made to be unreasonable. Inequality of the men in different groups excludes applicability of the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ to them.” 26. True it may be that when recommendations are made by a Pay Commission, evaluation of job must be held to have been made but the same by itself may not be a ground to enforce the recommendations by issuing a writ of or in the nature of mandamus although the State did not accept the same in toto and made rules to the contrary by evolving a policy decision which cannot be said to be arbitrary or discriminatory.” 20. In Secretary, Finance Department Vs. W.B Registration Service Association, 1993 Supp (1) SCC 153, the Supreme Court in paragraph 12 ruled as under: “12. We do not consider it necessary to traverse the case law on which reliance has been placed by counsel for the appellants as it is well settled that equation of posts and determination of pay scales is the primary function of the executive and not the judiciary and, therefore, ordinarily courts will not enter upon the task of job evaluation which is generally left to expert bodies like the Pay Commissions, etc. But that is not to say that the Court has no jurisdiction and the aggrieved employees have no remedy if they are unjustly treated by arbitrary State action or inaction. Courts must, however, realise that job evaluation is both a difficult and time consuming task which even expert bodies having the assistance of staff with requisite expertise have found difficult to undertake sometimes on account of want of relevant data and scales for evaluating performances of different groups of employees. This would call for a constant study of the external comparisons and internal relativities on account of the changing nature of job requirements. This would call for a constant study of the external comparisons and internal relativities on account of the changing nature of job requirements. The factors which may have to be kept in view for job evaluation may include (i) the work programme of his department (ii) the nature of contribution expected of him (iii) the extent of his responsibility and accountability in the discharge of his diverse duties and functions (iv) the extent and nature of freedoms/limitations available or imposed on him in the discharge of his duties (v) the extent of powers vested in him (vi) the extent of his dependence on superiors for the exercise of his powers (vii) the need to co-ordinate with other departments, etc. We have also referred to the history of the service and the effort of various bodies to reduce the total number of pay scales to a reason to number. Such reduction in the number of pay scales has to be achieved by resorting to broad banding of posts by placing different posts having comparable job charts in a common scale. Substantial reduction in the number of pay scales must inevitably lead to clubbing of posts and grades which were earlier different and unequal. While doing so care must be taken to ensure that such rationalisation of the pay structure does not throw up anomalies. Ordinarily a pay structure is evolved keeping in mind several factors, e.g. (i) method of recruitment, (ii) level at which recruitment is made, (iii) the hierarchy of service in a given cadre, (iv) minimum educational/technical qualifications required, (v) avenues of promotion, (vi) the nature of duties and responsibilities, (vii) the horizontal and vertical relativities with similar jobs, (viii) public dealings, (ix) satisfaction level, (x) employer's capacity to pay, etc. We have referred to these matters in some detail only to emphasise that several factors have to be kept in view while evolving a pay structure and the horizontal and vertical relativities have to be carefully balanced keeping in mind the hierarchical arrangements, avenues for promotion, etc. Such a carefully evolved pay structure ought not to be ordinarily disturbed as it may upset the balance and cause avoidable ripples in other cadres as well. Such a carefully evolved pay structure ought not to be ordinarily disturbed as it may upset the balance and cause avoidable ripples in other cadres as well. It is presumably for this reason that the Judicial Secretary who had strongly recommended a substantial hike in the salary of the Sub-Registrars to the Second (State) Pay Commission found it difficult to concede the demand made by the Registration Service before him in his capacity as the Chairman of the Third (State) Pay Commission. There can, therefore, be no doubt that equation of posts and equation of salaries is a complex matter which is best left to an expert body unless there is cogent material on record to come to a firm conclusion that a grave error had crept in while fixing the pay scale for a given post and Court's interference is absolutely necessary to undo the injustice.” 21. Thus, several factors have to be kept in mind while evolving a pay structure. One of those is the minimum educational/technical qualification required. 22. In light of the aforesaid discussion, it is difficult for me to grant the relief as prayed for by the writ-applicants. 23. As a result, this writ-application fails and is hereby rejected.