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2016 DIGILAW 1932 (ALL)

MASOOD PRAVEJ v. STATE OF U. P.

2016-05-18

DILIP GUPTA, RAVINDRA NATH KAKKAR

body2016
JUDGMENT By the Court.—This petition has been filed for a direction upon the Registrar appointed under The Registration Act, 1908 (the Registration Act) to decide the application dated 18 April 2016 filed by the petitioner under Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 (1973 Cr.P.C.) in proceedings that had been initiated under Sections 40/41 of the Registration Act by respondent No. 3-Irshad Ahmad against Shamshad and others for registration of a Will deed. 2. It is stated that Irshad Ahmad produced a Will deed dated 4 June 1996 before the Registrar on 20 March 2013 for its registration. This Will deed was registered on 1 May 2013. It is also stated that Irshad Ahmad had in the course of the proceedings produced a letter dated 14 March 2014 said to have been issued by the consulate at Jeddah in Saudi Arabia. The petitioner alleges that the said letter is a forged document. It is for this reason that the application was filed by the petitioner under Section 340 of 1973 Cr.P.C. before the Registrar for taking appropriate action. 3. Ms. Meenakshi Singh, learned counsel appearing for the State has raised a preliminary objection that the application filed by the petitioner under Section 340 of the 1973 Cr.P.C would not be maintainable before the Registrar as proceedings before him are not proceedings before a ‘Court’. In support of this contention learned counsel has placed reliance on a judgment of the Supreme Court in Keshab Narayan Banerjee and others v. State of Bihar, (2000) 1 SCC 607 . The submission is Section 340 of 1973 Cr.P.C. provides that ‘Court’ would have the same meaning as in Section 195 and that the definition of ‘Court’ in Section 195 admits of no doubt that a Registrar would not be a ‘Court’. 4. Ms. Archana Tyagi, learned counsel for the petitioner has, however, placed reliance upon a Full Bench judgment of the Madras High Court in Kotta Atchayya and another v. Devarasetti Gangayya, (1892) 2 MLJ 64 and the judgment of Patna High Court in Jamil Akhtar Javed v. State of Bihar, Laws (PAT)-1998-8-44/PATLJR-1999-2-540, to support the contention that the application filed before the Registrar would be maintainable as proceedings before him under Section 40/41 of the Registration Act would be proceedings before the Court. 5. We have considered the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties. 5. We have considered the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties. In order to appreciate the rival contentions addressed on behalf of the parties, it will be appropriate to reproduce the relevant provisions of Section 340 of 1973 Cr.P.C. because the application is said to have been filed by the petitioner under the aforesaid section and it is as follows : “Procedure in cases mentioned in Section 195.—Section 340. (1) When, upon an application made to it in this behalf or otherwise, any Court is of opinion that it is expedient in the interests of justice that an inquiry should be made into any offence referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 195, which appears to have been committed in or in relation to a proceeding in that Court or, as the case may be, in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in that Court, such Court may, after such preliminary inquiry, if any, as it thinks necessary- (a) record a finding to that effect; (b) make a complaint thereof in writing; (c) send it to a Magistrate of the first class having jurisdiction; (d) take sufficient security for the appearance of the accused before such Magistrate, or if the alleged offence is non-bailable and the Court thinks it necessary so to do, send the accused in custody to such Magistrate; and (e) bind over any person to appear and give evidence before such Magistrate. (2) ........... (3) ............ (4) In this section,”Court” has the same meaning as in Section 195.” 6. Sub-section (1) of Section 340 clearly stipulates that if any “Court” is of the opinion that an enquiry should be made into any offence referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 195 (1) which appears to have been committed in or in relation to a proceeding in that Court or in respect of a document produced or given in that Court, such Court may pass an order contemplated in that Section. ‘Court’ has been defined in sub-section (4) of Section 340 to have the same meaning as that provided in Section 195. 7. Section 195 of 1973 Cr.P.C. is, therefore, also required to be reproduced and it is as follows : “Section 195 (1)—No Court shall take cognizance- (a)..... ‘Court’ has been defined in sub-section (4) of Section 340 to have the same meaning as that provided in Section 195. 7. Section 195 of 1973 Cr.P.C. is, therefore, also required to be reproduced and it is as follows : “Section 195 (1)—No Court shall take cognizance- (a)..... (b) (i) of any offence punishable under any of the following section of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), namely, Sections 193 to 196 (both inclusive), 199, 200, 205 to 211 (both inclusive) and 228, when such offence is alleged to have been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any Court, or (ii) of any offence described in Section 463, or punishable under Section 471, Section 475 or Section 476, of the said Code, when such offence is alleged to have been committed in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any Court, or (iii) of any criminal conspiracy to commit, or attempt to commit, or the abetment of, any offence specified in sub-clause (i) or sub-clause (ii), except on the complaint in writing of that Court, or by such officer of the Court as that Court may authorise in writing in this behalf or of some other Court to which that Court is subordinate. (2) ............ (3) In Clause (b) of sub-section (1), the term “Court” means a Civil, Revenue or Criminal Court, and includes a tribunal constituted by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act if declared by that Act to be a Court for the purposes of this section. (4) ...............” Sub-section (3) of Section 195 clearly stipulates that the term ‘Court’ in clause (b) of sub-section (1) means a Civil, Revenue or a Criminal Court, and includes a tribunal constituted by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act if declared by that Act to be a Court for the purposes of the section. 8. What has, therefore, to be seen is whether a ‘Registrar’ while discharging functions under Sections 40/41 of the Registration Act would be a Civil, Revenue or Criminal Court or a tribunal as defined in sub-section (3) of Section 195 of 1973 Cr.P.C. Section 40 of the Registration Act provides that the testator, or after his death any person claiming as executor or otherwise under a will, may present it to any Registrar or Sub-Registrar for registration. Sub-section (1) of Section 41 of the Act provides that a will presented for registration by the testator or donor, may be registered in the same manner as any other document. Sub-section (2) of the Act provides that a will shall be registered if the registering officer is satisfied that the will was executed by the testator or the donor, as the case may be; that the testator or donor is dead; that the person presenting the will is, under Section 40, entitled to present the same. 9. The first decision that has been relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner is Kotta Atchayya delivered by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court on 13 October 1891. The question that was referred to the Full Bench of the Madras High Court was whether a Registrar under Sections 72 to 75 of the Registration Act would be a ‘Court’ for the purpose of Section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Since the decision was rendered on 13 October 1891, it was the Code of Criminal Procedure 1882 (1882 Cr.P.C.) that was applicable at that time. The Full Bench noticed that ‘Court’ had not been defined in the said Code of Criminal Procedure and concluded that the legislature intended to give a more extended meaning to ‘Court’. It is for this reason that a Registrar was held to be a ‘Court’ for the purpose of Section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The aforesaid decision was rendered interpreting Sections 476 and 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1882. Section 476 is reproduced as follows : “476. When any Civil, Criminal or Revenue Court is of opinion that there is ground for inquiring into any offence referred to in Section 195, and committed before it or brought under its notice in the course of a judicial proceeding, such Court, after making any preliminary inquiry, that may be necessary, may send the case for inquiry or trial to the nearest Magistrate of the first class, and may send the accused in custody, or take sufficient security for his appearance, before such Magistrate; and may bind over any person to appear and give evidence on such inquiry or trial.” 10. Section 195 did not define ‘Court’. It is for this reason that the Full Bench observed that “Court” had not been defined. Section 195 did not define ‘Court’. It is for this reason that the Full Bench observed that “Court” had not been defined. It needs to be stated that the Code of Criminal Procedure 1882 was repealed and the Code of Criminal Procedure 18987 was enacted. Relevant portion of Section 195(2) of this Code of Criminal Procedure, defined a ‘Court’ in the following terms : “Section 195 (2)—In clauses (b) and (c) of sub-section (1), the term ‘Court’ includes a Civil, Revenue or Criminal Court, but does not include a Registrar or Sub-Registrar under the Indian Registration Act, 1877.” 11. What needs to be noted is that the definition of ‘Court’ in Section 195 (2) of 1898 Cr.P.C. included a Civil, Revenue or Criminal Court but did not include a Registrar, Sub-Registrar under the Indian Registration Act 1877. Such being the definition, there can be manner of doubt that under Section 195 (I) of the 1898 Cr.P.C. a Registrar or Sub-Registrar would not be a ‘Court’. 12. Under the 1973 Cr.P.C. ‘Court’ has been defined, as noticed above, to mean a Civil, Revenue or Criminal Courts and would include a tribunal constituted by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act if declared by that Act to be a Court for the purposes of said Section. 13. There is, therefore, a material difference in the definition of ‘Court’ under the 1898 Cr.P.C. and the 1973 Cr.P.C. Whereas Section 195 (2) of 1898 Cr.P.C defined a ‘Court’ to include a Civil, Revenue or a Criminal Court but not to include a Registrar or Sub-Registrar, Section 195 (3) of 1973 Cr.P.C. defines a ‘Court’ to mean a Civil, Revenue or a Criminal Court and includes a tribunal. What also needs to be noted that ‘Court’ was not defined in Sections 476 or 195 of 1882 Cr.P.C. 14. It would be appropriate at this stage to examine the difference in the definition of ‘Court’ under Section 195(2) of the old 1898 Cr.P.C. and Section 195 (3) of the new 1973 Cr.P.C. This can be examined in the context of the 41st Law Commission Report as also the dictionary meaning of words ‘includes’ and ‘means’. It would be appropriate at this stage to examine the difference in the definition of ‘Court’ under Section 195(2) of the old 1898 Cr.P.C. and Section 195 (3) of the new 1973 Cr.P.C. This can be examined in the context of the 41st Law Commission Report as also the dictionary meaning of words ‘includes’ and ‘means’. It needs to be noted that the definition of ‘Court’ not to include a Registrar or Sub-Registrar under the Indian Registration Act, 1877 appearing in sub-section (2) of Section 195 of 1898 Cr.P.C. has been omitted in sub-section (3) of Section 195 of 1973 Cr.P.C.. 15. The Law Commission in its 41st report observed that exclusion of Registrar and Sub-Registrar in the definition of ‘Court’ was unnecessary as they cannot be regarded as Civil Courts. The relevant portion of the report dealing with this aspect is reproduced below : “15.100 We consider that the specific exclusion of Registrars and Sub-Registrars is unnecessary, as they cannot be regarded as Civil Courts for the purposes of Section 195.” 16. In regard to the inclusion of a Tribunal, the Law Commission observed as follows : “15.99. Consequently we have long series of cases over the years deciding what tribunals and officers acting in a judicial capacity should be not so regarded. The substitution of ‘includes’ for ‘means’ in the definition has, if any thing, added to the difficulties of the problem. We consider that for the purpose of Clauses (b) and (c), ‘Court’ should mean a Civil Court of a Revenue Court properly so called, but where a tribunal created by an Act has all or practically all the attributes of a Court, it might be regarded as a Court only if it is declared by that Act to be a Court for the purposes of this section. This would make the position clear to all concerned, and particularly to Criminal Courts when required to take cognizance of offences falling within the scope of Clause (c). They would then be left with the comparatively easy question whether the judicial body or authority before which the document was produced or given in evidence was a Civil Court or a Revenue Court or a Criminal Court.” 17. They would then be left with the comparatively easy question whether the judicial body or authority before which the document was produced or given in evidence was a Civil Court or a Revenue Court or a Criminal Court.” 17. The aforesaid report of the Law Commission, it needs to be reiterated, makes it abundantly clear that the exclusion of Registrar or Sub-Registrar in the definition of ‘Court’ in sub-section (2) of Section 195 of 1898 Cr.P.C. was unnecessary as a Registrar or Sub-Registrar cannot be regarded as Civil Courts for the purpose of Section 195. The Law Commission also emphasized that for the purposes of that clause ‘Court’ would mean a Civil Court or a Revenue Court properly so called. 18. Another aspect that needs to be noticed is the difference in the meaning of the words ‘includes’ and ‘means’. The Law Lexicon, Third Edition-2012 emphasizes the difference between these two words. It is stated that where the word ‘means’ is employed in a definition clause, it shows that the definition is a hard and fast definition and no other meaning can be assigned to the word or the expression defined than is put down in the definition. In other words, it is an exhaustive definition. On the other hand, the word ‘includes’ is very generally used in interpretation clauses in order to enlarge the meaning of the words and phrase occurring in the body of the Statute. 19. There is, therefore, no manner of doubt that the definition of ‘Court’ in sub-section (2) of Section 195 of 1898 Cr.P.C. was not an exhaustive definition of ‘Court’ and it could be enlarged though it did not include a Registrar or Sub-Registrar. However, the definition of ‘Court’ in sub-section (3) of Section 195 of 1973 Cr.P.C. is an exhaustive definition. 20. This aspect has also been considered by the Supreme Court in Keshab Narayan Banerjee. This decision deals with the definition of ‘Court’ under sub-section (3) of Section 195 of 1973 Cr.P.C. The Supreme Court highlighted the difference between the definition of ‘Court’ under sub-section (2) of Section 195 of 1898 Cr.P.C. and the definition of ‘Court’ under sub-section (3) of Section 195 of 1973 Cr.P.C. and pointed out that the term ‘Court’ had a wider meaning under the old Code but the new Code has given it a restricted meaning. The word ‘Court’ in Section 195 of the new code does not include all the judicial bodies constituted for administration of justice and that the ‘Courts’ contemplated under Section 195 (3) of the new code are only Civil Courts, Revenue Courts and Criminal Courts and those Tribunal which are required by Acts constituting them to be Courts for the purpose of Section 195. This aspect has been noticed by the Supreme Court in paragraphs 7, 9 and 10 of the judgment and the same are reproduced below : “7-The word ‘Court’ is a word of very wide connotation. In legal parlance it indicates a place where justice is judicially administered. But for the purposes of Section 195(1)(b) of the Code we have to go by the definition of the word ‘Court’ contained in sub-section (3) of that Section. Under the old Code (1898 Code) the term ‘Court’ was defined differently, and it read: “In Clauses (b) and (c) of sub-section (1) the term ‘Court’ includes a Civil, Revenue or Criminal Court, but does not include a Registrar or Sub-Registrar under the Indian Registration Act, 1877.” While enacting the new Code Section 195 was redrafted as recommended by the Law Commission in its 41st Report. The Commission had felt that for the purposes of clause (b) of sub-section (1), the term ‘Court’ should mean a Civil Court, a Revenue Court or a Criminal Court properly so called and include a Tribunal created by an Act if it is declared by that Act to be a Court for the purposes of Section 195. The term ‘Court’ had a wider meaning under the old Code but under the new Code it is given a restricted meaning. Now the word ‘Court’ does not include all the judicial bodies and authorities constituted for administering justice. The Courts contemplated now by Section 195 are only Civil Courts, Revenue Courts and Criminal Courts and those Tribunals which are required by the Acts constituting them to be Courts for the purposes of Section 195. 8. ....... 9. Assuming that the Compensation Officer appointed under the Act can be said to be a Court, it is not possible to hold that he is a Civil Court. Neither the Act nor any other legislation expressly provides that the Compensation Officer is a Civil Court. 8. ....... 9. Assuming that the Compensation Officer appointed under the Act can be said to be a Court, it is not possible to hold that he is a Civil Court. Neither the Act nor any other legislation expressly provides that the Compensation Officer is a Civil Court. Though he possesses certain powers which a Civil Court possesses under the Code of Civil Procedure and the proceedings before him are deemed to be judicial proceedings he does not possess all the attributes of a Civil Court. Though a proceeding before him is to be considered as a Judicial proceeding and is of a civil nature, it is of a limited nature. His appointment is under a Special Law and for a specific and limited purpose. His main function is to determine the amount of compensation. The amount of compensation is to be determined by finding out the rent and then making certain additions, subtractions and multiplications as provided in the Act itself. He cannot determine the questions of title or rights of the rival claimants except for the purpose of determining who should be paid compensation. The party claiming compensation cannot lead evidence as regards the value of his interest in the estate or tenure. Nor does a Compensation officer has the discretion to decide independently the amount of compensation on the basis of such evidence. We have already pointed out earlier that in the matter of preparation of draft assessment roll directions can be given to him by the state Government and Officers mentioned in Section 26(ii). He lacks the essential attribute of evidence which a Civil Court possesses. Thus, considering the nature of his jurisdiction and the extent of powers conferred on him it has to be said that he is not a Civil Court, though not directly on the point the decisions of this Court in Dr. Baliram Waman Hiray v. Justice B. Lentin and others, supports the view that we are taking. Determination of compensation for divesting a tenure-holder or an intermediary of his right in the estate or tenure is not a matter pertaining to revenue. For that reason he is not a Revenue Court also. 10. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the High Court was right in holding that Compensation Officer appointed under the Act is not a ‘Court’ within the meaning of Section 195(l)(b) of the Code. For that reason he is not a Revenue Court also. 10. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the High Court was right in holding that Compensation Officer appointed under the Act is not a ‘Court’ within the meaning of Section 195(l)(b) of the Code. In the result, this appeal is dismissed. The limited interim stay granted by this Court stands vacated.” (emphasis supplied) 21. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision rendered in Keshab Narayan Banerjee referred to its earlier decision in Dr. Baliram Waman Hiray v. Justice B. Lentin and others, (1988) 4 SCC 419 . In this case, the issue that was raised before the Supreme Court was whether a commission of enquiry constituted under Section 3 of the Commission of Enquiry Act, 1952 would be a ‘Court’ for the purpose of Section 195 (1) (b) of the 1973 Cr.P.C. Dr. Y.S. Chitale, appearing on behalf of the appellant had submitted that sub-section (3) of Section 195 of the 1973 Cr.P.C. brought about a change in law. Learned counsel for the respondents had, however, urged that earlier decision of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Lalji Haridas v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1964 SC 1154 , which by a majority of 3:2 held that proceedings before the Income Tax Officer under Section 37 (4) of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922 must be treated as proceedings in any Court for the purposes of Section 195 (1) (b) of 1898 Cr.P.C. was still a good law and the definition of ‘Court’ under sub-section (3) of Section 195 of 1973 Cr.P.C. did not alter the position. The crucial question that fell for consideration before the Supreme Court was, therefore, whether sub-section (3) of Section 195 of 1973 Cr.P.C. had brought about a change in the position of law and whether the majority decision in Lalji Haridas still held the field. The Supreme Court held that Section 195 (3) of 1973 Cr.P.C. did bring about a change in law and that the law declared in Lalji Haridas was no longer good law. 22. The observations of the Supreme Court are as follows: “(24) ......... The Supreme Court held that Section 195 (3) of 1973 Cr.P.C. did bring about a change in law and that the law declared in Lalji Haridas was no longer good law. 22. The observations of the Supreme Court are as follows: “(24) ......... It cannot be doubted that sub-section (3) of Section 195 of the Code has been enacted by Parliament to implement the recommendations of the 41st Report of the Law Commission which brought about the unsatisfactory state of law due to conflict of opinion between different High Courts as to the meaning of the word ‘Court’ in Section 195(1)(b) read in the context of Section 195(2) of the earlier Code. The interpretative exercise undertaken by the Courts over the years as to the precise meaning of the term ‘Court’ as defined in Section 195(1)(b) of the old Code prior to the introduction of sub-section(3) of Section 195 of the present Code reveals an endless oscillation between two views—each verging on a fringe of obscurity and vagueness. .............. (25) In that uncertain state of law, the Law Commission observed in paragraph 15.99 of its Report that it felt that in any concrete case this question is bound to create problem of interpretation and accordingly suggested a change in law for the purposes of Section 195 of the Code. It felt that the term ‘Court’ for the purposes of clauses (b) and (c) should mean a Civil, Revenue or a Criminal Court, properly so called, but where a tribunal created by an Act has all or practically all the attributes of a Court, it might be regarded as a Court only if declared by the Act to be a Court for the purposes of Section 195. Indibutably, the introduction of the inclusive clause in the definition of ‘Court in subs. (3) of Section 195 has brought about a change in the law. ....... (32) In view of the change in law, we fail to appreciate the contention of the learned Advocate-General, without meaning any disrespect, that the principles laid down by the majority in Lalji Haridas’ case that on a combined reading of sub-sections (4) and (5) of Section 5 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act read in the context of sub-section (4), an Income-tax Officer must still be regarded to be a Court for the purposes of Section 195(1)(b), despite the enactment of sub-section (3) of Section 195. A Commission of Inquiry is not a Court properly so called. A Commission is obviously appointed by the appropriate Government ‘for the information of its mind’ in order for it to decide as to the course of at action to be followed. It is therefore a fact-finding body and is not required to adjudicate upon the rights of the parties and has no adjudicatory function. The Government is not bound to accept its recommendations or act upon its findings. The mere fact that the procedure adopted by it is of a legal character and It has the power to administer an oath will not impart to it the status of a Court.” (emphasis supplied) 23. In Manohar Lal v. Vinesh Anand and others, (2001) 5 SCC 407 , the Supreme Court followed its earlier decision in Dr. Baliram Waman Hiray and observed that an arbitrator would not be a Court within the meaning of Section 195 (3) of the 1973 Cr.P.C. and so the question of applicability of Section 340 of 1973 Cr.P.C. in proceedings before an arbitrator would not arise. 24. The submissions of learned counsel for the petitioners that in view of the nature of the duties that a Registrar is required to perform while registering the will, it has to be held that the Registrar is “Court” under Section 195(3) of the 1973 Cr.P.C. cannot, therefore, be accepted. The Registrar may have to examine and be satisfied that the will was executed by the testator; that the testator or donor is dead; that the person presenting the will is, under Section 40, entitled to present the same but this would not mean that the Registrar would be a “Court” for the purposes of Section 195 (3) of 1973 Cr.P.C. The Registrar lacks the essential attribute which Civil Courts possess. This is what was observed by the Supreme Court in Keshab Narayan Banerjee while examining whether a Compensation Officer appointed could be said to be a “Court”. The Court noticed that though the Compensation Officer possesses certain powers which a Civil Court possesses under the Code of Civil Procedure, but he does not possess all the attributes of a Civil Court. The Court noticed that though the Compensation Officer possesses certain powers which a Civil Court possesses under the Code of Civil Procedure, but he does not possess all the attributes of a Civil Court. The amount of compensation is to be determined by finding out the rent and then making certain additions, subtractions and multiplications as provided in the concerned Act, but he cannot determine the question of title or rights of the rival claimants except for the purposes of determining who should be paid compensation. The earlier view taken by the Supreme Court in Lalji Haridas, while interpreting Section 195 of 1898 Cr.P.C. that proceedings before the Income Tax Officer under Section 37(4) of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922, was no longer held to be good law in view of the change brought about in the definition of the “Court” under Section 195(3) of 1973 Cr.P.C. 25. In view of the aforesaid position of law clearly enumerated in the aforesaid decisions of the Supreme Court, learned counsel for the petitioner is not justified in placing reliance on the decision of the Patna High Court in Jamil Akhtar Javed. In this decision the Patna High Court observed : “So far question as to whether the Registrar is a Court within the meaning of Section 195 of the Code is concerned, it appears to me that the Registrar has trappings of the Court under Chapter XIV of the Registration Act, 1908 and in that view of the matter the Registrar of the Registry office must be held to be a Court under Chapter XIV of the Registration Act. 26. Reliance placed by learned counsel for the petitioner on the decision of the Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Kotta Atchayya is also not justified. The said decision, as noticed above, was rendered on 13 October 1891 when the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1882 was in force. The Madras High Court after noticing that “Court” had not been defined, proceeded to give an extended meaning and held that a Registrar would be a “Court”. It needs to be noted that “Court” was defined in sub-section (2) of Section 195 of 1898 Cr.P.C. and it was specifically provided in the definition clause that “Court” includes a Civil, Revenue or Criminal Court but would not include a Registrar or Sub-Registrar under the Indian Registration Act, 1877. It needs to be noted that “Court” was defined in sub-section (2) of Section 195 of 1898 Cr.P.C. and it was specifically provided in the definition clause that “Court” includes a Civil, Revenue or Criminal Court but would not include a Registrar or Sub-Registrar under the Indian Registration Act, 1877. At the cost of repetition it needs to be noted that the 41st Law Commission report clearly mentions that the exclusion of Registrars and Sub-Registrars in the definition of “Court” in Section 195(3) of 1973 Cr.P.C. was unnecessary as these two officers cannot be regarded as Civil Court for the purposes of Section 195. This position was also explained by the Supreme Court in Keshab Narayan Banerjee. It was stated that the term “Court” had a wider meaning under 1898 Cr.P.C. but under the new 1973 Cr.P.C. it was given a restricted meaning and that only Civil Court, Revenue Court and Criminal Court and those Tribunals which are required by Acts constituting them to be Courts for the purposes of Section 195 would be Courts under Section 195(3) of 1973 Cr.P.C. 27. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also placed reliance on the provisions of Sections 81, 82, 83 and 84 contained in part XIV of the Registration Ac to contend that a Registrar would be a ‘Court’ under Section 195 (3) of the 1973 Cr.P.C. Part XIV deals with penalties. Section 81 deals with penalty for incorrectly endorsing, copying, translating or registering document with intent to injure. Section 82 deals with penalty for making false statements, delivering false copies or translations, false personation and abetment. Section 83 stipulates that the Registering Officers may commence prosecution for any offence under the Act coming to the knowledge of a Registering Officer in his official capacity. Section 84 provides that Registering Officer shall be deemed to be a public servant within the meaning of Indian Penal Code. There is nothing in these four sections which may even remotely lead to a conclusion that a Registrar would be ‘Court’ under Section 195 (3) of 1973 Cr.P.C. As observed earlier, the definition of ‘Court’ under sub-section (3) of Section 195 of 1973 Cr.P.C. is an exhaustive definition and does not admit of any enlargement. 28. There is nothing in these four sections which may even remotely lead to a conclusion that a Registrar would be ‘Court’ under Section 195 (3) of 1973 Cr.P.C. As observed earlier, the definition of ‘Court’ under sub-section (3) of Section 195 of 1973 Cr.P.C. is an exhaustive definition and does not admit of any enlargement. 28. Thus, as a Registrar would not be a Court within the meaning of sub-section (3) of Section 195 of 1973 Cr.P.C., the application filed by the petitioner under Section 340 of 1973 Cr.P.C. would not be maintainable. The petition, therefore, for all the reasons stated above is liable to be dismissed and is, accordingly, dismissed.