JUDGMENT : J.B PARDIWALA, J. By this writ-application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the writ-applicant, a former contractual employee of the respondent no. 1 - Institute, has prayed for the following reliefs: “(A) Issue a writ of mandamus, or any other appropriate writ, order and/or direction, quashing and setting aside the impugned order dated 21.3.2002 passed by the respondent no. 1 (at Annexure ‘A’) holding the same to be illegal and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. (B) Declare that the petitioner is entitled to be continued in service as Steno-Typist (English) under the respondent no. 1 Institute. (C) Pending admission, hearing and till final disposal of present petition, this Hon'ble Court be pleased to grant stay of operation, execution and implementation of the impugned order dated 21.3.2002 passed by the respondent no. 1 at Annexure ‘A’, in the interest of justice. (D) Grant such other and further reliefs as this Hon'ble Court deems fit, just and proper in the interest of justice.” 2. It appears from the materials on record that the writ-applicant herein was appointed as a Stenographer in the Planning Commission's sponsored “Agro Climatic Regional Planning Documentation and Dissemination Centre” purely on contractual basis. The terms and conditions of the appointment were as under: “1.You will draw a consolidated honorarium of Rs. 3350/- per month (with no other allowances). 2. Your contractual appointment on the project is purely temporary and for a period from April 3, 1996 to 31st March, 1997. 3. The Institute reserves its right to terminate your services earlier before the completion of period any time without any notice or assigning any reasons for termination 4. It is clearly understood that this appointment is in no case an appointment in the Institute but specifically in the sponsored project at ADDC entrusted to the Institute by the Planning Commission.” 3. It appears that the project was given to the respondent no. 1 Institute for implementation. The project was being funded by the Planning Commission. The project continued for almost 14 years. On 28th February 2002, the Planning Commission informed the Director of the respondent no. 1 Institute as regards the discontinuation of the ACRP project. The intimation in this regard reads as under: “Subject: Discontinuation of ACRP Project including ARPU-Regarding. 1 Institute for implementation. The project was being funded by the Planning Commission. The project continued for almost 14 years. On 28th February 2002, the Planning Commission informed the Director of the respondent no. 1 Institute as regards the discontinuation of the ACRP project. The intimation in this regard reads as under: “Subject: Discontinuation of ACRP Project including ARPU-Regarding. In continuation of letter No.Q-11011/7/96-97-ARPU dated 24.7.2000, it is to inform that with the approval of the competent authority in the Planning Commission, it has been decided to discontinue all the activities of Agro-Climatic Regional Planning (ACRP) Project, including Agro-Climatic Regional Unit (ARPU) w.e.f 01.04.2002 2. All the staff engaged in ARPU on contract basis for the ACRP project will stand reverted to SPIESR after 31.3.2002 The Planning Commission will have no liability, whatsoever, as per the conditions contained in the Office Order No.A-12013/21/88-Admn.I dated 17.06.1988 3. All the items purchased through the grants released by the Planning Commission under the Project will be the property of the Planning Commission which will decide on their utilization/disposal, etc. A complete inventory of all the items, purchased since inception of the ACRP Project from the grants provided by the Planning Commission, may be prepared and sent to the undersigned for taking further action. 4. Any amount remaining unutilised with SPIESR from out of the grants released under ACRP project will have to be refunded to the Planning Commission.” 4. In view of the above, the writ-applicant was informed by the Project Director on 21st March 2002 that his services were being discontinued with effect from 31st March 2002. The communication reads as under: “S.P Kashyap Director, Ref No.SPI/ARPU-576 Dt. 21st March 2002 Dear Shri. Babu, This has reference to the letter dated 21.8.1997 by which you had been given appointment to work in the Planning Commission sponsored “Agro-Climatic Regional Planning”. The Planning Commission vide its letter No.Q.11011/5/99-2000-ARPU dated 28th February 2002 decided to discontinue all the activities of Agro-Climatic Regional Planning Project including Agro-Climatic Regional Planning Unit with effect from 1.4.2002 In view of this you are hereby informed that your services are discontinued with effect from 31.3.2002 after office hours. With regards, Yours sincerely, Sd/- S.P Kashyap” 5. Hence, this writ-application. 6. Mr. Kariel, the learned counsel appearing for the writ-applicant, submitted that it is not in dispute that the appointment of his client was purely on contractual basis. With regards, Yours sincerely, Sd/- S.P Kashyap” 5. Hence, this writ-application. 6. Mr. Kariel, the learned counsel appearing for the writ-applicant, submitted that it is not in dispute that the appointment of his client was purely on contractual basis. He submitted that it is also not in dispute that all throughout his client served as a contractual employee in the project. However, according to Mr. Kariel, the Planning Commission made it very clear that all the staff engaged in the ARPU on contract basis should be reverted to the respondent no. 1 Institute after 31st March 2002. Mr. Kariel, laying much emphasize on this, submitted that it was incumbent upon the respondent no. 1 Institute to absorb the writ-applicant in service. 7. On the other hand, this writ-application has been vehemently opposed by Mr. Shah, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent no. 1 Institute. He submitted that the appointment of the writ-applicant was purely contractual. He submitted that mere long service on contractual basis by itself would not confer any right much less a legal right to claim absorption or regularisation in service. Mr. Shah pointed out that it was a project of the Planning Commission which was being implemented through the, Institute. The project came to an end in the year 2002, and with that, all the employees who were engaged in the project were relieved from service. 8. It appears that this writ-application was disposed of by an order dated 2nd July 2002, which reads as under: “1. Learned Advocate Mr. Vaishnav places on record an affidavit-in-rejoinder. 2. Heard learned Advocate Mr. Vaishnav for the petitioner and learned Senior Advocate Mr. Shah for respondent No. 1. 3. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in light of the legal proposition as settled by various pronouncements, this petition can be disposed of by observing that, in event a vacancy falls with respondent No. 1 and the petitioner applies for the post, his case will be considered by respondent No. 1 without being influenced by the non-entertainment of this petition. This petition stands dismissed of accordingly. Notice is discharged. No orders as to costs.” 9. This petition stands dismissed of accordingly. Notice is discharged. No orders as to costs.” 9. Being dissatisfied with the order passed by this Court referred to above, the writ-applicant preferred the Letters Patent Appeal No. 680 of 2003, which came to be allowed in the following terms: “We have heard learned counsel for the parties and carefully perused the record. In our opinion the order under challenge is liable to be set aside on the short ground that the same does not reflect consideration and adjudication of the appellant's prayer for invalidation of order dated 21.03.2002 Whether or not the said order suffered from any legal or constitutional infirmity and whether the appellant had a right to be regularised in public service are the questions which certainly merited a detailed examination by the learned Single Judge. It was also expected of the learned Single Judge to adjudicate upon the claim of the appellant by recording reasons which would have reflected application of mind to the points in issue. The failure of the learned Single Judge to adhere to the basic principle, namely, that the orders passed by the High Court in exercise of its power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India must contain reasons, howsoever briefly indicating the application of mind to the points in issue, we have no option but to set aside the order under challenge. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The order of the learned Single Judge is set aside. The Special Civil Application shall now be laid before an appropriate Single Judge for fresh adjudication of the appellant's prayer for quashing of order dated 21.3.2002” 10. In view of the order passed by the Division Bench, the writ-applicant has been once again placed for hearing. 11. On 22nd July 2016, the following order was passed by this Court. “1. After hearing the learned counsel appearing for the respective parties, I am of the view that some information at the end of the respondents will help the Court in the effective adjudication of the dispute. In such circumstances, the respondent No. 1 is directed to furnish the following details; (i) How many persons were engaged in the ARPU on the contract basis? In such circumstances, the respondent No. 1 is directed to furnish the following details; (i) How many persons were engaged in the ARPU on the contract basis? (ii) Furnish the details of the different posts, on which the persons were engaged in the ARPU on the contract basis; (iii) On receipt of the letter dated 28th February, 2002 of the Planning Commission, Government of India, which is at Annexure-C to this petition, how many persons, who were engaged in the ARPU on the contract basis, were reverted to the SPIESR; (iv) What is the current position of those persons who stood reverted to the SPIESR after 31st March, 2002; 2. Let such reply be filed within a period of one week from today. 3. Post the matter on 29th July, 2016.” 12. Pursuant to the order passed by this Court referred to above, the Institute filed an affidavit-in-surrejoinder, stating as under: “2. I say that between the years 1998 to 2002, in all 42 persons were engaged on contract basis in the Planning Commission Sponsored Cell on Agro Climatic Research Unit (ARPU). That a statement giving details including the details of different posts on which they were working is annexed herewith and marked as Annexure “I”. 3. I further say that out of these 42 persons, Shri. J.K Amin (Sr. No. 19) was appointed as Account Clerk in SPIESR on 01.10.1997, as there was a vacancy in SPIESR. 4. That Shri. M.J Vyas (Sr. No. 13) who was working as a Peon with ARPU, tendered his resignation on 10.06.1996 That after a period of about 1 year and 4 months of his resignation, he was appointed as a Watchman with SPIESR, when there was a vacancy for the post of Watchman. That the relevant details in this regard are given in Affidavit in Sur-Rejoinder filed by the respondent no. 1-Institute That a copy of list of 18 persons, who were engaged in the ARPU on contract basis, whose services were discontinued w.e.f 31.3.2002 is annexed herewith and marked as Annexure “II”. 5. I further say that on receipt of the letter dated 28.02.2002 of the Planning Commission, Government of India (Annexure ‘C’), no persons who were engaged in ARPU on contract basis, were reverted to the SPIESR. 6. 5. I further say that on receipt of the letter dated 28.02.2002 of the Planning Commission, Government of India (Annexure ‘C’), no persons who were engaged in ARPU on contract basis, were reverted to the SPIESR. 6. That all these persons were appointed in the Planning Commission sponsored Project on Agro Climatic Regional Planning Unit on a contractual appointment on the project on purely temporary basis and were not appointed at any point of time in SPIESR.” 13. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having considered the materials on record, the only question that falls for my consideration is, whether the writ-applicant is entitled to any of the reliefs as prayed for in this writ-application. The facts of this case are quite plain and clear. The appointment of the writ-applicant in the project was purely contractual. Since the project came to an end, the services of the writ-applicant were also put to an end. 14. For the purpose of seeking a writ of mandamus, one has to establish the legal right. The writ-applicant does not have any legal right emanating from any statutory Rules/Regulations. In the absence of any provision for the regularisation of contract employee, this Court should not give a direction to the respondents to consider the writ-applicant for regularisation in service. 15. The Supreme Court has authoritatively ruled that the Courts should not issue directions to the department/Government Institution or Organizations to regularise the services of an employee. Such a direction and implementation of the same would be violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution When the writ-applicant was offered employment, the advertisement, as well as, the appointment order made it clear that the selection and appointment was on the contract basis. The contract appointment cannot be converted into a regular appointment on the sole ground that the writ-applicant has continued for a long time. Had the respondents notified the selection and appointment for the ‘regular recruitment’, large scale candidates who were eligible and/or already working elsewhere on contract basis would be denied to compete for selection and appointment. In other words, each and every eligible candidate must know the nature of public appointment. This Court should not give direction to regularise the writ-applicant's services by way of writ of a mandamus, since the writ-applicant has not pointed out under which statutory rules he has got the right to seek regularisation. In other words, each and every eligible candidate must know the nature of public appointment. This Court should not give direction to regularise the writ-applicant's services by way of writ of a mandamus, since the writ-applicant has not pointed out under which statutory rules he has got the right to seek regularisation. Unless a legal right is vested in a person, the Court should not issue writ of mandamus to the respondents. Mandamus can be issued against a public authority only on its failure to perform mandatory legal duty. If there is no such failure, mandamus would not be issued. 16. The Supreme Court in the case of Mani Subrat Jain v. State of Haryana, (1977) 1 SCC 486 , held as follows:- “9. The High Court rightly dismissed the petitions. It is elementary though it is to be restated that no one can ask for a mandamus without a legal right. There must be a judicially enforceable right as well as a legally protected right before one suffering a legal grievance can ask for a mandamus. A person can be said to be aggrieved only when a person is denied a legal right by some one who has a legal duty to do something or to abstain from doing something (See Halsbury's Laws of England 4th Ed. Vol. I, paragraph 122; State of Haryana v. Subash Chander Marwaha (1) Jasbhai Motibhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar Haji Bashir Ahmed (2) and Ferris Extraordinary Legal Remedies paragraph 198.” 17. In the case of Tirumala Tirupathi Devasthanams v. K. Jotheeswara Pillai (dead) by LRs, (2007) 9 SCC 461 , it has been held that: “9………… The principles, on which a writ of mandamus can be issued, are well settled and we will refer to only one decision rendered in The Bihar Eastern Gangetic Fishermen Cooperative Society Ltd. v. Sipahi Singh (1977) 4 SCC 145 : AIR 1977 SC 2149 , where this Court observed as under: “A writ of mandamus can be granted only in a case where there is a statutory duty imposed upon the officer concerned and there is a failure on the part of that officer to discharge the statutory obligation. The chief function of a writ is to compel performance of public duties prescribed by statute and to keep subordinate tribunals and officers exercising public functions within the limits of their jurisdiction It follows, therefore, that in order that mandamus may issue to compel the authorities to do something, it must be shown that there is a statute which imposes a legal duty and the aggrieved party has a legal right under the statute to enforce its performance.”” 18. I am also not impressed by the submission canvassed on behalf of the writ-applicant as regards the doctrine of legitimate expectation. In fact this doctrine will have no application in cases of contractual employment. 19. Legitimate in legal parlance means that which is lawful, legally recognized by law or according to law Expectation means the act or the instance of expecting or looking forward something expected or hoped for probability of an event and expectation is most often relatable to ones prospects. In Halsburys Laws of England, Fourth Edition, Volume-I(I) 151, legitimate expectations finds mention of the following: “A person may have a legitimate expectation of being treated in a certain way of an administrative authority even though he has no legal right in private law to receive such treatment. The expectation may arise either from a representation or promise made by the authority, including an implied representation, or from consistent past practice. The existence of a legitimate expectation may have a number of different consequences; it may give locus standi to seek leave to apply for judicial review; it may mean that the authority ought not to act so as to defeat the expectation without some overriding reason of public policy to justify its doing so; or it may mean that, if the authority proposes to defeat persons legitimate expectation, it must afford him an opportunity to make representations on the matter. The Courts also distinguish, for example in licensing cases, between original applications, applications to renew and revocations; a party who has been granted a licence may have a legitimate expectation that it will be renewed unless there is some good reason not do so, and may therefore be entitled to greater procedural protection than a mere applicant for grant.” 20. The Courts also distinguish, for example in licensing cases, between original applications, applications to renew and revocations; a party who has been granted a licence may have a legitimate expectation that it will be renewed unless there is some good reason not do so, and may therefore be entitled to greater procedural protection than a mere applicant for grant.” 20. The Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. Hindustan Development Corporation, [(1993) 3 SCC 499 : AIR 1994 SC 988 ] has pointed out that the concept of legitimate expectation first stepped into the English Law in Schmidt v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs, (1969) 2 Ch 149, wherein it was observed that an alien who had been given leave to enter the United Kingdom for a limited period had a legitimate expectation of being allowed to stay for the permitted time and if that permission was revoked before the time expires, that alien ought to be given an opportunity of making representations. Thereafter the concept has been considered in a number of cases. In A.G of Hong Kong v. Ng Yuen Shiu, (1983) 2 AC 629, Lord Fraser said that the principle that a public authority is bound by its undertakings as to the procedure it will follow, provided they do not conflict with its duty is applicable to the undertaking given by the Government of Hong Kong to the respondent that each case would be considered on its merits. In Council of Civil Services Union v. Minister for the Civil Service, (1984) 3 All ER 935, a question arose whether the decision of the Minister withdrawing the right to Trade Union membership without consulting the staff which according to the appellant was his legitimate expectation arising from the existence of a regular practice of consultation, was valid. It was contended that the Minister had a duty to consult the staff as per the existing practice and that though the employee did not have a legal right, he had a legitimate expectation that the existing practice and that though the employee did not have a legal right, he had a legitimate expectation that the existing practice would be followed. On behalf of the Minister on the basis of the evidence produced, it was contended that the decision not to consult was taken for reasons of national security. On behalf of the Minister on the basis of the evidence produced, it was contended that the decision not to consult was taken for reasons of national security. The Court held as under:- “An aggrieved person was entitled to invoke judicial review if he showed that a decision of a public authority affected him by depriving him of some benefit or advantage which in the past he had been permitted to enjoy and which he could legitimately expect to be permitted to continue to enjoy either until he was given reasons for its withdrawal and the opportunity to comment on those reasons or because he had received an assurance that it would not be withdrawn before he had been given the opportunity of making representations against the withdrawal Noticing, however, Of late the doctrine of legitimate expectation is being pressed into service in many cases particularly in contractual sphere while canvassing the implications underlying the administrative law, The Supreme Court has proceed to add, Since we have not come across any pronouncement of this Court on this subject explaining the meaning and scope of the doctrine of legitimate expectation, we would like to examine the same a little more elaborately at this stage, and put the questions, who is the expectant and what is the nature of the expectation? When does such an expectation become a legitimate one and what is the foundation for the same? What are the duties of the administrative authorities while taking a decision in cases attracting the doctrine of legitimate expectation. The Supreme Court has thereafter answered the above as follows:- 28. Time is a three fold present: the present as we experience it, the past as a present memory and future as a present expectation. For legal purposes, the expectation cannot be the same as anticipation. It is different from a wish, a desire or a hope nor can it amount to a claim or demand on the ground of a right. However earnest and sincere a wish, a desire or a hope may be and however confidently one may look to them to be fulfilled, they by themselves cannot amount to an assertable expectation and a mere disappointment does not attract legal consequences. A pious hope even leading to a moral obligation cannot amount to a legitimate expectation. However earnest and sincere a wish, a desire or a hope may be and however confidently one may look to them to be fulfilled, they by themselves cannot amount to an assertable expectation and a mere disappointment does not attract legal consequences. A pious hope even leading to a moral obligation cannot amount to a legitimate expectation. The legitimacy of an expectation can be inferred only if it is founded on the sanction of law of custom or an establishment procedure followed in regular and natural sequence. Again it is distinguishable from a genuine expectation. Such expectation should be justifiably legitimate and protectable. Every such legitimate expectation does not by itself fructify into a right and therefore it does not amount to a right in the conventional sense. 29. It has to be noticed that the concept of legitimate expectation in administrative law has now, undoubtedly, gained sufficient importance. It is stated that Legitimate expectation is the latest recruit to a long list of concepts fashioned by the courts for the review of administrative action and this creation takes it place beside such principles as the rules of natural justice, unreasonableness, the fiduciary duty of local authorities and in future, perhaps, the principle of proportionately. A passage in Administrative Law, Sixth Edition by H.W.R Wade page 424 reads thus:- These are revealing decisions. They show that the courts now expect Government department to honour their published statements or else to treat the citizen with the fullest personal consideration. Unfairness in the form of unreasonableness here comes close to unfairness in the form of violation of natural justice, and the doctrine of legitimate expectation can operate in both contexts. It is obvious furthermore, that this principle of substantive, as opposed to procedural, fairness may undermine some of the established rules about estoppel and misleading advice, which tend to operate unfairly. Lord Scarman has stated emphatically that unfairness in the purported exercise of a power can amount to an abuse or excess of power, and this seems likely to develop into an important general doctrine. Another passage at page 522 in the above book reads thus: It was in fact for the purpose of restricting the right to be heard that legitimate expectation was introduced into the law. Another passage at page 522 in the above book reads thus: It was in fact for the purpose of restricting the right to be heard that legitimate expectation was introduced into the law. It made its first appearance in a case where alien students of scientology were refused extension of their entry permits as an act of policy by the Home Secretary, who had announced that no discretionary benefits would be granted to this sect. The court of Appeal held that they had no legitimate expectation of extension beyond the permitted time and so no right to a hearing, though revocation of their permits within that time would have been contrary to legitimate expectation. Official statements of policy, therefore, may cancel legitimate expectation, just as they may create it, as seen above. In a different context, where car-hire drivers had habitually offended against Airport Bye-laws, with many convictions and unpaid fines, it was held that they had not legitimate expectation of being heard before being banned by the Airport authority. There is some ambiguity in the dicta about legitimate expectation, which may mean either expectation of a fair hearing or expectation of the licence or other benefit which is being sought. But the result is the same in either case; absence of legitimate expectation will absolve the public authority from affording a hearing.” 21. In some cases a question arose, whether the concept of the legitimate expectations is an impact only on the procedure or whether it also can have a substantive impact and if so to what extent. Att. Gen. for New South Wales v. Quin, (1990) 64 Australian Law Journal Reports 327 is a case from Australia in which this aspect is dealt with. In that case the Local Courts Act abolished Courts of Petty Sessions and replaced them by Local Courts. S. 12 of the Act empowered the Governor to appoint any qualified person to be a Magistrate in the new Courts system. Mr. Quin, who had been a Stipendiary Magistrate in charge of a Court of Petty Sessions under the old system applied for, but was refused, an appointment under the new System. That was challenged. The challenge was upheld by the appellate Court on the ground that the Selection Committee had taken into account an adverse report on him without giving a notice to him of the contents of the same. That was challenged. The challenge was upheld by the appellate Court on the ground that the Selection Committee had taken into account an adverse report on him without giving a notice to him of the contents of the same. In the appeal by the Attorney General against that order before the High Court, it was argued on behalf of Mr. Quin that he had a legitimate expectation that he would be treated in the same way as his former colleagues considering his application on its own merits. Coming to the nature of the substantive impact of the doctrine, Brennan, J. observed that the doctrine of legitimate expectations ought not to unlock the gate which shuts the Court out of review on the merits and that the Courts should not trespass into the forbidden filed of the merits by striking down administrative acts or decisions which failed to fulfill the expectations. In the same case Mason, C.J, was of the view that if substantive protection is to be accorded to legitimate expectations that would encounter the objection of entailing crucial interference with administrative decisions on the merits by precluding the decision-maker from ultimately making the decision which he or she considers most appropriate in the circumstances. 22. In R. Vs. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Redudock, [(1987) 2 All ER 518], Taylor, J. after referring to the ration laid down in some of the above cases held thus:- “On these authorities I conclude that the doctrine of legitimate expectation in essence imposes a duty to act fairly. Whilst most of the cases are concerned, as Lord Roskill said, with a right to be heard, I do not think the doctrine is so confined. Indeed, in a case where ex hypothesi there is no right to be heard, it may be thought the more important to fair dealing that a promise or undertaking given by a Minister as to how he will proceed should be kept. Of course such promise or undertaking must not conflict with his statutory duty or his duty, as here, in the exercise of a prerogative power. I accept the submission of counsel for the secretary of State that the respondent cannot fetter his discretion By declaring a policy he does not preclude any possible need to change it. Of course such promise or undertaking must not conflict with his statutory duty or his duty, as here, in the exercise of a prerogative power. I accept the submission of counsel for the secretary of State that the respondent cannot fetter his discretion By declaring a policy he does not preclude any possible need to change it. But then if the practice has been to publish the current policy, it could be incumbent on him in dealing fairly to publish the new policy, unless again that would conflict with his duties. Had the criteria here needed changing for national security reasons, no doubt the respondent could have changed them. Had those reasons prevented him also from publishing the new criteria, no doubt he could have refrain from doing so. He had even decided to keep the criteria but depart from them in this single case for national security reasons, no doubt those reasons would have afforded him a defence to judicial review as in the GCHQ case.” 23. In Breen v. Amalgamated Engineering Union, [(1971) 2 Queen Bench Division 175], Lord Denning observed as under: “If a man seeks a privilege to which he has no particular claim such as an appointment to some post or other then he can be turned away without a word. He need not to be heard. No explanation need be given; see the cases cited in Schmidt v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs (1969) 2 Ch 149, 170-171. But if he is a man whose property is at stake, or who is being deprived of his livelihood, then reasons should be given why he is being turned down, and he should be given a chance to be heard. I go further. If he is man who has some right or interest, or some legitimate expectation of which it would not be fair to deprive him without a hearing, or reasons given, then these should be afforded him, according as the case may demand.” 24. When a challenge is made on the basis of the doctrine of legitimate expectation, the Supreme Court pointed out, that the same would not give scope to claim relief straight way from the administrative authorities in the absence of any crystallized right. When a challenge is made on the basis of the doctrine of legitimate expectation, the Supreme Court pointed out, that the same would not give scope to claim relief straight way from the administrative authorities in the absence of any crystallized right. The protection of such legitimate expectation does not require the fulfillment of the expectation where an overriding public interest requires otherwise or the position changes at the last minute e.g change in the policy, amendment in the rules and regulations etc. In other words, where a persons legitimate expectation is not fulfilled by taking a particular decision then the decision-maker should justify the denial of such expectation by showing some overriding public interest. In the present case no public interest is being projected for the purpose of deleting the names of the petitioners from the select list but the decision rendered by the Division Bench of this Court is being made the basis for denial of such expectation. 25. A person who puts forward his claim on the doctrine of legitimate expectation, in the first instance, most satisfy that there is a foundation and thus has the locus standi to make such a claim. In considering the same several factors which give rise to such legitimate expectation must be present. The decision taken by the authority must be found to be arbitrary, unreasonable and not taken in public interest. If it is a question of policy, even by way of change of the policy, the Court may refuse to interfere with such decision. In a given case whether there are such facts and circumstances, giving rise to the legitimate expectation, would be primarily a question of fact. If these tests are satisfied and if the Court is satisfied that a case of legitimate expectation is made out then the next question would be whether the failure to give an opportunity of hearing before the decision of affecting such legitimate expectation is taken, has resulted in failure of justice and whether on that ground the decision should be quashed. If that be so then what should be the relief is again a matter which would be dependent on the several factors. 26. If that be so then what should be the relief is again a matter which would be dependent on the several factors. 26. The Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra) has quoted from Schmidts case (1969 (2) Ch 149):- “……….If a denial of legitimate expectation in a given case amounts to denial of rights guaranteed or is arbitrary, discriminatory, unfair or biased, gross abuse or violation of principles of natural justice, the same can be questioned on the well-known grounds attracting Article 14 but a claim based on mere legitimate expectation without anything more cannot ipso facto give a right to invoke these principles. It can be one of the grounds to consider but of the Court must lift the veil and see whether the decision is violative of these principles warranting interference. It depends very much on the facts and the recognized general principles of administrative law applicable to such facts and the concept of legitimate expectation which is the latest recruit to a long list of concepts fashioned by the Courts for the review of administrative action, must be restricted to the general legal limitations applicable and binding the manner of the future exercise of administrative power in a particular case. If follows that the concept of legitimate expectation is not the key which unlocks the treasury of natural justice and it ought not to unlock the gates which shuts the Court out of review on the merits, particularly when the element of speculation and uncertainity is inherent in that very concept. As cautioned in Attorney General for New South Wales case the Courts should restrain themselves and restrict such claims duly to the legal limitations. It is a well-meant caution. Otherwise a resourceful litigant having vested interests in contracts, licences etc., can successfully indulge in getting welfare activities mandated by a directive principles thwarted to further his own interest. The caution, particularly in the changing scenario, becomes all the more important.” 27. It is a well-meant caution. Otherwise a resourceful litigant having vested interests in contracts, licences etc., can successfully indulge in getting welfare activities mandated by a directive principles thwarted to further his own interest. The caution, particularly in the changing scenario, becomes all the more important.” 27. A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Umadevi [ (2006) 4 SCC 1 ] referred to the circumstances in which the doctrine of legitimate expectation can be invoked thus: “The doctrine can be invoked if the decisions of the administrative authority affect the person by depriving him of some benefit or advantage which either (i) he had in the past been permitted by the decision-maker to enjoy and which he can legitimately expect to be permitted to continue to do until there have been communicated to him some rational grounds for withdrawing it on which he has been given an opportunity to comment; or (ii) he has received assurance from the decision-maker that they will not be withdrawn without giving him first an opportunity of advancing reasons for contending that they should not be withdrawn.” 28. Another Constitution Bench, referring to the doctrine, observed thus in the Confederation of Ex-servicemen Associations v. Union of India [ 2006 (8) JT 547 ]: “No doubt, the doctrine has an important place in the development of Administrative Law and particularly law relating to ‘judicial review’. Under the said doctrine, a person may have reasonable or legitimate expectation of being treated in a certain way by an administrative authority even though he has no right in law to receive the benefit. In such situation, if a decision is taken by an administrative authority adversely affecting his interests, he may have justifiable grievance in the light of the fact of continuous receipt of the benefit, legitimate expectation to receive the benefit or privilege which he has enjoyed all throughout. Such expectation may arise either from the express promise or from consistent practice which the applicant may reasonably expect to continue.” “In such cases, therefore, the Court may not insist an administrative authority to act judicially but may still insist it to act fairly. Such expectation may arise either from the express promise or from consistent practice which the applicant may reasonably expect to continue.” “In such cases, therefore, the Court may not insist an administrative authority to act judicially but may still insist it to act fairly. The doctrine is based on the principle that good administration demands observance of reasonableness and where it has adopted a particular practice for a long time even in absence of a provision of law, it should adhere to such practice without depriving its citizens of the benefit enjoyed or privilege exercised.” 29. Thus, from the above at least one thing is clear that no relief can be granted solely on the basis of the doctrine of legitimate expectation. The doctrine of legitimate expectation can be brought in aid with the other circumstances emerging from the record of the case including some right if not a indefeasible right. 30. The distinction between a temporary employee and a permanent employee is well-settled. Whereas a permanent employee has a right to the post, a temporary employee appointed on contractual basis has no right to the post. It is only a permanent employee who has a right to continue in service till the age of superannuation (unless he is dismissed or removed after an inquiry, or his service is terminated due to some other valid reason earlier). As regards a temporary employee, there is no age of superannuation because he has no right to the post at all. Hence, it follows that no direction can be passed in the case of any temporary employee that he should be continued till the age of superannuation. [See: Indian Drugs and Pharmaceuticals Limited v. Workman, Indian Drugs and Pharmaceuticals Limited, (2007) 1 SCC 408 ] 31. It is not as if the person who accepts an engagement either temporary or casual in nature, is not aware of the nature of his employment. He accepts the employment with eyes open. It may be true that he is not in a position to bargain - not at arms length - since he might have been searching for some employment so as to eke out his livelihood and accepts whatever he gets. He accepts the employment with eyes open. It may be true that he is not in a position to bargain - not at arms length - since he might have been searching for some employment so as to eke out his livelihood and accepts whatever he gets. But on that ground alone, it would not be appropriate to jettison the constitutional scheme of appointment and to take the view that a person who has temporarily or casually got employed should be directed to be continued permanently. By doing so, it will be creating another mode of public appointment which is not permissible. If the court were to void a contractual employment of this nature on the ground that the parties were not having equal bargaining power, that too would not enable the court to grant any relief to that employee. A total embargo on such casual or temporary employment is not possible, given the exigencies of administration and if imposed, would only mean that some people who at least get employment temporarily, contractually or casually, would not be getting even that employment when securing of such employment brings at least some succor to them. After all, innumerable citizens of our vast country are in search of employment and one is not compelled to accept a casual or temporary employment if one is not inclined to go in for such an employment. It is in that context that one has to proceed on the basis that the employment was accepted fully knowing the nature of it and the consequences flowing from it. In other words, even while accepting the employment, the person concerned knows the nature of his employment. It is not an appointment to a post in the real sense of the term. The claim acquired by him in the post in which he is temporarily employed or the interest in that post cannot be considered to be of such a magnitude as to enable the giving up of the procedure established, for making regular appointments to available posts in the services of the State. [See: Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Umadevi, (2006) 4 SCC 1 ] 32. Lastly, it was submitted that the matter may be considered sympathetically. 33. [See: Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Umadevi, (2006) 4 SCC 1 ] 32. Lastly, it was submitted that the matter may be considered sympathetically. 33. The Article 41 of the Constitution of India, no doubt, provides for the right to work, but this has been deliberately kept by the founding fathers of our Constitution in the Directive Principles and hence made unenforceable in view of the Article 37, because the founding fathers in their wisdom realized that while it was their wish that everyone should be given employment, but the ground realities of our country should not be overlooked. In my view, Article 21 of the Constitution should not be stretched so far as to mean that everyone must be given a job. The number of available jobs are limited, and hence the Courts must take a realistic view of the matter and must exercise self-restraint. [See: Indian Drugs and Pharmaceuticals (supra)]. 34. In Rajendra v. State of Rajasthan [ (1999) 2 SCC 317 : AIR 1999 SC 923 ], the Supreme Court following its own decision in Delhi Development Horticulture Employees Union v. Delhi Administration, Delhi [(1992) 4 SCC99 : AIR 1992 SC 789 ], held that the right to livelihood was found not feasible to be incorporated as a fundamental right in the Constitution and therefore employment was also not guaranteed under the Constitutional scheme. In Sandeep Kumar v. State of U.P [1993 Supp (1) SCC 525 : AIR 1992 SC 713 ], the Supreme Court observed that where there was no work in the project the employees cannot be regularized. In State of Himachal Pradesh v. Ashwani Kumar [ 1996 (1) JT 214 ], the Supreme Court held that where a project has to be closed down for non-availability of funds a direction to regularize the displaced employees of the project could not be given because such direction would amount to creating posts and continuing them in spite of non-availability of work. The same view was taken in State of U.P v. U.P Madhyamik Shiksha Parishad Shramik Sangh[ (1996) 7 SCC 34 : AIR 1996 SC 708 ]. It follows from these decisions that there is no legal right in the temporary employees (whether called casual, adhoc, contractual or daily rated workers) to get absorption, or to be continued in service or get regular pay. 35. It follows from these decisions that there is no legal right in the temporary employees (whether called casual, adhoc, contractual or daily rated workers) to get absorption, or to be continued in service or get regular pay. 35. In the case of Indian Drugs and Pharmaceuticals Limited (supra), the Supreme Court observed as under: “48 Before parting with this case, we would like to state that although this Court would be very happy if everybody in the country is given a suitable job, the fact remains that in the present state of our country's economy the number of jobs are limited. Hence, everybody cannot be given a job, despite our earnest desire. 49. It may be mentioned that jobs cannot be created by judicial orders, nor even by legislative or executive decisions. Jobs are created when the economy is rapidly expanding, which means when there is rapid industrialization. At present, the state of affairs in our country is that although the economy has progressed a little in some directions, but the truth is that this has only benefited a handful of persons while the plight of the masses has worsened. Unemployment in our country is increasing, and has become massive and chronic. To give an example, for each post of a Peon which is advertised in some establishments there are over a thousand applicants, many of whom have MA, M.Sc, M.Com or MBA degrees. Recently, about 140 posts of Primary School Teachers were advertised in a District in Western Madhya Pradesh, and there were about 13000 applicants i.e. almost 100 applicants for each post. Large scale suicides by farmers in several parts of the country also shows the level of unemployment. These are the social and economic realities of the country which cannot be ignored. 50 One may be very large hearted but then economic realities have also to be seen. Giving appointments means adding extra financial burden to the national exchequer. Money for paying salaries to such appointees does not fall from the sky, and it can only be realized by imposing additional taxes on the public or taking fresh loans, both of which will only lead to additional burden on the people.” 36. The issue raised in this writ-application, by and large, is covered by a plethora of judgments of the Supreme Court. One of those is, in the case of Mohd. The issue raised in this writ-application, by and large, is covered by a plethora of judgments of the Supreme Court. One of those is, in the case of Mohd. Abdul Kadir v. Director General of Police, Assam, (2009) 6 SCC 611 . In the said case, the appellants were two ex-servicemen who were employed under the Prevention of Infiltration of Foreigners Additional Scheme, 1987. The Scheme was mainly meant for strengthening of the Assam Government machinery for detection and deportation of foreigners. The Scheme was temporary but it was continued from time to time. The appellants raised certain grievances against the Scheme. A learned Single Judge of the High Court allowed the writ petition but the Division Bench set aside the judgment of the learned Single Judge. The matter was carried to the Supreme Court. One of the issues before the Supreme Court was, whether the appellants were entitled to regularisation. While answering the question in the negative, the Supreme Court pronounced in paras 13, 14 and 15 as under: “13. The fact that the appellants were employed under the PIF Additional Scheme is not disputed. The duration of PIF Additional Scheme under which they are employed was initially two years, to be reviewed for continuation along with the original PIF Scheme. The said scheme is being extended from time to time and is being continued. If the temporary or ad-hoc engagement or appointment is in connection with a particular project or a specific scheme, the ad hoc or temporary service of the persons employed under the Project or Scheme would come to an end on completion/closure/cessation of the Project or the Scheme. 14. The fact that the Scheme had been in operation for some decades or that the employee concerned has continued on ad hoc basis for one or two decades would not entitle the employee to seek permanency or regularization. Even if any posts are sanctioned with reference to the Scheme, such sanction is of ad hoc or temporary posts co-terminus with the scheme and not of permanent posts. 15. On completion of the project or discontinuance of the scheme, those who were engaged with reference to or in connection with such Project or Scheme cannot claim any right to continue in service, nor seek regularization in some other project or service. 15. On completion of the project or discontinuance of the scheme, those who were engaged with reference to or in connection with such Project or Scheme cannot claim any right to continue in service, nor seek regularization in some other project or service. (See Bhagwan Dass v. State of Haryana - (1987) 4 SCC 634 , Delhi Development Horticulture Employees Union v. Delhi Administration (1992) 4 SCC 99 , Hindustan Steel Works Construction Ltd., v. Employees Union - (1995) 3 SCC 474 , UP Land Development Corporation v. Amar Singh - (2003) 5 SCC 388 , Madhyamik Shiksha Parishad UP v. Anil Kumar Mishra - (2005) 5 SCC 122, Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Umadevi - (2004) 7 SCC 132 , Indian Council of Medical Research v. K. Rajyalakshmi - (2007) 2 SCC 332 , and Lal Mohammed v. Indian Railway Construction Co. Ltd. (2007) 2 SCC 513 ). In view of this settled position, the appellants will not be entitled to regularization.” 37. In view of the above, this writ-application should fail and is hereby rejected. 38. Since Mr. Kariel has put much emphasis on what was conveyed by the Planning Commission to the Institute in its letter dated 28th February 2002 (Annexure-‘C’ to this writ-application), it will be open for the writ-applicant to take up this issue independently with the Planning Commission, Government of India.