JUDGMENT : Mansoor Ahmad Mir, J. Subject matter of this appeal is the award dated 22nd March, 2011, made by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal-III, District Kangra, H.P. (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Tribunal’) in MACP RBT No. 70- K/07/10, titled as Miss Palvi versus Rajneesh Kumar & others, whereby the claim petition came to be dismissed (for short, “the impugned award”). 2. The claimant had invoked the jurisdiction of the Tribunal in terms of Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, for grant of compensation to the tune of Rs.3,00,000/- as per the break-ups given in the claim petition. 3. The respondents resisted and contested the claim petition by filing replies. 4. Following issues came to be framed by the Tribunal: “1. Whether the respondent No. 1 was driving the motor-cycle No. HP-40A- 0479 owned by respondent No. 2 in a rash and negligent manner on the road on 2-12-2005 and had struck it against the petitioner at Manal, thereby causing grievous injury to her due to which she had suffered permanent disability as alleged? …OPP 2. If issue No. 1 is proved in affirmative to what amount of compensation the petitioner is entitled and from whom? …OPP 3. Whether the respondent No. 1 was not holding valid and effective driving licence to drive the motorcycle and he had breached the terms and conditions of the Insurance Policy as alleged? ..OPR 4. Relief.” Issue No. 1 5. The Tribunal, after discussing Issue No.1, from para-7 to para-13 of the impugned award, held that there was not sufficient material on the record to hold that motor-cyclist, namely, Rajneesh Kumar, has driven the offending vehicle, i.e. motor cycle bearing registration No. HP-40A-0479, rashly and negligently. It is apt to reproduce para-13 of the impugned award herein:- “Hence, the entire evidence on record is not sufficient to establish that in fact respondent No. 1 was driving motor cycle No. HP-40-A-0479 and due to his rash and negligent driving he committed the accident in question on 2-12-2005 by hitting petitioner Palvi and in the accident petitioner sustained the injuries in question as well as permanent disability. Consequently, this Issue No. 1 is decided against the petitioner.” 6. It appears that the Tribunal has fallen in an error in holding that the claimant has failed to prove that the driver has driven the offending vehicle, rashly and negligently. 7. FIR (Ext. Consequently, this Issue No. 1 is decided against the petitioner.” 6. It appears that the Tribunal has fallen in an error in holding that the claimant has failed to prove that the driver has driven the offending vehicle, rashly and negligently. 7. FIR (Ext. PW-2/A) was lodged in Police Station Shahpur, District Kangra, H.P. 8. H.H.C. Om Swaroop (PW-2) had conducted the investigation, has specifically stated before the Tribunal that FIR was lodged against motorcyclist, Rajneesh Kumar, who had driven the offending motor cycle, rashly and negligently and caused the accident. Challan, in terms of the mandate of Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was presented against the driver in the Court of the competent jurisdiction, i.e. before the Judicial Magistrate 1st Class (II), Dharamshala, District Kangra. Thus, there is sufficient material on the record to hold that the motor-cyclist had driven the offending motor-cycle, rashly and negligently. 9. It is a beaten law of the land that standard of proof in criminal and civil cases is altogether different and in claim petition, the prima facie proof is required. The technicalities and procedural wrangles and tangles have no role to play. 10. My this view is fortified by the judgment of the Apex Court in the case titled as N.K.V. Bros. (P.) Ltd. versus M. Karumai Ammal and others etc., reported in AIR 1980 Supreme Court 1354. It is apt to reproduce relevant portion of para 3 of the judgment herein: “3. Road accidents are one of the top killers in our country, specifically when truck and bus drivers operate nocturnally. This proverbial recklessness often persuades the courts, as has been observed by us earlier in other cases, to draw an initial presumption in several cases based on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Accident Tribunals must take special care to see that innocent victims do not suffer and drivers and owners do not escape liability merely because of some doubt here or some obscurity there. Save in plain cases, culpability must be inferred from the circumstances where it is fairly reasonable. The court should not succumb to niceties, technicalities and mystic maybes. We are emphasising this aspect because we are often distressed by transport operators getting away with it thanks to judicial laxity, despite the fact that they do not exercise sufficient disciplinary control over the drivers in the matter of careful driving. The court should not succumb to niceties, technicalities and mystic maybes. We are emphasising this aspect because we are often distressed by transport operators getting away with it thanks to judicial laxity, despite the fact that they do not exercise sufficient disciplinary control over the drivers in the matter of careful driving. The heavy economic impact of culpable driving of public transport must bring owner and driver to their responsibility to their “neighbour”. Indeed, the State must seriously consider no-fault liability by legislation. A second aspect which pains us is the inadequacy of the compensation or undue parcimony practised by tribunals. We must remember that judicial tribunals are State organs and Art. 41 of the Constitution lays the jurisprudential foundation for state relief against accidental disablement of citizens. There is no justification for niggardliness in compensation. A third factor which is harrowing is the enormous delay in disposal of accident cases resulting in compensation, even if awarded, being postponed by several years. The States must appoint sufficient number of tribunals and the High Court should insist upon quick disposals so that the trauma and tragedy already sustained may not be magnified by the injustice of delayed justice. Many States are unjustly indifferent in this regard." (Emphasis Added) 11. The Jammu and Kashmir High Court in the case titled as Oriental Insurance Co. versus Mst. Zarifa and others, reported in, AIR 1995 Jammu and Kashmir 81, held that the MV Act is Social Welfare Legislation and the procedural technicalities cannot be allowed to defeat the purpose of the Act. It is profitable to reproduce para 20 of the judgment herein: “20. Before concluding, it is also observed that it is a social welfare legislation under which the compensation is provided by way of Award to the people who sustain bodily injuries or get killed in the vehicular accident. These people who sustain injuries or whose kith and kins are killed, are necessarily to be provided such relief in a short span of time and the procedural technicalities cannot be allowed to defeat the just purpose of the Act, under which such compensation is to be paid to such claimants.” 12. These people who sustain injuries or whose kith and kins are killed, are necessarily to be provided such relief in a short span of time and the procedural technicalities cannot be allowed to defeat the just purpose of the Act, under which such compensation is to be paid to such claimants.” 12. It would also be profitable to reproduce relevant portion of para 12 of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case titled as Sohan Lal Passi versus P. Sesh Reddy and others, reported in AIR 1996 Supreme Court 2627, herein: “12. ..................While interpreting the contract of insurance, the Tribunals and Courts have to be conscious of the fact that right to claim compensation by heirs and legal representatives of the victims of the accident is not defeated on technical grounds. Unless it is established on the materials on record that it was the insured who had wilfully violated the condition of the policy by allowing a person not duly licensed to drive the vehicle when the accident took place, the insurer shall be deemed to be a judgment-debtor in respect of the liability in view of sub-section (1) of Section 96 of the Act. It need not be pointed out that the whole concept of getting the vehicle insured by an insurance company is to provide an easy mode of getting compensation by the claimants, otherwise in normal course they had to pursue their claim against the owner from one forum to the other and ultimately to execute the order of the Accident Claims Tribunal for realisation of such amount by sale of properties of the owner of the vehicle. The procedure and result of the execution of the decree is well known.” 13. The Apex Court in a case titled Dulcina Fernandes and others vs. Joaquim Xavier Cruz and another, reported in, (2013) 10 SCC 646 has laid down the same principle and held that strict proof and strict links are not required. 13. The same principle has been laid down by this Court in a series of cases. 14. The Apex Court in a case titled Dulcina Fernandes and others vs. Joaquim Xavier Cruz and another, reported in, (2013) 10 SCC 646 has laid down the same principle and held that strict proof and strict links are not required. 13. The same principle has been laid down by this Court in a series of cases. 14. A Single Judge of this Court in FAO No. 127 of 1999, titled as Bimla Devi and others versus Himachal Road Transport Corporation and others, decided on 22.08.2005, held that the claimants have to prove the case by leading cogent evidence and applied the mandate of the Code of Civil Procedure, (for short ‘the CPC’) read with the Evidence Act, was questioned before the Apex Court by the medium of Civil Appeal No. 2538 of 2009, titled as Bimla Devi & Ors. versus Himachal Road Transport Corpn. & Ors., reported in, 2009 AIR SCW 4298, and the Apex Court set aside the said judgment and held that strict proof is not required. It is apt to reproduce paras 2 and 12 to 15 of the judgment herein: "2. This appeal is directed against a judgment and order dated 22.8.2005 passed by the High Court of Himachal Pradesh, Shimla in FAO No. 127 of 1999 whereby and where under an appeal preferred against a judgment and award dated 28.10.1998 passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal-II [MACT (I), Nahan] in MAC Petition No. 21-NL/2 of 1997, was set aside. xxx xxx xxx 12. While dealing with a claim petition in terms of Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, a Tribunal stricto sensu is not bound by the pleadings of the parties; its function being to determine the amount of fair compensation in the event an accident has taken place by reason of negligence of that driver of a motor vehicle. It is true that occurrence of an accident having regard to the provisions contained in Section 166 of the Act is a sine qua non for entertaining a claim petition but that would not mean that despite evidence to the effect that death of the claimants predecessor had taken place by reason of an accident caused by a motor vehicle, the same would be ignored only on the basis of a post mortem report vis-a-vis the averments made in a claim petition. 13. The deceased was a Constable. 13. The deceased was a Constable. Death took place near a police station. The post mortem report clearly suggests that the deceased died of a brain injury. The place of accident is not far from the police station. It is, therefore, difficult to believe the story of the driver of the bus that he slept in the bus and in the morning found a dead body wrapped in a blanket. If the death of a constable has taken place earlier, it is wholly unlikely that his dead body in a small town like Dharampur would remain undetected throughout the night particularly when it was lying at a bus stand and near a police station. In such an event, the court can presume that the police officers themselves should have taken possession of the dead body. 14. The learned Tribunal, in our opinion, has rightly proceeded on the basis that apparently there was absolutely no reason to falsely implicate the respondent Nos. 2 and 3. Claimant was not at the place of occurrence. She, therefore, might not be aware of the details as to how the accident took place but the fact that the First Information Report had been lodged in relation to an accident could not have been ignored. Some discrepancies in the evidences of the claimant s witnesses might have occurred but the core question before the Tribunal and consequently before the High Court was as to whether the bus in question was involved in the accident or not. For the purpose of determining the said issue, the Court was required to apply the principle underlying burden of proof in terms of the provisions of Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act as to whether a dead body wrapped in a blanket had been found at the spot at such an early hour, which was required to be proved by the respondent Nos. 2 and 3. 15. In a situation of this nature, the Tribunal has rightly taken a holistic view of the matter. It was necessary to be borne in mind that strict proof of an accident caused by a particular bus in a particular manner may not be possible to be done by the claimants. The claimants were merely to establish their case on the touchstone of preponderance of probability. The standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt could not have been applied. It was necessary to be borne in mind that strict proof of an accident caused by a particular bus in a particular manner may not be possible to be done by the claimants. The claimants were merely to establish their case on the touchstone of preponderance of probability. The standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt could not have been applied. For the said purpose, the High Court should have taken into consideration the respective stories set forth by both the parties." 15. There is sufficient prima facie proof on the record to the effect that the motor-cyclist had driven the offending vehicle, rashly and negligently, at the relevant point of time and had caused the accident, in which the claimant sustained injuries. Accordingly, Issue No. 1 is decided in favour of the claimant and against the respondents and the findings returned by the Tribunal on the said issue are set aside. 16. Before I deal with Issue No. 2, I deem it proper to deal with issue No. 3. Issue No. 3. 17. It was for the insurer to plead and prove that the driver was not having a valid and effective driving licence at the relevant time. 18. The insurer has examined Kewal Singh as RW-4, who had deposed that as per the register brought by him, the driving licence of the motor-cyclist was not issued by Licensing Authority, Khandur Sahib, District Taran Taaran, Punjab. But in the cross-examination, he has admitted that the said register was not relating to the series of 9000. He further admitted that after serial number 6228, the driving licences have also been issued. The number of the driving licence of the driver is 9648. 19. It was for the insurer to prove that the owner of the offending vehicle has committed willful breach of the terms and conditions of the insurance policy and mere plea here and there cannot be a ground for seeking exoneration, as held by the Apex Court in National Insurance Co. Ltd. versus Swaran Singh & others, reported in AIR 2004 Supreme Court 1531. It is apt to reproduce relevant portion of para 105 of the judgment hereinbelow: “105. ..................... (i) ......................... (ii) ........................ Ltd. versus Swaran Singh & others, reported in AIR 2004 Supreme Court 1531. It is apt to reproduce relevant portion of para 105 of the judgment hereinbelow: “105. ..................... (i) ......................... (ii) ........................ (iii) The breach of policy condition e.g. disqualification of driver or invalid driving licence of the driver, as contained in subsection (2) (a) (ii) of Section 149, have to be proved to have been committed by the insured for avoiding liability by the insurer. Mere absence, fake or invalid driving licence or disqualification of the driver for driving at the relevant time, are not in themselves defences available to the insurer against either the insured or the third parties. To avoid its liability towards insured, the insurer has to prove that the insured was guilty of negligence and failed to exercise reasonable care in the matter of fulfilling the condition of the policy regarding use of vehicles by duly licensed driver or one who was not disqualified to drive at the relevant time. (iv) The insurance companies are, however, with a view to avoid their liability, must not only establish the available defences raised in the said proceedings but must also establish 'breach' on the part of the owner of the vehicle; the burden of proof wherefore would be on them. (v)......................... (vi) Even where the insurer is able to prove breach on the part of the insured concerning the policy condition regarding holding of a valid licence by the driver or his qualification to drive during the relevant period, the insurer would not be allowed to avoid its liability towards insured unless the said breach or breaches on the condition of driving licence is/are so fundamental as are found to have contributed to the cause of the accident. The Tribunals in interpreting the policy conditions would apply “the rule of main purpose” and the concept of “fundamental breach” to allow defences available to the insured under Section 149(2) of available the Act.” 20. It is also profitable to reproduce para 10 of the latest judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Pepsu Road Transport Corporation versus National Insurance Company, reported in, (2013) 10 SCC 217 , hereinbelow: “10. In a claim for compensation, it is certainly open to the insurer under Section 149(2)(a)(ii) to take a defence that the driver of the vehicle involved in the accident was not duly licensed. In a claim for compensation, it is certainly open to the insurer under Section 149(2)(a)(ii) to take a defence that the driver of the vehicle involved in the accident was not duly licensed. Once such a defence is taken, the onus is on the insurer. But even after it is proved that the licence possessed by the driver was a fake one, whether there is liability on the insurer is the moot question. As far as the owner of the vehicle is concerned, when he hires a driver, he has to check whether the driver has a valid driving licence. Thereafter he has to satisfy himself as to the competence of the driver. If satisfied in that regard also, it can be said that the owner had taken reasonable care in employing a person who is qualified and competent to drive the vehicle. The owner cannot be expected to go beyond that, to the extent of verifying the genuineness of the driving licence with the licensing authority before hiring the services of the driver. However, the situation would be different if at the time of insurance of the vehicle or thereafter the insurance company requires the owner of the vehicle to have the licence duly verified from the licensing authority or if the attention of the owner of the vehicle is otherwise invited to the allegation that the licence issued to the driver employed by him is a fake one and yet the owner does not take appropriate action for verification of the matter regarding the genuineness of the licence from the licensing authority. That is what is explained in Swaran Singh case. If despite such information with the owner that the licence possessed by his driver is fake, no action is taken by the insured for appropriate verification, then the insured will be at fault and, in such circumstances, the Insurance Company is not liable for the compensation.” 21. This Court in FAO No. 322 of 2011, titled as IFFCO-TOKIO Gen. Insurance Company Limited versus Smt. Joginder Kaur and others, decided on 29.08.2014 and FAO No. 523 of 2007, titled as Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. versus Smt. Rikta alias Kritka & others, decided on 19.12.2014, has laid down the same principle. 22. Having said so, the insurer has failed to prove that the owner-insured has committed willful breach. Insurance Company Limited versus Smt. Joginder Kaur and others, decided on 29.08.2014 and FAO No. 523 of 2007, titled as Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. versus Smt. Rikta alias Kritka & others, decided on 19.12.2014, has laid down the same principle. 22. Having said so, the insurer has failed to prove that the owner-insured has committed willful breach. Accordingly, it is held that the insurer has to satisfy the liability. Issue No. 2. 23. The claimant has suffered 5% permanent disability and remained under treatment for about two months. 24. It is beaten law of land that while assessing compensation in injury cases, guess work is to be made. 25. My this view is fortified by the judgments made by the Apex Court in the cases titled as R.D D. Hattangadi versus M/s Pest Control (India) Pvt. Ltd. & others, reported in, AIR 1995 SC 755 , Arvind Kumar Mishra versus New India Assurance Co. Ltd. & another, reported in, 2010 AIR SCW 6085, Ramchandrappa versus The Manager, Royal Sundaram Aliance Insurance Company Limited, reported in, 2011 AIR SCW 4787, and Kavita versus Deepak and others, reported in, 2012 AIR SCW 4771. 26. This Court has also laid down the same principle in a series of cases. 27. Thus, the claimant is entitled to compensation to the tune of Rs.1,00,000/- under the head ‘loss of amenities of life’, Rs. 50,000/- under the head ‘pain and sufferings’ and Rs. 50,000/- under the head ‘medical expenses’. 28. Viewed thus, the claimant is held entitled to the total amount of compensation to the tune of Rs.1,00,000/- + Rs.50,000/- + Rs.50,000/- = Rs.2,00,000/- with interest at the rate of 7.5% per annum from the date of the impugned award till its final realization. 29. Accordingly, the impugned award is set aside and the appeal is allowed and compensation to the tune of Rs.2,00,000/- with interest at the rate of 7.5% per annum from the date of the impugned award till its final realization is awarded in favour of the claimant and against the insurer. 30. The insurer is directed to deposit the compensation amount before the Registry within six weeks from today. The Registry is directed to deposit the compensation amount in the fixed deposit for a period of five years. 31. Send down the record after placing a copy of the judgment on the Tribunal's file.