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2016 DIGILAW 194 (PAT)

Markandey Singh v. State of Bihar

2016-02-25

CHAKRADHARI SHARAN SINGH, I.A.ANSARI

body2016
JUDGMENT : CHAKRADHARI SHARAN SINGH, J. 1. The present appeal under the proviso to Section 372 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, has been preferred against the judgment and order, dated 01.10.2010, passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Lakhisarai, in Sessions Trial No. 3/2000, whereby he has recorded acquittal of respondent Nos. 2, 3 & 5 of the offences punishable under Sections 307, 323, 504, read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and of respondent No.4 of the offence under Section 324 of the Indian Penal Code. 2. The appellant is the informant. According to the case of the prosecution, as narrated by the informant in his fard-beyan, on the alleged date of occurrence, i.e., on 26.06.1999, at about 8.15 A.M., when he was sitting with his family members in his home, the accused persons, including these respondents, came armed with Lathi-Danda (Bamboostick) and dagger. It was alleged that they were pestering the informant to commit theft of a diesel machine of nearby College and hand it over to the accused a persons. As the informant declined to do so, the accused persons assaulted him on his head, shoulder and neck with Lathi-Danda causing several injuries. 3. The police, upon completion of investigation, submitted charge-sheet against the Opposite parties for the offences punishable under Sections 447, 323, 307, 324, 504/34 of the Indian Penal Code. Cognizance of the said offence was taken subsequently by an order, dated 19.08.1999, passed by learned Assistant Chief Judicial Magistrate, Lakhisarai. 4. The matter was committed to the Court of Sessions. After the charges having been framed, since the respondents pleaded not guilty, they were put on trial. This is to be noted that respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 5 were charged with the offences punishable under Sections 307, 323, 504 read with 34 of Indian Penal Code and Section 447 of the Indian Penal Code, whereas the respondent No.4 was charged of the offence punishable under Section 324 of the Indian Penal Code. 5. At the trial, altogether nine witnesses, including the informant, were examined. Out of nine witnesses, P.W.1 was declared hostile to the prosecution since he did not support the case of the prosecution. There was only one independent witness examined as P.W.2. P.Ws. 6 and 8 were the formal witnesses. P.W.7 is the Investigating Officer and P.W.9, the Doctor, who had prepared the injury report. Out of nine witnesses, P.W.1 was declared hostile to the prosecution since he did not support the case of the prosecution. There was only one independent witness examined as P.W.2. P.Ws. 6 and 8 were the formal witnesses. P.W.7 is the Investigating Officer and P.W.9, the Doctor, who had prepared the injury report. Upon evaluation of the evidence adduced at the trial, the learned trial Court came to the conclusion that the prosecution could not establish the charge against the respondents beyond all reasonable doubt and recorded their acquittal accordingly of the offences, which they stood charged with. 6. Learned counsel, appearing on behalf of the appellant, has submitted that despite the fact that all the witnesses supported the case of the prosecution, the learned trial Court erroneously recorded acquittal giving undue weightage to minor contradictions in the evidence of the witnesses vis-a-vis the fard-beyan of the informant and the injury report. She has submitted that merely on the ground that there was slight variance in the injury report not fully corroborating the allegation as contained in the First Information Report, the learned trial Court ought not to have recorded acquittal of the respondents. According to her, it was the duty of the Court to have scrutinized evidence carefully and separate the grain from chaff for arriving at a correct decision. 7. We have perused the impugned judgment and order, dated 01.10.2010. No ground has been taken that the description of the evidence, as recorded by the learned trial Court in the impugned judgment,, is incorrect. We have noticed that in the fard-beyan, it was alleged that several injuries were caused on the body of the informant, with Lathi and dagger. It appears from the record that only one lacerated wound and one incised wound were found on the body of the informant which have been opined to be simple in nature. The injury report, thus, does not corroborate the statement of the informant in his fard-beyan. We have also noticed that the learned trial Court has taken into account the contradictions in the evidence of the witnesses, which, in a considered view, are material and could not have been ignored. The injury report, thus, does not corroborate the statement of the informant in his fard-beyan. We have also noticed that the learned trial Court has taken into account the contradictions in the evidence of the witnesses, which, in a considered view, are material and could not have been ignored. For instance, as per the fard-beyan, respondents No. 2 and 3 gave several blows with lathi on various parts of the informant’s body and respondents No. 4 and 5 assaulted informant’s son (Ramadhar Singh, P.W.3) and daughter (Chanda Kumari, P.W.4), who had come to rescue the informant. This is also alleged that respondent No. 4 gave a blow with dagger on the lower portion of the chest of Chanda Kumari, (P.W.4). P.W.1, who, as per the fard-beyan, had rushed to the place of occurrence, at the trial deposed, in his evidence, that he did not know any thing about occurrence and was, thus, declared hostile to the prosecution. P.W.2 in his evidence, supporting the prosecution’s case, deposed that respondent 5 had assaulted P.W.3 (Ramadhar Singh) and P.W. 4 (Chanda Kumari) with dagger and because of the assault, they became unconscious. Evidently, there was no allegation in the fard-beyan that P.W.3 and P.W.4 had become unconscious. 8. It is true that a trial court is required to separate grains from the chaff, while evaluating evidence adduced at a trial but at the same, if the guilt of the accused is not capable of being proved beyond all reasonable doubt, such accused is entitled to have the benefit of doubt. The view, taken by the learned court in the judgment and order impugned, cannot be said to be wholly unreasonable as contradictions in the evidence of the prosecution’s witnesses, create reasonable doubt as regards the veracity of the case of the prosecution. 9. In such circumstance, upon evaluation of the evidence at the learned trial Court, if learned trial Court has recorded acquittal, the findings cannot be said to be perverse and/or not resonably possible view. In an appeal against acquittal, this Court is not required to interfere with the trial court’s judgment on the ground that another view is also possible. 9. In such circumstance, upon evaluation of the evidence at the learned trial Court, if learned trial Court has recorded acquittal, the findings cannot be said to be perverse and/or not resonably possible view. In an appeal against acquittal, this Court is not required to interfere with the trial court’s judgment on the ground that another view is also possible. Acquittal of an accused by the trial court reinforces the legal presumption of his innocence and unless some clinching evidence, adduced at the trial, is shown, based on which his conviction could be said to be the only possible view, no interference is required by this Court. 10. We, therefore, do not find this appeal against acquittal, a fit case for admission. 11. This appeal is, accordingly, dismissed. Appeal dismissed.