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2016 DIGILAW 1957 (GUJ)

Kundla Press & Oil Mill Pvt. Ltd. Thro Director Bharatbhai B v. State of Gujarat Thro Secretary

2016-09-06

R.SUBHASH REDDY, VIPUL M.PANCHOLI

body2016
JUDGMENT : VIPUL M. PANCHOLI, J. By way of this appeal, which is filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, the appellant-original petitioner seeks to challenge the order dated 23.06.2016 passed by the learned single Judge in Special Civil Application No. 352 of 2013 by which the learned single Judge has dismissed the petition. 2. The factual matrix of the present case is as under; 2.1 The land admeasuring 28,176 Sq. Metres falling within Gamtal of Savarkundla was given to the petitioner-Company on lease for a period of 30 years in the year 1922. The District Collector, Bhavnagar, vide order dated 06.09.1955, gave approval to respondent no. 3-Municipality to grant the land in question on lease to the petitioner. During the existence of the lease period, a dispute arose between the parties with regard to grant of permission for carrying out construction activity on the land in question. The dispute was referred to the Arbitrator, who passed an award on 23.03.1978 The said award became a decree on 26.04.1978, in pursuance of the decree passed by the Civil Court (S.D), Bhavnagar in Special Civil Suit No. 48 of 1978. 2.2 The respondent no. 1, vide order dated 2 3.10.1991, extended the lease period for a period of thirty years with effect from 01.04.1982 Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the action of respondent no. 1 extending the period of lease, respondent no. 3-Municipality filed Special Civil Application No. 1968 of 1992 before this Court. The said petition came to be dismissed for non-prosecution vide order dated 20.07.2002 A restoration application was filed by respondent no. 3-Municipality, which was dismissed on 06.07.2005 2.3 It is the case of the petitioner that the petitioner requested the respondent no. 3-Municipality to comply with the consent decree passed by the Civil Court on 26.04.1978 However, the respondent no. 3-Municipality refused to accept the lease rent in terms of the decree and on the contrary, raised bills for arrears of rent. Even after completion of 30 years of lease period, the respondent no. 3-Municipality did not enter into any lease agreement for renewal of lease. The petitioner, therefore, filed Special Civil Application No. 22772 of 2006 seeking direction against the respondent no.3-Municipality to renew the lease of the land in question as well as adjoining land, as per the consent decree passed by the Civil Court. 3-Municipality did not enter into any lease agreement for renewal of lease. The petitioner, therefore, filed Special Civil Application No. 22772 of 2006 seeking direction against the respondent no.3-Municipality to renew the lease of the land in question as well as adjoining land, as per the consent decree passed by the Civil Court. This Court by order dated 21.03.2007 disposed of the aforesaid petition with a direction to respondent no. 3-Municipality to comply the consent decree. 2.4 In pursuance of the directions issued by this Court, the respondent no.3-Municipality entered into a lease agreement with the petitioner vide agreement dated 12.02.2007 The lease period of 30 years got over in the year 2012 and therefore, the petitioner made a representation to the respondent no.3-Municipality to extend the period of lease for a further period of 30 years. However, in the General Meeting held on 23.03.2012, the respondent no.3-Municipality passed a Resolution to the effect that the application of the petitioner for renewal of lease has been rejected on the ground that the land in question is required for other public purposes. 2.5 The petitioner, therefore, filed Special Civil Application No. 353 of 2012 before this Court wherein, the petitioner prayed for the following reliefs; “(A) That the Hon'ble Court may be pleased to admit this petition. (B) That the Hon'ble Court may be pleased to allow this Special Civil Application by issuing an appropriate writ, order or direction to Municipality directing him to renew lease of land in possession of the petitioner bearing Survey No. 452/19 of City Savarkundla admeasuring 28,176 sq. metres as well as adjoining land admeasuring 1 acre 2 Gunthas as per consent decree. ALTERNATIVELY Your Lordships may be pleased to issue an appropriate writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus for quashing and setting aside the resolution passed by respondent no. 3 in the general meeting on dated 23.03.20123 as Resolution No. 5, which is contrary to the consent terms as agreed between the parties as well as direction issued by this Hon'ble Court in Special Civil Application No. 22772 of 2006 in the interest of justice.” (C) to (E) … 3. The learned single Judge, by the impugned order, dismissed the said petition and therefore, the present appeal is filed by the appellant. 4. Heard learned Senior Counsel Mr. R.R Marshall with learned advocate Mr. The learned single Judge, by the impugned order, dismissed the said petition and therefore, the present appeal is filed by the appellant. 4. Heard learned Senior Counsel Mr. R.R Marshall with learned advocate Mr. Ashish M. Dagli for the appellant-original petitioner, learned advocate Mr. Dipak Sanchela for respondent no.3-Municipality and learned AGP Mr. Utkarsh Sharma for respondent no. 1. 5. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner mainly contended that the learned single Judge has committed an error in observing that the construction carried out by the petitioner is illegal and that the petitioner is earning profit out of the construction made over the land in question. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that while dismissing the petition, the learned single Judge has directed the petitioner to vacate the land in question within a period of two months, which is erroneous. To substantiate the aforesaid contention, learned Senior Counsel referred to the order dated 31.03.1980 passed by the learned single Judge of this Court in Special Civil Application No. 895 of 1979, which is produced at Page 124 of the compilation. It is submitted that the learned single Judge of this Court in the said order specifically observed that the petitioner-Company had sought prior permission from the respondent no. 3-Municipality for carrying out construction activity over the land in question, as required under the Gujarat Municipalities Act and respondent no. 3-Municipality granted such permission vide its General Board Resolution. Thereafter, the petitioner-Company dug the foundation of the building. At that stage, the District Collector intervened to arrest the further progress in pursuance of the said municipal permission. Thus, when this Court had granted permission to the petitioner to carry out construction work, then such construction cannot be considered to be illegal, as has been observed by the learned single Judge. Hence, the impugned order passed by the learned single Judge be set aside. 5.1 Learned Senior Counsel Mr. Marshall, thereafter, referred to the order dated 21.03.2007 passed by the learned single Judge in Special Civil Application No. 22772 of 2006 wherein, the leaned single Judge has made reference about the decree dated 26.04.1978 passed by the Civil Court (S.D), Bhavnagar in Special Civil Suit No. 48 of 1978 and thereafter, observed that the respondent no.3-Municipality has acted in a most irresponsible and cavalier fashion. The respondent no.3-Municipality cannot be permitted to flout the valid decree of a competent Court and thereafter, the respondent no.3-Municipality was directed to comply with the decree dated 26.04.1978 within the stipulated period. It is contended that after the aforesaid directions of this Court, the respondent no.3-Municipality renewed the lease for a period of thirty years from 1982, by way of an Agreement executed on 12.04.2007 By referring to the said agreement, it has been contended that it was agreed upon that the lease will be renewed on completion of the lease period. In spite of such Agreement, the lease was not extended when it got over in the year 2012 and by the impugned decision taken in the General Meeting, the application submitted by the petitioner for renewal of lease has been dismissed by the respondent no.3-Municipality. It is contended that the learned single Judge has not properly appreciated the aforesaid important aspects and therefore, the impugned order passed by the learned single Judge be set aside and the respondent no.3-Municipality be directed to renew the lease for a period of thirty years. 6. On the other hand, learned counsel Mr. Dipak Sanchela appearing for the respondent no.3-Municipality referred to the provisions contained in Section 65(2) of the Gujarat Municipalities Act and two Circulars dated 19.05.1988 and 25.10.1990 issued by the respondent-State and thereafter, submitted that prior permission of the State Government is required where a lease is to be granted for a period of more than 10 years. It is contended that as per the direction given by this Court in the order dated 21.03.2007 passed in Special Civil Application No. 22772 of 2006, the respondent no.3-Municipality extended the lease for a period of thirty years commencing from 1982 as per the consent decree passed by the Civil Court. However, on completion of the period of thirty years in the year 2012, the respondent no.3-Municipality, in its General Meeting, resolved that the petitioner has illegally constructed shops over the land in question and that when the petitioner has not used the land in question for the purpose for which it was granted on lease, the application for renewal of lease cannot be accepted. It is further observed in the Resolution that the land in question is required by the respondent no.3-Municipality for public and educational purpose. Hence, no illegality is committed by the respondent no. It is further observed in the Resolution that the land in question is required by the respondent no.3-Municipality for public and educational purpose. Hence, no illegality is committed by the respondent no. 3-Municipality while rejecting the application of the petitioner for renewal of lease. Hence, the learned single Judge not committed any error while dismissing the petition. 6.1 Learned counsel Mr. Sanchela further submitted that the petitioner is not having any indefeasible right that the lease granted earlier has to be renewed for a further period of thirty years. Thus, when the respondent no.3-Municipality has taken the decision in public interest, the present appeal be dismissed. 7. Learned AGP Mr. Utkarsh Sharma has supported the submissions canvassed by learned counsel Mr. Dipak Sanchela. 8. Having considered the submissions advanced on behalf of learned advocates appearing for the parties and having gone through the material produced on record, it has emerged that the land in question was granted on lease in favour of the petitioner in the year 1922 for a period of thirty years. However, the petitioner has not produced the copy of the first lease deed along with the memo of petition. On the basis of the arbitration award, consent decree was passed by the Civil Court wherein, it has been observed that the respondent no. 3-Municipality should renew the lease for a period of thirty years. The said decree was passed on 26.04.1978 9. In spite of the decree passed by the Civil Court, the respondent no.3-Municipality did not renew the lease after the year 1982 and therefore, the petitioner filed a petition being Special Civil Application No. 22772 of 2006 before this Court. The learned single Judge, by relying upon the consent decree passed by the Civil Court, directed the respondent no.3-Municipality to renew the lease. Hence, the respondent no. 3-Municipality, by an Agreement dated 12.04.2007, renewed the lease for a period of thirty years commencing from 1982. The said lease period got over in the year 2012. In its General Meeting held on 23.03.2012, the respondent no.3-Municipality passed a Resolution whereby, the application of the petitioner to renew the lease for a further period of thirty years has been rejected. The said lease period got over in the year 2012. In its General Meeting held on 23.03.2012, the respondent no.3-Municipality passed a Resolution whereby, the application of the petitioner to renew the lease for a further period of thirty years has been rejected. Now, if we carefully examine the decree passed by the Civil Court on the basis of the arbitration award, which is produced at Page 23(A) of the compilation, it is revealed that the respondent no.3-Municipality was directed to renew the lease for a period of thirty years. It is also observed that the petitioner-Company has been permitted to carry out such construction over the land in question, which it may deem proper and as it may deem fit, for its own use. 10. The learned Senior Counsel had placed reliance upon the order dated 31.03.1980 passed by the learned single Judge in Special Civil Application No. 895 of 1979. However, the dispute in the said petition was with regard to the order passed by the District Collector u/s.258 of the Gujarat Municipalities Act. The Municipality had granted permission for carrying out construction over the land in question but, the District Collector while exercising powers u/s.258 of the Gujarat Municipalities Act, had restrained the petitioner from carrying out any construction over the land in question. The learned single Judge in the said case observed in Para-6 as under: “In the case on hand, even according to the Collector, the lease is operative till the year 1982. During that period of lease, the petitioner-Company is competent to put the land to any efficient use and it has a right to do so. The Collector's say that some possible injury might be caused to the public in future is not the injury contemplated by Sec. 258(1) of the Act. What that possible injury to the public can there be is also not stated by the Collector. The second ground that the Government would find it difficult to take back possession is also untenable. If the Government has authority to resume the land in the year 1982, it would be competent for it to take the land back in the condition in which it was at the time of the alleged grant of lease. The second ground that the Government would find it difficult to take back possession is also untenable. If the Government has authority to resume the land in the year 1982, it would be competent for it to take the land back in the condition in which it was at the time of the alleged grant of lease. Mere putting up of some shops during the continuance of the lease would be no adverse circumstance for the Collector to exercise power u/s. 258(1) of the Act.” 11. From the photographs annexed by the petitioner along with the additional affidavit, which are produced at Pages 132 to 143 of the compilation, it is revealed that the petitioner has constructed a commercial complex/shops over the land, which was given on lease by the respondent no. 3-Municipality and thereafter, the commercial complex/ shops have been allotted to the concerned persons. Thus, the petitioner is not using the land in question for its own purpose. 12. At this stage, it would be relevant to note that the Civil Court had specifically observed in its decree that the petitioner-Company could use the leased land for its own purpose. The learned single Judge of this Court has reproduced the relevant paragraphs in the order dated 21.03.2007 passed in Special Civil Application No. 22772 of 2006. From the photographs produced on record, it cannot be said that the petitioner-Company has carried out the construction for its own use. 13. In the above background, if the impugned order passed by the learned single Judge is seen, it would be evident that the petitioner has been using the land in question for commercial purposes and has been earning huge profits by way of rent. Once it is established that the land in question has been used for commercial purpose and huge income is being earned out of it, the petitioner could not be permitted to continue with its possession. From the Resolution passed by the respondent no.3-Municipality, it is clear that the land in question is required for educational purpose, which seems to be a valid cause. The learned single Judge, after considering the facts and circumstances of the case, dismissed the petition. 14. In view of the above, we are of the opinion that the learned single Judge has not committed any error while dismissing the petition and therefore, we see no merits in the present appeal. The learned single Judge, after considering the facts and circumstances of the case, dismissed the petition. 14. In view of the above, we are of the opinion that the learned single Judge has not committed any error while dismissing the petition and therefore, we see no merits in the present appeal. Accordingly, the same is dismissed.