JUDGMENT : Sandeep Sharma, J. 1. Instant Regular Second Appeal filed under Section 100 of the Code of Civil procedure is directed against the judgment and decree dated 5.9.2006, passed by learned District Judge, Bilaspur, District Bilaspur, H.P., affirming the judgment and decree dated 6.6.2002, passed by learned Sub Judge Ist Class, Bilaspur in Civil Suit No.118/1 of 1995, whereby suit of the plaintiffs for declaration and permanent prohibitory injunction and alternative for joint possession was decreed. 2. The brief facts, as emerge from the record are that the plaintiffs (hereinafter after referred to as the respondents) filed suit declaration and permanent prohibitory injunction and in alternative for joint possession against the defendant( hereinafter referred to as the appellant) in the Court of leaned Sub Judge, 1st Class, Bilaspur averring therein that land measuring 7-11 bighas, comprising khasra No.59/7 is in joint possession of the plaintiffs and the defendant as tenant and the revenue entries the name of the defendant as exclusive tenant are wrong, void and illegal and plaintiffs are not bound by such fictitious, fraudulent and unauthorizedly prepared revenue entries in collusion with the revenue officials. Plaintiffs also claimed in the plaint that defendant has no right, title or interest in the joint tenancy of the plaintiffs with consequential relief for permanent injunction restraining the defendant from making any kind of interference in the joint tenancy and possession of the plaintiffs. Plaintiff further averred that plaintiff No.1, Gopala Ram and Baja Ram, father of plaintiffs No.2 and 3 and defendant Tulsi Ram were the real brothers and they were joint tenants in possession of the land measuring 10.11 Bighas under the land owners on payment of 1/4th of the produce as rent. Plaintiffs further averred in the plaint that after the death of Sh. Baja Ram, plaintiffs No.2 and 3 inherited his tenancy rights as his sons. Plaintiff further averred in the plaint that after coming into operation of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, land measuring 3 bighas out of the total tenancy land was resumed by the owners, as result of which, suit land measuring 7.11 bighas is in the joint tenancy of the plaintiffs and the defendant and they are in possession of the same. Plaintiff specifically stated in the plaint that in the last week of June, 1995 when they were cultivating the suit land, the defendant interfered in the joint possession and questioned the rights of the plaintiffs in the joint tenancy and after making inquiry, the plaintiffs came to know that the defendant has manipulated the wrong revenue entries in his favour in collusion with the revenue officers. The plaintiffs, thereafter called upon the defendant not to interfere in the joint tenancy land and admit the claim of the plaintiffs by getting revenue entries correct in the name of the plaintiffs but no steps were taken and as such, plaintiffs were compelled to file the suit before the learned trial Court. 3. Defendants, by way of written statement refuted the claim of the plaintiffs in toto by stating that Sh. Baja Ram, father of plaintiffs No.2 and 3 and defendant were not in joint possession of the suit land as tenants. Defendant claimed that suit land was in possession of the defendant exclusively throughout and as such, Sh.Garja Ram and Baja Ram at the time of sanction of mutation No.74, gave their consent to record the possession of the defendant qua remaining land as tenant under the land owner and now the defendant has become owner of the suit land after coming into the force the operation of H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act. Defendant further contended that the revenue entries have been corrected on the basis of the tenancy and possession of the defendant, therefore, there is no question of changing the revenue entries in the name of the plaintiffs. The defendant specifically denied the possession of the plaintiffs as joint tenants, rather defendant raised preliminary objection No.4 stating therein that the plaintiffs have relinquished their share in favour of the defendant at the time of mutation No.74 in the presence and with the consent of the land owners because out of land measuring 10.11 bighas, 1.10 bighas of land was resumed by land owner and the remaining land was given as non-occupancy tenant to the defendant. In the aforesaid background, defendant refuted the claim of the plaintiffs by stating that the plaintiffs have no right to get the revenue entries declared as null and void, especially in view of the mutation No.74, the plaintiffs are not in possession of any portion of the suit land. In the aforesaid background, defendant refuted the claim of the plaintiffs by stating that the plaintiffs have no right to get the revenue entries declared as null and void, especially in view of the mutation No.74, the plaintiffs are not in possession of any portion of the suit land. Defendant also raised objection with regard to jurisdiction of the Civil Court to decide the controversy at hand. 4. By way of replication, the plaintiffs have reasserted and reaffirmed the allegations/averments contained in the plaint and denied the allegations contained in the written statement. 5. On the pleadings of the parties, the learned trial Court framed the following issues:- “1. Whether the suit property is in possession of the defendant as tenant is wrong void and illegal as alleged? If so its effect? OPP. 2. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief of injunction as prayed for? OPP. 3. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief of joint possession of the suit land in the alternative, as alleged? OPP. 4. Whether this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the suit as alleged? OPD. 5. Whether the suit is barred by limitation, as alleged? OPD. 6. Whether the act and conduct of the plaintiffs are bar to the present suit, as alleged? OPD. 7. Whether the plaintiffs have relinquished share of their tenancy in the suit land in favour of the defendants as alleged, if so, its effect? OPD. 8. Relief:- 6. The learned trial Court on the basis of the evidence adduced on record by the respective parties, decided issues No.1 to 3 in favour of the plaintiffs and issues No.4 to 7 were answered in negative. The learned trial Court vide impugned judgment and decree dated 6.6.2002, decreed the suit of the plaintiffs by holding that the suit property is joint tenancy of plaintiffs along with defendant and plaintiffs are entitled for permanent injunction. The learned trial Court also held plaintiffs entitled for the joint possession of the suit land. 7. The learned trial Court vide impugned judgment and decree dated 6.6.2002, decreed the suit of the plaintiffs by holding that the suit property is joint tenancy of plaintiffs along with defendant and plaintiffs are entitled for permanent injunction. The learned trial Court also held plaintiffs entitled for the joint possession of the suit land. 7. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment passed by learned trial Court, appellant/defendant filed an appeal under Section 96 CPC in the Court of leaned District Judge, Bilaspur, H.P by way of Civil Appeal No.78 of 2002, however fact remains that learned District Judge on the appraisal of the record made available to him upheld the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court and dismissed the appeal preferred by the present appellant/defendant. Hence, the present appeal before this Court. 8. This Regular Second Appeal was admitted on the following substantial questions of law:- “(1) Whether the findings of the learned Courts below is vitiated for non-consideration of the evidence led pursuant to allowing of the application under Section 65 of the Indian Evidence Act by the learned trial Court on 13.3.2001? 2. Whether the learned Courts below erred in concluding that the relinquishment made by the respondent-plaintiff in favour of the defendant-appellant was of no value since it was not registered ignoring the provisions of Section 38 of the Himachal Pradesh Land Revenue Act, 1954 read with provisions of Para 8.38 B and Para 8.1(V) of the Himachal Records Manual? 3. Whether the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the present suit? 9. At this stage, it may also be noticed that by way of CMP No.975 of 2006 filed under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC, applicant/appellant prayed for leading additional evidence in the matter. But this Court vide order dated 20.7.2007 ordered that the application would be considered at the time of hearing of the main matter. 10. Mr. Vijay Chaudhary, learned counsel representing the appellant vehemently argued that the impugned judgment passed by both the Courts below are not sustainable as the same are not based upon the correct appreciation of the evidence available on record. 10. Mr. Vijay Chaudhary, learned counsel representing the appellant vehemently argued that the impugned judgment passed by both the Courts below are not sustainable as the same are not based upon the correct appreciation of the evidence available on record. He contended that bare perusal of the judgment passed by both the Courts below suggest that Courts below have fallen in grave error while appreciating the evidence on record because close scrutiny of the impugned judgment and decree, suggest that the evidence adduced on record by the appellant-defendant was not read in its right perspective, rather entire judgment is based upon the surmises, hypothesis and conjectures. He further contended that the learned trial Court below have erred in not taking into consideration the controversy on tenancy while deciding the suit because admittedly defendant Tulsi Ram was in exclusive possession of the property earlier to 1971-72 and thereafter, after coming into force the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act (in short ‘Act’), the owner Sh. Kranti Kumar had moved an application for the resumption of land to the extent of 1.10 bighas in favour of the owner and remaining land was entered in the name of defendant Tulsi Ram. 11. Mr. Chaudhary, learned counsel further contended that the record qua attesting of mutation No.74 was repeatedly summoned and same could not be traced out and as such, an application under Section 65 of the Indian Evidence Act was moved for leading secondary evidence and on the basis of the evidence, the learned trial Court was pleased to accept the same. During the proceedings of the application under Section 65 of the Act, land owner made categorical statement while appearing as AW-2 on 24th April, 2000 stating therein that Sh. Tulsi Ram was in possession being non-occupancy tenant and out of which half of land was resumed in 1975-76 by moving an application before the then Land Reforms Officer and Land Reforms Officer conducted the proceedings after visiting the spot and land was resumed and tatima was also prepared. Mr. Chaudhary, further contended that learned trial Court after taking into consideration the statement of one Ved Parkash son of Sh. Tulsi Ram being AW-1 and Sh. Mr. Chaudhary, further contended that learned trial Court after taking into consideration the statement of one Ved Parkash son of Sh. Tulsi Ram being AW-1 and Sh. Kranti Kumar AW-2 in the proceedings of secondary evidence had been pleased to allow the application in favour of the defendant-appellant Tulsi Ram and in those proceedings, neither evidence in rebuttal was led by the plaintiffs nor further proceedings were taken before any Higher Authorities/Courts by the plaintiffs and as such, Courts below have fallen in grave error while not appreciating the categorical statement made by AW-2 on 24th April, 2000 with regard to attestation of mutation No.74. He further contended that apart from above, Rojnamcha which was entered at the spot in the year, 1972-73 clearly reveals that the plaintiffs themselves had given statement that land under tenancy should be entered in the name of defendant Tulsi Ram and as such, they had relinquished their tenancy rights in favour of defendant in the presence of witnesses. He forcibly contended that since it stood proved on record that the plaintiffs as well as the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs had relinquished their rights in the land in dispute from the beginning. Mr. Chaudhary, further contended that perusal of the plaint suggest that the suit was totally time barred because admittedly change, if any, in jamabandi (Ex.D-1)for the year, 1983-84 was made in favour 1983-84, whereas suit was filed in the year, 1995 and as such, suit ought to have been dismissed on the ground of limitation. 12. With a view to substantiate his aforesaid arguments, Mr. Chaudhary, invited the attention of the Court to Ex.D-1, Ex.D-2 and Ex.D-3, wherein defendant Tulsi Ram had been recorded as non occupancy tenant on payment of Galla Batie (rent). He also invited the attention of this Court to Ex.A-1 and Ex.A-2 annexed with the application bearing CMP No.975 of 2006 for leading additional evidence to suggest that mutation was sanctioned as per the application No.52, dated 7.5.1976 moved before the Land Reforms Officer, Bilaspur, wherein plaintiffs relinquished their tenancy rights in favour of the defendant. He also invited the attention of this Court to Ex.A-1 and Ex.A-2 annexed with the application bearing CMP No.975 of 2006 for leading additional evidence to suggest that mutation was sanctioned as per the application No.52, dated 7.5.1976 moved before the Land Reforms Officer, Bilaspur, wherein plaintiffs relinquished their tenancy rights in favour of the defendant. Mr.Chaudhary, further contended that learned Courts below wrongly came to the conclusion that no credible evidence has been led on record by the defendant to show that how mutation was attested in the year 1981 and on what basis this mutation was attested and the change made in the revenue record because entries, if any, in the revenue record were changed pursuant to the statement made by the plaintiffs before the Land Reforms Officer, as clearly emerge from Annexure A-1 and A-2 filed along with the application for leading additional evidence. Mr. Chaudhary, forcibly contended that learned Courts below have fallen in grave error while concluding that the suit was not barred by limitation because it stands duly proved on record that mutation in favour of Tulsi Ram was attested vide mutation No.122 on 23.9.1981 pursuant to orders of the Land Revenue Officer on 7.5.1976 as per column No.13 and land was resumed in favour of defendant No.2, Kranti Kumar. It is contended on behalf of the appellant that since order of resumption was not challenged at the time of passing of order dated 7.5.1976 whereby while resuming the land in favour of original owner Kranti Kumar, defendant was recorded as sole tenant qua the land under tenancy, no suit, if any, at belated stage could be entertained by the Courts below in terms of Section 100 of the Limitation Act, which provide for institution of suit, if any, within a period of one year from the date of passing of the order by the competent authority. He further stated that until and unless the order passed by the competent authority was not assailed or set-aside, plaintiffs had no right whatsoever, to claim joint tenancy by way of filing present suit. 13. Mr. Chaudhary learned counsel for the appellant-defendant while praying for quashment and setting aside of the judgment passed by the both the Courts forcibly contended that the learned lower appellate Court has fallen in grave error while concluding that one tenant could not relinquish his tenancy in favour of the other tenant. 13. Mr. Chaudhary learned counsel for the appellant-defendant while praying for quashment and setting aside of the judgment passed by the both the Courts forcibly contended that the learned lower appellate Court has fallen in grave error while concluding that one tenant could not relinquish his tenancy in favour of the other tenant. In the aforesaid background, Mr. Chaudhary, prayed that application bearing CMP No.975/2006 may be allowed and documents annexed with the same may be taken in evidence, which may clinch entire controversy at hand. As per Mr. Chaudhary, bare perusal of Annexure A-1 and Annexure A-2 annexed with the aforesaid application, clearly suggest that mutation No.74 was effected by the land Reforms Officer at the time of making order of resumption of land in favour of original owner Kranti Kumar and Patwari, patwar circle Dhoun Kothi, Tehsil Sadar, District Bilaspur, H.P. had recorded the statement of plaintiffs, wherein they themselves stated that the land in question is being cultivated by defendant Tulsi Ram and as such, his name may be recorded in the cultivation and they will have no objection qua the same. 14. Mr. Ajay Kumar Sood, learned Senior Advocate duly assisted by Mr. Dheeraj Vashishat, Advocate, supported the judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below. Mr. Sood, vehemently argued that bare perusal of the impugned judgment and decree passed by both the Courts below, suggest that Courts below have dealt with each and every aspect of the matter very meticulously and as such impugned judgment and decree passed by the Courts below calls for no interference, whatsoever, of this Court in the present facts and circumstances of the case. He further contended that this Court has very limited power to re-appreciate the evidence when both the Courts below have returned concurrent findings on the facts as well as law. In this regard, to substantiate the aforesaid plea, he placed reliance upon the judgment passed by Hon’ble Apex Court in Laxmidevamma and Others Vs. Ranganath and Others, (2015) 4 SCC 264 . 15. Apart from above, Mr. In this regard, to substantiate the aforesaid plea, he placed reliance upon the judgment passed by Hon’ble Apex Court in Laxmidevamma and Others Vs. Ranganath and Others, (2015) 4 SCC 264 . 15. Apart from above, Mr. Sood, strenuously argued that there is no illegality and infirmity in the impugned judgment passed by both the Courts below as bare perusal of the evidence led on record, clearly suggest that the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs and defendant were in joint possession of the suit land from very beginning and at no point of time plaintiffs relinquished their tenancy rights in favour of the defendant. With a view, to substantiate his aforesaid arguments, he invited the attention of this Court to Ex. P-2, copy of ‘Misal Haquiat Bandobast Jadid’ for the year, 1971-72, wherein land measuring 10.11 bighas having its present khasra No.7 is entered in the name of Devi Ram and Rattan Lal as owners and in possession column, Sh. Tulsi Ram, defendant Baja Ram, father of plaintiffs No. 2 and 3 and Sh. Gopala Ram, plaintiff No.1 have been recorded as ‘Gair Marusi’ on payment of 1/4th Galla Bati. He stated that Ex.P-2 has been prepared during the regular settlement operation held in the area of the parties to the suit and they have been rightly recorded in possession in the revenue papers in the joint possession of the tenancy. He invited the attention of this Court to Ex.P-1,copy of jamabandi for the year, 1983-84, wherein defendant Tulsi Ram has been shown as non- occupancy tenancy on payment of 1/4th share of the produce qua the suit land measuring 7.11 bighas, khasra No.59/7. He further argued that perusal of evidence adduced on record by the respective parties especially defendant, nowhere suggest that defendant at any point of time was able to convince the Courts below that on what basis the names of the plaintiffs were deleted as joint non-occupancy tenant along with defendant while attesting the mutation. He forcibly contended that bare perusal of Ex.P-2 to Ex.P-9, clearly suggest that plaintiffs along with defendant had been entered as ‘Gair Marusi’ on payment of Galla Batai. Mr. He forcibly contended that bare perusal of Ex.P-2 to Ex.P-9, clearly suggest that plaintiffs along with defendant had been entered as ‘Gair Marusi’ on payment of Galla Batai. Mr. Sood, made this Court to travel through the impugned judgment passed by the learned trial Court, wherein learned trial Court specifically concluded that at no point of time assertion with regard to attestation of mutation No.74 could be proved by the defendant by leading cogent and convincing evidence and as such, Mr. Sood forcibly contended that since defendant was unable to prove on record by leading cogent and convincing evidence that mutation No.74 was effected in accordance with law at that relevant time, no illegality and infirmity in the judgment passed by both the Courts can be found. He further contended that at no point of time defendant made record available pertaining to the mutation No.74, wherein Land Reforms Officer allegedly entered mutation No.74 on the basis of the statements allegedly given by the plaintiffs. Mr. Sood, while making prayer to reject the application filed on behalf of the appellant/applicant for leading additional evidence under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC stated that no application, if any, at this belated stage can be allowed to defeat the mandate of the Courts below, which is apparently based upon the correct appreciation of the evidence as well as law. Mr. Sood, while concluding his arguments, prayed for dismissal of the present appeal as well as application for leading additional evidence by stating that in terms of Section 31 of H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972, no tenancy could be relinquished by the tenant in favour of the tenant or land owners and as such, production, if any, of the documents annexed with the application filed by the appellant/applicant for leading additional evidence is of no consequence and same cannot be allowed to be relied upon at the stage of second appeal that too after loosing in two Courts below. 16. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record of the case. 17. 16. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record of the case. 17. Since, this Court while entertaining the application bearing CMP No. 975/2006 had ordered vide order dated 20.7.2007 that application for leading additional evidence would be considered at the time of hearing the main appeal, it would be appropriate in the interest of justice, if the same is taken for consideration at first instance before adverting to the merits of the case. 18. By way of aforesaid application filed under Order 41 Rule 27 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure for placing on record documents i.e. certified copy of mutation No.74, decided on 23.9.1981 and certified copy of Rapat Roznamcha for the year, 1972-73 and for permission to lead additional evidence to prove on record the aforesaid documents. In the instant application, applicant/appellant have stated that during the pendency of the litigation, revenue record, whereby proprietary rights were conferred vide mutation No.74 by the then Land Reforms Officer and Rapat Rojnamcha, whereby the plaintiffs had abandoned their rights to tenancy could not be led in evidence. Applicant/appellant further stated that they had moved an application under Section 65 of the Indian Evidence Act for grant of permission to lead the secondary evidence relating to the documents and learned trial Court vide order dated 13th March, 2001 recorded the evidence of both the parties, which was accepted by the learned trial Court after recording the evidence of both the parties. Perusal of the application referred above, suggest that since secondary evidence led on record by the defendant pursuant to order dated 13th March, 2001 was not held sufficient by the Courts below while considering the plea of the defendant with regard to mutation No.74 as well as relinquishment of tenancy in favour of the defendant by the plaintiff, the applicant/appellant intended to place on record certified copies of mutation No.74 as well as Rapat Roznamcha in the shape of Annexure A-1 and A-2 annexed along with application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC. The applicant/appellant also stated that aforesaid documents earlier could not be filed by them despite due diligence. 19. The applicant/appellant also stated that aforesaid documents earlier could not be filed by them despite due diligence. 19. Non-applicant by way of reply, opposed the prayer having been made on behalf of the applicant/appellant for placing on record additional evidence by stating that entire issue on which alleged additional evidence is sought to be led has been dealt with by the learned trial Court in para 14 and 15 of its judgment and as such, there is no requirement for placing on record the aforesaid documents. Non-applicant also stated that the defence taken by the appellant/applicant was false and baseless and the learned Courts below have already rendered their findings on the issue of revenue entries i.e. mutation No.74. Non-applicant further stated that purpose of the application is to fill lacunas in the case and there is complete lack of diligence on the part of the applicant/appellant and as such, present application deserve to be dismissed in terms of clause (aa) of sub rule 1 of Rule 27 of Order 41 C.P.C. 20. In the aforesaid background, non-applicant sought dismissal of the application being wrong, false and baseless. Non-applicant/defendant further stated that present application is an attempt on the part of the appellant/applicant to reopen the case. Non-applicant/defendant further stated that when the very basis of the suit was that the revenue entries recorded in favour of Sh. Tulsi Ram, predecessor-in-interest of the appellant/applicant as exclusive tenant are wrong, illegal null and void and the plaintiffs are not bound by such fictitious, fraudulent and illegal entries prepared in collusion with the revenue officers, applicant/appellant ought to have placed on record revenue record, if any, at the time of filing of written statement. Non-applicant further stated that since both the Courts below after appreciation of evidence have rendered their findings on the issue, now under the garb of this application the applicant/appellant cannot be allowed to set at naught the findings of the learned Courts below and as such, documents are neither relevant nor necessary for determination of the case and as such, application deserve to be dismissed with costs. 21. Learned counsel for the applicant/appellant placed reliance upon the judgment in case Wadi versus Amilal and others (2015) 1 SCC 677 , wherein it was held as under:- “5. Now it is clear that Rule 27 deals with production of additional evidence in the appellate Court. 21. Learned counsel for the applicant/appellant placed reliance upon the judgment in case Wadi versus Amilal and others (2015) 1 SCC 677 , wherein it was held as under:- “5. Now it is clear that Rule 27 deals with production of additional evidence in the appellate Court. The general principle incorporated in Sub-rule (1) is that the parties to an appeal are not entitled to produce additional evidence (oral or documentary) in the appellate Court to cure a lacuna or fill up a gap in a case. The exceptions to that principle are enumerated there under in Clauses (a), (aa) and (b). We are concerned here with Clause (b) which is an enabling provision. It says that if the appellate Court requires any document to be produced or any witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce judgment, it may allow such document to be produced or witness to be examined. The requirement or need is that of the appellate Court bearing in mind that the interest of justice is paramount. If it feels that pronouncing a judgment in the absence of such evidence would result in a defective decision and to pronounce an effective judgment admission of such evidence is necessary, Clause (b) enables it to adopt that course. Invocation of Clause (b) does not depend upon the vigilance or negligence of the parties for it is not meant for them. It is for the appellant to resort to it when on a consideration of material on record it feels that admission of additional evidence is necessary to pronounce a satisfactory judgment in the case.” 22 In State of Karnataka and another versus K.C. Subramanya and others 2014 (13) SCC 468 . The relevant paras No.4 and 5 of the judgment is reproduced as under:- “4. However, we do not feel impressed with this argument and deem it fit to reject it in view of Order 41 Rule 27(1) (aa) which clearly states as follows: “27(1)(a) ......... (aa) the party seeking to produce additional evidence, establishes that notwithstanding the exercise of due diligence, such evidence was not within his knowledge or could not, after the exercise of due diligence, be produced by him at the time when the decree appealed against was passed, or (b) .......... (aa) the party seeking to produce additional evidence, establishes that notwithstanding the exercise of due diligence, such evidence was not within his knowledge or could not, after the exercise of due diligence, be produced by him at the time when the decree appealed against was passed, or (b) .......... On perusal of this provision, it is unambiguously clear that the party can seek liberty to produce additional evidence at the appellate stage, but the same can be permitted only if the evidence sought to be produced could not be produced at the stage of trial in spite of exercise of due diligence and that the evidence could not be produced as it was not within his knowledge and hence was fit to be produced by the appellant before the appellate forum. 5. It is thus clear that there are conditions precedent before allowing a party to adduce additional evidence at the stage of appeal, which specifically incorporates conditions to the effect that the party in spite of due diligence could not produce the evidence and the same cannot be allowed to be done at his leisure or sweet will”. 23. In this regard, reliance has also been placed upon the judgment in case Union of India versus Ibrahim Uddin and another 2012 (8) SCC 148 . The relevant para No.36 to 49 of the judgment is reproduce as under:- Order XLI Rule 27 C.P.C. “36. The general principle is that the Appellate Court should not travel outside the record of the lower Court and cannot take any evidence in appeal. However, as an exception, Order XLI Rule 27 CPC enables the Appellate Court to take additional evidence in exceptional circumstances. The Appellate Court may permit additional evidence only and only if the conditions laid down in this rule are found to exist. The parties are not entitled, as of right, to the admission of such evidence. Thus, provision does not apply, when on the basis of evidence on record, the Appellate Court can pronounce a satisfactory judgment. The matter is entirely within the discretion of the Court and is to be used sparingly. Such a discretion is only a judicial discretion circumscribed by the limitation specified in the rule itself. Thus, provision does not apply, when on the basis of evidence on record, the Appellate Court can pronounce a satisfactory judgment. The matter is entirely within the discretion of the Court and is to be used sparingly. Such a discretion is only a judicial discretion circumscribed by the limitation specified in the rule itself. (Vide: K. Venkataramiah v. A. Seetharama Reddy & Ors., AIR 1963 SC 1526 ; The Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Lala Pancham & Ors., AIR 1965 SC 1008 ; Soonda Ram & Anr. v. Rameshwaralal & Anr., AIR 1975 SC 479 ; and Syed Abdul Khader v. Rami Reddy & Ors., AIR 1979 SC 553 ). 37. The Appellate Court should not, ordinarily allow new evidence to be adduced in order to enable a party to raise a new point in appeal. Similarly, where a party on whom the onus of proving a certain point lies fails to discharge the onus, he is not entitled to a fresh opportunity to produce evidence, as the Court can, in such a case, pronounce judgment against him and does not require any additional evidence to enable it to pronounce judgment. (Vide: Haji Mohammed Ishaq v. Mohamed Iqbal and Mohamed Ali and Co., AIR 1978 SC 798 ). 38. Under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC, the appellate Court has the power to allow a document to be produced and a witness to be examined. But the requirement of the said Court must be limited to those cases where it found it necessary to obtain such evidence for enabling it to pronounce judgment. This provision does not entitle the appellate Court to let in fresh evidence at the appellate stage where even without such evidence it can pronounce judgment in a case. It does not entitle the appellate Court to let in fresh evidence only for the purpose of pronouncing judgment in a particular way. In other words, it is only for removing a lacuna in the evidence that the appellate Court is empowered to admit additional evidence. [Vide: Lala Pancham & Ors. (supra)]. 39. It is not the business of the Appellate Court to supplement the evidence adduced by one party or the other in the lower Court. In other words, it is only for removing a lacuna in the evidence that the appellate Court is empowered to admit additional evidence. [Vide: Lala Pancham & Ors. (supra)]. 39. It is not the business of the Appellate Court to supplement the evidence adduced by one party or the other in the lower Court. Hence, in the absence of satisfactory reasons for the non-production of the evidence in the trial Court, additional evidence should not be admitted in appeal as a party guilty of remissness in the lower Court is not entitled to the indulgence of being allowed to give further evidence under this rule. So a party who had ample opportunity to produce certain evidence in the lower Court but failed to do so or elected not to do so, cannot have it admitted in appeal. (Vide: State of U.P. v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava, AIR 1957 SC 912 and S. Rajagopal v. C.M. Armugam & Ors., AIR 1969 SC 101 ). 40. The inadvertence of the party or his inability to understand the legal issues involved or the wrong advice of a pleader or the negligence of a pleader or that the party did not realize the importance of a document does not constitute a "substantial cause" within the meaning of this rule. The mere fact that certain evidence is important, is not in itself a sufficient ground for admitting that evidence in appeal. 41. The words "for any other substantial cause" must be read with the word "requires" in the beginning of sentence, so that it is only where, for any other substantial cause, the Appellate Court requires additional evidence, that this rule will apply, e.g., when evidence has been taken by the lower Court so imperfectly that the Appellate Court cannot pass a satisfactory judgment. 42. Whenever the appellate Court admits additional evidence it should record its reasons for doing so. (Sub-rule 2). It is a salutary provision which operates as a check against a too easy reception of evidence at a late stage of litigation and the statement of reasons may inspire confidence and disarm objection. Another reason of this requirement is that, where a further appeal lies from the decision, the record of reasons will be useful and necessary for the Court of further appeal to see, if the discretion under this rule has been properly exercised by the Court below. Another reason of this requirement is that, where a further appeal lies from the decision, the record of reasons will be useful and necessary for the Court of further appeal to see, if the discretion under this rule has been properly exercised by the Court below. The omission to record the reasons must, therefore, be treated as a serious defect. But this provision is only directory and not mandatory, if the reception of such evidence can be justified under the rule. 43. The reasons need not be recorded in a separate order provided they are embodied in the judgment of the appellate Court. A mere reference to the peculiar circumstances of the case, or mere statement that the evidence is necessary to pronounce judgment, or that the additional evidence is required to be admitted in the interests of justice, or that there is no reason to reject the prayer for the admission of the additional evidence, is not enough comp1iance with the requirement as to recording of reasons. 44. It is a settled legal proposition that not only administrative order, but also judicial order must be supported by reasons, recorded in it. Thus, while deciding an issue, the Court is bound to give reasons for its conclusion. It is the duty and obligation on the part of the Court to record reasons while disposing of the case. The hallmark of order and exercise of judicial power by a judicial forum is for the forum to disclose its reasons by itself and giving of reasons has always been insisted upon as one of the fundamentals of sound administration of the justice–delivery system, to make it known that there had been proper and due application of mind to the issue before the Court and also as an essential requisite of the principles of natural justice. The reason is the heartbeat of every conclusion. It introduces clarity in an order and without the same, the order becomes lifeless. Reasons substitute subjectivity with objectivity. The absence of reasons renders an order indefensible/unsustainable particularly when the order is subject to further challenge before a higher forum. Recording of reasons is principle of natural justice and every judicial order must be supported by reasons recorded in writing. It ensures transparency and fairness in decision making. The person who is adversely affected must know why his application has been rejected. Recording of reasons is principle of natural justice and every judicial order must be supported by reasons recorded in writing. It ensures transparency and fairness in decision making. The person who is adversely affected must know why his application has been rejected. (Vide: State of Orissa v. Dhaniram Luhar, AIR 2004 SC 1794 ; State of Uttaranchal v. Sunil Kumar Singh Negi, 2008 (11) SCC 205 ; Victoria Memorial Hall v. Howrah Ganatantrik Nagrik Samity, AIR 2010 SC 1285 and Sant Lal Gupta v. Modern Cooperative Group Housing Society Limited, (2010) 13 SCC 336 ). 45. In City Improvement Trust Board v. H. Narayanaiah AIR 1976 SC 2403 , while dealing with the issue, a three judge Bench of this Court held as under: “28. We are of the opinion that the High Court should have recorded its reasons to show why it found the admission of such evidence to be necessary for some substantial reason. And if it found it necessary to admit it an opportunity should have been given to the appellant to rebut any inference arising from its insistence by leading other evidence.” (Emphasis added) A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Basayya I. Mathad v. Rudrayya S. Mathad (2008) 3 SCC 120 . 46. A Constitution Bench of this Court in K. Venkataramiah (Supra), while dealing with the same issue held: (AIR p.1529, para 13) “13. It is very much to be desired that the Courts of appeal should not overlook the provisions of cl. (2) of the Rule and should record their reasons for admitting additional evidence….. The omission to record reason must, therefore, be treated as a serious defect. Even so, we are unable to persuade ourselves that this provision is mandatory.” (Emphasis added) In the said case, the Court after examining the record of the case came to the conclusion that the appeal was heard for a long time and the application for taking additional evidence on record was filed during the final hearing of the appeal. In such a fact-situation, the order allowing such application did not vitiate for want of reasons. 47. In such a fact-situation, the order allowing such application did not vitiate for want of reasons. 47. Where the additional evidence sought to be adduced removes the cloud of doubt over the case and the evidence has a direct and important bearing on the main issue in the suit and interest of justice clearly renders it imperative that it may be allowed to be permitted on record such application may be allowed. 48. To sum up on the issue, it may be held that an application for taking additional evidence on record at a belated stage cannot be filed as a matter of right. The Court can consider such an application with circumspection, provided it is covered under either of the prerequisite condition incorporated in the statutory provisions itself. The discretion is to be exercised by the Court judicially taking into consideration the relevance of the document in respect of the issues involved in the case and the circumstances under which such an evidence could not be led in the Court below and as to whether the applicant had prosecuted his case before the Court below diligently and as to whether such evidence is required to pronounce the judgment by the appellate Court. In case the Court comes to the conclusion that the application filed comes within the four corners of the statutory provisions itself, the evidence may be taken on record, however, the Court must record reasons as on what basis such an application has been allowed. However, the application should not be moved at a belated stage. Stage of Consideration: 49. An application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC is to be considered at the time of hearing of appeal on merits so as to find whether the documents and/or the evidence sought to be adduced have any relevance/bearing on the issues involved. The admissibility of additional evidence does not depend upon the relevancy to the issue on hand, or on the fact, whether the applicant had an opportunity for adducing such evidence at an earlier stage or not, but it depends upon whether or not the Appellate Court requires the evidence sought to be adduced to enable it to pronounce judgment or for any other substantial cause. The true test, therefore is, whether the Appellate Court is able to pronounce judgment on the materials before it without taking into consideration the additional evidence sought to be adduced. The true test, therefore is, whether the Appellate Court is able to pronounce judgment on the materials before it without taking into consideration the additional evidence sought to be adduced. Such occasion would arise only if on examining the evidence as it stands the Court comes to the conclusion that some inherent lacuna or defect becomes apparent to the Court. (Vide: Arjan Singh v. Kartar Singh & Ors., AIR 1951 SC 193 and Natha Singh & Ors. v. The Financial Commissioner, Taxation, Punjab & Ors., AIR 1976 SC 1053 )”. 24. Perusal of aforesaid averments contained in the application referred hereinabove, clearly suggest that the applicant/appellant has prayed for placing on record Annexure A-1 and Annexure A-2 to demonstrate that plaintiffs had relinquished their tenancy in favour of the defendant namely Tulsi Ram. Before adverting to the merits of the aforesaid application, it would be appropriate to refer Section 31 of the H.P. Land Reforms Act, which deals with relinquishment:- Section 31: Relinquishment:-No relinquishment of a tenancy shall be made by a tenant in favour of landlord. However, if a tenant wants to make a voluntary surrender of his tenancy land, the same shall be in favour of the State Government. The State Government shall have right to induct any suitable tenant or landless agricultural labourer to the relinquished land in the manner to be prescribed. 25. Bare perusal of the aforesaid provisions of law, clearly suggest that no tenancy can be relinquished by a tenant in favour of the landowner. This aforesaid provisions also provides that if tenant wants to make a voluntary surrender of his tenancy land, the same can be made in favour of the State Government and thereafter State Government would have right to induct any suitable tenant or landless agricultural labourer to the relinquished land in the manner to be prescribed. 26. Close scrutiny of aforesaid provisions of law, clearly suggest that tenancy, if any, can only be relinquished in favour of the Government not in favour of any person. Though, at first glance perusal of aforesaid suggest that no relinquishment of tenancy can be made by a tenant in favour of the landowner but perusal of the second part of the aforesaid provision of law clearly suggest that tenancy, if any, can only be surrendered in favour of the State Government, meaning thereby, tenant cannot surrender tenancy in favour of co-tenant/joint tenant. This Court after perusing the aforesaid provision of law of Section 31 of the Act, as reproduced hereinabove, is fully satisfied that no tenancy can be relinquished in favour of any person other than State Government and as such, this Court sees no reason to disagree with the concurrent findings returned by the trial Court that tenant could not relinquish tenancy in favour of other tenant. In view of above, this Court sees no reason to allow the application for leading additional evidence for placing on record Annexure A-1 and Annexure A-2, whereby allegedly plaintiffs, who were admittedly joint tenant along with defendant, relinquished their tenancy in favour of the defendant Tulsi Ram. 27. Since there was specific bar contained under Section 31 of the Act as referred above, plaintiff being joint tenant could not have relinquished tenancy in favour of the defendant, who happened to be joint tenant along with the plaintiffs and as such, no benefit, if any, can be taken by the applicant/appellant by placing on record aforesaid documents to substantiate his claim that tenancy was relinquished by the plaintiff at the time of attestation of mutation No.74. Since this Court is of the view that documents intended to be placed on record has no relevance in terms of section 31 of the Act, the judgments as referred hereinabove by the learned counsel for the appellant/applicant are not applicable in the present facts and circumstance of the present Case. Accordingly, the present application is dismissed. 28. Now, this Court would proceed to decide the substantial questions of law referred hereinabove. 29. Perusal of substantial question No.1 of law, whereby this Court is under obligation to decide “whether the findings of the learned Courts below is vitiated for non consideration of the evidence led pursuant to allowing of the application under Section 65 of the Indian Evidence Act by learned trial Court on 13th March, 2001”, clearly suggest that this question requires no more consideration, especially in view of Section 31 of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, which deals with relinquishment of tenancy. As clearly emerge from the pleadings as well as impugned judgment that the appellant/defendant by way of application moved under Section 65 of the Indian Evidence Act had intended to lead secondary evidence to prove that at the time of attestation of mutation No.74, plaintiffs abandoned their tenancy rights in favour of defendant Sh.Tulsi Ram. Though, learned trial Court had allowed to lead secondary evidence after allowing the aforesaid application but being not satisfied and convinced with the secondary evidence led on record had rejected the plea of abandonment of tenancy raised by the defendant. But now this Court after perusing Section 31 of the Act, which has been elaborately dealt with by this Court while considering the application for leading additional evidence, is fully convinced that plaintiff being joint tenant had no right whatsoever, to relinquish/ surrender tenancy in favour of the any person other than State Government. In the instant case, since defendant while leading secondary evidence in terms of Section 65 of the Indian Evidence Act had only intended to prove the attestation of mutation No.74 to demonstrate that plaintiffs had relinquished tenancy in favour of the defendant, no illegality and infirmity, if any, can be found with the judgment passed by both the Courts below while dealing with the secondary evidence led on record, especially in view of Section 31 of the Act, wherein relinquishment of tenancy by a tenant, if any, is completely barred in favour of any person other than State Government. Accordingly, substantial question No.1 is answered accordingly. 30. Similarly, substantial question No.2 of Law also relates to the findings returned by learned Courts below that relinquishment made by the respondent-plaintiff in favour of the defendant-appellant was of no value since it was not registered ignoring the provisions of section 38 of the Himachal Pradesh Land Revenue Act, 1954. In view of the detailed discussion made hereinabove, with regard to relinquishment, if any, by the tenant in terms of Section 31 of the Act, aforesaid question needs no more discussion, especially when this Court has come to the conclusion that tenant/joint tenant has no power to relinquish tenancy in favour of any person other than State Government. In view of the detailed discussion made hereinabove, with regard to relinquishment, if any, by the tenant in terms of Section 31 of the Act, aforesaid question needs no more discussion, especially when this Court has come to the conclusion that tenant/joint tenant has no power to relinquish tenancy in favour of any person other than State Government. Hence, in view of Section 31 of the Act, this Court sees no occasion to see correctness, if any, of findings returned by the Courts below with regard to registration and relinquishment made by the respondent-plaintiff in favour of the defendant-appellant. 31. Now, question which remains to be decided is with regard to jurisdiction of Civil Court to entertain the suit in question. Admittedly, by way of present suit plaintiffs sought declaration and permanent prohibitory injunction and in alternative for joint possession claiming themselves to be joint tenant along with defendant of land measuring 7.11 bighas as per description given hereinabove. Bare perusal of pleadings as well as evidence led on record by the parties, nowhere suggest that dispute, if any, between landlord and tenant was with regard to possession or conferment of proprietary rights in terms of Section 100 of the Land Reforms Act, rather careful perusal of the record as well as evidence adduced on record, suggest that the plaintiffs sought decree for declaration that they along with defendant are in joint possession of the suit land as tenant and revenue entries showing defendant as a sole tenant qua the land in tenancy may be declared null and void and as such, this Court finds it difficult to accept the aforesaid contention that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction. It emerge from the record that learned counsel for the appellant/defendant while raising plea of jurisdiction invited the attention of the learned trial Court to the judgment passed in case Chuhniya Devi versus Jindu Ram RSA No. 338 of 1988; but same cannot be applicable in the present case because there is no dispute between landlord and tenant regarding conferment of proprietary rights as observed above, rather plaintiffs filed suit for declaration claiming themselves to be joint tenant with the defendant and placed on record credible evidence in the shape of jamabandis continuously showing them in joint possession of land under tenancy. By way of present suit plaintiff only sought correction of revenue record, which was allegedly changed by defendant in connivance with the revenue staff, whereby revenue authorities by deleting the name of the plaintiffs entered defendant No.1 as exclusive sole tenant on the tenancy land. Moreover, defendant by way of filing written statement as well as application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC for additional evidence made an attempt to demonstrate that he has acquired the status of owner qua the suit land by way of conferment of proprietary rights in term of section 104 of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972. But interestingly, no evidence be it oral or ocular has been led on record by either of the parties to prove that the suit land in question stand vested in them by virtue of conferment and proprietary rights meaning thereby that at the time of filing of the suit, status of the parties was only of tenant over suit land and as such, this Court sees no force in the contention put forth on behalf of the learned counsel for the appellant/defendant that no suit could be entertained by the Civil Court in terms of specific bar under the H.P. Land Revenue Act. 32. This Court sees no irregularity and infirmity, if any, in the judgments passed by the courts below, rather, same are based upon correct appreciation of the evidence available on record. This Court is fully satisfied that both the courts below have very meticulously dealt with each and every aspect of the matter and there is no scope of interference, whatsoever, in the present matter. Since both the Courts below have returned concurrent findings, which otherwise appear to be based upon proper appreciation of evidence, this Court has very limited jurisdiction/scope to interfere in the matter. In this regard, it would be apt to reproduce the relevant contents of judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in Laxmidevamma and Others vs. Ranganath and Others, (2015) 4 SCC 264 , herein below:- “16. Based on oral and documentary evidence, both the courts below have recorded concurrent findings of fact that plaintiffs have established their right in 'A' schedule property. In the light of concurrent findings of fact, no substantial questions of law arose in the High Court and there was no substantial ground for re-appreciation of evidence. Based on oral and documentary evidence, both the courts below have recorded concurrent findings of fact that plaintiffs have established their right in 'A' schedule property. In the light of concurrent findings of fact, no substantial questions of law arose in the High Court and there was no substantial ground for re-appreciation of evidence. While so, the High Court proceeded to observe that the first plaintiff has earmarked the 'A' schedule property for road and that she could not have full fledged right and on that premise proceeded to hold that declaration to plaintiffs' right cannot be granted. In exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100 C.P.C., concurrent findings of fact cannot be upset by the High Court unless the findings so recorded are shown to be perverse. In our considered view, the High Court did not keep in view that the concurrent findings recorded by the courts below, are based on oral and documentary evidence and the judgment of the High Court cannot be sustained.” 33. Consequently, in view of the discussion made hereinabove, this Court is of the view that the judgments passed by both the Courts below are based on correct appreciation of the evidence, be it ocular or documentary on the record and, as such, present appeal fails and same is accordingly dismissed. Interim directions, if any, are vacated. All miscellaneous applications are disposed of.