JUDGMENT Harsh Kumar, J. – The present appeal has been filed by defendants/appellants against the judgment and decree dated 10.7.1981 passed by Civil Judge, Muzaffarnagar in Civil Appeal No.314 of 1979 (Brijveer Singh and another v. Sukhan and another) arising out of Civil Suit No.375 of 1977 decreed by Munsiff, Muzaffarnagar. 2. The brief facts relating to the appeal are that the plaintiffs/respondents filed Civil Suit No.375 of 1977 in the Court of Munsif, Muzaffarnagar for a decree for redemption of mortgage in respect of the property in suit as well as for delivery of possession over the property in dispute to the plaintiffs after payment of amount involved, against the defendants, with the allegation that the property in suit was mortgaged by Ram Chandra, the father of plaintiff nos.1 to 3 and 5 to 7 and husband of plaintiff no.4 on 20.2.1947 through registered deed of mortgage for securing the payment of money of Rs. 150/- advanced by way of loan; that as per terms of mortgage deed the plaintiffs being heirs of Ram Chandra deceased are entitled to get redemption of property in suit on payment of money advanced as well as on payment of the cost of constructions which were permitted to be raised by the defendants, mortgagees in respect with which it was agreed that at the time of redemption the cost of constructions will be payable by the plaintiffs, the mortgagors to defendants, the mortgagees. 3. The defendant filed written statement with specific averments that Ram Chandra executed a registered mortgage deed for a sum of Rs. 150/- advanced to him, on 20.2.1947 in which mortgagees/defendants were given the right for raising constructions; that the defendants had filed a Civil Suit No.501 of 1975 for permanent prohibitory injunction over the property in suit but it was wrong to say that in that suit he made a statement on oath that he is absolute owner of the property mortgaged and rather he claimed the ownership of the constructions only which were raised by him over the property in suit; that the plaintiffs did not offer or tender any amount under the terms for redemption of mortgage deed, hence they have no cause of action for the suit; that the defendants never objected for the redemption of mortgaged property and have always been ready and willing to redeem the mortgage on payment of Rs. 50,000/- costs of constructions and Rs. 150/- the money advanced in accordance with the terms of mortgage deed. 4. On parties' pleadings, the trial Court framed as many as five issues and after recording the evidence of both parties and hearing the arguments, decreed the suit of plaintiffs for redemption of mortgage property on payment of Rs. 13,101/- (towards costs of construction and money advanced) by the plaintiffs to the defendants. 5. Feeling aggrieved with the amount assessed to be paid on redemption being excessive, the plaintiffs filed Civil Appeal No.314 of 1979 on the ground that the trial Court has fixed the amount excessively and that since the defendants have violated the terms of mortgage deed, the plaintiffs are not liable to pay any amount beyond Rs. 150/-. On the other hand, the defendants though were not aggrieved with the decree of redemption passed by trial Court yet they also preferred Civil Appeal No.330 of 1979 against the impugned decree only on the limited ground that the quantum of amount has been under assessed, towards of costs of constructions, for redemption of mortgaged property with a prayer that the cost of constructions over disputed property must have been valued by the Court at Rs. 15,000/- 6. Both the appeals were decided together by the impugned judgment and decree passed by the Civil Judge, Muzaffarnagar on 10.7.1981 refusing to decrease the amount for redemption assessed by trial court and holding the plaintiffs entitled to redemption of the disputed property on payment of total Rs. 15,150/-, as against Rs. 13,101/- as assessed by trial Court. Consequently the appeal no.330 of 1979 filed by defendants for enhancing the amount from Rs. 13,101/- to Rs. 15,000/- was virtually allowed and the Civil Appeal No.314 of 1979 filed by the plaintiffs for reducing the amount of Rs. 13,101/- was virtually dismissed. 7. Now the defendants have preferred the present second appeal only against the judgment and decree passed in 1st Civil Appeal No.314 of 1979 by Civil Judge, Muzffarnagar on 10.7.1981 and no appeal has been filed by them against the judgment and decree passed in 1st Civil Appeal No.330 of 1979 (which was filed by them defendants). The plaintiffs/respondents have filed cross objections with a prayer that the impugned decree be modified and the suit for redemption of mortgaged property be decreed on payment of Rs. 150/- only. 8. The plaintiffs/respondents have filed cross objections with a prayer that the impugned decree be modified and the suit for redemption of mortgaged property be decreed on payment of Rs. 150/- only. 8. Heard Shri. Arjun Singhal, learned counsel for the appellant and Sri. V. Sahai, learned counsel for the plaintiffs/respondents on the Second Appeal No. 1841 of 1981 as well as cross objections filed by plaintiffs-respondents. 9. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that Civil Suit No.375 of 1977 filed by the respondents was wrongly decreed by the trial Court and the appeal filed by the defendant as well as the plaintiffs-respondents were wrongly decided by the First Appellate Court confirming the part of the decree passed by the trial Court. The appeal was admitted on 4.9.1981 on following two substantial questions of law : - (1) Whether the cost of constructions has to be determined with reference to the date of suit or to the point of time when final decree is being prepared? (2) Whether the price of Malba (debries) has been fixed arbitrarily by the First Appellate Court? 10. The learned counsel for appellants did not advance arguments on any of the two substantial questions of law framed at the time of admission of the second appeal, and submitted that the court can frame some additional substantial questions of law, involved in the second appeal at the time of final hearing, has to dispose off the appeal on such substantial questions of law which are found to be involved, leaving the questions previously framed. He submitted that since the mortgage deed in question dated 20.2.1947 is not in accordance with the provisions of Section 58 of Transfer of Property Act it amounts to a sale deed and the substantial questions of law actually involved in the Second Appeal are (1) whether the impugned mortgage deed is a mortgage deed or is to be treated as sale deed? and (2) Whether the suit of plaintiffs is barred by time? (3) Whether suit of plaintiffs is barred by provisions of Sections 58 and 83 of Transfer of Property Act? 11. and (2) Whether the suit of plaintiffs is barred by time? (3) Whether suit of plaintiffs is barred by provisions of Sections 58 and 83 of Transfer of Property Act? 11. He argued that the period of limitation for filing suit for redemption of mortgage is 30 years from the date of execution of mortgage deed as prescribed under Article 61 of Limitation Act and the suit filed in 1977 after the period of 40 years from the date of execution of mortgage deed is barred by time; that the learned courts below have incorrectly decided the issue of limitation in favour of plaintiffs/respondents; that there were two reports of valuers on record along with another report of Advocate Commissioner but the learned Courts below acted wrongly in relying on the valuation report of architect produced on behalf of plaintiffs-respondents and discarding the valuation report filed on behalf of the defendant on the ground that the valuation report of valuation filed by the architect of appellant was by a duly qualified architect holding degree, while that of the defendant was by only a diploma holder; that the suit is also barred by provisions of Section 83 of Transfer of Property Act as the plaintiffs have not deposited the amount due to redemption of mortgage; that the Courts below have wrongly misread the evidence on record and discarded the evidence of defendant; that the findings recorded at by Courts below are perverse and are liable to be set aside. 12. 12. Per contra learned counsel for plaintiffs/respondents submits that the fact that the impugned deed is a registered mortgage deed has not been disputed, rather has been admitted by defendants, in their pleadings mentioned in the written statement; that the contention that impugned deed amounts to a sale deed has neither been raised before the Courts below at any stage nor even in the grounds of appeal and such an absurd plea may not be permitted to be raised at the stage of final arguments in second appeal claiming it to be a substantial question of law, which is not at all involved in the appeal; that the issue of limitation has been decided by Courts below in favour of the plaintiffs and in fact the above issue was never pressed before the Courts below; that it is wrong to say that the suit is barred by time because of having been filed after more than 30 years from the date of execution of mortgage deed; that the cause of action for filing the suit arose in 1975 and the suit was well within time; that Article 61 of the Limitation Act provides that the limitation, for filing suit by a mortgagor to redeem or recover possession of immovable property mortgaged will be 30 years, which shall commence from the date "when the right to redeem or to recover possession accrues" that the evidence on record with regard to costs of constructions over the property has been correctly analysed by the Courts below and the learned Courts below have not committed any mistake in analysing and assessing the evidence and relying on the valuation report submitted on behalf of the plaintiffs; that the report of valuation submitted on behalf of the plaintiffs has been prepared by duly qualified architect and has been duly proved by his statement on oath of Shiv Kumar Mittal as P.W.-2; that it is wrong to say that the findings of Courts below with regard to valuation of the property are arbitrary or suffer from any manifest error or perversity; that it is wrong to say that the suit of plaintiffs was barred by provisions of Section 58 or 83 of the Transfer of Property Act; that the appeal has been admitted on two questions framed at the time of admission of appeal regarding the point of time on which the assessment of the costs of constructions and price Malba ( debries) is to be made, but the defendants/appellants have neither pressed nor addressed the court on above points rather have raised several new substantial questions of law which are not at all involved in the above second appeal; that on the point of limitation, issue no.4 was framed by the trial Court which was not pressed by the defendants before the trial Court or in the first appeal and the appellants have no right to raise it for the first time in second appeal; that it is wrong to say that the suit is barred by time; that the suit is well within time from the date when cause of action for filing suit arose in 1975; that the defendant/appellants have admitted the execution of mortgage deed and have neither pleaded nor can claim at the stage of second appeal that the above deed of mortgage amounts to a sale deed; that in this appeal no substantial question of law is involved and the questions so framed or raised on behalf of the defendants/appellants are not at all involved in the appeal; that the substantial questions of law framed earlier are actually the factual issues which have been pressed as substantial questions of law and so have not been pressed by and on behalf of the appellants; that the appeal has been filed on false and baseless ground to harm and harass the plaintiffs-respondents and is liable to be dismissed with costs. 13. Upon hearing the parties' counsel and perusal of record, I find that the arguments advanced by and on behalf of the appellants, have been advanced without considering that the matter is under consideration at the stage of second appeal and which substantial questions of law were framed at the time of admission of appeal, rather the second appeal has been argued as if it the arguments are being advanced before the trial Court. The learned counsel for appellants has also not taken care to go through the pleadings of defendants-appellants in their written statement, a few paragraphs of which are being reproduced as under : - "3- ;g fd okn i= dh /kkjk uEcj 3(v) esa fnukad 20-02-1947 dks fookfnr lEifRr dk mRrjnkrk izfroknhx.k ds uke cU/kd ukek fy[kk tkuk jftLV~jh gksuk Lohdkj gSA 6- ;g fd okn i= dh /kkjk uEcj 3(n) esa 150 : i;k ds fy;k cU/kdukek fy[kuk Lohdkj gSA 11- ;g fd okn i= dh /kkjk uEcj 5 esa ;g Lohdkj gS fd cU/kdukesa ds vuqlkj izfroknhx.k dks lEifRr fookfnr esa rkehjkr djus ds iw.kZ vf/kdkj fn;s FksA 30- ;g fd izfroknhx.k us cU/kd lEifRr dks NqM+kus ds fy;s dHkh ,rjkt ugha fd;k cfYd jguukesa dh 'krksZa ds eqrkfcd viuh ipkl gtkj : i;s dh ykxr o Ms AIR 1979 SC 1937 , relied by the learned counsel for appellants, the part of mortgage had been redeemed by co-mortgagors between the years 1913-1918 and the suit filed by co-mortgagors in the year 1946 after a period of 28 years for redemption of remaining part as well as after more than 12 years from the expiry of the then prescribed period of 50 years, held to be barred by time. The facts of the above case have no relevance or similarity with the facts of this case and are neither applicable to this case nor help the appellants. 18. Before proceeding further, para 7 of the impugned judgement passed by the first Appellate Court is being reproduced as under : - "7. Feeling aggrieved, the plaintiffs have filed C.A. No.314 of 1979 alleging that learned trial Court has fixed the amount quite excessively because plaintiffs are not liable to pay any amount as defendants violated the terms of mortgage. Before proceeding further, para 7 of the impugned judgement passed by the first Appellate Court is being reproduced as under : - "7. Feeling aggrieved, the plaintiffs have filed C.A. No.314 of 1979 alleging that learned trial Court has fixed the amount quite excessively because plaintiffs are not liable to pay any amount as defendants violated the terms of mortgage. The defendants have also preferred C.A. No.330/79 challenging the findings of the learned trial court and asserted that disputed property must have been valued by the Court at Rs. 15000/-." 19. It is noteworthy that against the judgement and decree passed by trial Court Munsif, Muzaffarnagar, the first appeals were filed by both the parties on a limited question of quantum of amount to be paid on redemption. This amount was assessed at Rs. 13,101/- by the trial Court and while Civil Appeal No.314 of 1979 was filed by plaintiffs for reducing the amount, the Civil Appeal No.330 of 1979 was filed by defendants for enhancing the amount to Rs. 15,000/-. Since the amount was enhanced, as per prayer made in Civil Appeal No.330 of 1979 filed by defendants/appellants, they may not be held to be aggrieved by the decree passed in Civil Appeal no.330 of 1979 and since the above amount was not reduced, as per prayer made by plaintiffs-respondents in Civil Appeal No.314 of 1979, so also the defendants/appellants may not be considered to be aggrieved by non-reducing of the amount payable on redemption. 20. The fact that a Kotha over the property in suit was demolished by defendants and new constructions were raised by them in the year 1969 and 1974 is not disputed between the parties. It is also not disputed that the report with regard to valuation of constructions raised by defendants/appellants over the mortgaged property, given by duly qualified architect possessing a degree from the great Roorkee University has been relied by both the Courts below and non acceptance of the report of non-qualified Advocate Commissioner, or less qualified diploma holder, the concurrent findings of fact with regard to costs of construction as well as malba (debries) of Kotha, categorically discussed in para 11 of the impugned judgement of first Appellate Court, may not be considered to be wrong, illegal or arbitrary and such concurrent findings of fact may not be interfered with in second appeal. 21. 21. As far as the first substantial question of law framed at the time of admitting appeal, on which though no arguments were advanced on behalf of appellants, I am of the considered view that in para 12 of the impugned judgement of First Appellate Court, it has been rightly held that basis for assessment of value of improvements etc. the year of redemption must be the date of filing of the suit and must be taken that of 1977 when suit was instituted. 22. The learned counsel for plaintiffs-respondents argued in support of his cross objections that since the defendants-appellants violated the terms and conditions of mortgage deed and filed Civil Suit No.501 of 1975 for injunction over the mortgaged property, the plaintiffs-respondents are not obliged to make payment of costs of the constructions raised by defendants-appellants and are entitled to get the redemption of property in suit in their favour on payment of Rs. 150/- only, (the money originally advanced). I find no substance or force in the arguments so advanced on behalf of respondents/cross objectors as there is no such term mentioned in the mortgage deed which, exonerates the plaintiffs respondents from making payment of costs of construction, as per terms of deed. The argument that the first Appellate Court has wrongly and arbitrarily enhanced the valuation of above costs of construction is also made to be rejected. 23. I am of the considered view that the learned First Appellate Court has not committed any mistake in arriving at the valuation of costs of constructions payable at the time of redemption and, raising the amount from Rs. 13,101/- to Rs. 16,500/- and after deducting the amount of malba (debries) Rs. 1,500/-, in fixing it at Rs. 15,150/- 24. On the IIIrd question of law raised by appellants at the time of final hearing, I find that since the impugned deed of mortgage has been executed for the purpose of securing the payment of money Rs. 150/- advanced and specifically provides for redemption, it does not come within the definition of sale under section 54 of Transfer of Property Act. Consequently, the Learned counsel for the defendants-appellants has failed to show as to how the impugned mortgaged deed is hit by provisions of section 58 of Transfer of Property Act and amounts to a sale deed. 25. Consequently, the Learned counsel for the defendants-appellants has failed to show as to how the impugned mortgaged deed is hit by provisions of section 58 of Transfer of Property Act and amounts to a sale deed. 25. Section 83 Transfer of Property Act gives an option to the mortgagor to deposit the amount payable on redemption of mortgage and does not bar the institution of suit, for non deposit of such amount. The deposit of amount payable on redemption has not been made a pre-requisite condition to enabling the mortgagor to file the suit and I find that it will not be correct to say that due to non deposit of amount in the account of mortgagee, the suit for redemption of mortgaged property was barred by provisions of section 83 of the Transfer of Property Act. 26. In view of above, I find that the arguments of learned counsel for the defendants/appellants on question no.3 regarding bar by provisions of sections 58 & 83 of Transfer of Property Act, also have no force and the question so raised is decided in negative. 27. In view of the discussions made above with reference to para 7 of impugned judgement reproduced above, I find that the defendant/appellants are neither aggrieved with the dismissal of first Civil Appeal no.314 of 1979 Brijveer Singh and others v. Sukhan and another nor are aggrieved with enhancement of amount to be paid by plaintiffs-respondents to defendants-appellants on redemption of mortgage, in accordance with prayer made by them in their first Civil Appeal No.330 of 1979 Sukhan and another v. Brijveer Singh and others. I am also of the considered view that though the defendants/appellant are not aggrieved with the impugned judgement, and decree yet the appeal has been filed by them not only to harm and harass the plaintiffs-respondents and to deprive them from taking fruits of decree, filing of which has also caused sheer wastage of valuable time of courts wherein several important matters are pending for consideration. Moreover, there is no substantial questions of law worth consideration and involved in this second appeal, the appeal is liable to be dismissed with special costs. 28. The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs throughout and special cost of Rs. 2,000/-. The cross objections filed by plaintiffs-respondents are also dismissed. 29. Interim order, if any, stands discharged. Appeal dismissed.