JUDGMENT : Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J. The defendant is the appellant and has come up in appeal against concurrent findings recorded against him by the learned Courts below. 2. The facts as necessary for the adjudication of the case are that the predecessor-in-interest of the respondents/plaintiffs i.e. Chingu Ram (hereinafter referred to as the ‘plaintiff’) filed a suit for declaration and injunction to the effect that he is owner in possession of the suit land as detailed in the plaint being legal heir of deceased Rania son of Dheru and that the mutation No. 515 in favour of the appellant/defendant (hereinafter referred to as the ‘defendant’) is null and void and that the Will dated 15.3.1946 in favour of the defendant executed by deceased Rania is also wrong and illegal. A decree of permanent injunction was also sought by the plaintiff against the defendant to the effect that he be restrained from cutting or removing trees or taking forcible possession of the suit land. 3. It was averred that the suit land was owned and possessed by deceased Rania S/o Dheru as co-sharer. The said Rania left the village and his whereabouts are not known for the last sixty years nor he has been heard of being alive. He was 12 years of age when he left the village. He never visited the village again and as such, is presumed to be dead. The mutation was attested on 12.8.1988 in respect of his estate and as such, his date of death is to be presumed to be 12.8.1988. The said Rania was minor when he left the village and therefore, there was no occasion for him to execute Will nor he ever executed Will nor he was competent to do so. The defendant in connivance with the settlement field staff and witnesses propounded a false forged Will and on its basis managed to mutate the estate of deceased Rania in his favour. The Will in question is forged and fabricated document and therefore is not binding on the rights of the plaintiff in the suit land. The plaintiff is the only legal heir of deceased Rania and is entitled to succeed his estate. The revenue official did not adopt proper procedure at the time of attestation of mutation and forged Will was relied upon for attestation of mutation. The plaintiff is the only legal heir of deceased Rania and is entitled to succeed his estate. The revenue official did not adopt proper procedure at the time of attestation of mutation and forged Will was relied upon for attestation of mutation. The defendant threatened to cut and remove the trees and to take forcible possession of the suit land in an illegal manner. 4. The suit was contested and resisted by defendant by raising preliminary objections regarding maintainability, estoppel on account of his act and conduct, jurisdiction and limitation. On merits, it was admitted that the suit land was owned and possessed by Rania son of Dheru. It was denied that said Rania left the village when he was child. It was also denied that he had not been heard of for the last more than 60 years. The said Rania was having disposing state of mind and being issueless on 15.3.1946, had executed the Will of his entire property in favour of the parties to the extent of half share. It was denied that Rania left the village when he was of 12 years old, rather he left about thirty years back. It was averred that the dispute inter se the parties in respect of the estate of deceased Rania arose during settlement in the year 1986. It was denied that mutation had been wrongly attested. It was averred that the Will was a genuine one and had been executed by deceased Rania voluntarily. It was also averred that during consolidation operation, the revenue staff had partitioned the joint land and the same cannot be assailed before the Civil Court. It was denied that Rania left the village before 15.3.1946 or that he was insane or incompetent to execute the Will. The correctness of the pedigree-table was also challenged. It was averred that the defendant is already in possession of his share in the suit land. It was lastly denied that the defendant threatened to cut or remove the trees. The defendant accordingly prayed for dismissal of the suit. 5. The plaintiff filed replication wherein the contents of the written statement were controverted and those of the plaint were reiterated. 6. From the pleadings of the parties, the learned trial Court framed the following issues: 1. Whether plaintiff is owner in possession of the suit land being legal heir of deceased Rania as alleged? OPP 2. 5. The plaintiff filed replication wherein the contents of the written statement were controverted and those of the plaint were reiterated. 6. From the pleadings of the parties, the learned trial Court framed the following issues: 1. Whether plaintiff is owner in possession of the suit land being legal heir of deceased Rania as alleged? OPP 2. Whether mutation No. 515 dated 12.2.88 is wrong, illegal and void? If so, its effect? OPP. 3. Whether plaintiff is entitled to the relief of injunction as prayed? OPP 4. Whether plaintiff is entitled to the relief of possession of suit land in alternative? OPP 5. Whether suit is not maintainable as alleged? OPD 6. Whether act and conduct of plaintiff is a bar to the suit? OPD 7. Whether this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit? OPD 8. Whether deceased Rania had executed a valid Will in favour of the parties qua the suit land as alleged? If so, its effect? OPD 9. Relief. 7. The learned trial Court vide judgment and decree dated 31.3.2003 decreed the suit of the plaintiff. The appeal filed by the defendant against the judgment and decree of the learned trial Court resulted in dismissal and this is how the defendant is before this Court by way of the present regular second appeal. 8. On 21.11.2006, this Court admitted the appeal on the following substantial question of law: “Whether the two courts below ought to have drawn presumption under Section 90 of the Evidence Act in favour of the Will, it having been executed in the year 1946 and having been produced from the proper custody? I have heard learned counsel for the parties and gone through the records of the case carefully. 9. In order to appreciate the controversy in issue, it would be appropriate to refer to Section 90 of The Indian Evidence Act, 1872, which reads thus: “90. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and gone through the records of the case carefully. 9. In order to appreciate the controversy in issue, it would be appropriate to refer to Section 90 of The Indian Evidence Act, 1872, which reads thus: “90. Presumption as to documents thirty years old.—Where any document, purporting or proved to be thirty years old, is produced from any custody, which the Court in the particular case considers proper, the Court may presume that the signature and every other part of such document, which purports to be in the handwriting of any particular person, is in that person’s handwriting, and, in the case of a document executed or attested, that it was duly executed and attested by the persons by whom it purports to be executed and attested. Explanation.—Documents are said to be in proper custody if they are in the place in which, and under the care of the person with whom, they would naturally be; but no custody is improper if it is proved to have had a legitimate origin, or if the circumstances of the particular case are such as to render such an origin probable. This Explanation applies also to section 81.” 10. This section does away with the strict rules, as regards requirement of proof, which are enforced in the case of private documents, by giving rise to a presumption of genuineness, in respect of certain documents that have reached a certain age. The period is to be reckoned backward from the date of the offering of the document, and not any subsequent date i.e. the date of decision of suit or appeal. Thus, the said section deals with the admissibility of ancient documents, dispensing with proof as would be required, in the usual course of events in usual manner. However, the moot question is wither the presumption extends to wills which are more than thirty years old. 11. In Bharpur Singh and others vs. Shamsher Singh, (2009) 3 SCC 687 , it was categorically held that a presumption regarding documents thirty years old, does not apply to a Will and the same has to be proved in terms of Section 63 (c) of the Succession Act read with Section 68 of the Evidence Act. It was observed as under: “19. It was observed as under: “19. The provisions of Section 90 of the Indian Evidence Act keeping in view the nature of proof required for proving a Will have no application. A Will must be proved in terms of the provisions of Section 63(c) of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 and Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. In the event the provisions thereof cannot be complied with, the other provisions contained therein, namely, Sections 69 and 70 of the Indian Evidence Act providing for exceptions in relation thereto would be attracted. Compliance with statutory requirements for proving an ordinary document is not sufficient, as Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act postulates that execution must be proved by at least one of the attesting witness, if an attesting witness is alive and subject to the process of the Court and capable of giving evidence. (See B. Venkatamuni vs. C.J. Ayodhya Ram Singh & ors. [(2006) 13 SCC 449, SCC p. 458, para 19).” 12. Similar reiteration of law can be found in the subsequent judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in M.B. Ramesh (dead) by LRs vs. K.M. Veeraje Urs (dead) by LRS and others (2013) 7 SCC 490 , wherein it was observed as under: “15. The first submission on behalf of the appellant has been that the learned judge of the high Court has erred by framing the question of law, in the manner in which he has. It was submitted that when the trial court and the first appellate court have given a concurrent finding about the invalidity of the will, it was a finding of fact, and the High Court could not have disturbed the finding of fact by framing a question of law as to whether the finding was bad in law, and perverse or contrary to the evidence on record. Reliance was placed, in this behalf, on the observations of this Court in Narayanan Rajendran Vs. Lekshmy Sarojini reported in 2009 (5) SCC 264 . That apart, it was submitted that in any case, the findings of the Courts below could not in any way be categorized as perverse, since they were not contrary to the evidence on record. “ 13. Lekshmy Sarojini reported in 2009 (5) SCC 264 . That apart, it was submitted that in any case, the findings of the Courts below could not in any way be categorized as perverse, since they were not contrary to the evidence on record. “ 13. Though, the question of law could have been conveniently answered by holding that the presumption as envisaged under Section 90 of the Evidence Act does not apply to a Will and the same is required to be proved in accordance with law. However, to be fair to the appellant, this Court would go into question as to whether the Will in question has been proved and the appellant has been able to dispel all suspicious circumstances. 14. It is more than settled that when the Will is allegedly shrouded in suspicion, its proof ceases to be a simple lis between the plaintiff and the defendant. An adversarial proceeding in such cases becomes a matter of court’s conscience and propounder of the will has to remove all suspicious circumstances to satisfy that the Will was duly executed by the testator wherefore cogent and convincing explanation of suspicious circumstances shrouding the making of Will must be offered. This was so held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Jaswant Kaur vs. Amrit Kaur (1977) 1 SCC 369 , wherein some of the suspicious circumstances were enumerated as follows: “23. Suspicious circumstances like the following may be found to be surrounded in the execution of the Will: i. The signature of the testator may be very shaky and doubtful or not appear to be his usual signature. ii. The condition of the testator's mind may be very feeble and debilitated at the relevant time. iii. The disposition may be unnatural, improbable or unfair in the light of relevant circumstances like exclusion of or absence of adequate provisions for the natural heirs without any reason. iv. The dispositions may not appear to be the result of the testator's free will and mind. v. The propounder takes a prominent part in the execution of the Will. vi. The testator used to sign blank papers. vii. The Will did not see the light of the day for long. viii. Incorrect recitals of essential facts. “ 15. Adverting to the facts, the Court is first required to examine the oral evidence. The plaintiffs examined five witnesses. vi. The testator used to sign blank papers. vii. The Will did not see the light of the day for long. viii. Incorrect recitals of essential facts. “ 15. Adverting to the facts, the Court is first required to examine the oral evidence. The plaintiffs examined five witnesses. PW-1 Ramesh Rana stated that his grand father and the grand father of Rania were real brothers. Rania had not died in the village and had gone missing. He had not executed any Will and his property was inherited by his legal heir Chingo which property in turn had thereafter been inherited by him and his three brothers and one sister and the defendant had no concern with this property. In cross-examination, the witness stated that he had not seen Rania. He denied that Rania had executed a Will on 15.3.46. 16. PW-2 Nathu Ram stated that he had not seen Rania ever since his childhood. In cross-examination, he stated that he had been working at Amritsar for the last 15 years and had left for Amritsar about 10 years ago. He had no knowledge whether Rania was married or not as he had never seen Rania. 17. PW-3 Davinder Kumar was the Secretary, Co-operative Society, Gindpur Malaun and had simply brought the record. PW-4 Satya Dev Sharma was a retired Kanungo, who had translated the document Ex.PW-4/A from Urdu to Hindi. 18. As against this, the defendant examined four witnesses. DW-1 Hardev Singh has stated that the original Will of Rania had been written by his father and he was conversant with his handwriting as he remained with him. In cross-examination, the witness stated that Will was not written in his presence and he had no personal knowledge of the villagers and the parties. He further stated that his house was situated at a distance of about 2 KM from the village of the parties. 19. DW-2 Rattan Chand has stated that his father had told him that Rania had executed a Will in favour of Hans Raj and Chingo and he claimed to have been a witness to that Will and had put thumb impression on the same. In cross-examination, the witness denied that Rania was missing from his childhood as according to him Rania was missing after 50 years of age. He further stated that about 38-40 years have elapsed since Rania was found to have gone missing. In cross-examination, the witness denied that Rania was missing from his childhood as according to him Rania was missing after 50 years of age. He further stated that about 38-40 years have elapsed since Rania was found to have gone missing. He admitted that the Will had not been written in his presence, but claimed that he had seen the Will about 20-22 years ago. 20. DW-3 Inderjit Singh has stated that he had seen the original Will which had been signed by his father as he was conversant with his father’s signature. In cross-examination, the witness stated that he had passed matriculation in 1972, but had not read Urdu language. According to him, he knew little bit of Urdu, but could not read the 7th line of the Will. He could not even read Urdu. He denied that Will Ext. D-1 had not been signed by his father. 21. DW-4 Hans Raj stated that Rania had executed a Will of his entire property on 15.3.46 in his favour and in favour of Chingo Ram in equal shares as he had no off-spring. According to him, Rania had left the village about 30 years ago and never came back. He denied that Rania had left the village about 60 years ago and was minor at that time. He stated that the mental condition of Rania was sound at the time he left the house. In cross-examination, he stated that his father had expired about 25 years ago, whereas Rania had gone missing for the last 15-20 years. He further stated that Rania was missing since 1965. He also stated that the age of Rania was 50 years when he executed the Wil. The age of Rania in 1965 was 70-75 years as he was 40-45 years elder to his father. He further stated that Will had been handed over to him by the plaintiff about 18 years ago and claimed to have knowledge regarding the same even earlier to the same being handed over to him. He claimed to be 20 years of age at the time of preparation of Will. This in entirety is the oral evidence led by the parties. 22. He claimed to be 20 years of age at the time of preparation of Will. This in entirety is the oral evidence led by the parties. 22. As regards documentary evidence, the plaintiff has filed the copy of jamabandi Missal Hakiat for the year 1987-88 Ext.P-1, P-2, P-3 and copy of Missal Hakiat for the year 1989-90 Ext.P-4, copy of Missal Hakiat for the year 1989-90 Ext.P-5, Ext.P-6, Ext.P-7, copy of Missal Hakiat for the year 1987-88 Ext.P-8, Ext.P-9, jamabandi for the year 1981-82 Ext.P-10, jamabandi for the year 1982-83 Ext.P-11, copy of jamabandi for the year 1982-83, Ext.P-12, P-13 to P-16 and copy of members of co-operative society Kharoh Ext.PW-4/A. 23. The defendant on the other hand has only produced on record the Will Ext.D-1. 24. It is evidently clear from the oral and documentary evidence that both the parties were related to deceased Rania but the plaintiff is in closer proximity and the legal heir, who in absence of the Will is alone entitled to inherit his property and this fact is not even disputed by the defendant. 25. Therefore, the only question that arises for consideration is whether late Rania had executed a valid Will Ext.D-1 and the same has been proved in accordance with law. 26. The learned Courts below have categorically found the evidence led by the defendant to be totally shaky and have further held the Will not to be a genuine document, but a fabricated one. 27. Learned Courts below have culled out the following suspicious circumstances: (i) That alleged scribe of the Will Partap Singh has been shown to be village Gindpur in Tehsil Una, whereas his son DW-1 Hardev Singh has clearly stated on oath that he is resident of Village Gulerdhar situated in Tehsil Jaswan in District Kangra. This witness had further deposed that not only his father but even his ancestors were residing at Village Gulerdhar. Therefore, there was no reason for alleged scribe to give his address as a resident of village Gindpur. Not only this, it was not even the case of any of the parties that the scribe Partap Singh was resident of Village Gindpur. (ii) Second suspicious circumstance noted by the learned courts below was that at the time of execution of the Will the father of the defendant Hans Raj was very much alive. Not only this, it was not even the case of any of the parties that the scribe Partap Singh was resident of Village Gindpur. (ii) Second suspicious circumstance noted by the learned courts below was that at the time of execution of the Will the father of the defendant Hans Raj was very much alive. DW-4 Hans Raj had categorically stated in his statement on oath that his father had died about 45 years and such statement was recorded on 25.10.2002 and that would mean that Sher Singh father of Hans Raj was alive at the relevant time. It assumes importance because deceased plaintiff Chingu Ram and Sher Singh were cousins of deceased Rania. Chingu and Sher Singh were having one sister Nihatu. The defendant Hans Raj is the son of aforesaid Sher Singh. The will contains a clear cut recital to the effect that Rania was bequeathing his property in favour of Hans Raj son of Sher Singh and Chingu because they happened to be his heirs. Once Sher Singh is proved to be alive at the time of execution of the Will then in that event, Hans Raj could not and cannot be considered to be the heir of Rania. (iii) The third suspicious circumstance relates to the identification of the signature of the attesting witness Kehar Singh whose signatures were sought to be proved with the aid of statement of DW-3 Inderjit. This witness on oath has stated that he had been living with his father and had seen him writing and could identify his signatures which were admittedly in Urdu language. However, when the witness was subjected to cross-examination, it is clearly revealed that he had very little knowledge of Urdu language and admitted that he did not know how to write Urdu, but could only identify Urdu writing. Surprisingly, the witness during the course of examination failed to read the 7th line of the Will. It was on the basis of such testimony and conduct of the witness that the Courts below have come to a categorical conclusion that the witness had no knowledge of the Urdu language and whatever he was deposing was on the basis of guess work and was not sufficient to prove the signature of his father on the Will in question. (iv) The last suspicious circumstance observed by the learned Courts below related to the production of the Will after considerable lapse of time from the date of disappearance of deceased Rania. DW-4 Hans Raj had in his examination-in-chief stated that whereabouts of Rania were not known since 1965 and, therefore, he would be presumed to be dead in the year 1972. The Will in question was stated to have been executed in the presence of Hans Raj, who was supposed to be in its custody for the last more than 18 years and before that Will was allegedly in the custody of the plaintiff deceased Chingu. In such circumstances, why the defendant took no steps to get the mutation attested despite the fact that Rania as per him had already gone missing since 1965. Why the defendant Hans Raj waited for more than a decade to cause production of the Will from the year 1972 for the purpose of attestation of the mutation. 28. Even before this Court, learned senior counsel for the appellant has not been able to dispel the suspicious circumstances noted by the learned Courts below. 29. In addition to the aforesaid, learned senior counsel for the respondents has taken me through the trend of cross-examination adopted by the defendant whereby while examining PW-1 it is suggested to the witness that Rania had not gone missing and had been visiting the village and this suggestion completely demolish the case set up by the defendant. The substantial question of law is answered accordingly. 30. There is no impropriety, illegality or irregularity much less perversity in the findings recorded by the learned Courts below and the same are based on proper appreciation of the pleadings as also the evidence and the law on the subject. Having said so, I find no merit in this appeal and the same is accordingly dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs. The pending applications if any, stands disposed of.