JUDGMENT Hon’ble Sudhir Agarwal, J.—Petitioners, Bhagelu and Ganga Ram, both sons of Ram Swaroop (now deceased and substituted by legal heirs) have filed this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, being aggrieved by order dated 2.2.1974 passed by Deputy Director of Consolidation, Basti (hereinafter referred to as the “DDC”), whereby it has allowed Revision No. 469 of respondent No. 4 and dismissed Revision No. 451 filed by petitioners and held that except sale-deeds executed by petitioners, in remaining land, respondents No. 3 (Bhulai) and 4 (Ram Autar) each, shall have half share. 2. The dispute relates to Khata No. 19, Plots No. 11, 181, 208(M), 240, 243, 208/2, 206 and 240(M). 3. Petitioners claimed to be recorded Bhumidhar in basic year entry. Respondents 3 and 4 filed objection claiming sole Bhumidhari and Sirdari rights stating that petitioners have no such right over disputed land. Respondents 3 and 4 are off shoot in the same family tree of petitioners though from different branches. Petitioners on incorrect facts filed suit under Section 229-B of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as the “Act, 1950”) and it being decreed, got disputed plot recorded solely in their names though they have no rights. Petitioners have sold their rights on 25.8.1969 in favour of Mst. Sukhani wife of Bhulai. There is no compromise between parties and names of petitioners be expunged and names of Respondents 3 and 4 be entered. 4. Petitioners contested matter stating that Respondents 3 and 4 are not in any way from common family tree but they are distant relatives. Their names were incorrectly recorded in respect of disputed plots. When petitioners came to know they filed suit under Section 229-B. Respondent 4, Ram Autar entered in a compromise with petitioners while Respondent 3 did not appear despite service, hence matter proceeded ex parte against him and suit was ultimately decreed in favour of petitioners. Petitioners have deposited ten times rental and became Bhumidhar. 5. Smt. Sukhani, wife of Bhulai, also filed an objection claiming mutation of her name over Plots No. 240 and 208. 6. Consolidation Officer (hereinafter referred to as the “CO”) vide order dated 22.6.1971 rejected objections and decided matter in favour of petitioners. Petitioners have deposited ten times rental and became Bhumidhar. 5. Smt. Sukhani, wife of Bhulai, also filed an objection claiming mutation of her name over Plots No. 240 and 208. 6. Consolidation Officer (hereinafter referred to as the “CO”) vide order dated 22.6.1971 rejected objections and decided matter in favour of petitioners. Respondents 3 and 4 preferred Appeals No. 1062 and 1063 respectively under Section 11 of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 (hereinafter referred to as the “Act, 1953”), which was allowed by Settlement Officer (Consolidation), Harraiya, Basti (hereinafter referred to as the “SOC”) and the matter was remanded in respect of Respondent 3. In regard to Respondent 4, Ram Autar SOC said that he had already entered into a compromise, cannot withdraw. 7. On remand, CO again decided matter vide order dated 4.6.1973 holding that Respondent 3 has no interest left and ex parte decree was binding upon him. Thereagainst Bhulai preferred Appeal No. 3703 under Section 11 of Act, 1953, which was allowed by SOC directing that name of Bhulai should be entered and petitioners’ name should be deleted for the reason that they have already sold their share in disputed land vide sale-deed dated 25.8.1969 in favour of Smt. Sukhani. Thereafter two revisions were filed, i.e., Revisions No. 469 by Respondent 4 and 451 by petitioners. DDC allowed revision filed by Respondent 4 and dismissed revision filed by petitioners holding that Respondents 3 and 4 both are entitled for half share each. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that DDC has committed manifest error in law by allowing revision of Respondent 4, whose appeal was already dismissed by SOC and, thereagainst he had not filed any revision. After remand, the order passed by CO was challenged only by Respondent 3 a nd appeal was filed only by Respondent 3, therefore, Respondent 4 could not have filed revision. He further submitted that admission, i.e., compromise entered by Respondent 4 was binding upon him and could not have been ignored at all. He further said that suit filed under Section 229-B of Act, 1950 having been decreed ex parte, and having not abated at all, there was no occasion for authorities below to treat suit as abated. Since decree dated 22.5.1969 was not set aside, it was binding and hence no relief could have been granted to Respondent 3 also. 9. He further said that suit filed under Section 229-B of Act, 1950 having been decreed ex parte, and having not abated at all, there was no occasion for authorities below to treat suit as abated. Since decree dated 22.5.1969 was not set aside, it was binding and hence no relief could have been granted to Respondent 3 also. 9. I have heard Sri Awadhesh Kumar Singh, Advocate for petitioners and Sri Dinesh Pathak, Advocate for contesting respondents. 10. With respect to family tree there is a dispute between parties. Respondents 3 and 4 have claimed family tree as under: Ram Lal Ram Swarup Ramjas Guru (Respondent) Charan (Respondent) Ganga Ram (Petitioner) Bhagelu (Petitioner) 11. Petitioners claimed that Respondents 3 and 4 are not family members and from different branch. They have given their family tree in para 3 of writ petition as under: Ram Din Matadin Dhopat Ram Swarup Ganga Ram (Petitioner 2) Bhagelu (Petitioner 1) 12. Petitioners filed Suit No. 471 under Section 229-B of Act, 1950 impleading Respondents 3 and 4 as also Gram Sabha Kaptan Ganj and State of U.P. before Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Harraiya. The Respondent 3 did not respond hence order was passed to press ex parte against him. A compromise dated 22.5.1969 entered between petitioners and Ram Autar was placed whereupon Sub-Divisional Magistrate decided suit in terms of aforesaid compromise vide order dated 22.5.1969. 13. Thereupon Respondent 3, Bhulai filed application dated 5.7.1971 for setting aside ex parte decree dated 22.5.1969 passed against him alleging that he has no knowledge of suit, hence could not file any written statement or contest suit. Petitioners contested this application. Sub-Divisional Magistrate passed order dated 8.8.1972 holding that no ex parte order was passed against Bhulai and, therefore, his name shall continue in revenue records. 14. It appears that petitioners then preferred a review whereupon Deputy Collector passed an order stating that further proceedings in the matter shall continue. This order dated 8.8.1972 was challenged by Petitioner 2 in Revision No. 1505/B before Commissioner, Gorakhpur Division, Gorakhpur. Commissioner vide order dated 22.12.1972 observed that decree dated 22.5.1969 was passed in terms of compromise when suit was already proceeding and, therefore, it must be deemed to be an ex parte decree passed against Bhulai. 15. This order dated 8.8.1972 was challenged by Petitioner 2 in Revision No. 1505/B before Commissioner, Gorakhpur Division, Gorakhpur. Commissioner vide order dated 22.12.1972 observed that decree dated 22.5.1969 was passed in terms of compromise when suit was already proceeding and, therefore, it must be deemed to be an ex parte decree passed against Bhulai. 15. Bhulai filed application dated 5.7.1971 under Order IX Rule 13 C.P.C. for setting aside ex parte decree but Deputy Collector erred in observing that no ex parte order was passed against Bhulai. Thus, order dated 8.8.1972 as also review order dated 30.10.1972, both were defective. Commissioner vide order dated 22.12.1972 made recommendation to allow revision, set aside orders dated 8.8.1972 and 30.10.1972 and remand matter to Trial Court for dealing with application of Respondent 3, filed under Order IX Rule 13 C.P.C., and decide again in accordance with law. 16. Commissioner made a reference to Board of Revenue in terms of aforesaid recommendation dated 22.12.1972 and it is nobody’s case and nothing has been brought on record as to what ultimately happened in Board of Revenue. In absence of anything otherwise, I do not find any reason to treat that proceedings in suit under Section 229-B were pending and it cannot be said that decree dated 22.5.1969 attained finality so far as Respondent 3, Bhulai is concerned. On commencement of consolidation, the proceeding stood abated. 17. It is also evident from record that only two Khataui extracts were filed, i.e., 1292 fasli and 1359 fasli. In 1292 fasli, name of Matadeen was recorded who claimed to be great-grandfather of petitioners but in 1959 fasli names of petitioners, Respondent 4 and father of Respondent 3 are mentioned. Subsequent Khatauni mention names of all parties, therefore, in absence of anything otherwise, the above entries can safely be relied and have been so relied by DDC in impugned revisional order and to my mind, rightly. 18. It is also evident that petitioners have executed sale-deed dated 25.8.1969 of half of land in favour of Smt. Sukhani wife of Bhulai. This deed relates to Plots No. 181, 208/2, 208/1 and 240, total area 2-13-4 bigha. Total area of disputed land is 4-16-6. Therefore, petitioners have already sold out almost half of the land to Smt. Sukhani, vide sale-deed dated 25.8.1969. This sale-deed is also not in dispute. This deed relates to Plots No. 181, 208/2, 208/1 and 240, total area 2-13-4 bigha. Total area of disputed land is 4-16-6. Therefore, petitioners have already sold out almost half of the land to Smt. Sukhani, vide sale-deed dated 25.8.1969. This sale-deed is also not in dispute. Since alleged ex parte decree, as I have already observed, did not attain finality and ultimately abated, I have no hesitation in holding that share of Respondent 3 in disputed property continued and, therefore, DDC has rightly passed order in his favour. 19. Now question relates to order passed in favour of Respondent 4. Compromise entered into by Respondent 4 with petitioners in respect of his share was on record and to that extent there is no dispute. Initially when CO passed order dated 22.6.1971 rejecting objections of Respondents 3 and 4, both preferred appeal separately. Appeals No. 1062 was preferred by Respondent 4 and 1063 was preferred by Respondent 3. SOC vide order dated 28.12.1971 dismissed Appeal No. 1062 preferred by Respondent 4 and allowed Appeal No. 1063 preferred by Respondent 3 and to that extent only matter was remanded. SOC’s order dated 28.12.1971 attained finality inasmuch as Respondent 4, thereagainst did not prefer any revision before DDC. 20. Thus, when matter in respect of Respondent 3 was remanded, CO could have considered that matter to the extent of Respondent No. 3 and not beyond that. In fact CO’s order dated 4.6.1973 passed after remand shows that in initial part he has referred to all the three objections but in the body of order, he has clearly said that he has considered, after remand, only the matter of Respondent 3, (Bhulai). In fact CO’s order dated 4.6.1973 passed after remand shows that in initial part he has referred to all the three objections but in the body of order, he has clearly said that he has considered, after remand, only the matter of Respondent 3, (Bhulai). This is clear from following extract of order: ^^mijksDr lHkh okn iz'uksa dk foospu esjs iwokZf/kdkjh us vius vkns'k fnukad 22-6-71 ds fu.kZ; i= esa fd;k gSA bl vkns'k ls {kqC/k gksdj vihysa c0v0 pdcanh ds ;gka izLrqr dh xbZA bu nksuksa vihyksa dk fu.kZ; vius fu.kZ; ls c0v0p0 us vius vkns'k fnukad 28-2-72 esa fd;k gS blesa HkqybZ dk uke [kkfjt gksus ds gn rd jn~n djrs gq;s fjekUM fd;k gSA blh vkns'k ds vuqikyu esa ;g fookn pdcanh vfèkdkjh dIrkuxat ds U;k;ky; esa fopkjk/khu Fkk tks c0v0p0 ds vkns’k fnukad 27-1-73 }kjk bl U;k;ky; dks LFkkukUrfjr gksdj vk;k gSA c0v0p0 ds fjekUM vkns'k ds vUrxZr bl i=koyh esa tc dsoy HkqybZ ds gd ds lEcUèk esa foospu djuk gSA** “My predecessor-in-office has, in his order dated 22.6.1971, discussed all the aforesaid issues. Aggrieved by this order, appeals have been filed before the Settlement Officer, Consolidation. Both these appeals have been decided by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation vide his order dated 28.2.1972, remanding the case while setting it aside insofar as it relates to deletion of Bhulai’s name. In compliance of this very order, this dispute was pending before the Court of Consolidaion Officer, Kaptanganj and this case has come to this Court by way of transfer vide order dated 27.1.1973 passed by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation. Under remand order passed by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation, this case has to be determined in respect of entitlement of Bhulai only.” (English translation by the Court) 21. Thereafter CO passed order only in respect to Respondent 3 and rejected his objection. Thereagainst Respondent 3 preferred appeal under Section 11 of Act, 1953 which was allowed by SOC vide order dated 19.11.1973. In these circumstances, no revision could have been filed by Respondent 4 against order dated 19.11.1973 passed by SOC. 22. However, it appears that a delayed revision was filed by Respondent 4 challenging SOC’s order dated 28.12.1971 which has been entertained by Revisional Court. In these circumstances, no revision could have been filed by Respondent 4 against order dated 19.11.1973 passed by SOC. 22. However, it appears that a delayed revision was filed by Respondent 4 challenging SOC’s order dated 28.12.1971 which has been entertained by Revisional Court. I have no objection in admitting a delayed revision also but from revisional order what I find is that it has not paid any attention to the agreement/compromise executed between petitioners and Respondent 4. Moreover, it has also misread the order dated 8.8.1972 passed by Deputy Collector on restoration application of Respondent 3 that the decree dated 22.5.1969 was set aside but Commissioner’s order dated 22.12.1972 shows that Deputy Collector stated in order dated 8.8.1972 that no ex parte order was passed against Bhulai, hence his name shall continue in revenue records. There is nothing on record that decree dated 22.5.1969 was set aside in its entirety so as to nullify even the terms of compromise which were accepted and decree was passed. To this extent order of DDC is clearly perverse and illegal. 23. Once decree dated 22.5.1969, passed in terms of compromise entered with Respondent 4, continued, there was no question of granting any relief to Respondent 4. DDC has committed manifest error in allowing revision of Respondent 4 and declaring his share in property in dispute which he has already surrendered in favour of petitioners. 24. Even otherwise, if this Court go to the extent of saying that decree dated 22.5.1969 stood set aside since subsequently proceedings abated, even then the that fact is that compromise entered between petitioners and Respondent 4 was neither challenged nor said to have been entered on account of any fraud or misrepresentation nor was otherwise held to be not binding between parties. That be so, binding effect of compromise would continue having the effect of denying any relief Respondent 4, contrary to the terms of aforesaid compromise. 25. This question has been considered in some of the authorities which may refer hereat. 26. In Shadi Ram v. Amin Chand, AIR 1930 Lahore 937, Lahore High Court took a view that a compromise emerged in a decree would not become extinct upon the decree being set aside. 27. In Lal Ji Singh and others v. Shiv Pujan Singh and others, 1981 AWC 845 , following aforesaid authority in Shadi Ram v. Amin Chand (supra), this Court held: “5. 27. In Lal Ji Singh and others v. Shiv Pujan Singh and others, 1981 AWC 845 , following aforesaid authority in Shadi Ram v. Amin Chand (supra), this Court held: “5. By order dated 31.8.1979, the Deputy Director of Consolidation had set aside the order dated 2.7.1975, which was passed in terms of compromise. The compromise itself was not set aside. In Shadi Ram v. Amin Chand, AIR 1930 Lahore 937, it was held by the Lahore High Court that a compromise which has merged in a decree does not become extinct upon the decree being set aside. In this view of the matter, I am of the opinion that where a decree or order based on compromise is set aside but the genuineness of the compromise itself has not been doubted in any manner, whatsoever, nor it has been set aside being invalid or fraudulently obtained, the compromise would continue to have the legal force and binding effect on the parties thereto. It can be referred to and relied upon in that very suit or proceedings and also in other proceedings as well, for the purpose of showing the terms contained therein, to which the parties had agreed with open eyes and settled to be bound by it. It can also be referred and relied upon as a valid piece of evidence containing admissions of parties thereto on relevant facts contained therein. It would, of course be open to parties to urge and establish the circumstances, dubious in nature, in which it was obtained, so as to indicate that it was not at all genuine and was fraudulently obtained. It can also be shown that the facts contained therein are erroneous and untrue or that the parties never intended to be bound by it or that it is opposed to law. 6. A party to the compromise, however, cannot wriggle out of it, unless he succeeds in establishing facts touching its validity on the ground of being arrived at between the parties not competent to enter into a compromise or being filed or recorded not in accordance with the prescribed procedure and law or that it was vitiated by some misrepresentation of facts or undue influence, coercion or fraud practised either on the party or upon Court. If Court has been defrauded in accepting a compromise for example, where some one impersonated while executing and presenting a compromise for and on behalf of a party and the Court accepts the same believing it to have been arrived at genuinely by the concerned party itself it would be void ab initio and non est. But where a party is defrauded and the compromise stands vitiated for reasons aforesaid, the same can be avoided and the party defrauded can resile from it either in the same proceedings before that Court or in appeal or revision against the order founded on such compromise or by a separate suit in that behalf. But if the compromise filed and verified before the Court of competent jurisdiction was found to be genuine and bona fide, it would survive and continue to have legal force and binding effect although the decree or order which was passed on its basis was set aside. The Deputy Director of Consolidation has, thus, not acted illegally in placing reliance upon the earlier compromise filed in the case, which has not been shown to be either fictitious or fraudulently obtained and thus the parties thereto were bound by it.” (emphasis added) 28. In Thakur Din and others v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Faizabad and others, 1983 All LJ 1382, Court again reiterated above view and in paras 10 and 11 said as under: “10. In view of the above, I am unable to hold that when a decree, based on compromise, is et aside, being invlid on certain grounds. The compromise, embodied in it, dies with it and it cannot be read and relied upon in evidence. If the compromise itself has not been set aside on the ground that it stands vitiated, having been secured by practicing fraud, undue influence or coercion, it can be referred to in respect of admission, if any, contained therein, as admissible substantive evidence relevant to the issues involved in the case. 11. It is well-settled that admission is a best piece of evidence and decisive of the matter provided it is clear, certain and unambiguous and not vitiated by fraud, undue influence or coercion and should not have been extracted by misrepresentation or extending false promises. What is admitted by a party to be true must be presumed to be true unless the contrary is shown. (See AIR 1954 SC 355 ). What is admitted by a party to be true must be presumed to be true unless the contrary is shown. (See AIR 1954 SC 355 ). However, the admission previously made can be allowed to be explained in order to show that it was erroneous or vitiated on aforesaid grounds. The maker of the admission can very well show that the facts admitted are not correct, but the admission will be used as substantive evidence even if he fails to step into the witness box. It can be read and relied upon in evidence without even being referred to the maker for contradiction in witness box under Section 145 of the Evidence Act. It will be admissible as substantive evidence by itself in view of Sections 17 and 21 of the Evidence Act though it is not conclusive proof of the matter admitted. What weight may be attached to the admission by a party is a matter different from its use as admissible evidence, and the same would depend on the consideration in totality of the facts and circumstances and other evidence on record. (See AIR 1966 Sc 405 , AIR 1974 SC 117 and AIR 1977 SC 409 ).” (emphasis added) 29. The terms of compromise, therefore, in any case, is an admission by parties to document and can be used as substantial piece of evidence against the maker. This is what has been said by this Court in Girdhari Lal and others v. Deputy Director of Consolidation and others, 1985 RD 135, wherein Court said: “7. It appears to be fairly well-settled that an admission about a relevant fact by any one of persons having joint interest in the property in dispute would be an admission against all co-owners whether they be jointly sued or not, provided it fulfils the triple test; firstly, it should be an admission about the disputed property, secondly, it should be the admission of the person jointly interested in the property as co-owner thereof and the admission runs against his own interest in the property, and lastly, it should not have been collusively made in order to defraud or designed to deprive the co-owners, of the property in dispute, wholly or partially. Thus, if the admission of co-owner fulfils these tests and is genuine and not shown to be mala fide, it would not only bind the maker but also the co-owners. Thus, if the admission of co-owner fulfils these tests and is genuine and not shown to be mala fide, it would not only bind the maker but also the co-owners. And it can be used as an admissible substantial evidence against the maker and his co-owners as well and also against all those who claim under them as their heirs, successors and assigns. This view finds support from a number of decisions (See Kowsulliah Sundari Dasi and another v. Mukta Sundari Dasi and another, ILR (11) Cal. 588, Kanta Mohan Mallik and others v. Makhan Santra, 39 Calcutta Weekly Notes 277, Mst. Ramihari Kuer and others v. Devanand Singh and others, AIR (33) 1946 Pat 278; and Bhura and another v. Bahadur Singh and another, AIR 1976 Raj. 249 .” (emphasis added) 30. It is well-settled that an admission is preserved to be true unless contrary is shown. (See, Nathoo Lal v. Durga Prasad, AIR 1954 SC 355 ). 31. In Thiru John v. Returning Officer, AIR 1977 SC 1724 , the Court said: “It is well-settled that a party’s admission as defined in Sections 17 to 20, fulfilling the requirements of Section 21, Evidence Act, is substantive evidence pro-prio vigors. An admission, if clearly and unequivocally made is the best evidence against the party making it and though not conclusive, shifts the onus on to the maker on the principle that what a party himself admits to be true may reasonably be presumed to be so and until the presumption is rebutted the facts admitted must be taken to be established.” (emphasis added) 32. In the present case decree passed in terms of compromise with Respondent 4 is not shown to have been set aside vis-a-vis Respondent 4. Even otherwise the compromise itself being not in dispute, it was not open to DDC to grant relief to Respondent 4 in a revision preferred before him against order of SOC by ignoring the said compromise. 33. The compromise document was already on record. If that be so, in absence of anything to doubt the same, DDC was bound to treat it as an admission on the part of Respondent 4 and in that view it could not have declared any share of Respondent 4 to continue which he admitted, and in any case surrendered, in favour of petitioners. 34. If that be so, in absence of anything to doubt the same, DDC was bound to treat it as an admission on the part of Respondent 4 and in that view it could not have declared any share of Respondent 4 to continue which he admitted, and in any case surrendered, in favour of petitioners. 34. In view of above discussion, I am clearly of the view that impugned judgment passed by Revisional Court, in so far as Respondent 4 is concerned, i.e., to the extent it allowed Revision No. 469 preferred by Respondent 4, cannot sustain. 35. The writ petition is allowed partly. Impugned judgment and order dated 2.2.1974, to the extent it has allowed Revision No. 469 filed by Respondent 4, Ram Autar, is set aside and the direction with respect of declaring share of Respondent 4 in respect of property in dispute is also set aside. Instead, I declare that, in respect of disputed property Respondent 3 shall have half share and remaining part is jointly in the co-ownership of both petitioners. 36. There shall be no order as to costs. ———————