JUDGMENT : Sandeep Sharma, J. This appeal has been filed by the appellants plaintiffs against the judgment and decree dated 20.03.2005, passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, H.P., reversing the judgment and decree dated 11.5.2001, passed by the learned Sub Judge Ist Class, Ghumarwin, whereby the suit filed by the appellants plaintiffs has been decreed. 2. The brief facts of the case are that the appellants-plaintiffs (herein after referred to as the `plaintiffs’), filed a suit for declaration and permanent prohibitory injunction against the respondents-defendants (hereinafter referred to as the `defendants’) stating therein that they were owners in possession of the suit land measuring 9.6 bighas, comprised in Khasra No.59 and 9 Khata/Khatauni No.20 min/33 and 34, situated in village Nagraon, Pargana Tiun, Tehsil Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, Himachal Pradesh. It was averred in the plaint that in the revenue record, the suit land was wrongly entered in the possession of defendants No.1 to 3 and at the same time defendant No.4 was recorded as co-owner in the column of ownership, which entries were challenged by the plaintiffs. It was further stated that defendant No.4 had disposed of more land than her share and consequently she was left with no share in the suit land. It was further stated that defendants No.1 to 3 were not in possession of the suit land. However, it was only on 26.6.1992 when defendants came to the suit land and tried to dispossess the plaintiffs. Thereafter, plaintiffs came to know that A.C. Ist Grade, Ghumarwin, declared defendants to be owners in possession of the suit land and said order was also challenged. Hence, the present suit for declaration that plaintiffs are owners in possession of the suit land. Plaintiffs further prayed for consequential relief of permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the defendants from interfering in the suit land. 3. Defendants No.1 to 3 contested the suit and filed joint written statement. They also filed counter claim against the plaintiffs. It was stated by the defendants that suit land was under possession of their predecessor-ininterest Sant Ram and Bhauru as non-occupancy tenant under the previous owners Shankru Devi, Sundri Devi and Gulabi Devi on the payment of 1/4th produce as rent. The plaintiffs had purchased the share of Ishwar Dass and Narain Singh successors of Gulabi in the year 1965-66, but the tenancy of defendant No.1 to 3 were prior to said sale. The plaintiffs had purchased the share of Ishwar Dass and Narain Singh successors of Gulabi in the year 1965-66, but the tenancy of defendant No.1 to 3 were prior to said sale. Therefore, defendants stated that now by operation of H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, defendants had acquired proprietary rights. Therefore, defendants prayed by way of counter-claim to be declared owners in possession of the suit land. 4. Defendant No.4 did not appear to contest the suit before the lower Court and as such she was proceeded against ex-parte. 5. The plaintiffs filed written statement to the counter-claim and also replication whereby they again reaffirmed their own case and refuted the case of defendants as pleaded in the written statement and the counter claim. 6. On the pleadings of the parties, the learned trial Court framed the following issues:- “1. Whether the plaintiffs are the owners in possession of the suit land? OPP. 2. Whether the defendants are entitled to be declared as owner in possession of the suit land? OPP. 3. Relief.” 7. Learned trial Court vide common judgment and decree dated 11.5.2001 partly decreed the suit of the plaintiff and also dismissed the counter claim filed by the defendants. 8. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court, whereby suit filed by the plaintiff was partly decreed and counter claim of defendants-appellants were dismissed, appellants-defendants filed an appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short `CPC’) read with Section 21 of the H.P. Courts Act assailing therein judgment and decree dated 11.5.2001 passed by learned Sub Judge Ist Class in the Court of learned Additional District Judge, Ghumarwin. 9. Learned Additional District Judge, Ghumarwin vide judgment and decree dated 20.3.2005 accepted the appeal preferred by the defendants by setting aside the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court. Learned first appellate Court also decreed the counter claim of the contesting defendants to the effect that defendants No.1 to 3 are owners in possession of the suit land and entries in the revenue record in favour of plaintiffs are wrong and illegal. 10. In the aforesaid background the present appellants-plaintiffs filed this Regular Second Appeal before this Court, details whereof have already been given above. 11. 10. In the aforesaid background the present appellants-plaintiffs filed this Regular Second Appeal before this Court, details whereof have already been given above. 11. This second appeal was admitted on the following substantial question of law: “(1) Whether the findings of the ld. Appellate court below are sustainable in the eyes of law when it is based on mere revenue entries which are itself contradictory and stands rebutted by adducing oral as well as documentary evidence. Particularly when the appellants/ plaintiffs are in exclusive possession of the suit land for the last more than 30 years and are entitled to be declared as owners in possession of the suit land and whereas defendants/respondents never remained in possession of suit land? 2. Whether the Ld. Addl. District Judge has committed illegality in allowing the appeal and decreeing the counter claim of the respondents-defendants whereas separate appeal against the dismissal of counter claim has not been filed by the respondents? 3. Whether the Ld. Addl. District Judge wrongly interpreted the revenue entries?” 12. Mr. B.P. Sharma, Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants-plaintiffs, vehemently argued that the impugned judgment and decree passed by learned first appellate Court is not sustainable in the eye of law as the same is not based upon correct appreciation of evidence as well as law on point. Mr. Sharma contended that bare perusal of impugned judgment passed by learned first appellate Court suggests that the same is based on conjectures and surmises and learned first appellate Court has fallen in grave error while reversing the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court that too on the very flimsy grounds. 13. Mr. Sharma forcefully contended that the impugned judgment passed by the first appellate Court is totally contrary to the provisions of law because learned first appellate Court had no occasion, whatsoever, to decree the counter claim of defendants in the appeal preferred by them against the judgment and decree dated 11.5.2001 passed by learned trial Court, whereby the suit of the plaintiffs was partly decreed and counter claims were dismissed. As per Mr. As per Mr. Sharma, since defendants had not filed separate appeal after paying requisite court fee against the dismissal of the counter claim by the trial Court, learned first appellate Court had no authority, whatsoever, to allow the counter claim in the appeal admittedly filed against the judgment passed by the learned trial Court, whereby suit of the plaintiffs was partly decreed. With a view to substantiate his aforesaid arguments, he invited the attention of this Court to Order 8 Rule 6A CPC to demonstrate that counter claim is in the nature of plaint and when it is dismissed, it is to be assailed by way of filing an appeal before the competent Forum by paying requisite court fee on the basis of claim. 14. Mr. Sharma forcefully contended that bare perusal of Order 8 Rules 6A to 6D clearly suggests that a counter claim preferred by the defendants, is in the nature of a cross-suit and even if the suit is dismissed, counter claim remain alive for adjudication; meaning thereby that the counter claim can only be entertained by the Court if requisite court fee is paid by the defendants on the valuation of counter claim. Mr. Sharma strenuously argued that if the counter claim is dismissed on being adjudicated on merits, it forecloses the rights of the defendants and hence as per Order 8 Rule 6A(2) Court is required to pronounce the final judgment in the same suit, both on the original claim/suit as well as also on counter claim. Mr. Sharma further contended that though in the present case learned trial Court, while partly allowing the suit filed by the plaintiff, dismissed the counter claim filed by defendants vide common judgment, but same could not be assailed by way of common appeal as is in the present case assailing therein impugned judgment and decree passed in favour of the plaintiffs as well as rejection of counter claim. Mr. Sharma forcefully contended that once there was conclusive determination of right of parties by the Court, while rejecting the counter claim filed by the defendants, it attained the status of decree and as such same was required to be assailed by way of filing separate appeal. Mr. Mr. Sharma forcefully contended that once there was conclusive determination of right of parties by the Court, while rejecting the counter claim filed by the defendants, it attained the status of decree and as such same was required to be assailed by way of filing separate appeal. Mr. Sharma further contended that trial Court may have not drawn formal decree, while rejecting the counter claim of the defendants, but once the rights are finally adjudicated by the Court, while rejecting the counter claim, it attained the status of decree and as such judgment and decree, specifically dismissing the counter claim, could not be assailed by way of common appeal, as has been done in the present case. Learned Counsel representing the plaintiffs-appellants also contended that learned first appellate Court, while allowing the counter claim filed on behalf of defendants, miserably failed to appreciate the evidence on record which was suggestive of the fact that the appellants are owners in possession of the suit land for more than 30 years and the learned trial Court had rightly concluded on the basis of evidence adduced on record that the defendants never remained in possession of the suit land. 15. Mr. Sharma with a view to substantiate his submissions further stated that learned first appellate Court has fallen in grave error while not appreciating that apart from entries, which were itself contrary in the revenue record, defendants No.1 and 2 miserably failed to adduce any cogent evidence showing defendants in possession of the suit land and moreover the revenue entries stood rebutted by the overwhelming evidence, be it ocular or documentary, on record. While concluding his arguments, Mr. Sharma strenuously argued that the judgment passed by learned first appellate Court deserves to be quashed and set aside being perverse and against law because bare perusal of the pleadings as well as evidence produced on record suggests that learned first appellate Court has failed to appreciate that there was no document available on record suggestive of the fact that payment of rent, if any, was further made by defendants to S/Shri Narain Singh and Ishwar from whom the plaintiff had purchased the land. Mr.Sharma also placed reliance on the judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court in Rajni Rani and Another vs. Khairati Lal and Others, (2015)2 SCC 682 and Laxmidas Dayabhai Kabrawala vs. Nanabhai Chunilal Kabrawala and others, AIR 1964 SC 11 . 16. Mr.Sharma also placed reliance on the judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court in Rajni Rani and Another vs. Khairati Lal and Others, (2015)2 SCC 682 and Laxmidas Dayabhai Kabrawala vs. Nanabhai Chunilal Kabrawala and others, AIR 1964 SC 11 . 16. Mr.Neeraj Gupta, learned counsel appearing for the defendants-respondents, supported the judgment passed by the learned first appellate Court. Mr.Gupta vehemently argued that bare perusal of the impugned judgment passed by learned first appellate Court suggests that the same is based upon correct appreciation of evidence available on record as well as law laid down and as such no interference, whatsoever, by this Court warranted in the present facts and circumstances of the case. Mr.Gupta, while referring to the impugned judgment, strenuously argued that close scrutiny of the same suggests that each and every aspect of the matter including legal arguments as have been raised by their learned counsel representing the plaintiffs, have been duly and meticulously dealt with by the learned trial Court and as such present appeal deserves to be dismissed. 17. Mr.Gupta, while refuting the submissions having been made on behalf of the appellants that counter claim filed by the defendants could not be allowed in the composite appeal filed by the defendants before the learned Additional District Judge, stated that since learned trial Court vide common judgment dated 11.5.2001 had dismissed counter claim filed by the defendants while allowing the appeal preferred by the present plaintiffs, defendants rightly filed first appeal before learned District Judge laying challenge therein to both passing of decree in favour of the plaintiffs as well as dismissal of counter claim and as such no illegality and infirmity can be found in the judgment passed by learned trial Court below. Mr.Gupta further contended that no appeal can be filed without there being any decree. Learned trial Court while rejecting the counter claim had not drawn any decree and as such no separate appeal could be filed. In this regard reliance has been placed upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in (Smt.)Satya Devi vs. Partap Singh and others, (2006)1 SCC 312. 18. Learned trial Court while rejecting the counter claim had not drawn any decree and as such no separate appeal could be filed. In this regard reliance has been placed upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in (Smt.)Satya Devi vs. Partap Singh and others, (2006)1 SCC 312. 18. Mr.Gupta further contended that bare perusal of revenue record, adduced on record by the parties, clearly demonstrates that previously Bhauru was recorded as tenant in possession of the suit land during settlement under owners; namely; Narain Singh and Ishwar Dass cosharers on payment of 1/4th of the produce as rent i.e. Exs.D-1 and D-2. Similarly, Bhauru is also recorded as tenant under Smt.Gulabi and Ishwar Dass in copy of Jamabandi for the year 1965-66 (Ex.D-2) and thereafter as per Ex.D-3 the plaintiffs purchased the suit land from Smt.Gulabi and Ishwar Dass. Since Bhauru was already coming in possession of the suit land in non-occupancy tenant under Narain Singh and Ishwar Dass on payment of 1/4th share of the produce as rent and he continued to be non-occupancy tenant in possession of the suit land on payment of 1/4th share of the produce of the rent even after purchase of share of Smt.Gulabi by the plaintiffs. Mr.Gupta forcefully contended that since the entries in the revenue record, (since the time of consolidation) were in favour of defendants No.1 to 3 and their predecessor-in-interest was coming in possession of suit land as tenants on payment of 1/4th share of the produce as rent, there is no illegality and infirmity in the judgment passed by the learned first appellate Court, whereby it came to the conclusion that predecessor-in-interest of defendants No.1 to 3 were already in possession of the suit land and as non-occupancy tenants even before suit land was purchased by the plaintiffs in the year 1966. Mr.Gupta further contended that bare perusal of evidence available on record, nowhere suggests that evidence, if any, was either led by the plaintiffs to rebut the entries in revenue record prior to the year 1966, which clearly depicts that predecessor-in-interest of defendants No.1 to 3 were already in possession of the suit as nonoccupancy tenant prior to purchase the suit land by the plaintiffs. 19. 19. Mr.Gupta also contended that it stands duly proved on record that previously Bhauru i.e. predecessor-ininterest of defendants No.1 to 3 was non-occupancy tenant qua the suit land on payment of 1/4th share of produce of rent, but lateron proprietary rights were conferred upon defendants No.1 to 3 qua suit land in terms of Section 104 of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972 (for short Tenancy Act’). But the defendants were wrongly reflected as purchasers of the suit land in the revenue record; whereas it is proved that the defendants and their predecessors-ininterest were coming in possession of the suit land as nonoccupancy tenants. Hence, the entries in the revenue record showing the plaintiffs as owners and defendants No.1 to 3 as were apparently wrong, whereas defendants No.1 to 3 had become owners of the suit land as per Section 104 of the Tenancy Act. In view of aforesaid submissions, Mr.Gupta prayed for dismissal of the present appeal. 20. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record of the case. 21. Keeping in view the specific objection with regard to maintainability of appeal filed by the defendants under Section 96 CPC read with Section 21 of the H.P. Courts Act before the learned Additional District Judge, wherein defendants laid challenge to the judgment and decree dated 11.5.2001 passed by learned Sub Judge Ist Class, Ghumarwin passed in Civil Suit No.214/1 of 1992, it would be appropriate for this Court to take substantial question No.2, which is reproduced below, for consideration at the first instance:- 2. Whether the Ld.Addl.District Judge has committed illegality in allowing the appeal and decreeing the counter claim of the respondents-defendants whereas separate appeal against the dismissal of counter claim has not been filed by the respondents? 22. It is undisputed before this Court that present appellants-plaintiffs filed a suit for declaration and permanent injunction against the respondents-defendants specifically on the averments which have been narrated in the earlier part of the judgment. It is also matter of record that in the aforesaid Civil Suit No.214/1 of 1992, present defendants-respondents filed counter claims alongwith the written statement. 23. It is undisputed before this Court that present appellants-plaintiffs filed a suit for declaration and permanent injunction against the respondents-defendants specifically on the averments which have been narrated in the earlier part of the judgment. It is also matter of record that in the aforesaid Civil Suit No.214/1 of 1992, present defendants-respondents filed counter claims alongwith the written statement. 23. Perusal of the counter claims filed on behalf of the defendants-respondents suggests that defendants- respondents valued their counter claims at the rate of Rs.200/- for the purpose of court fee and jurisdiction and fixed court fee of Rs.20/- on the counter claim. Careful perusal of record of trial Court below further suggests that present appellants-plaintiffs also filed replication-cumwritten statement to the counter claims filed by the respondents-defendants. 24. However, fact remains that learned trial Court, after framing issues, as have been reproduced above, passed judgment and decree dated 11.5.2001, whereby suit of the present appellants-plaintiffs was partly decreed and counter claims filed by the respondents-defendants were dismissed. Operative part of the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court suggests that learned trial Court decreed the suit of the plaintiff for declaration as well as permanent prohibitory injunction partly by declaring the plaintiffs to be the owners in possession of the suit land alongwith defendant No.4. Since defendants No.1 to 3 could not establish their tenancy as well as possession, the plea of tenancy raised by the defendants was rejected. Learned trial Court further decreed the suit of the plaintiff for permanent prohibitory injunction restraining defendants No.1 to 3 from causing any interference in the suit land. Learned trial Court after dismissing the suit of the plaintiffs against defendant No.4 also dismissed counter claims filed by the defendants, whereby defendants-respondents had sought declaration that they are owners in possession over the suit land. 25. Learned trial Court on the basis of judgment and decree, as referred above, also drawn decree in suit for possession in terms of Order 20 Rules 9 & 10 CPC specifically ordering therein that suit of the plaintiffs for declaration as well as permanent prohibitory injunction is partly decreed to the effect that plaintiffs are hereby declared as owners in possession of the suit land alongwith defendant No.4. Careful perusal of decree, as referred, hereinabove, suggests that it also stands mentioned, “Hence, suit against defendant No.4 fails and is hereby dismissed and the counterclaim filed by the defendants is also hereby dismissed”. But, learned trial Court failed to draw separate decree as far as dismissal of counter claims filed by the defendants is concerned. 26. Defendants-respondents, being aggrieved with the aforesaid judgment and decree, approached the learned District Judge by way of appeal under Section 96 CPC read with Section 21 of H.P. Courts Act. At this stage, it would be appropriate to reproduce cause title/head-note of appeal preferred by the defendants-respondents before the learned District Judge, which reads thus: “Civil appeal Under Section 96 C.P.C. read with section 21 of the HP Courts Act against the decree and judgment dated 11.5.2001 in Civil Case No.214/1 of 1992, of Sh.Purender Vidya, Sub Judge Ist Class Ghumarwin, by which the learned Sub Judge has decreed the suit filed by plaintiffs i.e. respondents No.1 to 4, against the appellants. Appeal for setting aside the decree and judgment passed by the learned Sub Judge and to dismiss the suit of the plaintiffs.” 27. Careful perusal of aforesaid cause title nowhere suggests that defendants-respondents, while filing appeal, assailing therein judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court, specifically prayed for allowing the counter claims. Though record reveals that in prayer clause defendants-respondents, while seeking quashing and setting aside the judgment and decree dated 11.5.2001 passed by learned Sub Judge also prayed that counter claim filed by defendants may be decreed with costs. 28. Before adverting to the submissions having been made on behalf of the learned counsel representing both the parties, it would be appropriate to refer to relevant provisions of law applicable in the present case i.e. Order 8 Rule 6A: “6A. 28. Before adverting to the submissions having been made on behalf of the learned counsel representing both the parties, it would be appropriate to refer to relevant provisions of law applicable in the present case i.e. Order 8 Rule 6A: “6A. Counter claim by defendant.- (1) A defendant in a suit may, in addition to his right of pleading a set off under rule 6, set up, by way of counter claim against the claim of the plaintiff, any right or claim in respect of a cause of action accruing to the defendant against the plaintiff either before or after the filing of suit but before the defendant has delivered his defence or before the time limited for delivering his defence has expired, whether such counter claim is in the nature of a claim for damages or not: Provided that such counter claim shall not exceed the pecuniary limits of the jurisdiction of the court. (2) Such counter claim shall have the same effect as a cross suit so as to enable the court to pronounce a final judgment in the same suit, both on the original claim and on the counter claim. (3) The plaintiff shall be at liberty to file a written statement in answer to the counter claim of the defendant within such period as may be fixed by the court. (4) The counter claim shall be treated as a plaint and governed by the rules applicable to plaints.” 29. Aforesaid provisions of law entitles defendants in a suit to set up counter claims against the claim of the plaintiffs in respect of cause of action accruing to them against the plaintiffs either before or after filing the suit, but before defendants files their defence or before the time stipulated for delivering the defence is expired. Needless to say that aforesaid right of filing counter claim is in addition to his right of pleading as set up in Rule 6. Further perusal of aforesaid provisions of law suggests that counter claim, if any, filed on behalf of the defendants would be treated as a plaint and same would be governed by Rules applicable to the plaint. Similarly, counter claims filed on behalf of the defendants would have same effect as a cross suit so as to enable the Court to pronounce a final judgment in the same suit, both on the original claim and the counter claim. Similarly, counter claims filed on behalf of the defendants would have same effect as a cross suit so as to enable the Court to pronounce a final judgment in the same suit, both on the original claim and the counter claim. 30. Similarly, Rule 6A(3) enables the plaintiff to file a written statement, if any, to the counter claim filed by the defendants. Rule 6D specifically provides that in case suit of the plaintiff is stayed, discontinued or dismissed, the counter claim filed on behalf of the defendant would nevertheless be proceeded with. 31. Similarly, Rule 6E provides that if plaintiff fails to file reply to the counter claim made by the defendant, the Court may pronounce judgment against the plaintiff in relation to the counter-claim made against him, or make such order in relation to the counter-claim as it deems fit. It would be relevant here to refer to Order VIII Rule 6F: “6F. Relief to defendant where counterclaim succeeds.- Where in any suit a setoff or counter-claim is established as a defence against the plaintiffs claim and any balance is found due to the plaintiff or the defendant, as the case may be , the Court may give judgment to the party entitled to such balance.” 32. Perusal of aforesaid Order VIII Rule 6F clearly suggests that where in any suit a set-off or counter claim is established as a defence against the plaintiffs’ claim and any balance is found due to the plaintiff or the defendant, Court may give judgment to the party entitled to such balance. Further perusal of Order VIII Rule 6G suggests that no pleadings, if any, subsequent to the written statement filed by a defendant other than by way of defence to set up a claim can be presented except with the leave of Court. 33. Under Order VIII Rule 10 when any party fails to file written statement as required under rule 1 or rule 9 within the stipulated time, the Court shall pronounce judgment against him, or make such order in relation to the suit as it thinks fit and on the pronouncement of such judgment a decree shall be drawn up. 34. 33. Under Order VIII Rule 10 when any party fails to file written statement as required under rule 1 or rule 9 within the stipulated time, the Court shall pronounce judgment against him, or make such order in relation to the suit as it thinks fit and on the pronouncement of such judgment a decree shall be drawn up. 34. Careful perusal of aforesaid provisions of law clearly suggests that counter claim, if any, preferred by the defendant in the suit is in nature of cross suit and even if suit is dismissed counter claim would remain alive for adjudication. Since counter claim is in nature of cross suit, defendant is required to pay the requisite court fee on the valuation of counter claim. It has been specifically provided in the aforesaid provisions that the plaintiff is obliged to file a written statement qua counter claim and in case of default court can pronounce the judgment against the plaintiff in relation to the counter claim put forth by the defendant as it has an independent status. As per Rule 6A(2), the Court is required to pronounce a final judgment in the same suit both on the original claim and also on the counter-claim. 35. In the instant case, as has been discussed in detail, defendants filed counter claims which were finally dismissed by the trial Court by stating that defendants No.1 to 3 could not establish their tenancy as well as possession and accordingly they were restrained from interfering in the possession of the plaintiffs as well as defendant No.4. 36. In the present case, as clearly emerged from the judgment passed by the learned trial Court, learned trial Court effectively determined the rights of the parties on the basis of counter claim as well as written statement thereto filed by the respective parties and as such it attained the status of decree. It would be profitable here to reproduce definition of the term `decree’ as contained in Section 2(2) of CPC:- “2.(2) “decree” means the formal expression of an adjudication which, so far as regards the Court expressing it, conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit and may be either preliminary or final. It shall be deemed to include the rejection of a plaint and the determination of any question within [1][ * * *] Section 144, but shall not include – (a) any adjudication from which an appeal lies as an appeal from an order, or (b) any order of dismissal for default. Explanation- A decree is preliminary when further proceedings have to be taken before the suit can be completely disposed of. It is final when such adjudication completely disposes of the suit. It may be partly preliminary and partly final;” 37. Close scrutiny of aforesaid definition of “decree” clearly suggests that there should be formal expression of adjudication by the Court while determining the rights of the parties with regard to controversy in the suit, which would also include the rejection of plaint. Similarly, determination should be conclusive determination resulting in a formal expression of the adjudication. It is settled principle that once the matter in controversy has received judicial determination, the suit results in a decree, either in favour of the plaintiff or in favour of the defendant. 38. In the present case, as has been observed above, learned trial Court while decreeing the suit of the plaintiff specifically dismissed the counter claim on the ground that defendants were unable to prove their possession and tenancy; meaning thereby that counter claim filed by defendants was duly adjudicated and decided on merits by the trial Court holding that defendants No.1 to 3 have not been able to prove their tenancy and possession qua the suit land. At the cost of repetition, it is once again stated that by way of counter claim defendants claimed that they may be declared owners in possession of the suit land which was negatived by the trial Court. 39. In the aforesaid background, this Court while examining the statements having been made on behalf of the counsel representing the appellants-plaintiffs, found sufficient force in the arguments raised on behalf of appellants that learned first appellate Court could not have entertained composite appeal as preferred in the present case by the defendant specifically laying challenge therein to the judgment and decree passed by the Court, whereby the suit was decreed and counter claim was dismissed. 40. 40. When learned trial Court dismissed the counter claim by expressing opinion that defendants No.1 to 3 were not able to prove their tenancy and possession, it can be termed as formal expression of adjudication as far as counter claim is concerned. Definition of “decree” clearly suggests that there has to be formal expression of adjudication. Accordingly, in the present case, as is seen from the judgment passed by the learned trial Court, learned trial Court specifically observed while rejecting the counter claim that “defendants No.1 to 3 could not establish their tenancy as well as possession, therefore, the plea of tenancy raised by the defendants itself sufficient to cause serious threat in the possession of the plaintiffs”. Admittedly, in the present case, learned trial Court has not drawn formal decree while rejecting counter claims filed by defendants, but if the judgment in its entirety passed by the Court is seen, it clearly emerge that rights have finally been adjudicated. Once as per provisions of law counter claims are in nature of cross-suit, learned trial Court below ought to have passed separate decree specifically dismissing the counter claim of the defendants. But in the present case, where no separate decree was passed while rejecting counter claim, defendants cannot be allowed to state that since there was no formal decree passed by trial Court, there was no occasion for them to file separate appeal after paying requisite court fee. It has been held in catena of cases that Court may or may not draw formal decree, but if by virtue of order of Court rights are finally decided/adjudicated, it would assume the status of decree. Apart from above, aforesaid issue, as is being determined in the instant appeal, is no more res intigra. 41. In this regard, it would be appropriate to place reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Rajni Rani and Another vs. Khairati Lal and Others, (2015)2 SCC 682 , wherein the Court has held as under:- “3. After the counter-claim was filed, Defendants 1 and 2 filed an application for dismissal of the counter-claim on the foundation that the same did not merit consideration as it was barred by Order 2, Rule 2 CPC. After the counter-claim was filed, Defendants 1 and 2 filed an application for dismissal of the counter-claim on the foundation that the same did not merit consideration as it was barred by Order 2, Rule 2 CPC. It was set forth in the application that a suit for declaration was earlier filed by the present appellants along with others against the defendants and a decree was passed in their favour on 21.9.2002 whereby it was held that the present appellants and some of the respondents were entitled to 1/4th share each. The judgment and decree passed in the said suit was assailed in appeal and the appellate court modified the judgment and decree dated 21.9.2002 vide judgment dated 15.2.2003 holding that each one of them was entitled to 1/9th share and the said modification was done on the ground that the property was ancestral in nature and the sisters had their shares. After disposal of the appeal, one of the sisters filed a declaratory suit to the effect that she is the owner in possession of land in respect of 1/9th share in the suit land and in the said suit a counter-claim was filed by Defendants 12 to 14 stating that they had become owners in possession of the suit property on the basis of a properly registered Will dated 18.5.1995 executed by Jeth Ram. In the application it was set forth that the counterclaim had been filed in collusion with the plaintiff as the plea of claiming any status under the Will dated 18.5.1995 was never raised in the earlier suit. It was urged that the plea having not been raised in the earlier suit, it could not have been raised by way of a counter-claim in the second suit being barred by the principles of Order 2, Rule 2 of CPC. 4. The learned trial Judge adverted to the lis in the first suit, the factum of not raising the plea with regard to Will in the earlier suit and came to hold that the counter-claim could not be advanced solely on the ground that the existence of the Will had come to the knowledge of the defendants only in the year 2003. Being of this view, the learned trial Judge allowed the application filed by the Defendant 1 and 2 and resultantly dismissed the counter-claim filed by the Defendant 12 to 14 vide order dated 13.10.2010. Being of this view, the learned trial Judge allowed the application filed by the Defendant 1 and 2 and resultantly dismissed the counter-claim filed by the Defendant 12 to 14 vide order dated 13.10.2010. 5. The legal substantiality of the aforesaid order was called in question in Civil Revision No. 900 of 2011 preferred under Article 227 of the Constitution of India wherein the High Court taking note of the previous factual background came to hold that the learned trial Judge had failed to appreciate that the Will dated 18.5.1995 executed by Jeth Ram, the father of Defendant 12 to 14, was alive at the time of adjudication of the earlier suit and hence, the said Will could not have taken aid of during his lifetime. The aforesaid analysis persuaded the learned Single Judge to set aside the order passed by the learned trial Judge. However, the Single Judge observed that it would be open to the plaintiff to raise all pleas against the counter-claim. 6. We have heard Mr. Arvinder Arora, learned counsel for the appellants and Mr. S.S. Nara, learned counsel for the respondents. 7. At the very outset, we must make it clear that we are not inclined to advert to the defensibility or justifiability of the order of rejection of the counter-claim by the learned trial Judge or the annulment or invalidation of the said order by the High Court. We shall only dwell upon the issue whether the revision petition could have been entertained or was it obligatory on the part of respondents herein to assail the order by way of appeal. 8. The submission of Mr. Arora, learned counsel appearing for the appellants is that the counterclaim is in the nature of a plaint and when it is dismissed it has to be assailed by way of appeal before the competent forum by paying the requisite court fee on the basis of the claim and such an order cannot be set at naught in exercise of supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court. Learned counsel for the respondents, per contra, would contend that such an order is revisable and, in any case, when cause of justice has been subserved this Court should not interfere in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. 9. Learned counsel for the respondents, per contra, would contend that such an order is revisable and, in any case, when cause of justice has been subserved this Court should not interfere in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. 9. To appreciate the controversy in proper perspective it is imperative to appreciate the scheme relating to the counter-claim that has been introduced by CPC (amendment) Act 104 of 1976 with effect from 1.2.1977. 9.1 Order 8, Rule 6A deals with counter-claim by the defendant. Rule 6A(2) stipulates thus:- “6-A(2) Such counter-claim shall have the same effect as a cross-suit so as to enable the Court to pronounce a final judgment in the same suit, both on the original claim and on the counter-claim.” 9.2. Rule 6A(3) enables the plaintiff to file a written statement. The said provision reads as follows:- “6-A(3) The plaintiff shall be at liberty to file a written statement in answer to the counterclaim of the defendant within such period as may be fixed by the Court.” 9.3. Rule 6A(4) of the said Rule postulates that: “6-A.(4) The counter-claim shall be treated as a plaint and governed by rules applicable to a plaint. 9.4 Rule 6B provides how the counter-claim is to be stated and Rule 6C deals with exclusion of counter-claim. 9.5 Rules 6-D deals with the situation when the suit is discontinued. It is as follows:- “6-D. Effect of discontinuance of suit. – If in any case in which the defendant sets up a counter-claim, the suit of the plaintiff is stayed, discontinued or dismissed, the counter-claim may nevertheless be proceeded with.” 9.6. On a plain reading of the aforesaid provisions it is quite limpid that a counterclaim preferred by the defendant in a suit is in the nature of a cross-suit and by a statutory command even if the suit is dismissed, counter-claim shall remain alive for adjudication. For making a counter-claim entertainable by the court, the defendant is required to pay the requisite court fee on the valuation of the counter-claim. The plaintiff is obliged to file a written statement and in case there is default the court can pronounce the Judgment against the plaintiff in relation to the counter-claim put forth by the defendant as it has an independent status. The purpose of the scheme relating to counter-claim is to avoid multiplicity of the proceedings. The plaintiff is obliged to file a written statement and in case there is default the court can pronounce the Judgment against the plaintiff in relation to the counter-claim put forth by the defendant as it has an independent status. The purpose of the scheme relating to counter-claim is to avoid multiplicity of the proceedings. When a counter-claim is dismissed on being adjudicated on merits it forecloses the rights of the defendant. As per Rule 6A(2) the court is required to pronounce a final judgment in the same suit both on the original claim and also on the counter-claim. The seminal purpose is to avoid piece-meal adjudication. The plaintiff can file an application for exclusion of a counter-claim and can do so at any time before issues are settled in relation to the counterclaim. We are not concerned with such a situation. 10. In the instant case, the counter-claim has been dismissed finally by expressing an opinion that it is barred by principles of Order 2, Rule 2 of the CPC. The question is what status is to be given to such an expression of opinion. In this context we may refer with profit the definition of the term decree as contained in section 2(2) of CPC:- “2. (2) “decree” means the formal expression of an adjudication which, so far as regards the Court expressing it, conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit and may be either preliminary or final. It shall be deemed to include the rejection of a plaint and the determination of any question within[ [* * *] Section 144, but shall not include – (a) any adjudication from which an appeal lies as an appeal from an order, or (b) any order of dismissal for default. Explanation- A decree is preliminary when further proceedings have to be taken before the suit can be completely disposed of. It is final when such adjudication completely disposes of the suit. It may be partly preliminary and partly final;” 11. In R. Rathinavel Chettiar and Another v. V. Sivaraman, (1999)4 SCC 89 , dealing with the basic components of a decree, it has been held thus: (SCC pp.93-94, paras 10-11) “10. Thus a “decree” has to have the following essential elements, namely: (i) There must have been an adjudication in a suit. In R. Rathinavel Chettiar and Another v. V. Sivaraman, (1999)4 SCC 89 , dealing with the basic components of a decree, it has been held thus: (SCC pp.93-94, paras 10-11) “10. Thus a “decree” has to have the following essential elements, namely: (i) There must have been an adjudication in a suit. (ii) The adjudication must have determined the rights of the parties in respect of, or any of the matters in controversy. (iii) Such determination must be a conclusive determination resulting in a formal expression of the adjudication. 11. Once the matter in controversy has received judicial determination, the suit results in a decree either in favour of the plaintiff or in favour of the defendant.” 12. From the aforesaid enunciation of law, it is manifest that when there is a conclusive determination of rights of parties upon adjudication, the said decision in certain circumstances can have the status of a decree. In the instant case, as has been narrated earlier, the counter-claim has been adjudicated and decided on merits holding that it is barred by principle of Order 2, Rule 2 CPC. The claim of the defendants has been negatived. In Jag Mohan Chawla v. Dera Radha Swami Satsang, (1996)4 SCC 699 dealing with the concept of counter-claim, the Court has opined thus (SCC p.703, para 5) “5... is treated as a cross-suit with all the indicia of pleadings as a plaint including the duty to aver his cause of action and also payment of the requisite court fee thereon. Instead of relegating the defendant to an independent suit, to avert multiplicity of the proceeding and needless protection (sic protraction), the legislature intended to try both the suit and the counter-claim in the same suit as suit and cross-suit and have them disposed of in the same trial. In other words, a defendant can claim any right by way of a counter-claim in respect of any cause of action that has accrued to him even though it is independent of the cause of action averred by the plaintiff and have the same cause of action adjudicated without relegating the defendant to file a separate suit.” 13. In other words, a defendant can claim any right by way of a counter-claim in respect of any cause of action that has accrued to him even though it is independent of the cause of action averred by the plaintiff and have the same cause of action adjudicated without relegating the defendant to file a separate suit.” 13. Keeping in mind the conceptual meaning given to the counter-claim and the definitive character assigned to it, there can be no shadow of doubt that when the counter-claim filed by the defendants is adjudicated and dismissed, finality is attached to it as far as the controversy in respect of the claim put forth by the defendants is concerned. Nothing in that regard survives as far as the said defendants are concerned. If the definition of a decree is appropriately understood it conveys that there has to be a formal expression of an adjudication as far as that Court is concerned. The determination should conclusively put to rest the rights of the parties in that sphere. When an opinion is expressed holding that the counter-claim is barred by principles of Order 2, Rule 2 CPC, it indubitably adjudicates the controversy as regards the substantive right of the defendants who had lodged the counterclaim. It cannot be regarded as an ancillary or incidental finding recorded in the suit. 14. In this context, we may fruitfully refer to a three-Judge Bench decision in M/s. Ram Chand Spg. & Wvg. Mills v. M/s. Bijli Cotton Mills (P) Ltd., AIR 1967 SC 1344 wherein their Lordships was dealing with what constituted a final order to be a decree. The thrust of the controversy therein was that whether an order passed by the executing court setting aside an auction sale as a nullity is an appealable order or not. 15. The Court referred to the decisions in Jethanand and Sons v. State of U.P., AIR 1961 SC 794 and Abdul Rahman v. D.K. Cassim and Sons, AIR 1933 PC 58 and proceeded to state as follows: (Ram Chand Spg. & Wvg. Case, AIR p. 1347, para 13) “13. 15. The Court referred to the decisions in Jethanand and Sons v. State of U.P., AIR 1961 SC 794 and Abdul Rahman v. D.K. Cassim and Sons, AIR 1933 PC 58 and proceeded to state as follows: (Ram Chand Spg. & Wvg. Case, AIR p. 1347, para 13) “13. In deciding the question whether the order is a final order determining the rights of parties and, therefore, falling within the definition of a decree in Section 2(2), it would often become necessary to view it from the point of view of both the parties in the present case — the judgment-debtor and the auction purchaser. So far as the judgment-debtor is concerned the order obviously does not finally decide his rights since a fresh sale is ordered. The position however, of the auction-purchaser is different. When an auction-purchaser is declared to be the highest bidder and the auction is declared to have been concluded certain rights accrue to him and he becomes entitled to conveyance of the property through the court on his paying the balance unless the sale is not confirmed by the court. Where an application is made to set aside the auction sale as a nullity, if the court sets it aside either by an order on such an application or suo motu the only question arising in such a case as between him and the judgment- debtor is whether the auction was a nullity by reason of any violation of Order 21, Rule 84 or other similar mandatory provisions. If the court sets aside the auction sale there is an end of the matter and no further question remains to be decided so far as he and the judgment-debtor are concerned. Even though a resale in such a case is ordered such an order cannot be said to be an interlocutory order as the entire matter is finally disposed of. It is thus manifest that the order setting aside the auction sale amounts to a final decision relating to the rights of the parties in dispute in that particular civil proceeding, such a proceeding being one in which the rights and liabilities of the parties arising from the auction sale are in dispute and wherein they are finally determined by the court passing the order setting it aside. The parties in such a case are only the judgment-debtor and the auction-purchaser, the only issue between them for determination being whether the auction sale is liable to be set aside. There is an end of that matter when the court passes the order and that order is final as it finally, determines the rights and liabilities of the parties viz. the judgment-debtor and the auction-purchaser in regard to that sale, as after that order nothing remains to be determined as between them.” After so stating, the Court ruled that the order in question was a final order determining the rights of the parties and, therefore, fell within the definition of a decree under Section 2(2) read with Section 47 and was an appealable order. 16. We have referred to the aforesaid decisions to highlight that there may be situations where an order can get the status of a decree. A Court may draw up a formal decree or may not, but if by virtue of the order of the Court, the rights have finally been adjudicated, irrefutably it would assume the status of a decree. As is evincible, in the case at hand, the counter-claim which is in the nature of a cross-suit has been dismissed. Nothing else survives for the defendants who had filed the counter-claim. Therefore, we have no hesitation in holding that the order passed by the learned trial Judge has the status of a decree and the challenge to the same has to be made before the appropriate forum where appeal could lay by paying the requisite fee. It could not have been unsettled by the High Court in exercise of the power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Ergo, the order passed by the High Court is indefensible.” 42. After perusing aforesaid judgment passed by Hon’ble Apex Court, this Court need not to elaborate further on the issue at hand because Hon’ble Apex Court has categorically held that if by virtue of order of the Court rights have finally been adjudicated, it would assume the status of decree. Hon’ble Apex Court has also stated that Court may or may not draw a formal decree but if rights are finally adjudicated, it would assume the status of a decree. Hon’ble Apex Court has also stated that Court may or may not draw a formal decree but if rights are finally adjudicated, it would assume the status of a decree. Learned Apex Court has further held that in such like situation order passed by trial Judge has the status of decree and challenge to the same has to be made before the appropriate forum where appeal could lay by paying the requisite fee. 43. Accordingly, in view of the detailed discussion made hereinabove as well as law laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court, this Court sees no force in the contention put forth on behalf of the counsel representing the defendants that in the absence of specific decree drawn by learned trial Court at the time of dismissal of their counter claim, defendants could not file separate appeal. Substantial question is answered accordingly. 44. Since this Court is of the view that learned first appellate Court has erred in entertaining the composite appeal filed on behalf of the defendants specifically laying challenge to the judgment passed by the learned trial Court, wherein suit of the plaintiffs was partly decreed and the counter claim filed by the defendants was dismissed, there is no need to look into the other substantial questions of law as the same have become redundant in view of the findings returned by the Court qua substantial question No.2. 45. As far as judgments relied upon by the learned counsel appearing for the respondents-defendants are concerned, this Court is of the view that the same are not applicable in the present facts and circumstances of the case, especially in view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court (supra). 46. In view of the detailed discussion made hereinabove, this appeal is allowed. The judgment passed by the learned first appellate Court below is quashed and set aside and that of the learned trial Court is upheld and the suit filed by the plaintiffs is decreed. There shall be no order as to costs. Interim order, if any, stands vacated. All miscellaneous applications are disposed of.