JUDGMENT : Sandeep Sharma, J. Instant Regular Second Appeal filed under Section 100 of the Code of Civil procedure is directed against the judgment and decree dated 30.11.2002, passed by learned Additional District Judge, Nahan, District Sirmaur, H.P. in Civil Appeal No. 49-N/13 of 2002, affirming the judgment and decree dated 8.5.2002, passed by learned Senior Sub Judge, Sirmaur District at Nahan, H.P. in Civil Suit No. 253/1 of 2001/96, whereby suit filed by plaintiffs was decreed by declaring him to be owner in possession of entire suit land including disputed share of Shri Mohar singh (Original mortgagor) comprised under Khewat No. 8, Khatauni Nos. 25, 26 and 27, total measuring 23-16 bighas as per jamabandi for the year 1992-93 situated in village Chamba Sheel, Tehsil Nahan, District Sirmaur, H.P. Learned trial Court while allowing aforesaid suit of the plaintiffs also declared revenue entries showing defendant i.e. State of H.P. as owner of mortgagor of suit land to the extent of ½ share, illegal, null and void and not binding upon the right of the plaintiffs. 2. Briefly stated facts, as emerged from the record are that the plaintiffs (hereinafter after referred to as the ‘respondents-plaintiffs’) filed suit for declaration against defendant (hereinafter referred to as the ‘appellant-defendant’) averring therein that they are owner in possession of suit land comprised in Khewat No. 8, Khatauni Nos. 25, 26 & 27, measuring 23 bighas and 16 biswas as per jamabandi for the year 1992-93 situated in village Chamba Sheel, Tehsil Nahan, District Sirmaur, H.P. , which has been recorded in the column of ownership to the extent of ½ share in the name of the appellant-defendant and the remaining ½ share in the names of the plaintiffs-respondents. Plaintiffs-respondents further averred that half share of the suit land was owned by predecessor-in interest of plaintiffs-respondents, namely, Shri Dharmu & Bir Singh sons of Shri Ganga Ram to the extent of the of ½ share and the remaining ½ share was owned by Shri Mohar Singh son of Shri Mangal Singh. As per plaintiffs-respondents, Shri Mohar Singh mortgaged his share with the predecessor-in-interest of plaintiffs-respondents vide mutation No. 16 attested on 20th Chait BK Sambat 1970. As per plaintiffs-respondents, Shri Mohar Singh mortgaged his share with the predecessor-in-interest of plaintiffs-respondents vide mutation No. 16 attested on 20th Chait BK Sambat 1970. Plaintiffs-respondents further contended that predecessor-in-interest of plaintiffs-respondents remained in possession of entire suit land and mortgage was never redeemed either by Shri Mohar Singh or his successor-in interest, as a result of which, the plaintiffs-respondents, who succeeded the suit land, became owner of the entire suit land. Plaintiffs-respondents further contended that half share of Shri Mohar Singh in the suit land was inherited by Smt. Sandla Devi widow of Shri Mohar Singh, but since she also failed to get the mortgage of the suit land redeemed till 31.12.1970, her right to get the suit land redeemed got extinguished, as a result of which, plaintiffs-respondents became absolute owner of the suit land. Plaintiffs-respondents further alleged that Smt. Sandla Devi in connivance with the appellant-defendant surrendered half share of the suit land in favour of appellant-defendant, as a result of which, appellant-defendant was shown mortgagor of the suit land, but fact remains that entire suit land was in possession of the plaintiffs-respondents and same was wrongly shown in the ownership of Smt. Sandla Devi after 31.12.1970. In the aforesaid background, plaintiffs-respondents filed suit for declaration as has been detailed hereinabove. 3. Present appellant-defendant by way of written statement refuted the claim of the plaintiffs-respondents by stating that total area of holding was 8-9 bighas whereas now the plaintiffs-respondents are claiming ownership and possession of 23-16 bighas. Appellant-defendant further contended that plaintiffs-respondents got the revenue entries changed in their favour in connivance with the revenue officials by playing fraud upon the appellant-defendant. Appellant defendant further stated that mortgage created by Shri Mohar Singh in favour of predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs respondents was without any share in shamlat, as such, plaintiffs-respondents cannot be treated owner in possession of 23-16 bighas of land. In the aforesaid background, appellant defendant sought dismissal of the suit filed by the plaintiffs respondents. 4. Plaintiffs-respondents by way of replication reiterated its case as made out in plaint and denied all the averments contained in the written statement. Learned trial Court on the basis of pleadings available on record framed following issues on 11.12.1997:- “1. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for the decree of declaration, as alleged? …OPP 2. Whether the suit is not maintainable in the present form? …OPD 3. Learned trial Court on the basis of pleadings available on record framed following issues on 11.12.1997:- “1. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for the decree of declaration, as alleged? …OPP 2. Whether the suit is not maintainable in the present form? …OPD 3. Whether plaintiff has no enforceable cause of action? OPD 4. Whether the suit is not within time? OPD 5. Whether this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the present suit? OPD 6. Whether the plaintiffs have no locus-standi to file the present suit? OPD 7. Whether the suit is not properly valued for the purpose of court fees and jurisdiction? OPD 8. Whether no valid and legal notice as required under Section 80, C.P.C. served upon the defendant? If so, its effect? OPD. 9. Relief.” 5. Thereafter, vide judgment and decree dated 5.11.1999, learned trial Court decreed the suit of the plaintiffs respondents. Present appellant-defendant i.e. State of H.P. being aggrieved with the passing of judgment and decree dated 5.11.1999, preferred an appeal before Appellate Court i.e. learned District Judge, Sirmaur at Nahan. The learned Appellate Court vide judgment dated 15.11.2001 set aside the impugned judgment and decree dated 5.11.1999 and remanded the case to the learned trial Court for fresh trial after recasting issue No. 1, which is as under:- “Whether the entire suit land was mortgaged with possession with the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs and as such they are entitled to the decree for declaration, as prayed for? …OPP” 6. Accordingly, learned trial Court in terms of judgment dated 15.11.2001 called upon the parties to lead evidence on additional re-casted issue No. 1, but fact remains that no oral or documentary evidence was led on record by the parties. Learned trial Court on the basis of evidence adduced on record by the respective parties, decreed the suit of the plaintiffs-respondents, as has been detailed hereinabove. 7. Being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the impugned judgment passed by learned trial Court, present appellant defendant filed an appeal before learned Additional District Judge, Sirmaur District at Nahan, which came to be registered as Civil Appeal No. 49-N/13 of 2002 and learned Additional District Judge vide judgment 30.11.2002 dismissed the appeal preferred by the present appellant-defendant and upheld the trial Court judgment dated 8.5.2002. 8. Hence, present Regular Second Appeal by present appellant-defendant praying therein for setting aside the judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below. 9. 8. Hence, present Regular Second Appeal by present appellant-defendant praying therein for setting aside the judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below. 9. This Regular Second Appeal was admitted on the following substantial questions of law:- “1 That the Judgment and Decree dated 30.11.2002 passed by Addl. District Judge, Nahan, District Sirmaur by affording the Judgment and Decree passed by Senior Sub-Judge, Nahan dated 8.5.2002 is against the provision of H.P. Mortgage Redemption Act, 1971 with the result the Judgment and decree passed by the Ld. Courts below are liable to be set aside. 2. That the both Courts below has acted beyond the jurisdiction vested in it under Law with the result the Judgment and decree passed by the Courts below are not tenable in the eyes of law and needs to be set-aside. 3. Whether the Judgment and decree passed by the Courts below are exercised the jurisdiction nor vested in it as the jurisdiction cannot be assumed by the consent of the parties and specific findings were required for the issues framed by the Courts below. Particularly issue No. 5 with the result, the judgment and decree passed by the Courts below are liable to be set aside. 4. Whether the both Courts below have mis-read and misinterpreted the evidence and documents of the parties with the result the judgment and decree passed by Courts below are liable to be set aside. 5. Whether the Courts below were having jurisdiction to triable beyond his scope of jurisdiction and to decide the matter where it was neither the pleading of the necessary party nor it was evidence of the party at the case not pleaded and proved.” 10. Shri Rupinder Singh Thakur, learned Additional Advocate General representing the appellant-defendant vehemently argued that judgments passed by both the Courts below are not sustainable as the same are not based upon the correct appreciation of evidence available on record, as such, same deserves to be quashed and set aside. Mr. Thakur forcefully contended that both the Courts below have gravely erred in exercising their jurisdiction, which is not vested in it, specifically in the matter arising / falling within the scope of H.P. Mortgage Redemption Act, 1971 and H.P. Restitution of Mortgaged Lands Act, 1976. As per Mr. Mr. Thakur forcefully contended that both the Courts below have gravely erred in exercising their jurisdiction, which is not vested in it, specifically in the matter arising / falling within the scope of H.P. Mortgage Redemption Act, 1971 and H.P. Restitution of Mortgaged Lands Act, 1976. As per Mr. Thakur, Collector of District u/s 2 (2) and 13 of the Acts decided the matter arising out of this matter and whereas the jurisdiction of Civil Court is completely barred, as such, he prayed for quashing and setting aside of the impugned judgments passed by both the Courts below. As per Mr. Thakur, since plaintiffs-respondents in Civil Suit has questioned the validity of vestment of land, which admittedly falls under Himachal Pradesh Restitution of Mortgaged Lands Act, 1976, jurisdiction of the Civil Court is completely barred under Section 13 of the Act No. 20 of 1976, as such, judgments passed by both the Courts below are quashed and set aside being illegal. 11. Mr. Thakur further contended that both the Courts below have traveled beyond the jurisdiction and has not decided the matter on the question of jurisdiction and Courts below have failed to return findings on issue No. 5 framed by Senior Sub Judge, Nahan, as such, prayed for quashing and setting aside the judgments passed by both the Courts below. Mr. Thakur while concluding his arguments strenuously argued that subject matter decided by the Courts below was pure question of law and issue No. 5 as framed by the learned Senior Sub Judge, Nahan, ought to have been decided as preliminary issue by the Court without adverting to the merits of the case, as such, grave injustice has been caused to the present appellant-defendant. Similarly, Mr. Thakur made this Court to travel through the statements of witnesses adduced on record by the plaintiffs-respondents to demonstrate that plaintiff himself never stepped into witness box though he was alive, at that relevant time, as such, in absence, Courts below should have refrained from granting discretionary relief of declaration. In the aforesaid background, Mr. Thakur prayed that present appeal may be accepted by quashing and setting aside the impugned judgment passed by both the Courts below. 12. Mr. Sanjay Jaswal, counsel representing the plaintiffs-respondents supported the judgments passed by both the Courts below. Mr. In the aforesaid background, Mr. Thakur prayed that present appeal may be accepted by quashing and setting aside the impugned judgment passed by both the Courts below. 12. Mr. Sanjay Jaswal, counsel representing the plaintiffs-respondents supported the judgments passed by both the Courts below. Mr. Jaswal vehemently argued that bare perusal of the impugned judgment passed by First Appellate Court clearly suggests that same is based upon the correct appreciation of evidence adduced on record by the respective parties. He solely with a view to substantiate his aforesaid plea, invited the attention of the Court to the judgments passed by both the Courts below to demonstrate that Courts below have dealt with each and every aspect of the matter meticulously, as such, no interference, whatsoever, of this Court is warranted in the present facts and circumstances of the case. 13. While refuting arguments having been made on behalf of counsel representing the appellant-defendant that Civil Court had no jurisdiction, he invited the attention of this Court to the plaint filed by plaintiffs-respondents, whereby they sought declaration that revenue entries showing appellant defendant as owner with respect to Khewat No. 8, Khatauni No. 25, 26 & 27, measuring 23 bighas and 16 biswas as per jamabandi for the year 1992-93 situated in village Chamba Sheel, Tehsil Nahan, District Sirmaur may be declared illegal, null and void and not binding upon the right of the plaintiffs respondents qua ownership of the suit land. Perusal of plaint, as shown to the Court, clearly suggests that, at no point of time, plaintiffs-respondents in Civil Suit questioned the validity of vestment of land with the appellant-defendant, rather, by way of Civil Suit, plaintiffs-respondents made a prayer to declare revenue entries illegal, null & void showing appellant defendant as owner qua the suit land as per jamabandi for the year 1992-93. 14. Mr. Jaswal further contended that since suit was filed for granting decree of declaration declaring that entries showing appellant-defendant as owner qua the suit land, dispute, if any, as alleged by the appellant-defendant could not be decided in terms of provisions of H.P. Mortgage Redemption Act, 1971 and the Civil Court had all the jurisdiction to look into the controversy at hand. Mr. Mr. Jaswal also invited the attention of the Court to the para 16 of the judgment dated 8.5.2002 passed by learned trial Court to demonstrate that counsel representing appellant-defendant had himself not pressed issue Nos. 4, 5 and 7 and accordingly learned trial Court decided the issue as not pressed against the appellant-defendant. He also invited the attention of this Court to Issue No. 5 “ Whether this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the present suit?, Mr. Jaswal contended that since appellant-defendant themselves not pressed the issue of jurisdiction i.e. Issue No. 5, now it does not lie in the mouth of appellant-defendant to rake up the issue of jurisdiction at this appellate stage. 15. Mr. Jaswal while concluding his arguments also invited the attention of the Court to the evidence led on record by the plaintiffs-respondents to demonstrate that plaintiffs respondents were successful in proving that the revenue entries showing the appellant-defendant i.e. State of H.P. as owner of the suit land to the extent of half share was illegal, null and void and not binding upon the right of the plaintiff, as such, there is no illegality and infirmity in the judgments passed by the Courts below. Mr. Jaswal further contended that this Court has very limited power to re-appreciate the evidence, especially, when both the Courts below have returned concurrent findings on the facts as well as law. In this regard, to substantiate the aforesaid plea, he placed reliance upon the judgment passed by Hon’ble Apex Court in Laxmidevamma and Others Vs. Ranganath and Others, (2015)4 SCC 264 . 16. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record of the case. 17. Careful perusal of substantial questions of law No. 1 to 3, as reproduced hereinabove, suggests that same pertains to jurisdiction of Civil Court to decide controversy at hand and, as such, this Court would be taking up these issues together for consideration at the first instance. 18. It has been vehemently argued on behalf of counsel representing the appellant-defendant that learned First Appellate Court erred in upholding the judgment passed by learned trial Court, especially, when jurisdiction of Civil Court was completely barred in the facts and circumstances of the case. Mr. 18. It has been vehemently argued on behalf of counsel representing the appellant-defendant that learned First Appellate Court erred in upholding the judgment passed by learned trial Court, especially, when jurisdiction of Civil Court was completely barred in the facts and circumstances of the case. Mr. Rupinder Thakur, learned Additional Advocate General, argued that Courts below have fallen in grave error while exercising their jurisdiction whereas this matter was arising / falling within the scope of the Himachal Pradesh Mortgage Redemption Act, 1971 and H.P. Restitution of Mortgaged Lands Act, 1976. Mr. Thakur also contended that plaintiffs in Civil Suit no where questioned the validity of vestment of land, which falls under the H.P. Restitution of Mortgaged Lands Act, 1976 and jurisdiction of the Civil Court was also barred under Section 13 of the Act No. 20 of 1976. 19. But perusal of judgment dated 8.5.2002 passed by learned Senior Sub Judge, District Sirmaur at Nahan clearly suggests that it had framed specific issue with regard to jurisdiction to entertain the present suit, which is as under:- “5.Whether this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the present suit.” 20. Interestingly, as emerged from Para 16 of the judgment rendered by learned trial Court, learned ADA representing defendant-State, at that relevant time, did not press issue No. 4, 5 and 7 and moreover no arguments were addressed on specific issue of jurisdiction as mentioned in Para 16 of the judgment. Accordingly, learned trial Court decided issue Nos. 4, 5 and 7 against the defendant-State being not pressed. 21. This Court is of the view that since issue specifically framed by learned trial Court with regard to jurisdiction of Court was not pressed by appellant-defendant, now it is not open for it to raise the issue of jurisdiction, that too, during the second appeal. Moreover, there is no explanation noted even in the grounds of appeal before this Court while maintaining present appeal that why issue Nos. 4, 5 and 7 were not pressed by learned counsel representing the defendant-State during trial stage, as such, this Court is unable to accept the contention putforth on behalf of counsel representing the appellant-defendant that issue No. 5 framed by trial Court was not taken up for consideration and no findings were returned. 4, 5 and 7 were not pressed by learned counsel representing the defendant-State during trial stage, as such, this Court is unable to accept the contention putforth on behalf of counsel representing the appellant-defendant that issue No. 5 framed by trial Court was not taken up for consideration and no findings were returned. Appellant defendant in its grounds of appeal as well as submission having been made during the arguments specifically stated that judgments passed by Courts below deserves to be quashed and set aside solely on the ground that Courts below miserably failed to return findings qua issue No. 5, but as has been discussed above, issue Nos. 4, 5 and 7, which also includes issue of jurisdiction were not pressed by the present appellant defendant, as such, learned trial Court had no occasion whatsoever, to return findings qua the same. Moreover, as emerged from the record, learned A.D.A., at that relevant time, had not addressed any arguments qua issue of jurisdiction, as such, this Court sees no force in the contention put-forth on behalf of counsel representing the appellant-defendant that issue No. 5 was not dealt with by the learned trial Court while deciding the suit. 22. Moreover, this Court after perusing the relief clause contained in the plaint, is in total disagreement with the contention put-forth on behalf of appellant-defendant that since plaintiffs in civil suit did not question the validity of vestment of land, which falls under H.P. Restitution of Mortgaged Lands Act, 1976, jurisdiction of Civil Court was barred under Section 13 of the Act No. 20 of 1976. The Section 13 of the Act No. 20 of 1976 is reproduced here-in-below:- “13. Jurisdiction of civil courts barred. – No civil court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any claim to enforce any right under a mortgage declared extinguished under this Act, or to question the validity of any proceedings under this Act. The Section 13 of the Act No. 20 of 1976 is reproduced here-in-below:- “13. Jurisdiction of civil courts barred. – No civil court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any claim to enforce any right under a mortgage declared extinguished under this Act, or to question the validity of any proceedings under this Act. Otherwise also bare perusal of averments contained in plaint as well as relief, clearly suggests that by way of civil suit, plaintiffs prayed for granting decree of declaration that the revenue entries showing the appellant-defendant as owner in respect of Khewat No. 8, Khatauni No. 25, 26 and 27, total area measuring 23 bighas, 16 biswas per jamabandi for the year, 1992-93, situated in village Chamba sheel, Tehsil Nahan, District Sirmaur be declared illegal, null & void and not binding upon the right of the plaintiffs qua ownership of the suit land. 23. Careful perusal of documents Exts.P1 to P11 clearly suggest that suit land to the extent of ½ share was earlier in ownership of predecessor-in-interest of plaintiffs, whereas ½ share of one Shri Mohar Singh, who had mortgaged it with predecessor-in-interest of plaintiff. It is also undisputed that since then plaintiffs-respondents are in continuous possession of the suit land, which was earlier in possession of predecessor-in interest. Similarly, appellant-defendant has not been able to prove on record that suit land mortgaged by Mohar Singh in favour of predecessor-in-interest of plaintiffs was, at any point of time, got redeemed by his widow Smt. Sandla Devi within stipulated period. Since, Smt. Sandla Devi and any LRs of late Mohar Singh failed to redeem the property mortgaged with the predecessor-in-interest of plaintiffs-respondents, plaintiffs respondents became owner of the same after expiry of stipulated time. 24. Hence, this Court sees no illegality and infirmity in the findings returned by the Courts below that even if it is presumed that Smt. Sandla Devi after inheriting half share of Shri Mohar Singh relinquished her share in favour of State of H.P., she had no right, title or interest in the suit land after 31.12.1970, when plaintiffs-respondents had became absolute owner due to failure of Smt. Sandla Devi or other LRs of Shri Mohar Singh to redeem the land within stipulated period. Since, by way present suit, plaintiffs-respondents had only sought decree of declaration that the revenue entries showing appellant-defendant as owner of the suit land may be declared illegal, null and void, Civil Court had all jurisdiction to decide the controversy at hand and, as such, there is no force in the arguments having been advanced on behalf of appellant-defendant. Hence, substantial questions of law No. 1 to 3 are answered accordingly. 25. Now, this Court would be taking up substantial question of law No. 4. Since, this Court while exploring answer to aforesaid substantial question of law, as has been decided in earlier part of judgment, had an opportunity to peruse the entire evidence, be it ocular or documentary, led on the record by the respective parties, it can be safely concluded that both the Courts below have dealt with each and every aspect of the matter very meticulously and there is no mis-reading and misinterpretation of the evidence led on record by the respective parties, rather both the Courts below have examined each and every aspect of the matter minutely before arriving at final conclusion. Hence, this Court sees no force in the contention put-forth on behalf of counsel representing the appellant defendant that learned Courts below mis-read and misinterpreted the evidence, as a result of which, suit of the plaintiff was decreed. Accordingly, substantial question No. 4 is answered accordingly. 26. This Court sees no illegality and infirmity, if any, in the judgments passed by the Courts below, rather, same are based upon correct appreciation of the evidence available on record. This Court is fully satisfied that both the Courts below have critically examined the issue involved in the matter and there is no scope of interference, whatsoever, in the present matter. Since, both the Courts below have returned concurrent findings, which otherwise appear to be based upon proper appreciation of evidence, this Court has very limited jurisdiction/scope to interfere in the matter. In this regard, it would be apt to reproduce the relevant contents of judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in Laxmidevamma and Others vs. Ranganath and Others, (2015)4 SCC 264 , herein below:- “16. Based on oral and documentary evidence, both the courts below has recorded concurrent findings of fact that plaintiffs have established their right in 'A' schedule property. In this regard, it would be apt to reproduce the relevant contents of judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in Laxmidevamma and Others vs. Ranganath and Others, (2015)4 SCC 264 , herein below:- “16. Based on oral and documentary evidence, both the courts below has recorded concurrent findings of fact that plaintiffs have established their right in 'A' schedule property. In the light of concurrent findings of fact, no substantial questions of law arose in the High Court and there was no substantial ground for re-appreciation of evidence. While so, the High Court proceeded to observe that the first plaintiff has earmarked the 'A' schedule property for road and that she could not have full fledged right and on that premise proceeded to hold that declaration to plaintiffs' right cannot be granted. In exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100 C.P.C., concurrent findings of fact cannot be upset by the High Court unless the findings so recorded are shown to be perverse. In our considered view, the High Court did not keep in view that the concurrent findings recorded by the courts below, are based on oral and documentary evidence and the judgment of the High Court cannot be sustained.” 27. Consequently, in view of the discussion made hereinabove, this Court is of the view that the judgments passed by both the Courts below are based on correct appreciation of the evidence, be it ocular or documentary on the record and, as such, present appeal fails and same is accordingly dismissed. 28. Interim directions, if any, are vacated. All miscellaneous applications are disposed of.