JUDGMENT : Sureshwar Thakur, J. The learned trial Court had dismissed the suit of the plaintiff/predecessor-in-interest of the respondents herein Bakshi Ram (since dead) (for short the plaintiff) wherein he had sought relief of declaration and permanent injunction against the defendants qua the suit property. In an appeal carried therefrom by the aggrieved plaintiff before the learned first appellate Court, the latter Court reversed the decree of the learned trial Court whereupon it declared the plaintiff to be the owner in possession of the suit land by way of adverse possession also restrained the defendants from interfering with his possession qua the suit land. 2. The defendants/appellants herein (for short “the defendants) stand aggrieved by the aforesaid rendition of the learned first Appellate Court wherefrom for assailing it they preferred the instant appeal herebefore. Also they stand aggrieved by the rendition of the learned first appellate Court whereby it dismissed the cross objections laid therebefore against the rendition of the learned trial Court whereby it discountenanced their claim for title to the suit land on anvil of sale deed Ex.DW-2/A. Consequently the defendants concert to seek reversal of the verdict recorded thereon by the learned first appellate Court. 3. The plaintiff has instituted a suit for declaration and permanent prohibitory injunction against the defendants. It is averred by him in the plaint that one Gurdawaru was in possession of the land bearing Khasra No. 623 and 624 measuring 1.4 bighas situated in village Pehrwin, Pargaina Tiun, Tehsil Ghuamrwin, District Bilaspur, H.P., who had become owner thereof by way of adverse possession. Said Gurdawaru had inducted tenants over the suit land and he used to get the land cultivated from others. Whereas Gurdwaru was in possession of the suit land. Before 1951-52 said Gurdwaru had entered into an agreement for sale of the said land in favour of the plaintiff. Thereafter on 29.11.1952 Gurdawaru had executed sale deed of the said land in favour of the plaintiff. Thus the plaintiff became owner in possession of the land by way of adverse possession. Lateron during consolidation proceedings khasra No. 580, 581 and 583 corresponding to new khasra No. 164, measuring 17 biswas (for short the “suit land”) was allotted in lieu of Khasra No. 623 and 624. It is claimed that defendants never possessed the suit land nor the suit land was mortgaged with any body. Lateron during consolidation proceedings khasra No. 580, 581 and 583 corresponding to new khasra No. 164, measuring 17 biswas (for short the “suit land”) was allotted in lieu of Khasra No. 623 and 624. It is claimed that defendants never possessed the suit land nor the suit land was mortgaged with any body. The revenue entries showing the defendants in possession of a part of the suit land. Kanshi Ram and Smt. Shiv Dei had applied for partition of the suit land before Assistant Collector, Ist Grade, Ghumarwin which was contested by the plaintiff. Finally the Divisional Commissioner vide his order dated 23.10.1986 has held that the remedy available to the plaintiff lies in the Civil Court. The defendants are successors-in-interest of Kanshi Ram. The plaintiff had requested the defendants to admit his claim over the suit land, but they declined his request. Hence, the suit was filed by the plaintiff for declaration that he was owner in possession of the suit land by adverse possession and that the entries in the revenue record in favour of the defendants were illegal null and void and also consequential relief of permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with his possession over the suit land. 4. The defendant’s No. 1, 2, 4, 7, 8 and 11 contested the suit. The defendants Nos. 1, 2 and 11 filed separate written-statements, whereas defendant No.4 filed his separate written-statement and defendant’s No. 7 and 8 filed their separate written-statements. The contesting defendants had raised preliminary objections inter-alia maintainability, estoppels, valuation, non-joiner of necessary parties, resjudicata and limitation. On merits, it was pleaded that said Gurdwaru was never remained in possession of the suit land nor he was inducted as tenant by anybody. Hence, there was no question of becoming owner by adverse possession. It is denied that Gurdawaru had entered into an agreement with the plaintiff for sale of the suit land. It is also denied that Gurdrawu had executed sale deed of 29.11.1952 in favour of the plaintiff. The contesting defendants had alleged that they were owners in possession of the suit land. 5. In the replication, the plaintiff controverted the contention of the defendant and reiterated his stand taken in the plaint. 6. On the pleadings of the parties, the learned trial Court struck following issues inter-se the parties at contest:- “1. The contesting defendants had alleged that they were owners in possession of the suit land. 5. In the replication, the plaintiff controverted the contention of the defendant and reiterated his stand taken in the plaint. 6. On the pleadings of the parties, the learned trial Court struck following issues inter-se the parties at contest:- “1. Whether the plaintiff has become owner by way of adverse possession over the suit land? OPP 2. If issue No.1 is proved in affirmative whether the plaintiff is entitled for the relief of permanent injunction as prayed? OPP 3. If issue No.1 is not proved in affirmative, then whether the defendants No.1 and 2 are owners in possession of the suit land and as alleged? OPD. 4. Whether the suit is not maintainable in the present form? OPD. 5. Whether the plaintiff is estopped to file the present suit? OPD 6. Whether the suit is not properly valued for the purpose of Court fee and jurisdiction? OPD 7. Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties? OPD 8. Whether the suit is barred by the principles of resjudicata? OPD-7, 8 and 4. 9. Whether the suit is barred by time? OPD 1, 2, 11 and 4. 10. Relief.” 7. When RSA No. 73 of 2006 came up for admission on 22.9.2006, this Court admitted it on the hereinafter extracted substantial questions of law. “1. Whether the first Appellate Court was not right in concluding that respondent-plaintiff had acquired title by adverse possession, when it was his own plea that he had purchased the suit land from one Gurdwaru who held the land as a tenant? 2. Whether the first Appellate Court was not justified in rejecting the appellants’ plea that they had purchased the land simply on account of the non-production of the sale deed, when the respondent-plaintiff had allegedly not denied the execution of such sale deed.” 8. Also when RSA No. 74 of 2006 came up for admission on 3.9.2007, this Court admitted it on the hereinafter extracted substantial questions of law:- “2. Whether in order to sustain the plea of his adverse possession over the suit land, the plaintiff was required to admit the ownership of the defendants and then was required to claim his hostile animus? 3. Whether in order to sustain the plea of his adverse possession over the suit land, the plaintiff was required to admit the ownership of the defendants and then was required to claim his hostile animus? 3. Whether the plaintiff can maintain his plea of adverse possession over the suit land against the defendants after claiming his title on the same land by virtue of a registered sale deed? 5. Whether the suit for declaration etc. filed by the plaintiff was hopelessly barred by limitation?” Substantial questions of law (in both of appeal):- 9. The claim of the plaintiff qua rendition of a declaratory decree of title vis-à-vis him qua the suit land stood anchored upon one Gurdwaru with an animus possidendi holding uninterrupted possession of the suit land whereafter on his acquiring its possession from the aforesaid Gurdwaru he also with an alike animus possidendi uninterruptedly holding its possession whereupon hence he contended qua his possession thereon ripening, by statutory prescription ensuing from efflux of the apposite statutory period, into absolute dominion thereon besides he also averred in his plaint qua his acquiring title thereof as its owner on 29.11.1952 whereat exhibit PA stood executed inter-se him and Gurdwaru. The learned first Appellate Court had imputed sanctity qua valid and due execution of Ex.PA also it had construed it to be conveying title as owner qua the suit land upon the plaintiff. Further more it also had validated the plea raised in the plaint of one Gurdwaru wherefromwhom the plaintiff acquired possession of the suit property holding up to the execution of Ex.PA possession qua the suit property with an animus possidendi whereafter possession of the suit property standing held with a pari materia capacity by the plaintiff whereupon it concluded of the plaintiff acquiring prescriptive title qua the suit property ensuing from his with an animus possidendi holding its uninterrupted possession for the apt period prescribed in the relevant provisions of the limitation Act whereby he hence stood empowered to obtain a decree qua his perfecting his title thereto by prescription. The tenacity of the aforesaid conclusion when tested on the anvil of judicial verdicts wherewithin formidable pronouncements stand encapsulated of the plaintiff not holding any tenable leverage to espouse for an apposite declaratory decree of title standing rendered qua him significantly when his espousal stands harboured upon his acquiring title qua the suit property by adverse possession, contrarily the aforesaid plea stands mandated in judicial pronouncements to be available for ventilation by only the defendants merely as a shield for baulking any onslaught by the plaintiff for usurping his/their possession qua the suit land. In aftermath the learned first Appellate Court has perpetuated gross injustice in overlooking/transgressing the mandate of the aforesaid judicial verdicts whereby an interdiction stands cast vis-à-vis the plaintiff against his espousing qua a declaratory decree of title qua the suit land being renderable vis-à-vis him on anvil of his perfecting his title thereon by adverse possession. In sequel its thereupon countenancing the aforesaid claim of the plaintiff has committed a gross error. Even otherwise the plaintiff had anvilled qua the suit land a claim for rendition of adeclaratory decree of title qua it vis-à-vis him on a ground grossly contradistinctive vis-à-vis his claim qua it on anvil of the aforesaid facet, contradistinctivity whereof stands significantly bespoken by his staking on anvil of Ex.PA, a purported sale deed qua the suit land executed vis-à-vis him by one Gurdwaru, a claim for rendition of a declaratory decree of title vis-à-vis him qua the suit land, in sequel with his thereupon setting a plea qua his standing entitled to a declaratory decree of title qua the suit property anvil of plea whereof is ridden with rife contradictions vis-à-vis his espousal qua his perfecting his title qua the suit property by adverse possession also hence is perse personificatory qua his embodying a claim for title qua the suit property on starkly militative pleas, obviously also rendered oustable his concert to acquisition of title thereto by adverse possession. With cogent proof emanating qua the valid execution of Ex.PA also with manifestations occurring in Ex.P-4,P-5 and P-6 qua the plaintiff holding possession of the suit property besides with the plaintiff deposing qua his obtaining possession of the suit land in exchange are loud acquiescences of the plaintiff qua his concurring with Ex.PA besides also his concurring with apposite revelations in consonance therewith occurring in the relevant revenue records. His acquiescences besides also his concurrences qua the facet of execution of Ex.PA qua him by Gurdwaru enjoined upon him to adduce poof qua his thereunder from Gurdwaru acquiring absolute title as owner qua the suit property. Though the factum of execution of Ex.PA stands clinchingly proven, however for the reasons ascribed thereinafter the mere factum of clinching proof standing adduced qua the execution of Ex.PA would not commend it qua its holding sinewed evidence qua its standing construable to be conferring title as owner upon the plaintiff qua the property enunciated therein. 10. A studied perusal of Ex.PA makes an evident disclosure of Gurdwaru thereunder conveying his tenancy rights upon the plaintiff. The import of specific recitals existing therein qua conveyance thereunder by him qua the plaintiff his hitherto specific right of a tenant qua the suit land is qua hence the intrinsic explicit signification borne by the apposite conveyance of tenancy rights by one Gurdwaru vis-à-vis the plaintiff being unamenable qua its standing either enlarged or extended in parlance for hence erecting an obvious fallacious inference qua the plaintiff standing invested with absolute title as owner qua the suit land. Consequently the occurrence of findings in the verdict of the first Appellate Court qua under Ex.PA the plaintiff acquiring from Gurdwaru absolute title as owner qua the suit land hold no vigor, it untenably thereupon imputing qua it, a signification which apparently is not held therewithin conspicuously also when tritely the relevant document cannot beyond its explicit recitals be construed to be conferring qua the relevant Lessee/vendee any absolute right qua the relevant property. 11. The effect of the aforesaid conclusion is of the plaintiff holding qua the suit land rights pari materia vis-à-vis tenancy right held thereon by Gurdwaru. 11. The effect of the aforesaid conclusion is of the plaintiff holding qua the suit land rights pari materia vis-à-vis tenancy right held thereon by Gurdwaru. Besides also for reiteration dehors the aforesaid reason as stands meted by this Court for enfeebling the efficacy of the verdict of the first Appellate Court qua unflinching proof standing adduced by the plaintiff qua his acquiring title by adverse possession qua the suit property, infirmity thereof stands enhanced by the factum of portrayals in Jamabandis Ex.P-1 to P-5 relating to year 1937-38, 1951-1952 whereat Gurdwaru held possession of the suit land wherefrom unveilings stand pronounced qua the factum of his holding possession of the suit land as a tenant, reflections whereof when remained un-rebutted for non-adduction by the plaintiff of potent evidence for hence belying their truth, they hence acquire conclusivity. With conclusivity standing imputed to Ex.P-1 to P-5 besides when the inference of conclusivity being imputable to Ex.P-1 to P-5 stands read in coagulation with narrations occurring in Ex.PA, exhibit whereof stands proven by cogent evidence, narrations whereof occurring therein hold manifestations qua Gurdwaru holding possession of the suit land as a tenant, rights whereof held therein by him stood conveyed thereunder to him hence are also connotative of the factum of the plaintiffs acquiescing besides concurring with the factum of the his/theirs likewise thereunder acquiring qua the suit land an alike right as a tenant. 12. Further more the effect of the aforesaid acquiescence qua the facet aforesaid is of the claim of the plaintiff qua his since 1937-38 whereat Gurdwaru held its possession, his therefrom upto now with an animus possidendi holding its uninterrupted possession, standing wholly muted, whereupon also the rendition of the learned first appellate Court qua the plaintiff proving his standing entitled to a declaratory decree of title qua the suit property given his evidently holding its adverse possession, stands ingrained with a gross fallacy. The plaintiff when under PA holds tenancy rights qua the suit property also when he holds its possession, he concomitantly stood entitled to a relief for injuncting the defendants from interfering with his possession qua the suit property. The plaintiff when under PA holds tenancy rights qua the suit property also when he holds its possession, he concomitantly stood entitled to a relief for injuncting the defendants from interfering with his possession qua the suit property. However the learned first appellate Court in affording to him a declaratory decree qua his holding title qua the suit property by way of adverse possession has starkly gone astray from the relevant evidence existing on record also its verdict qua the facets aforesaid stands anchored upon its mis-appreciating the germane and relevant evidence, hence warrants its being quashed and set aside. 13. The learned first appellate Court dismissed the objections reared therebefore by the defendants qua theirs holding title qua the suit property on anvil of Ex.DW-2/A a sale deed executed by its lawful owners vis-à-vis one Kanshi Ram their predecessor-in-interest. However the learned first appellate Court tenably concluded qua with no conclusive poof standing adduced qua the trite factum qua its standing validly and duly executed, in sequel, any purported conveyance of title thereunder by the vendors vis-à-vis Kanshi Ram holding no leverage to the defendants to either dislodge the claim of the plaintiff anvilled upon Ex.PA nor concomitantly facilitating them to efficaciously contend of their holding possession of the suit property. 14. Moreover with the manifestations occurring in Ex.P-4, 5 and 6 qua the plaintiff holding possession of the suit property when remained uneroded by cogent evidence in rebuttal thereto standing adduced by the defendants, whereupon hence with the relevant manifestations occurring therein acquiring conclusivity also disabled the defendants qua theirs holding a right to obtain a decree for injunction for restraining the plaintiffs from interfering with their possession qua the suit property. Conspicuously when for rendition of a decree for injunction enjoined satiation by conclusive evidence, the indefeasible tenet of the plaintiff holding possession of the suit property, tenet whereof when stands evidently proven by un-eroded manifestations occurring in the relevant jamabandi qua the suit land, personifications whereof pronounce his holding possession concomitantly empowered the plaintiff to stand entitled to a decree for restraining the defendants from interfering with his/their possession vis-à-vis the suit property. Assumingly also hence if Ex. Assumingly also hence if Ex. DW-2/A holds any validity nonetheless with the plaintiff under Ex.PA extantly holding possession of the suit land as tenants naturally their possessory rights as tenants thereon enure besides subsist vis-à-vis vendees of Ex.DW-2/A. As a sequel also the visible lawful possession of the plaintiffs as tenants qua the suit property cannot be subjected to an assault standing mounted thereon by the defendants. Needless to say of with the claim for injunction qua the suit property staked by the plaintiff holding tenacity also with Ex.PA holding recitals of the plaintiff acquiring from Gurdwaru tenancy rights qua the suit property, the defendants were enjoined to adduce evidence for disimputing sanctity to Ex.PA whereas they omitted to do nor they have emphatically proven theirs holding possession of the suit property naturally the apt sequel therefrom is of the cross objection reared by them before the learned first appellate court warranting dismissal as tenably done by it. 15. In view of above RSA No. 73 of 2006 is partly allowed to the extent of the declaratory decree of title qua the suit property vis-à-vis the plaintiffs is quashed and set aside. However the judgment and decree of the learned first Appellate Court qua relief of permanent prohibitory injunction as rendered by it vis-à-vis the plaintiff is maintained and affirmed. Further more, RSA No. 74 of 2006 stands dismissed Substantial questions of law in both the appeals are answered accordingly. No costs.