JUDGMENT By the Court.—Heard Sri Ashish Mishra, learned Counsel for the appellant, Sri Imran Saiyad for the first respondent and learned Standing Counsel for the respondent No. 2. Respondent No. 3 is a formal party. 2. The appeal questions the correctness of the judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 14.3.2014, whereby the learned Single Judge has allowed the writ petition filed by the respondent-petitioner and has set aside the order of punishment awarded to him whereby he was reduced in rank from Upper Division Assistant (UDA) to a Lower Division Assistant (LDA) in the establishment of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad. 3. The background in which the proceedings were initiated against the respondent No. 1 and three others was about the alleged manipulation of an appeal that was got listed and was dismissed. The manner in which the said listing was processed including the preparation of the records of the appeal was the foundation of the charges and accordingly, an Enquiry Officer was appointed to enquire into the same. The then Registrar of the High Court being the Appointing Authority and the Disciplinary Authority of all Class-III employees examined the enquiry report and came to the conclusion that the respondent No. 1/petitioner Sheo Prasad-II deserves to be dismissed from service, and awarded lesser punishments by stopping the increments of Jagdish Sahai Srivastava, Harihar Prasad and Parmeshwar Din. The order of the learned Registrar is extracted hereunder : “O R D E R Sarvasri Harihar Prasad (the then Group Incharge of First Appeal Section), Parmeshwar Deen (the then Munsarim of First Appeal Section), Jagdish Sahai Srivastava (the then Second Paper-Book Clerk) and Sheo Prasad (the then Head Counter Paper Book Section) were charge-sheeted on the allegations that they conspired together and managed to get First Appeal No. 348 of 1958 listed in Court without notice to the appellant, Smt. Hira Rani Singhania with the object of having the appeal dismissed in default. In order to achieve this end all the aforesaid four official were alleged to have committed acts against the Rules of Court with a dishonest intention. The substance of the charge against Sri Sheo Prasad was that in pursuance of the aforesaid conspiracy, be in his capacity as Head Counter prepared an estimate of deficiency of Rs. In order to achieve this end all the aforesaid four official were alleged to have committed acts against the Rules of Court with a dishonest intention. The substance of the charge against Sri Sheo Prasad was that in pursuance of the aforesaid conspiracy, be in his capacity as Head Counter prepared an estimate of deficiency of Rs. 15.31 and sent the same on May 2, 1974 to Sri B. N. Asthana, counsel for the appellant for payment within 30 days but before the expiry of the said period he passed a tender presented by one Sri H. N Singh clerk to Sri V.B. Singh, counsel for the respondents and in this way got the deficiency removed. The result was that the appellant and her counsel were kept in dark and the appeal was dismissed in default on August 20, 1974 and when Sri O.P. Singhania, son of the appellant, made an enquiry from him as to how this manipulation was done, Sri Sheo Prasad said to him: “Aap ka khoon mere hath se hona likha tha to main kya kar sakta hun.” Sri Sheo Prasad is further alleged to have quarelled with one Sri Akhtar Hussain of Copying Department on the question of aportionment of the illegal gratification received by him. Sri Sheo Prasad was also alleged to be responsible for a loss of Rs. 87.70 to the Government as deficiency in preparation of the suplementary paper book in the case. Sri Jagdish Sahai Srivastava is said to have approached the proof distribution clerk, Sri Mahabir Saran, on June 12, 1974 and told him that the appeal in question was an old one and, therefore, he should correct the supplementary paper book at once, he personally received the proof of the said paper book and took it to Bharat Press for printing although it was not his duty to do so, that he also approached the Crown Press and the Aloka Press for preparation of the paper book and that he also took part in the quarrel that took place between Sri Sheo Prasad and Sri Akhtar Hussain on the question of distribution of the illgotten money. The substance of the charge against Sri Harihar Prasad was that after preparation of the suplementary paper book he did not send the file to the Stamp Reporter for final checking, with the result that the deficiency of Rs. The substance of the charge against Sri Harihar Prasad was that after preparation of the suplementary paper book he did not send the file to the Stamp Reporter for final checking, with the result that the deficiency of Rs. 87.70 remained unrealized and the Government had to suffer a financial loss on that account, that he received the suplementary paper book without the T.P.A. file and did not care to get the T.P.A. file before getting the appeal listed. He also did not care to check whether there was deficiency or not. The substance of the charge against Sri Parmeshwar Din was that he did not get the appeal in question notified as ready for hearing and only sent a slip to be hung on the notice board on 22.7.74, although on that very day other First Appeals were duly notified, that he also did not get the complete file checked up by the Peshi Clerk in order to find out if all the formalities were completed and all the papers such as T.P.A. etc. were on the file or not and that he did not care to find out if there was any deficiency to be made good. A preliminary enquiry was first conducted by the Deputy Registrar, Sri B.M. Singh, on the basis of which the then Registrar appointed the Joint Registrar to conduct a regular departmental enquiry against Sri Harihar Prasad for gross negligence and deriliction of duty, Sri Parmeshwar Din for conspiracy, gross negligence and deriliction of duty and Sarvasri Sheo Prasad and Jagdish Sahai Srivastava for conspiracy and doing illegal and irregular acts, grave deriliction of duty and gross negligence. The charges against Sarvasri Sheo Prasad and Jagdish Sahai Srivastava being prima facie serious, they were placed under suspension with effect from January 7, 1977, the date of the order. Subsequently under the orders of the then Hon’ble C.J. Dated 8.5.177 the suspension orders were revoked and Sarvasri Sheo Prasad and Jagdish Sahai Srivastava were reinstated. The Inquiring Officer submitted his findings dated November 18, 1977 and found that all the four officials were in league and they connived to get First Appeal No. 348 of 1958 listed in such a manner that the appellant might not be able to know about it. The charges levelled against the four officials were found to be fully proved by the Inquiring Officer. The charges levelled against the four officials were found to be fully proved by the Inquiring Officer. Proposing the punishment the Inquiring Officer observed that Sri Sheo Prasad had played a major role in achieving the desired end of the conspirators and he accordingly proposed the punishment of dismissal from services for him. About Sarvasri Jagdish Sahai, Sri Harihar Prasad and Sri Parmeshwar Din the punishment proposed by the Inquiring Officer was that their increments may be withheld for a period of three years and the postponement of their increments was proposed to have the effect of postponing future increments. By his order dated January 20, 1977 the then Registrar agreed with the findings of the Inquiring Officer and issued show-cause notices to the four officials against the proposed punishments. Accordingly the show-cause notices were issued on January 21, 1978 giving them fourteen days’ time to submit their explanations, if any. The four officials by means of separate applications prayed for supply of copies of certain documents on the enquiry file and also prayed for further time. The copies applied for were supplied and the time was also extended. The four officials submitted their separate applications and took the same pleas as were taken by them during the courses of the enquiry. All the four officials were given personal hearing also and were heard by me on June 12, 1978. All of them pleaded not guilty and repeated the pleas that they had taken during the course of the enquiry as well as in their explanations to the show-cause notices. I have again gone through the entire file and after proper scrutiny of the evidence on the record I fully agree with the findings of the Inquiring Officer that the charges levelled have been fully proved against each of the four officials. The charged officials have been given full and proper opportunity to defend themselves. I also agree with the punishments proposed against the four officials and I accordingly order as follows : Sri Sheo Prasad II shall be dismissed from service forthwith. Increments of each of Sarvasri Jagdish Sahai Srivastava, Hari Har Prasad and Parmeshwar Din shall be postponed for a period of three years and the postponement shall have the effect of postponing their future increments also.” 4. Increments of each of Sarvasri Jagdish Sahai Srivastava, Hari Har Prasad and Parmeshwar Din shall be postponed for a period of three years and the postponement shall have the effect of postponing their future increments also.” 4. Aggrieved the respondent-petitioner filed a representation before the then Hon’ble Chief Justice entertainable under the Rules who, upon a consideration of the material on record, affirmed the guilt, but modified the order of dismissal in the case of respondent-petitioner by reducing him in rank from UDA to LDA w.e.f. 16.1.1979. The order passed by Hon’ble the Chief Justice is extracted hereunder : “The guilt is fully established. The punishment is changed. The order of Dismissal is set aside. Instead he be reduced in rank from U.D.A. to L.D.A. w.e.f. 16.1.1979.” 5. Aggrieved subsequent representations appear to have been filed and having failed to get any relief, the respondent-petitioner ultimately filed writ petition No. 24237 of 1988 assailing the said orders. The said writ petition has been decided on 14.3.2014 by the impugned judgment whereby the order of punishment, as modified by Hon’ble the Chief Justice, has been set aside granting all consequential benefits to the respondent-petitioner. 6. Sri Mishra, learned counsel for the appellant has pressed a legal issue that arises according to the appellant on the procedure adopted by the learned Single Judge to proceed with the case, namely, that in a disciplinary proceeding of this nature, the learned Single Judge could not have converted himself into a substitute for the Enquiry Officer or the Disciplinary Authority to arrive at a different conclusion in the manner in which it has been done through the impugned judgment. He therefore submits that this is clearly contrary to the legal position as laid down in several cases of the Apex Court and the settled position as has been recently pronounced once again in the case of Union of India and others v. P. Gunasekaran, (2015) 2 SCC 610 paragraphs 12 to 17]. The relevant paragraphs are extracted hereunder : “12. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, re-appreciating even the evidence before the enquiry officer. The finding on Charge No. I was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, re-appreciating even the evidence before the enquiry officer. The finding on Charge No. I was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second Court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into reappreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether: (a) the enquiry is held by a competent authority; (b) the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf; (c) there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings; (d) the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case; (e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations; (f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion; (g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence; (h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding; (i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence. 13. Under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not: (i) re-appreciate the evidence; (ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law; (iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence; (iv) go into the reliability of the evidence; (v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based. (vi)correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; (vii)go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience. 14. In one of the earliest decisions in State of Andhra Pradesh and others v. S. Sree Rama Rao, many of the above principles have been discussed and it has been concluded thus: (AIR pp.1726-27, para 7) “7.... 14. In one of the earliest decisions in State of Andhra Pradesh and others v. S. Sree Rama Rao, many of the above principles have been discussed and it has been concluded thus: (AIR pp.1726-27, para 7) “7.... The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution a Court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant: it is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Where there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The High Court may undoubtedly interfere where the departmental authorities have held the proceedings against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion, or on similar grounds. But the departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and if there be some legal evidence on which their findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution.” 15. In State of Andhra Pradesh and others v. Chitra Venkata Rao, the principles have been further discussed at paragraph-21 to 24, which read as follows: (SCC pp.561-63) “21. The scope of Article 226 in dealing with departmental inquiries has come up before this Court. In State of Andhra Pradesh and others v. Chitra Venkata Rao, the principles have been further discussed at paragraph-21 to 24, which read as follows: (SCC pp.561-63) “21. The scope of Article 226 in dealing with departmental inquiries has come up before this Court. Two propositions were laid down by this Court in State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao. First, there is no warrant for the view that in considering whether a public officer is guilty of misconduct charged against him, the rule followed in criminal trials thatan offence is not established unless proved by evidence beyond reasonable doubt to the satisfaction of the Court must be applied. If that rule be not applied by a domestic tribunal of inquiry the High Court in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is not competent to declare the order of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry invalid. The High Court is not a Court of appeal under Article 226 over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant. The Court is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Second, where there is some evidence which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The High Court may interfere where the departmental authorities have held the proceedings against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and 2 (1975) 2 SCC 557 capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion. The departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and if there is some legal evidence on which their findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226. 22. Again, this Court in Railway Board, representing the Union of India, New Delhi v. Niranjan Singh, said that the High Court does not interfere with the conclusion of the disciplinary authority unless the finding is not supported by any evidence or it can be said that no reasonable person could have reached such a finding. In Niranjan Singh case this Court held that the High Court exceeded its powers in interfering with the findings of the disciplinary authority on the charge that the respondent was instrumental in compelling the shut-down of an air compressor at about 8.15 a.m. on May 31, 1956. This Court said that the Enquiry Committee felt that the evidence of two persons that the respondent led a group of strikers and compelled them to close down their compressor could not be accepted at its face value. The General Manager did not agree with the Enquiry Committee on that point. The General Manager accepted the evidence. This Court said that it was open to the General Manager to do so and he was not bound by the conclusion reached by the committee. This Court held that the conclusion reached by the disciplinary authority should prevail and the High Court should not have interfered with the conclusion. 23. The jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari under Article 226 is a supervisory jurisdiction. The Court exercises it not as an appellate Court. The findings of fact reached by an inferior Court or tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence are not reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. The findings of fact reached by an inferior Court or tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence are not reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by a tribunal, a writ can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Again if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. A finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal is insufficient or inadequate to sustain a finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal. See Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan. 24. The High Court in the present case assessed the entire evidence and came to its own conclusion. The High Court was not justified to do so. Apart from the aspect that the High Court does not correct a finding of fact on the ground that the evidence is not sufficient or adequate, the evidence in the present case which was considered by the Tribunal cannot be scanned by the High Court to justify the conclusion that there is no evidence which would justify the finding of the Tribunal that the respondent did not make the journey. The Tribunal gave reasons for its conclusions. It is not possible for the High Court to say that no reasonable person could have arrived at these conclusions. The High Court reviewed the evidence, reassessed the evidence and then rejected the evidence as no evidence. That is precisely what the High Court in exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari should not do.” 16. These principles have been succinctly summed-up by the living legend and centenarian Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer in State of Haryana and another v. Rattan Singh3. That is precisely what the High Court in exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari should not do.” 16. These principles have been succinctly summed-up by the living legend and centenarian Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer in State of Haryana and another v. Rattan Singh3. To quote the unparalled and inimitable expressions: (SCC p.493, para 4) “4..... in a domestic enquiry the strict and sophisticated rules of evidence under the Indian Evidence Act may not apply. All materials which are logically probative for a prudent mind are permissible. There is no allergy to hearsay evidence provided it has reasonable nexus and credibility. It is true that departmental authorities and Administrative Tribunals must be careful in evaluating such material and should not glibly swallow what is strictly speaking not relevant under the Indian Evidence Act. For this proposition it is not necessary to cite decisions nor text books, although we have been taken through case-law and other authorities by counsel on both sides. The essence of a judicial approach is objectivity, exclusion of extraneous materials or considerations and observance of rules of natural justice. Of course, fairplay is the basis and if perversity or arbitrariness, bias or surrender of independence of judgment vitiate the conclusions reached, such finding, even though of a domestic tribunal, cannot be held good.” 17. In all the subsequent decisions of this Court upto the latest in Chennai Water Supply and Sewarage Board v. T.T. Murali Babu4, these principles have been consistently followed adding practically nothing more or altering anything.” 7. Sri Mishra on the strength of the aforesaid proposition of law contends that the said ratio is clearly transgressed and the learned Single Judge has therefore exceeded in authority to proceed and reverse the punishment order by recording independent findings on the charges separately and then arriving at a different conclusion as if sitting in appeal. 8. Sri Mishra on the strength of the aforesaid proposition of law contends that the said ratio is clearly transgressed and the learned Single Judge has therefore exceeded in authority to proceed and reverse the punishment order by recording independent findings on the charges separately and then arriving at a different conclusion as if sitting in appeal. 8. Opposing the said contentions, Sri Imran Saiyad contends that the learned Single Judge in order to arrive at the correct conclusion had to investigate the matter in view of the fact that Hon’ble the Chief Justice himself had been pleased to reduce the punishment and therefore, the evidence not only being weak but also not being available, the entire punishment order should have been set aside and having not done so, the learned Single Judge was justified in proceeding to consider the material on record and recording his own opinion. 9. We have considered the submissions raised and what we find is that Hon’ble the Chief Justice has been pleased to affirm the guilt thereby affirming the findings on the charges but on the proportionality of the punishment, in exercise of such discretion that is available under the constitutional powers under Article 229 of the Constitution of India, has reduced the said punishment from dismissal to reduction in rank from the post of UDA to LDA w.e.f. 16.1.1979. To our mind, the proportionality has been adjudged in the light of the charge of conspiracy as also the impact of the conduct of all the employees and the punishment awarded to them, wherein the punishing authority namely, the Registrar on the basis of almost the same evidence had awarded a lower punishment to the other three delinquents whereas the respondent-petitioner had been dismissed from service. We find ourselves in full agreement with the same inasmuch as on the basis of the same charges having been found to be true and keeping in view the involvement of the respondent-petitioner as charged, he did not deserve the extreme punishment of dismissal and therefore, the reduction in punishment clearly appears to be justified. 10. So far as the issue of charges are concerned, we find that the learned Single Judge has proceeded to deal with each charge separately and record his own independent opinion about the evidence with regard to the charges. This was clearly impermissible in view of the legal position that has been indicated here-in-above. 10. So far as the issue of charges are concerned, we find that the learned Single Judge has proceeded to deal with each charge separately and record his own independent opinion about the evidence with regard to the charges. This was clearly impermissible in view of the legal position that has been indicated here-in-above. The opinion expressed by the learned Single Judge was therefore clearly a substitute for the findings of the Enquiry Officer as accepted by the Disciplinary Authority which was not permissible as per law that has been cited on behalf of the appellant by Sri Mishra. The impugned judgment therefore for the aforesaid reasons cannot be sustained. 11. The appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment dated 14.3.2014 is set aside and the order of Hon’ble the Chief Justice dated 12.4.1979 is affirmed. ——————