ORDER : K.M. THAKER, J. 1. Heard Mr. Pandya, learned advocate for the petitioner and Mr. D.G. Shukla, learned advocate for the respondent. 2. In the petition the petitioner has prayed, inter-alia, that:- “16(B) Your Lordship may be pleased to issue a writ of mandamus or certiorari or a writ in the nature of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction quashing and setting aside the impugned order dated 21.5.2010 passed by the Appellate Authority under the Payment of Gratuity Act, passed in Appeal No. 11 of 2010 (Annexure-A) as well as the order dated 26.9.2008 and order dated 10.6.2009 passed by the Controlling Authority in Gratuity Application No. 101 of 2008 (Annexure-B Colly) and further be pleased to direct the Appellate Authority to restore the Appeal as well as the Application to its file and to decide the same in accordance with law for the reasons stated in the memo of petition and in the interest of justice and fairness of things; 3. The petitioner is aggrieved by order dated 21.5.2010 passed by Appellate Authority under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 whereby Appellate Authority rejected the Appeal filed by present petitioner on the ground that the Appeal was filed after expiry of prescribed limit. 4. So far as factual background is concerned it has merged from the material on record and from the submissions by learned advocate for the petitioner and the respondent that the respondent demanded gratuity from the petitioner on the ground that though he had worked for 5 years with the company and though he fulfilled eligibility criteria, the employer (i.e. present petitioner) did not pay gratuity. Initially the claimant demanded gratuity from the employer by submitting application in prescribed form. The said request was not accepted by the petitioner. Therefore the claimant (respondent herein) filed gratuity claim application before the controlling authority. The said gratuity claim application was registered by controlling authority as Gratuity Application No. 101/08. The controlling authority considered factual aspects narrated by the claimant in his application and the details mentioned by the employer in its reply/written submissions and reached to the conclusion that the claimant had worked continuously with the employer for 19 years and his average drawn salary per day was Rs.480.75 and the claimant was entitled for gratuity on that basis. The controlling authority considered factual aspects narrated by the claimant in his application and the details mentioned by the employer in its reply/written submissions and reached to the conclusion that the claimant had worked continuously with the employer for 19 years and his average drawn salary per day was Rs.480.75 and the claimant was entitled for gratuity on that basis. The controlling authority accordingly quantified amount payable to the claimant towards gratuity vide order dated 26.9.2008 5. The employer felt aggrieved by the said order. However, despite the fact that statutory alternative remedy by way of Appeal was available against the order passed by the controlling authority the petitioner employer did not avail said remedy and instead filed petition in High Court. 6. Before proceeding further, it is relevant to note that after the controlling authority passed order dated 26.9.2008, inadvertent typographical error in the final quantification of the amount payable to the claimant was brought to the notice of the controlling authority and it was mentioned that instead of mentioning Rs.1,37,019/- the authority had mentioned Rs.1,70,13.15. In that view of the matter, the controlling authority passed order dated 10.6.2009 rectifying the mistake. Thereafter, the employer, feeling aggrieved by the controlling authority's order, filed writ petition somewhere in July 2009 which was registered as SCA No. 11325 of 2009. 7. The petitioner subsequently was permitted to withdraw the petition with a view to availing statutory alternative remedy i.e. with a view to filing appeal before the appellate authority. Consequently said petition came to be disposed of vide order dated 29.1.2010 passed by this Court in SCA No. 11325 of 2009. Thereafter the petitioner employer filed appeal before appellate authority. It appears that the petitioner herein filed appeal before controlling authority on or around 9.3.2010 The appellate authority considered the appeal and submissions by the contesting parties and reached to the conclusion that the appeal was filed after expiry of prescribed limitation and that therefore for want of authority to condone delay beyond period prescribed under the Act, appeal was not maintainable and consequently appellate authority passed order dated 21.5.2010 and rejected the appeal on account of delay/limitation. It is against the said order by the appellate authority that the petitioner employer has taken out present petition. 8. Mr. It is against the said order by the appellate authority that the petitioner employer has taken out present petition. 8. Mr. Pandya, learned advocate for the petitioner would submit that after controlling authority passed order dated 26.9.2008 the matter was pending before controlling authority for rectification of error and the controlling authority passed order on 10.6.2009 He would further submit that the petitioner immediately i.e. on or around 2.7.2009 filed writ petition in the High Court. The said petition came to be disposed of as withdrawn on 29.1.2010 and the petitioner thereafter filed appeal before appellate authority on or around 9.3.2010 According to learned advocate for the petitioner employer had immediately availed remedy by filing writ petition against controlling authority's order and that therefore controlling authority ought to have considered the said aspect and should have allowed the application which was filed by the petitioner with request to condone delay. Learned advocate for the petitioner would submit that the appellate authority committed mistake in not condoning delay and in rejecting appeal on ground of delay/limitation. Mr. Pandya, learned advocate for the petitioner further submitted that the claimant was not employed by the petitioner for 19 years and the controlling authority committed error in relying on the allegation by the claimant that he had worked for 19 years with the petitioner. He submitted that the controlling authority failed to appreciate difference between names of two establishments i.e. Bhairavnath Industries Pvt. Ltd. and Bhairavnath Textile Limited. He submitted that the claimant might have worked with Bhairavnath Textile Limited before joining the petitioner i.e. Bhairavnath Industries Pvt. Ltd. However, controlling authority failed to appreciate said aspect as well as the document which was placed on record by the petitioner to demonstrate distinction between two establishments and that therefore the controlling authority's order is incorrect and unjustified and the learned appellate authority, instead of appreciating said grievance and contentions, rejected the appeal merely on ground of limitation/delay and that therefore the appellate authority's order is unjustified. 9. The petition and submissions by learned advocate for the petitioner are opposed by the learned advocate for the respondent. Learned advocate for the respondent would submit that the appellate authority does not have power to condone delay beyond prescribed limit i.e. beyond 120 days whereas the appeal was filed after prescribed limitation and that therefore the appellate authority could not have entertained the appeal. Learned advocate for the respondent would submit that the appellate authority does not have power to condone delay beyond prescribed limit i.e. beyond 120 days whereas the appeal was filed after prescribed limitation and that therefore the appellate authority could not have entertained the appeal. He would submit that the appellate authority has not committed error in rejecting the delay condonation application and the appeal. Learned advocate for the respondent would submit that the petition challenging such decision of the appellate authority is not maintainable and does not deserve to be entertained. He would submit that even otherwise there is no substance in the case of the petitioner inasmuch as the controlling authority has, after examining material submitted by the petitioner recorded findings of fact that the claimant successfully established before the authority that he had worked with the petitioner for 19 years and that therefore he was entitled for gratuity for entire period of service. According to the case of the respondent the petition is without merits and may be rejected. 10. I have considered the submissions by learned advocates for the petitioner and respondent. 11. It is not in dispute that after hearing the parties and after considering available material the controlling authority passed order dated 26.9.2008 and allowed gratuity application No. 101 of 2008 filed by present respondent. It is also undisputed fact that the controlling authority passed further order dated 10.6.2009 so as to rectify error in mentioning amount payable to the claimant. It is also not in dispute that after said order dated 10.6.2009 passed by the controlling authority the petitioner herein did not prefer appeal before appellate authority though Act provides remedy of appeal against order of the controlling authority. The petitioner, instead, filed petition i.e. SCA No. 11325 of 2009. The said petition came to be filed on or around 2.7.2009 i.e. about 10 months after order dated 26.9.2008 and about 3 weeks after order dated 10.6.2009 It is not clear from the record as to whether any application was filed by the employer or workmen for correction of error or the controlling authority had suo motu undertaken said exercise and corrected the error. Even if it is assumed that it was one of the parties who had moved application before the controlling authority with a request to correct the error, the fact remains that the petitioner filed said SCA No. 11325 of 2009 almost 10 months after the order dated 26.9.2008 and about 3 weeks after order dated 10.6.2009 Thereafter the petitioner continued to prosecute said petition for almost 6 months and it was on 29.1 2010 that the petitioner sought permission to withdraw the petition. The Court therefore disposed of the petition vide order dated 29.1.2010 because the petitioner expressed that he desires to avail alternative remedy. 12. It is pertinent that after withdrawing the petition on 29.1.2010 for about 1 month the petitioner did not take any action and filed appeal after more than 1 month on or around 9.3.2010 Thus, by any standard, appeal was filed after expiry of more than 120 days from the date of initial order i.e. from 26.9.2008 as well as from the date of subsequent order i.e. 10.6.2009 13. Subsection (4) of Section 7 of the Act prescribes that a person aggrieved by the order of the controlling authority can file appeal before the appellate authority within 60 days from the date of receipt of the order. The said subsection (4) of Section 7 of the Act also confers power on the appellate authority to entertain appeal even if it is filed after expiry of 60 days provided concerned party offers explanation and makes out sufficient cause for delay in filing appeal. The Act confers power on the appellate authority to condone delay, however subject to the restriction prescribed by the proviso of Section (4) of Section 7. According to the said proviso the appellate authority can condone delay for maximum 60 days. Thus, the appellate authority cannot entertain appeal which is filed after expiry of 120 days and it does not have power to condone delay beyond the restriction prescribed by the Act. The appellate authority under the Act cannot exercise inherent power or cannot act dehors the limitation prescribed under the Act or cannot exercise the power which is not conferred to it by the legislature. 14. The appellate authority under the Act cannot exercise inherent power or cannot act dehors the limitation prescribed under the Act or cannot exercise the power which is not conferred to it by the legislature. 14. In this context it would be jappropriate to take into account observations by the full bench in the decision in case of Jayminbhai Navinbhai Doshi v. State of Gujarat, 2015 (1) GLH 167 wherein the Court considered provision under Bombay (Gujarat) Stamp Act. In the said decision Hon'ble full bench observed that:- 13. In view of the above observations of the Supreme Court, where even the High Courts jurisdiction under the Act was found to be excluded by operation of section 35H of the Central Excise Act, by applying the same principle, it must be concluded that by providing no power of condonation under Section 53 and by giving power of condonation only to the limited extent to the proceedings under section 54(1A), the Legislature has made its intention clear that so far the present cases are concerned, the authority under Section 53(1) had no power of condonation. However, in the present cases, since the reference has also been made on the question as to the power of condonation of delay by High Court in exercise of the power conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, we also propose to answer the said question. 14. It is now settled law that the Limitation Act has no application to a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution and consequently, no period of limitation is prescribed either under the Limitation Act or in the Constitution of India for moving an application under Article 226 and thus, there is no scope of taking aid of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution. 15. A person is entitled to move High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution when by the illegal action or inaction on the part of a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution, any of his legal or fundamental rights is infringed. In the Special Civil Applications out of which the present References arise, the petitioners have alleged violation of their legal rights accrued by virtue of the provisions contained in the Act itself. In the Special Civil Applications out of which the present References arise, the petitioners have alleged violation of their legal rights accrued by virtue of the provisions contained in the Act itself. In view of our finding that the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority exercising power under Section 53(1) of the Act has no power of condonation of delay in filing the application beyond the period mentioned therein, for the refusal on the part of the said authority to condone delay for want of jurisdiction, none of the legal rights of the petitioners have been infringed and thus, if the Chief Controlling Authority has no power of condonation, it necessarily follows that the High Court in exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution against the order of the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority cannot condone the delay when the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority did not possess such power and rightly refused to condone. Thus, by taking recourse to Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, the High Court cannot condone such delay in the proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution. 15. In this context reference may also be had to the observation in the decision in case of Panoli Intermediate (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 2015 Gujarat 97 wherein the Court has held in paragraph 31 that:- “31. We may now proceed to answer the question. (1) Question No. 1 is answered in negative by observing that the limitation provided under section 35 of the Act cannot be condoned in filing the appeal beyond the period of 30 days as provided by the proviso nor the appeal can be filed beyond the period of 90 days. (2) The second question is answered in negative to the extent that the petition under Article 226 of the Constitution would not lie for the purpose of condonation of delay in filing the appeal. (2) The second question is answered in negative to the extent that the petition under Article 226 of the Constitution would not lie for the purpose of condonation of delay in filing the appeal. (3) On the third question, the answer is in affirmative, but with the clarification that:- (A) The petition under Article 226 of the Constitution can be preferred for challenging the order passed by the original adjudicating authority in following circumstances that: (A.1) The authority has passed the order without jurisdiction and by assuming jurisdiction which there exist none, or (A.2) Has exercised the power in excess of the jurisdiction and by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (A.3) Has acted in flagrant disregard to law or rules or procedure or acted in violation of principles of natural justice where no procedure is specified. (B) Resultantly, there is a failure of justice or it has resulted into gross injustice. We may also sum up by saying that the power is there even in aforesaid circumstances, but the exercise is discretionary which will be governed solely by the dictates of the judicial conscience enriched by judicial experience and practical wisdom of the judge.” 16. Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Chhattisgarh SEB v. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission, (2010) 5 SCC 23 , considered similar provision under Section 125, proviso under Electricity Act, 2003, providing period of limitation for appeal to the Supreme Court against order of Appellate Tribunal for Electricity. It was held that delay in filing appeal beyond 120 days cannot be condoned. The Apex Court stated, “The use of the expression within a further period of not exceeding 60 days in the proviso to Section 125 makes it clear that the outer limit for filing an appeal is 120 days. There is no provision in the Act under which this Court can entertain an appeal filed against the decision or order of the Tribunal after more than 120 days.” (Para 25) 17. There is no provision in the Act under which this Court can entertain an appeal filed against the decision or order of the Tribunal after more than 120 days.” (Para 25) 17. The Apex Court emphasized the object underlying the provision and observed that: “The object underlying establishment of a special adjudicatory forum i.e. the Tribunal to deal with the grievance of any person who may be aggrieved by an order of an adjudicating officer or by an appropriate Commission with a provision for further appeal to this Court and prescription of special limitation for filing appeals under Sections 111 and 125 is to ensure that disputes emanating from the operation and implementation of different provisions of the Electricity Act are expeditiously decided by an expert body and no court, except this Court, may entertain challenge to the decision or order of the Tribunal. The exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil courts (Section 145) qua an order made by an adjudicating officer is also a pointer in that direction.” (Para 26) “It is thus evident that the Electricity Act is a special legislation within the meaning of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, which lays down that where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the one prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application unless they are not expressly excluded by the special or local law.” (Para 27) “In view of the above discussion, we hold that Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be invoked by this Court for entertaining an appeal filed against the decision or order of the Tribunal beyond the period of 120 days specified in Section 125 of the Electricity Act and its proviso. Any interpretation of Section 125 of the Electricity Act which may attract the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act read with Section 29(2) thereof will defeat the object of the legislation, namely, to provide special limitation for filing an appeal against the decision or order of the Tribunal and proviso to Section 125 will become nugatory. (Para 32)” 18. (Para 32)” 18. In the aforesaid judgment, it was finally held: “As specific period of limitation is provided with prescription of outer limit there under Section 7(7) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, which is a special statute, the same would prevail and reign. The writ jurisdiction cannot be exercised to grant any relief to the petitioner when the appeal before the Appellate Authority was beyond the maximum period of limitation statutorily fixed, as entertaining the petition and granting any relief would amount to breaching and circumventing the statutory provision.” 19. What is finally held in Chhattisgarh SEB (supra) is equally and fully applicable to interpretation of section 7(7) of the Gratuity Act. 20. When the decision of the appellate authority is considered in light of above mentioned decisions it becomes clear that the appellate authority has not committed error in rejecting the appeal on the ground that the appeal is barred by limitation prescribed under the Act. 21. Besides above mentioned aspects it is also appropriate to note that on examination of the order passed by the controlling authority it clearly emerges that the controlling authority considered all facts and circumstances and the material which were placed on record before the controlling authority and the controlling authority has recorded the fact that the person who is examined as witness by the employer did not appear for cross examination and that therefore the deposition (examination in chief) of the employer's witness was cancelled. The controlling authority has also recorded that the claimant had placed on record documents and certificates which were not controverted and disputed by the employer in accordance with law and that the documents available on record establish that the claimant worked at New Clothes Market in office of the petitioner. The controlling authority has recorded specific findings of fact that the claimant had worked for more than 240 days in each year and that he worked with the petitioner employer from 1988 i.e. for 19 years and that his last drawn salary was Rs.4500/- 22. With regard to the said findings of fact recorded by the controlling authority this Court would not sit in appeal and this Court would not enter into process of re-appreciation of the evidence. 23. Under the circumstances any strong circumstances or any ground to interfere with the orders impugned in this petition are not made out. With regard to the said findings of fact recorded by the controlling authority this Court would not sit in appeal and this Court would not enter into process of re-appreciation of the evidence. 23. Under the circumstances any strong circumstances or any ground to interfere with the orders impugned in this petition are not made out. The petition does not deserve to be entertained. 24. The order passed by the controlling authority does not suffer from any infirmity or error. The order passed by the appellate authority is in consonance with the provisions under the Act and also in consonance with legal position settled by above mentioned decisions and the said order of the appellate authority does not warrant any interference. 25. Therefore, following order is passed:- 26. The petition is not accepted Rule is discharged. Ad-interim/interim relief, if any, stands vacated forthwith. 27. Accordingly the petition stands disposed of. 28. Orders accordingly.