JUDGMENT : J.B. Pardiwala, J. By this writ-application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the writ-applicants serving with the Gujarat Secondary and Higher Secondary Education Board, have prayed for the following reliefs:- “…Your Lordships may be pleased to issue a writ of certiorari, mandamus or any other appropriate writ, direction or order - (A) declaring the prescription of written test and oral interview by office order dated 1.10.2002 as irrational, arbitrary, unreasonable and unjustified and against the letter and spirit of the Court's order and, therefore, violative of Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India, illegal, null and void and quashing the same; (B) restraining the respondents from insisting upon the passing of the written test and the oral test for the petitioners in order to be absorbed in the Board by way of implementation of the office order dated 1.10.2002; (C) directing the respondents to judge the efficiency and quality of the petitioners on the basis of their total experience of more than 18 to 20 years and to absorb them in the services of the Board and to regularise them with all consequential benefits without insisting upon the passing of the written test and oral interview as prescribed by the impugned office order; (D) passing any other appropriate order; (E) granting interim relief including ad interim relief in terms of above and restraining the respondents from holding the written test and oral interview of the petitioners for the purpose of absorption during the pendency and till disposal of this petition.” 2. The facts of this case may be summarised as under: 3. The writ-applicants herein in the first round of the litigation prayed for regularising their services with the Board by filing the Special Civil Application No. 4622 of 1986. The writ-application came to be rejected vide the judgment and order dated 12th June 2000. The judgment reads as under: “Heard learned Advocate Mr. Oza for the respondent no. 2 and the learned AGP Mr. Premal Joshi for Respondent No. 1 and learned advocate Mr. S.V. Raju for respondent Nos. 3 to 8 and 10 to 16. Rest of the respondents are served. Learned advocate Mr. Girish Patel appearing for the petitioner is not present on call. 2. The petitioners before this Court, 40 in number, are the employees of Gujarat Secondary Education Board, the respondent no. S.V. Raju for respondent Nos. 3 to 8 and 10 to 16. Rest of the respondents are served. Learned advocate Mr. Girish Patel appearing for the petitioner is not present on call. 2. The petitioners before this Court, 40 in number, are the employees of Gujarat Secondary Education Board, the respondent no. 2 herein [hereinafter referred to as, ‘the Board’]. Pending this petition, seven of the writ petitioners successfully took the selection test given by the Board and their services have been regularized from the date of their selection. The names of said writ petitioners have been deleted by order dated 22nd October, 1996. It is the claim of the petitioners that petitioners' names were sponsored either by the Employment Exchange Officer or by the Social Welfare Officer for appointment in the Board. The Board, after receiving the names of the petitioners and after holding interviews, had appointed the petitioners on daily wages. The petitioners have been serving with the Board on daily wages for a long period continuously. Nonetheless, the petitioners are treated as ad hoc employees appointed on temporary basis and their services are sought to be terminated. It is contended that the nature of duties performed by the petitioners are perennial and the petitioners having been appointed after due procedure, their services are required to be treated as regular service. The petitioners, therefore, have prayed that the order of termination of their services be set aside; the services of the petitioners be regularized and they be permanently absorbed in the cadre of Junior Clerk on the basis of total length of service rendered by them, without asking them to take any test/examination/interview or selection for the same. 3. The petition is contested by the Board. It is contended that apart from the regular staff of the Board, the Board recruits certain daily wage employees/apprentice to man the additional workload during the time of examination held in the months of March and October every year. These appointments are made purely on temporary basis to meet the additional workload alone. It is further contended that their selection and appointments are made on daily wages. The attempt of the Board to regularise their services by giving them test has failed on account of want of cooperation by the petitioners. The appointments having been made on daily wages, the petitioners cannot claim automatic regularization in service. 4. It is further contended that their selection and appointments are made on daily wages. The attempt of the Board to regularise their services by giving them test has failed on account of want of cooperation by the petitioners. The appointments having been made on daily wages, the petitioners cannot claim automatic regularization in service. 4. The averments made in the petition are not supported by documentary evidence i.e., neither appointment orders nor the termination orders have been placed on the records. Only order which is placed on record is of 12th August, 1986 whereby one M.R. Parmar, petitioner no. 5 has been informed that his services were not required with effect from 12th August, 1986 and that he would be called upon as and when his services are required. However, this is not sufficient to hold that the services of all the petitioners have been terminated in the like manner. Further, in the affidavit made by one Naranbhai H. Mochi, petitioner no. 39 as late as on 13th September, 1999, it is stated that all the petitioners continue in service till the date. The said averment is reiterated by the said petitioner in his Affidavit dated 27th January, 2000. Hence, to me, it appears that on the date of the petition, services of the petitioners were yet not terminated nor was any order made in respect of the termination of their services. Further, the respondent no. 5 Shri M.R. Parmar also appears to have continued in service inspite of the order of termination dated 12th August 1986 and in that view of the matter, no cause of action can be said to have accrued to the petitioners and the petition should be held to be premature to that extent. 5. The petitioners' claim for regularization in service also is not tenable. It is evident that petitioners were never selected for regular appointment. It should make a hell of a difference when a person is being interviewed for a permanent employment and when one is being interviewed for appointment on daily wages for temporary arrangement. Merely because the petitioners' names have been sponsored by the Employment Exchange Officer or the Social Welfare Officer, as the case may be, they cannot seek regularization in service irrespective of terms of their appointment. The action of the Board in giving test to such employees before offering them permanent employment is absolutely just and legal. Merely because the petitioners' names have been sponsored by the Employment Exchange Officer or the Social Welfare Officer, as the case may be, they cannot seek regularization in service irrespective of terms of their appointment. The action of the Board in giving test to such employees before offering them permanent employment is absolutely just and legal. Such action cannot be vitiated as claimed by the petitioners. It further appears that respondents nos. 3 to 37 are the employees of the Board who have been selected and appointed on the permanent establishment. Some of those employees were initially appointed on daily wages alongwith the petitioners herein. However, since they successfully took the selection test, their services have been regularized from the date of their selection. The action of the Board in regularizing the services of such employees who have successfully undergone the selection test cannot be faulted with. However, considering the long service rendered by these petitioners, it should be justiciable that these petitioners are given an opportunity for regular selection as and when such selections are being made. It is, therefore, directed that as and when regular selections are made, the Board shall also consider the case of the petitioners for regular selection, irrespective of the age-bar which may be faced by such petitioners, provided the concerned petitioners are were within the age limit on the date of their first appointment. 6. Subject to the above observations, the petition is dismissed. Rule is discharged.” 4. It appears that being dissatisfied with the judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge referred to above, the writ-applicants preferred the Letters Patent Appeal No. 357 of 2000. The Letters Patent Appeal came to be disposed of vide the judgment and order dated 4th May 2001 by a Division Bench of this Court. The judgment and order reads as under: “This is an appeal filed by 34 employees of the Gujarat Secondary Education Board. They are not fully satisfied with the directions contained in the impugned order of the learned Single Judge dated 12.6.2000 in SCA No. 4622 of 1986. Their prayer is that having put in long 13 years of service as junior clerks on daily wage basis they have a legitimate claim to be considered for regulation or absorption in the services of the Board. 2. Their prayer is that having put in long 13 years of service as junior clerks on daily wage basis they have a legitimate claim to be considered for regulation or absorption in the services of the Board. 2. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants appears to be right in his submission that a precarious situation in the matter of services of the appellants has been created because of a fundamental mistake in man power planning of the Board. The Board conducts higher secondary school examination generally twice in a year in the months of March and October. For some period, before holding of examination and after examination, there is increase of work depending upon number of students appearing in the examination. For this pre-examination and post-examination work, the appellants were recruited as junior clerks on daily wage basis. Their work includes scrutiny of applications of candidates, preparation of complete record for conducting examination, allotment of seat numbers and the centres. After completion of the examination, the post-examination work includes receipt and transportation of all the answer books of all the candidates from the concerned centres established for centralised assessment. In the stream for science subject, the nature of work includes receipt of answer books duly assessed by the examiners, collection and arrangement of moderators and moderators' mark sheets after they are received from the moderators, arranging mark sheets according to continuous seat numbers of the candidates. A part of this work which was being done manually is now undertaken by data processing computerisation programme. 3. There are no statutory recruitment rules framed by the Board for giving employment. It is not disputed that the appellants have put in long 13 years of service on daily wages. Certain additional posts of junior clerks were sanctioned but the appellants, excepting a few of them, could not be considered for appointment against those sanctioned posts as they had become age barred by the time the posts were sanctioned. The appellants thus are being compelled to work only on daily wage basis and are in constant threat of dispensation of their services. As against the sanctioned posts, under the orders of this court, respondents Nos. 3 to 37 have been appointed through selection process, but subject to the result of SCA No. 4622 of 1986. Respondents Nos. The appellants thus are being compelled to work only on daily wage basis and are in constant threat of dispensation of their services. As against the sanctioned posts, under the orders of this court, respondents Nos. 3 to 37 have been appointed through selection process, but subject to the result of SCA No. 4622 of 1986. Respondents Nos. 3 to 37 are also working in the service of the Board from the date of their recruitment some time in the year 1986-87. There are thus two competitive claims now of the appellants as daily rated junior clerks and respondents Nos. 3 to 37 as selected and appointed subject to the result of the above SCA. 4. Opposing the claim of the appellants, the stand of the Board is that appointment on daily wage basis was given with specific terms that the appointment is periodic and the appointees would have no right to claim regular appointment. On behalf of the Board, the learned counsel submitted that pre and post examination work is for a limited period in academic year and the appellants cannot be appointed on regular basis and allowed to earn wages even for the idle period. The other stand taken on behalf of the Board is that posts are sanctioned by the State Government and employees are State employees. In the absence of sanction of posts and the appellants being not qualified under the terms and conditions fixed for recruitment, they cannot be considered either for regular appointment or for absorption in the service of the Board. 5. The appellants are working in the service of the Board for long period of 13 years. They have spent best part of their life in the service of the Board and at this stage, now, they are disqualified for any other public employment. As stated on behalf of the Board, it may be true that clerks employed for pre and post examination work cannot be employed for the whole academic year, but employment of clerks for pre and post examination work is perennial and recurring requirement of the Board which is an uninterrupted annual feature. As stated on behalf of the Board, it may be true that clerks employed for pre and post examination work cannot be employed for the whole academic year, but employment of clerks for pre and post examination work is perennial and recurring requirement of the Board which is an uninterrupted annual feature. In a sound man power planning which the Board as a model employer and ‘State’ within the definition of that term under Article 12 of the Constitution, is expected to make or it should create regular posts of junior Clerks for such examination work of recurring nature. Such posts are required to be created in consultation with the State Government. Instead of doing the same, the Board has resorted to the method of employment of junior clerks on daily wage basis and continuing them year after year without giving them a chance of regular appointment. The Board being ‘State’ under Article 12 of the Constitution cannot be allowed to employ persons on exploitative terms. Employees having no bargaining power cannot be denied right of regular appointment by taking stand as is of the Board that their terms of appointment are such that they have to work only for limited duration on daily wages. The court cannot ignore the fact that with introduction of computer data process system in the Board need of manual power to some extent might have been reduced. The existing employees have first to be given just and fair conditions of employment before making human power planning for future. 6. It may be mentioned that in the course of long pendency of this case before the learned Single Judge and before us, many rounds of talks of settlement and conciliation between the Board and the employees took place, but without any amicable solution of the problem. At one stage, the Board was willing to give all the appellants fresh appointment but no seniority on the basis of service as daily rated employees. The employees were not prepared to accept the employment on the terms proposed. Later on, on their behalf, however, the learned counsel agreed that they would be willing to accept even fresh appointment on regular basis, provided on their past period of service as daily rated employees is counted only for the purpose of pension and not for seniority. That counter offer of the employees was not acceptable to the Board. Later on, on their behalf, however, the learned counsel agreed that they would be willing to accept even fresh appointment on regular basis, provided on their past period of service as daily rated employees is counted only for the purpose of pension and not for seniority. That counter offer of the employees was not acceptable to the Board. It has, therefore, become necessary for us to decide the legal issue involved. 7. The learned counsel for the appellants very strongly relies on the later decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Gujarat Agricultural University Vs. Rathod Labhu Bechar, AIR 2001 SC 706 . That was a case of daily wage workmen in the Agricultural University. The case arose from a labour dispute under the Industrial Disputes Act. We need not go into the question whether junior clerks herein also can claim to be ‘workmen’ within the definition of the Industrial Disputes Act. The following observations of the Supreme court in the case of Gujarat Agricultural University (supra) to a great extent, support the claim of regular appointment or absorption of service of the appellant and negative the contentions raised by the Board as employer: “16….In fact, the Tribunal has held on the date of the award, most of the workmen had completed 10 years of their service. It is also well settled, if work is taken by the employer continuously from daily wage workers for a long number of years without considering their regularisation for its financially gain as against employees legitimate claim, has been held by this Court repeatedly as an unfair labour practice. In fact, taking work, from daily wage worker or ad hoc appointee is always viewed to be only for a short period or as a stop gap arrangement, but we find new culture is growing to continue with it for a long time, either for financial gain or for controlling its workers more effectively with sword of Damocles hanging over their heads or to continue with favoured one in the cases of ad hoc employee with staling competent and legitimate claimants. Thus we have no hesitation to denounce this practice. If the work is of such a nature, which has to be taken continuously and in any case when this pattern become apparent, when they continue to work for year after year, only option to the employer is to regularise them. Thus we have no hesitation to denounce this practice. If the work is of such a nature, which has to be taken continuously and in any case when this pattern become apparent, when they continue to work for year after year, only option to the employer is to regularise them. Financial viability no doubt is one of the considerations but then such enterprise or institution should not spread its arms longer than its means. The consequent corollary is, where work is taken not for a short period or limited for a season or where work is not of part time nature and if pattern shows work is to be taken continuously year after year, there is no justification to keep such persons hanging as daily rate workers. In such situation a legal obligation is cast on an employer if there be vacant post to fill it up with such workers in accordance with rules if any and where necessary by relaxing the qualifications, where long experience could be equitable with such qualifications. If no post exists then duty is cast to assess the quantum of such work and create such equivalent post for their absorption.” “18…..It was not expected from the institutions like the present appellant, especially when it is fully funded by the State Government that this process of absorption should have taken such a long time and to have yielded to it only after this long battle. This legal position is well known not only to the appellant but the State who is funding it, then why to do it only after Courts’ intervention. It is true creation of post does involve financial implication. Hence financial health of a particular institution plays important role to which Courts also keep in mind. The Court does exercise its restrain where facts are such where extent of creation of post creates financial disability. But at this juncture we would like to express our note of caution, that this does not give largess to an institution to engage larger number of daily wage workers for long number of years without absorbing them or creating posts which constitutes an unfair labour practice. If finances are short engagement of such daily wage workers could only be for a short limited period and if continuous work is required it could only do so by creating permanent post. If finances are short engagement of such daily wage workers could only be for a short limited period and if continuous work is required it could only do so by creating permanent post. If finances are not available, take such work which is within financial mean. Why take advantage out of it at the cost of workers.” 8. From the observations quoted above, the Supreme Court clearly negatived the stand of the employer that the work for which employment was made on daily rate basis is of such nature that no permanent appointment could be made and that creation of post would have adverse financial implication. It has been held that where nature of work is to continue year after year and the employees have been continued for a very long period, constraint of finance cannot be accepted as a legitimate stand of the employer to deny fair treatment to the employees. 9. In the instant case, however, we have also to take into consideration the claim and interest of respondents Nos. 3 to 37 who have been recruited against sanctioned posts and are awaiting their regular absorption subject to orders of this court. We have also to examine the long period of service put in by them during the pendency of the petition. 10. Taking support from the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Gujarat Agricultural University (supra), we allow this appeal by substituting the directions of the learned Single Judge dated 12.6.2000 by the following directions: (i) The State of Gujarat through Secretary, Education Department (respondent No. 1) on being approached by the Gujarat Secondary Education Board (respondent No. 2), shall consider creation of 40 or more supernumerary posts of junior clerks with designation, nomenclature and pay-scale as considered suitable for such posts. For this purpose, a formal approach in writing shall be made by the Board to the State Government within a period of one month; (ii) On creation of supernumerary posts of junior clerks, the respondent Board shall prepare a scheme of regularisation or absorption of the appellants by process of scrutiny or selection based on efficiency and past performance of the appellants; (iii) So far as respondents Nos. 3 to 37 are concerned, since they have been appointed subject to the result of the petition and against existing sanctioned posts, the respondent Board may proceed for finalisation of appointment process but without prejudice to the rights and claim for absorption or regularisation of services of the appellants. (iv) Let the process of creation of posts, framing a scheme for absorption or regularisation of service of the appellants on newly created posts and respondents Nos. 3 to 37 on the sanctioned posts be completed by respondents Nos. 1 and 2 within an outer limit of three months from today. Until then, the appellants and respondents Nos. 3 to 37 shall be continued in service of the respondent Board on the same terms and conditions existing on the date of making of this order. In the facts and circumstances of the case, however, we leave the parties bear their own costs. No orders on the civil applications.” 5. It also appears that the judgment and order passed by the Division Bench in the Letters Patent Appeal No. 357 of 2000 referred to above was challenged before the Apex Court by filing the Special Leave Petition No. 10469 of 2001. The SLP was disposed of as withdrawn vide order dated 30th August 2001. While permitting to withdraw the SLP, the Supreme Court granted the Board the liberty to approach this Court for an appropriate relief. In such circumstances, the Board preferred the Misc. Civil Application No. 1653 of 2001 for review, which came to be rejected vide order dated 22nd October 2001. The order reads as under: “1. The Gujarat Secondary Education Board has preferred this Review Petition against our order in Letters Patent Appeal No. 357 of 2001 in Special Civil Application No. 4622 of 1986 decided on 4-5-2001. 2. Against our order Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 10469 of 2001 was preferred before the Supreme Court of India. At the time of hearing, the learned counsel appearing for the Board sought permission to withdraw the Special Leave to Appeal with liberty to approach the High Court for appropriate relief. The order reads:- “Learned counsel for the petitioner seeks permission to withdraw the Special Leave Petition with liberty to approach the High Court for appropriate relief. It is accordingly dismissed as withdrawn.” The Supreme Court, therefore, dismissed the Special Leave to Appeal as withdrawn. 3. The order reads:- “Learned counsel for the petitioner seeks permission to withdraw the Special Leave Petition with liberty to approach the High Court for appropriate relief. It is accordingly dismissed as withdrawn.” The Supreme Court, therefore, dismissed the Special Leave to Appeal as withdrawn. 3. In this Review Petition, learned counsel appearing for the Board made strenuous effort to take us to the various reasons given and conclusions reached by us in our judgment to persuade us that there are errors in our decision. The main contention advanced is that the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Gujarat Agricultural University Vs. Rathod Labhu Bechar AIR 2001 SC 706 , on which this Court has placed reliance, arose out of an industrial dispute and could not be extended to the services of the Board. It is also submitted that other Supreme Court decisions relevant on the point were not brought to the notice of this Court and therefore this Court should review the judgment and relieve the Board of the obligation to regularise the services of the employees, who may be working for a long period on daily wages. 4. After hearing the learned counsel, we find that an attempt is made to argue certain points as if the Review Petition is an Appeal against our own order. The scope of Review is restricted and even in writ proceedings the Court had been exercising the powers of review within the parameters laid down under Order 47, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Explanation below Order 47, Rule 1(2) reads:- “Explanation.-The fact that the decision on a question of law on which the judgment of the court is based has been reversed or modified by the subsequent decision of a superior court in any other case, shall not be a ground for the review of such judgment.” 5. We find that an attempt to obtain special leave before the Supreme Court was made, but then the counsel for the Board withdrew the Petition and sought liberty to approach this Court. It is to be noted that the Supreme Court has not interfered with our order. The Special Leave Petition has been dismissed as withdrawn. We find that an attempt to obtain special leave before the Supreme Court was made, but then the counsel for the Board withdrew the Petition and sought liberty to approach this Court. It is to be noted that the Supreme Court has not interfered with our order. The Special Leave Petition has been dismissed as withdrawn. It is also to be noted that pursuant to the directions made by us, the Board itself has approached the State Government and the State Government has sanctioned the required number of posts. The only difficulty that appears to be that the State Government has not given equivalent financial grant and for these posts the financial burden will be on the Board. We find no apparent error in our judgment which can be corrected in exercise of powers of review. We also do not find that any failure of justice has been caused by our order. Consequently, the Miscellaneous Civil Application is dismissed. Notice is discharged. There shall be no order as to costs. In view of the order passed in M.C.A. No. 1653 of 2001, there shall be no order in M.C.A. No. 1656 of 2001.” 6. It also appears that the writ-applicants preferred the Special Civil Application No. 10522 of 2000, challenging the order passed by the Board terminating their services. The Special Civil Application No. 10522 of 2000 came to be disposed of in the following terms: “By way of present petition, the petitioners have challenged the termination order with following prayers made in Para-38 of the present petition. Prayer made in present petition are quoted as under:- 38. The petitioners, having no other alternative, efficacious and adequate remedy at law, approach Your Lordships under Article 226 of the Constitution of the India and pray that Your Lordships may be pleased to issue a writ of certiorari, mandamus or any other appropriate writ, direction or order. Prayer made in present petition are quoted as under:- 38. The petitioners, having no other alternative, efficacious and adequate remedy at law, approach Your Lordships under Article 226 of the Constitution of the India and pray that Your Lordships may be pleased to issue a writ of certiorari, mandamus or any other appropriate writ, direction or order. [A] declaring the termination orders dated 19-6-2000 issued to all the petitioners as absolutely arbitrary, irrational, unreasonable and unjustified and discriminatory and in clear violation of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act and as violative of Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India, illegal, null and void and quashing the same; [B] restraining the respondents from enforcing, implementing or acting upon the impugned orders of termination dated 19-6-2000 and from denying work and job to the petitioners as if no impugned order has been issued; [C] staying the operation of the termination orders dated 19-6-2000 and allowing the petitioners to continue to work in the respondent Board as if they have continued and their services have not been terminated; [D] directing the respondents to reinstate the petitioners with all backwages and benefits and; [E] passing any other appropriate order;” Considering the submissions of the learned advocates for the parties, in view of this Court, for the purpose of interim order in the matter, the controversy revolves on interpretation of direction issued by the Division Bench of this Court while allowing LPA No. 357/2000. Therefore, relevant directions disputed by the respondent Board, in para-10[iv] of the order dated 4th May, 2001 is again reiterated as under:- “[iv] Let the process of creation of posts, framing a scheme for absorption or regularisation of service of the appellants on newly created posts and respondents Nos. 3 to 37 on the sanctioned posts be completed by respondents Nos. 1 and 2 within an outer limit of three months from today. Until then, the appellants and respondents Nos. 3 to 37 shall be continued in service of the respondent Board on the same terms and conditions existing on the date of making of this order.” Perusal of the direction issued by the Division Bench clearly speaks that the Division Bench has directed that process of creation of posts, framing a scheme for absorption or regularisation of service of the appellants on newly created posts and respondent Nos. 3 to 37 on the sanctioned posts be completed by respondents Nos. 1 & 2 within an outer limit of three months today, meaning thereby, from the date of order. Until then, the appellants and the respondents Nos. 3 to 37 shall be continued in service of the respondent Board on the same terms and conditions existing on the date of making of this order. Before this Court, the real controversy between two advocates representing the parties as to interpretation of the direction referred to hereinabove. Learned Govt. Pleader Mr. A.D. Oza appearing on behalf of the respondent Board has submitted that the learned Single Judge has not set aside the order dated 12th August, 1986 and even the Division Bench of this Court has not set aside the order of termination dated 19th June, 2000 though Civil Application was filed by the petitioners. Mr. Oza, learned GP has also submitted that in the present petition, the petitioners have challenged the termination order dated 19th June, 2000 and no interim stay been granted by this Court against termination and therefore, his submission before me is that when the order passed by the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court on 4th May, 2001, at that time, the petitioners were not in service pursuant to the termination order dated 19th June, 2000 and resultantly, when the petitioners were not in service of the respondent Board, the directions of the Division Bench to the effect that the petitioners shall be continued in service of the respondent Board on the same terms and conditions existing on the making of this order, will not help the petitioners to claim reinstatement on the basis of the order of the Division Bench dated 4th May, 2001 inasmuch as the petitioners were not in service on date 4-5-2001 when the order was passed by the Division Bench and therefore, the petitioners are not entitled to be continued in service. Mr. Girish Patel, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioners has submitted that in the proceedings of LPA No. 357/2000 before the Division Bench of this Court, the petitioners had filed Civil Application being C.A No. 6446/2000 wherein, the Division Bench [Coram: Mr. Justice R.K Abichandani and Mr. Justice D.A Mehta, JJ.] has passed order issuing RULE and granted Ad-interim relief staying further operation of the impugned order of termination dated 19-6-2000. Therefore, Mr. Justice R.K Abichandani and Mr. Justice D.A Mehta, JJ.] has passed order issuing RULE and granted Ad-interim relief staying further operation of the impugned order of termination dated 19-6-2000. Therefore, Mr. Patel, learned Advocate has submitted that the impugned order of termination dated 19th June, 2000 had been stayed and the order passed by the Division Bench on 9th October, 2000 in C.A.6446/2000 remained in existence and operation till the Letter Patent Appeal was finally decided by the Division Bench of this Court. Therefore, when the Letter Patent Appeal was finally decided by the Division bench [Coram: Hon'ble the Chief Justice Mr. D.M. Dharmadhikari and Mr. Justice P.B Majmudar, JJ.] of this Court, this interim order dated 9-10-2000 was very well existing and in operation and the Division Bench keeping in mind the order passed by the Division Bench [Coram: Mr. Justice RK. Abichandani and Mr. Justice D.A Mehta, JJ.] dated 9-10-2000 staying termination, have issued directions against the respondent Board and therefore, petitioners are entitled to reinstatement in service from the date of order passed by the Division Bench of this Court on date 4th May, 2001. It is also brought to the notice of this Court that necessary prayer to this effect has been made in the present petition praying interim direction for reinstatement of the present petitioners by staying operation of the termination order. Therefore, according to submissions of Mr. Girish Patel, all the petitioners are entitled to reinstatement from the date of order passed by the Division Bench of this Court on date 4th May, 2001 and therefore, they are also entitled to wages of interim period and also entitled to be continued in service till the scheme as suggested and directed by the Division Bench is finalised by the respondent Board. I have considered the submissions of the learned advocates for the parties. This Court has also minutely gone through the record of the Letter Patent Appeal No. 357/2000 in SCA No. 4622/1986 as also, Civil Application No. 6446/2000, CA No. 1023/2000 and MCA No. 1653/2001 and MCA No. 1656/2001. After considering the entire record and submissions of the learned advocates for the parties, according to my opinion, the Division Bench of this Court has in clear terms passed order on 9-10-2000 in Civil Application No. 6446/2000 filed by the petitioners, staying further operation of the impugned order of termination dated 19-6-2000. After considering the entire record and submissions of the learned advocates for the parties, according to my opinion, the Division Bench of this Court has in clear terms passed order on 9-10-2000 in Civil Application No. 6446/2000 filed by the petitioners, staying further operation of the impugned order of termination dated 19-6-2000. However, it is also noticed that the respondent Board being aggrieved of this order, had preferred Civil Application No. 10203/2000 but no substantial order was passed in Civil Application No. 10203/2000 preferred by the respondent Board but the Division Bench has merely directed to put up LPA for hearing along with CA. Therefore, it is clear that ad-interim relief granted by the Division Bench in CA No. 6446/2000 staying further implementation of the termination order dated 19th June, 2000 remained in existence till the Letter Patent Appeal No. 357/2000 was finally decided by the Division Bench headed by the Hon'ble the Chief Justice Mr. Justice D.M Dharmadhikari and Mr. Justice P.B Majmudar, JJ. Therefore, considering all these aspects of the matter, direction issued by the Division Bench of this Court in judgment dated 4th May, 2001 in para-10[iv] to the effect that the appellants and respondent Nos. 3 to 37 shall be continued in service of the respondent Board on the same terms and conditions existing on the date of making of the order, meaning thereby, on 4-5-2001 the day of passing of the order by the Division Bench, order on 9-10-2000 in Civil Application No. 6446/2000 filed by the petitioners, staying further operation of the impugned order of termination dated 19-6-2000 was in existence and operation and therefore, it is construed that the termination order dated 19th June, 2000 was already stayed by the Division Bench of this Court. Therefore, naturally as per the legal effect of the said order the Division Bench on 9th October, 2000, the petitioners are deemed to be in service for all purpose. But the question arises for consideration is whether the order passed by the Division Bench dated 9th October, 2000 was implemented by the respondent Board or not? Therefore, naturally as per the legal effect of the said order the Division Bench on 9th October, 2000, the petitioners are deemed to be in service for all purpose. But the question arises for consideration is whether the order passed by the Division Bench dated 9th October, 2000 was implemented by the respondent Board or not? This is different question which can be examined at the time of final hearing of this petition but so far the legality of the directions issued by the Division Bench in order dated 9th October, 2000 is concerned, this Court has to consider that legal effect, the ad-interim relief staying termination order dated 19th June, 2000 was in existence and this order was not vacated by the Division Bench. Even the order passed by the Division Bench on date 9th October, 2000 was not vacated despite of the specific prayer in the Civil Application No. 10203/2000 preferred by the respondent Board. Therefore, obviously legal effect is, the order of termination dated 19th June 2000 has been stayed by the Division Bench and the petitioners are deemed to be in service for all purpose Considering these aspects and directions issued by the Division Bench in para-10[iv], naturally as per the legal effect the petitioners are entitled to reinstatement in service as directed by the Division Bench of this Court vide order dated 4th May, 2001 and they shall remain continued in service till the scheme is finalised as suggested and directed by the Division Bench of this Court. Perusal of the entire record of the LPA No. 357/2000 and allied Civil Applications as also Misc. Civil Applications also reveal one more important aspect It has been found that on the basis of the directions issued by the Division Bench in LPA No. 357/2000 dated 4th May, 2001, the respondent Board has approached the State Government for creation of 40 posts and pursuant to the directions of the Division Bench, the State Government has sanctioned 40 posts in question and therefore, at present, newly created 40 posts are available with the respondent Board. Considering all these aspects of the matter, according to my opinion, the petitioners are entitled to reinstatement in service from the date of order passed by the Division Bench of this Court in LPA No. 357/2000 on date 4th May, 2001. Considering all these aspects of the matter, according to my opinion, the petitioners are entitled to reinstatement in service from the date of order passed by the Division Bench of this Court in LPA No. 357/2000 on date 4th May, 2001. In view of above discussions and considering the controversy involved in the present petition, in view of this Court, present petition - SCA No. 10522/2000 requires consideration and hence, RULE. By way of this Interim Order, it is directed to the respondent Board to reinstate petitioners herein who are thirty two in numbers with effect from 4th May, 2001. Actual reinstatement of the petitioners will have to made on or before 1st March, 2002. It is further directed to the respondent Board to pay full wages to each petitioner with effect from 4th May, 2001 till the date of actual reinstatement within period of two months from the date of receiving the copy of this order. Learned Government Pleader Mr. A.D. Oza has made a statement before this Court that each petitioner may report for duty on 1st March, 2002 and the respondent Board will allow all the petitioners to resume their duties without any difficulty. However, it is clarified that the statement made by Mr. A.D. Oza, learned Govt. Pleader is without prejudice to the rights and contentions and reinstatement ordered in favour of the petitioners would be subject to final out come of this petition. Direct Service is permitted.” 7. Pursuant to the directions issued by the Division Bench in the Letters Patent Appeal No. 357 of 2000, the State Government issued a notification dated 6th June 2001, creating 40 supernumerary posts of Junior Clerk in the pay-scale of Rs. 3050-4590. It also appears that pursuant to the directions of this Court issued in the Letters Patent Appeal No. 357 of 2000, the Board framed a scheme of regularisation dated 1st October 2002. According to the scheme, a written test of the level of Standard-X (SSC exam) carrying 100 marks would be conducted and the candidates should be able to secure minimum 35 marks. Thereafter, the candidates, i.e. the writ-applicants, would be subjected to oral interview, carrying 25 marks. The candidates shall have to obtain minimum 40 marks in both, the written and oral tests. According to the scheme, the written test was to be conducted before 30th November 2002. Thereafter, the candidates, i.e. the writ-applicants, would be subjected to oral interview, carrying 25 marks. The candidates shall have to obtain minimum 40 marks in both, the written and oral tests. According to the scheme, the written test was to be conducted before 30th November 2002. The scheme was made applicable only to the writ-applicants who had preferred the Letters Patent Appeal No. 357 of 2000. 8. The writ-applicants are dissatisfied with the terms and conditions of the scheme of regularisation. It is their case that they should not be subjected to any written test or oral interview. According to them, the Board should have proceeded to absorb them considering the directions issued by the Division Bench as contained in para 10(ii) of the judgment and order dated 4th May 2001. In such circumstances, they have come up with this writ-application. 9. On 23rd July 2003, the following order was passed: “Heard learned Senior advocate Mr. Girish Patel with learned advocate Mr. Shalin N. Mehta on behalf of the petitioners, learned AGP Mr. R.V Desai appearing on behalf of respondent No. 1 and learned GP Mr. A.D Oza appearing on behalf of Respondent No. 2 2. I have heard this matter for about more than one and half hours and I have considered the submissions made by the respective parties at length and, considering the submissions, the question raised in the present petition require detailed examination by this Court, hence RULE. Interim relief in terms of para 19(E). Learned AGP Mr. Desai waive the service of notice of rule on behalf of respondent No. 1 and learned GP Mr. A.D. Oza waive the service of notice of rule on behalf of respondent No. 2. 3. During the pendency of the present petition, it is open for the petitioners to make a detailed representation to the respondent Board. As and when such a representation will be made to the respondent Board, the respondent Board will consider the same sympathetically while keeping in mind the fact that the petitioners are working since 1982/1983/1984 with the Board. However, it is made clear that the representation which will be made by the petitioners is without prejudice to the rights and contentions of all the respective parties. 4. In view of the above observations and directions, present petition is disposed of.” 10. However, it is made clear that the representation which will be made by the petitioners is without prejudice to the rights and contentions of all the respective parties. 4. In view of the above observations and directions, present petition is disposed of.” 10. Thus, in view of the interim order granted by this Court in terms of para 19(E), the Board could not proceed to conduct the written test as well as the oral interview for the purpose of absorption on the 40 supernumerary posts created by the State Government. 11. Mr. Shalin Mehta, the learned senior counsel appearing for the writ-applicants, vehemently submitted that the action on the part of the Board is highly arbitrary and frustrates the very object with which the Division Bench passed the order dated 4th May 2001. Mr. Mehta would submit that this Court made it very clear that on creation of the supernumerary posts of Junior Clerk the Board shall prepare a scheme of regularisation or absorption of the writ-applicants by process of scrutiny or selection based on the efficiency and past performance of the writ-applicants. The Division Bench had never intended the conduct of any written exam as well as oral interview. According to Mr. Mehta, the terms of regularisation travels much beyond the scope of the directions issued by this Court. 12. Mr. Mehta would submit that after putting in more than 20 years of service his clients should not be asked to appear in a written exam as well as oral interview and the selection should be on the basis of past performance and efficiency. 13. Mr. Mehta fervently urged before this Court to take into consideration the following averments made in this writ-application: “(v) All the petitioners have been working since 1982-83 upto the present day. They have worked throughout the year and the table cited at the time of the original proceedings clearly shows their year-round employment and requirement of the services by the Board for whole year. The petitioners thus have put in more than 18 to 20 years' continuous service with the respondent Board as daily wager clerks. (vi) All the petitioners have thus very long experience of more than 18 to 20 years with the examinations conducted by the respondent Board. The petitioners thus have put in more than 18 to 20 years' continuous service with the respondent Board as daily wager clerks. (vi) All the petitioners have thus very long experience of more than 18 to 20 years with the examinations conducted by the respondent Board. Their performance has always been satisfactory and there has been no complaint regarding their conduct or performance and no disciplinary action has been taken against any of them. They have discharged their duties honestly, efficiently and to the best of their abilities and throughout the Court proceedings, nothing has been pointed out by the respondent Board as regards any complaint about their work, performance or conduct. (viii) The Government has also issued a general circular dated 1.1.99 granting exemption to employees from departmental examination if they have completed 45 years of age at the time of this circular dated 1.1.99 is annexed hereto and marked as Annexure-F. (ix) All the petitioners except two have crossed 45 years of age and have families with children who themselves are appearing in the examinations. It would be too strenuous and harsh to ask them to appear in the examination again for their absorption. (x) It is understood that it is difficult for people above certain age to appear at the written examination and pass particularly when they have to shoulder heavy responsibility of family and they have crossed certain age limit. This is explicitly recognised by the Government and many other organisations. (xi) The test contemplated includes 30 marks for Gujarati (with grammar), 15 marks for Arithmetic, 20 marks for English with grammar and 35 marks for General Knowledge. It also covers 25 marks for oral test. It is generally accepted that to have functionally acquaintance with the language and General Knowledge is one thing and to appear in the examination and pass in such examination is a different thing and written test or oral test cannot be the sole method of assessing the efficiency and experience of persons. (xii) In the present case, to hold such written and oral tests as prescribed by the office order would impose a very heavy burden upon the petitioners and will put them to such a great tension, because they know that if they cannot pass the test, their services would come to an end in the midst of their middle age. (xii) In the present case, to hold such written and oral tests as prescribed by the office order would impose a very heavy burden upon the petitioners and will put them to such a great tension, because they know that if they cannot pass the test, their services would come to an end in the midst of their middle age. It would be a very heavy and unjustifiable burden upon the petitioners. (xiii) It is also submitted that if a person has worked on a particular post for a long period say, 15 to 20 years and if the work is satisfactory and without any complaint, a written test of the SSC level is not at all necessary and justified only to decide to absorb them in their regular work. Their experience of 20 years without any complaint should be considered as sufficient for enabling them to be absorbed. (xiv) It is submitted that to hold a written examination of the SSC level and oral examination for persons above 45 years of age who themselves were SSC or above at the time of their original appointment in 1982-83 and who have worked continuously for more than 18 to 20 years on the same post without any complaint or grievance would be totally irrational, arbitrary and unjustified.” 14. Mr. Mehta has placed reliance on the following decisions: 1. Valsala Kumari Devi M. Vs. Director, Higher Secondary Education, (2007) 11 Scale 431; 2. ONGC Ltd. Vs. Petroleum Coal Labour Union, AIR 2015 SC 2210 ; and 3. Union of India Vs. Parul Debnath, (2009) 14 SCC 173 . 15. Mr. Mehta lastly pointed out that during the pendency of this writ-application most of the writ-applicants have retired from service. As on date, only two writ-applicants are in service. He would submit that the Board may be directed to consider the past record of each of the writ-applicants and regularise them in service so that they would be able to receive the terminal benefits in accordance with the rules and regulations. 16. In such circumstances referred to above, Mr. Mehta prays that there being merit in this writ-application, the same may be allowed. 17. On the other hand, this writ-application has been vehemently opposed by Mr. Kamal B. Trivedi, the learned Advocate General, assisted by Mr. A.D. Oza, the learned counsel appearing for the Board. Mr. 16. In such circumstances referred to above, Mr. Mehta prays that there being merit in this writ-application, the same may be allowed. 17. On the other hand, this writ-application has been vehemently opposed by Mr. Kamal B. Trivedi, the learned Advocate General, assisted by Mr. A.D. Oza, the learned counsel appearing for the Board. Mr. Trivedi vehemently submitted that the writ-applicants are not entitled to the reliefs prayed for in this writ-application. The principal argument of Mr. Trivedi is that the very direction issued by the Division Bench, which is sought to be implemented, pales into insignificance because there has been a drastic change in the law so far as the subject of the regularisation of temporary employees is concerned. Mr. Trivedi would submit that the learned Single Judge had rightly declined the claim of regularisation in service. However, the Division Bench, having regard to the long length of service put in by the writ-applicants, thought fit to issue directions, first, to the State Government to create supernumerary posts of Junior Clerk and, thereafter, to the respondent Board, to prepare a scheme of regularisation or absorption by process of scrutiny or selection based on efficiency and past performance of the writ-applicants. 18. Mr. Trivedi would submit that the terms of regularisation are within the discretion of the Board. The decision to conduct a written exam followed by an oral interview, by any stretch of imagination is not travelling beyond what has been directed by the Division Bench. The word ‘selection’ by itself would suggest that the same can be determined by conducting a written exam as well as calling the writ-applicants for interview. Mr. Trivedi further submitted that the writ-applicants should not be permitted to dictate the terms of regularisation in service. Regularisation cannot be claimed as a matter of any right, much less any legal right. Regularisation has to be subject to the terms and conditions. Mr. Trivedi, in support of his submissions, has placed reliance on the following decision of the Supreme Court: 1. Secretary, State of Karnataka Vs. Uma Devi, (2006) 4 SCC 1 ; 2. Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation Vs. Casteribe Rajya Parivahan Karmchari Sanghatana, (2009) 8 SCC 556 ; 3. A.P. Public Service Commission, Hyderabad Vs. B. Sarat Chandra, (1990) 2 SCC 669 ; 4. State of U.P. Vs. Dr. K.U. Ansari, (2002) 1 SCC 616 ; and 5. Nand Kumar Vs. Uma Devi, (2006) 4 SCC 1 ; 2. Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation Vs. Casteribe Rajya Parivahan Karmchari Sanghatana, (2009) 8 SCC 556 ; 3. A.P. Public Service Commission, Hyderabad Vs. B. Sarat Chandra, (1990) 2 SCC 669 ; 4. State of U.P. Vs. Dr. K.U. Ansari, (2002) 1 SCC 616 ; and 5. Nand Kumar Vs. State of Bihar, (2014) 5 SCC 300 . 19. According to Mr. Trivedi, the Division Bench took support from the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Gujarat Agricultural University (supra) and allowed the appeal by substituting the directions of the learned Single Judge with the directions contained in para 10. Mr. Trivedi submits that the Gujarat Agricultural University (supra) has been held to be not laying down correct law as observed by the Supreme Court in its latter decision in the case of Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation (supra). 20. Mr. Trivedi pointed out that the writ-applicants were recruited as Junior Clerks on daily wage basis for the pre-examination and post-examination work. Their work includes scrutiny of applications of the candidates, preparation of complete record for conducting the examination, allotment of seat numbers and the centres. After the completion of the examination, the post-examination work includes the receipt and transportation of all the answer books of all the candidates from the concerned centres established for centralized assessment. In the stream for science subject, the nature of work includes receipt of answer books duly assessed by the examiners, collection and arrangement of moderators and mark-sheets after they are received from the moderators, arranging mark-sheets according to the continuous seat numbers of the candidates. A part of this work which was being done manually is now undertaken by the data processing computerization programme. 21. Mr. Trivedi submits that having regard to the important functions and duties being performed by the writ-applicants if the Board has thought fit to conduct a written examination for the purpose of selection based on efficiency, then there is nothing wrong in such decision. 22. Mr. Trivedi submitted that the scheme framed by the Board is in no manner violative of any fundamental right or any legal right of the writ-applicants. Neither the same is violative of the directions issued by the Division Bench of this Court nor the same could be termed as unreasonable or arbitrary. In such circumstances referred to above, Mr. 22. Mr. Trivedi submitted that the scheme framed by the Board is in no manner violative of any fundamental right or any legal right of the writ-applicants. Neither the same is violative of the directions issued by the Division Bench of this Court nor the same could be termed as unreasonable or arbitrary. In such circumstances referred to above, Mr. Trivedi prays that there being no merit in this writ-application, the same may be rejected. 23. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having considered the materials on record, the only question that falls for my consideration is, whether the writ-applicants are entitled to the reliefs prayed for in this writ-application. 24. I am not impressed by the submission of Mr. Trivedi, the learned Advocate General, appearing for the Board that the directions issued by the Division Bench of this Court pales into insignificance having regard to the position of law prevailing as on date on the subject of regularisation, more particularly, the power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to issue directions as regards the regularisation. 25. It is true that the Supreme Court, in catena of decisions over a period of time, has made it clear that the High Court should not issue directions either to create any supernumerary post or order regularisation in service. In the aforesaid context, the observations of the Supreme Court in Uma Devi's case (supra) are relevant: “43. Thus, it is clear that adherence to the rule of equality in public employment is a basic feature of our Constitution and since the rule of law is the core of our Constitution, a Court would certainly be disabled from passing an order upholding a violation of Article 14 or in ordering the overlooking of the need to comply with the requirements of Article 14 read with Article 16 of the Constitution. Therefore, consistent with the scheme for public employment, this Court while laying down the law, has necessarily to hold that unless the appointment is in terms of the relevant rules and after a proper competition among qualified persons, the same would not confer any right on the appointee. Therefore, consistent with the scheme for public employment, this Court while laying down the law, has necessarily to hold that unless the appointment is in terms of the relevant rules and after a proper competition among qualified persons, the same would not confer any right on the appointee. If it is a contractual appointment, the appointment comes to an end at the end of the contract, if it were an engagement or appointment on daily wages or casual basis, the same would come to an end when it is discontinued. Similarly, a temporary employee could not claim to be made permanent on the expiry of his term of appointment. It has also to be clarified that merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent, merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by the relevant rules. It is not open to the court to prevent regular recruitment at the instance of temporary employees whose period of employment has come to an end or of ad hoc employees who by the very nature of their appointment, do not acquire any right. High Courts acting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, should not ordinarily issue directions for absorption, regularization, or permanent continuance unless the recruitment itself was made regularly and in terms of the constitutional scheme. Merely because, an employee had continued under cover of an order of Court, which we have described as ‘litigious employment’ in the earlier part of the judgment, he would not be entitled to any right to be absorbed or made permanent in the service. In fact, in such cases, the High Court may not be justified in issuing interim directions, since, after all, if ultimately the employee approaching it is found entitled to relief, it may be possible for it to mould the relief in such a manner that ultimately no prejudice will be caused to him, whereas an interim direction to continue his employment would hold up the regular procedure for selection or impose on the State the burden of paying an employee who is really not required. The courts must be careful in ensuring that they do not interfere unduly with the economic arrangement of its affairs by the State or its instrumentalities or lend themselves the instruments to facilitate the bypassing of the constitutional and statutory mandates. 44. The concept of ‘equal pay for equal work’ is different from the concept of conferring permanency on those who have been appointed on ad hoc basis, temporary basis, or based on no process of selection as envisaged by the Rules. This Court has in various decisions applied the principle of equal pay for equal work and has laid down the parameters for the application of that principle. The decisions are rested on the concept of equality enshrined in our Constitution in the light of the directive principles in that behalf. But the acceptance of that principle cannot lead to a position where the court could direct that appointments made without following the due procedure established by law, be deemed permanent or issue directions to treat them as permanent. Doing so, would be negation of the principle of equality of opportunity. The power to make an order as is necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending before this Court, would not normally be used for giving the go-by to the procedure established by law in the matter of public employment. Take the situation arising in the cases before us from the State of Karnataka. Therein, after the Dharwad decision, the Government had issued repeated directions and mandatory orders that no temporary or ad hoc employment or engagement be given. Some of the authorities and departments had ignored those directions or defied those directions and had continued to give employment, specifically interdicted by the orders issued by the executive. Some of the appointing officers have even been punished for their defiance. It would not be just or proper to pass an order in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 or 32 of the Constitution or in exercise of power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India permitting those persons engaged, to be absorbed or to be made permanent, based on their appointments or engagements. Complete justice would be justice according to law and though it would be open to this Court to mould the relief, this Court would not grant a relief which would amount to perpetuating an illegality. 45. Complete justice would be justice according to law and though it would be open to this Court to mould the relief, this Court would not grant a relief which would amount to perpetuating an illegality. 45. While directing that appointments, temporary or casual, be regularized or made permanent, courts are swayed by the fact that the concerned person has worked for some time and in some cases for a considerable length of time. It is not as if the person who accepts an engagement either temporary or casual in nature, is not aware of the nature of his employment. He accepts the employment with eyes open. It may be true that he is not in a position to bargain - not at arms length - since he might have been searching for some employment so as to eke out his livelihood and accepts whatever he gets. But on that ground alone, it would not be appropriate to jettison the constitutional scheme of appointment and to take the view that a person who has temporarily or casually got employed should be directed to be continued permanently By doing so, it will be creating another mode of public appointment which is not permissible. If the court were to void a contractual employment of this nature on the ground that the parties were not having equal bargaining power, that too would not enable the court to grant any relief to that employee. A total embargo on such casual or temporary employment is not possible, given the exigencies of administration and if imposed would only mean that some people who at least get employment temporarily, contractually or casually, would not be getting even that employment when securing of such employment brings at least some succor to them. After all, innumerable citizens of our vast country are in search of employment and one is not compelled to accept a casual or temporary employment if one is not inclined to go in for such an employment. It is in that context that one has to proceed on the basis that the employment was accepted fully knowing the nature of it and the consequences flowing from it. In other words, even while accepting the employment, the person concerned knows the nature of his employment. It is not an appointment to a post in the real sense of the term. In other words, even while accepting the employment, the person concerned knows the nature of his employment. It is not an appointment to a post in the real sense of the term. The claim acquired by him in the post in which he is temporarily employed or the interest in that post cannot be considered to be of such a magnitude as to enable the giving up of the procedure established, for making regular appointments to available posts in the services of the State The argument that since one has been working for some time in the post, it will not be just to discontinue him, even though he was aware of the nature of the employment when he first took it up, is not one that would enable the jettisoning of the procedure established by law for public employment and would have to fail when tested on the touchstone of constitutionality and equality of opportunity enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 46. Learned Senior Counsel for some of the respondents argued that on the basis of the doctrine of legitimate expectation, the employees, especially of the Commercial Taxes Department, should be directed to be regularized since the decisions in Dharwad (supra), Piara Singh (supra), Jacob, and Gujarat Agricultural University and the like, have given rise to an expectation in them that their services would also be regularized. The doctrine can be invoked if the decisions of the Administrative Authority affect the person by depriving him of some benefit or advantage which either (i) he had in the past been permitted by the decision-maker to enjoy and which he can legitimately expect to be permitted to continue to do until there have been communicated to him some rational grounds for withdrawing it on which he has been given an opportunity to comment; or (ii) he has received assurance from the decision-maker that they will not be withdrawn without giving him first an opportunity of advancing reasons for contending that they should not be withdrawn (See Lord Diplock in Council of Civil Service Unions Vs. Minister for the Civil Service, 1985 Appeal Cases 374, National Buildings Construction Corpn. Vs. S. Raghunathan, (1998) 7 SCC 66 and Dr. Chanchal Goyal Vs. State of Rajasthan, (2003) 3 SCC 485 ). Minister for the Civil Service, 1985 Appeal Cases 374, National Buildings Construction Corpn. Vs. S. Raghunathan, (1998) 7 SCC 66 and Dr. Chanchal Goyal Vs. State of Rajasthan, (2003) 3 SCC 485 ). There is no case that any assurance was given by the Government or the concerned department while making the appointment on daily wages that the status conferred on him will not be withdrawn until some rational reason comes into existence for withdrawing it. The very engagement was against the constitutional scheme. Though, the Commissioner of the Commercial Taxes Department sought to get the appointments made permanent, there is no case that at the time of appointment any promise was held out. No such promise could also have been held out in view of the circulars and directives issued by the Government after the Dharwad decision. Though, there is a case that the State had made regularizations in the past of similarly situated employees, the fact remains that such regularizations were done only pursuant to judicial directions, either of the Administrative Tribunal or of the High Court and in some case by this Court. Moreover, the invocation of the doctrine of legitimate expectation cannot enable the employees to claim that they must be made permanent or they must be regularized in the service though they had not been selected in terms of the rules for appointment. The fact that in certain cases the court had directed regularization of the employees involved in those cases cannot be made use of to found a claim based on legitimate expectation. The argument if accepted would also run counter to the constitutional mandate. The argument in that behalf has therefore to be rejected. 47. When a person enters a temporary employment or gets engagement as a contractual or casual worker and the engagement is not based on a proper selection as recognized by the relevant rules or procedure, he is aware of the consequences of the appointment being temporary, casual or contractual in nature. Such a person cannot invoke the theory of legitimate expectation for being confirmed in the post when an appointment to the post could be made only by following a proper procedure for selection and in concerned cases, in consultation with the Public Service Commission. Therefore, the theory of legitimate expectation cannot be successfully advanced by temporary contractual or casual employees. Such a person cannot invoke the theory of legitimate expectation for being confirmed in the post when an appointment to the post could be made only by following a proper procedure for selection and in concerned cases, in consultation with the Public Service Commission. Therefore, the theory of legitimate expectation cannot be successfully advanced by temporary contractual or casual employees. It cannot also be held that the State has held out any promise while engaging these persons either to continue them where they are or to make them permanent. The State cannot constitutionally make such a promise. It is also obvious that the theory cannot be invoked to seek a positive relief of being made permanent in the post. 48. It was then contended that the rights of the employees thus appointed, under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, are violated. It is stated that the State has treated the employees unfairly by employing them on less than minimum wages and extracting work from them for a pretty long period in comparison with those directly recruited who are getting more wages or salaries for doing similar work. The employees before us were engaged on daily wages in the concerned department on a wage that was made known to them. There is no case that the wage agreed upon was not being paid. Those who are working on daily wages formed a class by themselves, they cannot claim that they are discriminated as against those who have been regularly recruited on the basis of the relevant rules. No right can be founded on an employment on daily wages to claim that such employee should be treated on a par with a regularly recruited candidate, and made permanent in employment, even assuming that the principle could be invoked for claiming equal wages for equal work. There is no fundamental right in those who have been employed on daily wages or temporarily or on contractual basis, to claim that they have a right to be absorbed in service. As has been held by this Court, they cannot be said to be holders of a post, since, a regular appointment could be made only by making appointments consistent with the requirements of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. As has been held by this Court, they cannot be said to be holders of a post, since, a regular appointment could be made only by making appointments consistent with the requirements of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The right to be treated equally with the other employees employed on daily wages, cannot be extended to a claim for equal treatment with those who were regularly employed. That would be treating unequals as equals. It cannot also be relied on to claim a right to be absorbed in service even though they have never been selected in terms of the relevant recruitment rules. The arguments based on Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution are therefore overruled. 53. One aspect needs to be clarified. There may be cases where irregular appointments (not illegal appointments) as explained in S.V. Narayanappa (supra), R.N. Nanjundappa (supra), and B.N. Nagrajan (supra), and referred to in paragraph 15 above, of duly qualified persons in duly sanctioned vacant posts might have been made and the employees have continued to work for ten years or more but without the intervention of orders of courts or of tribunals. The question of regularization of the services of such employees may have to be considered on merits in the light of the principles settled by this Court in the cases above referred to and in the light of this judgment. In that context, the Union of India, the State Governments and their instrumentalities should take steps to regularize as a one time measure, the services of such irregularly appointed, who have worked for ten years or more in duly sanctioned posts but not under cover of orders of courts or of tribunals and should further ensure that regular recruitments are undertaken to fill those vacant sanctioned posts that require to be filled up, in cases where temporary employees or daily wagers are being now employed. The process must be set in motion within six months from this date. We also clarify that regularization, if any already made, but not sub judice, need not be reopened based on this judgment, but there should be no further by-passing of the constitutional requirement and regularizing or making permanent, those not duly appointed as per the constitutional scheme. (Emphasis supplied) 54. We also clarify that regularization, if any already made, but not sub judice, need not be reopened based on this judgment, but there should be no further by-passing of the constitutional requirement and regularizing or making permanent, those not duly appointed as per the constitutional scheme. (Emphasis supplied) 54. It is also clarified that those decisions which run counter to the principle settled in this decision, or in which directions running counter to what we have held herein, will stand denuded of their status as precedents. 55. In cases relating to service in the commercial taxes department, the High Court has directed that those engaged on daily wages, be paid wages equal to the salary and allowances that are being paid to the regular employees of their cadre in Government service, with effect from the dates from which they were respectively appointed. The objection taken was to the direction for payment from the dates of engagement. We find that the High Court had clearly gone wrong in directing that these employees be paid salary equal to the salary and allowances that are being paid to the regular employees of their cadre in Government service, with effect from the dates from which they were respectively engaged or appointed. It was not open to the High Court to impose such an obligation on the State when the very question before the High Court in the case was whether these employees were entitled to have equal pay for equal work so called and were entitled to any other benefit. They had also been engaged in the teeth of directions not to do so. We are, therefore, of the view that, at best, the Division Bench of the High Court should have directed that wages equal to the salary that are being paid to regular employees be paid to these daily wage employees with effect from the date of its judgment. Hence, that part of the direction of the Division Bench is modified and it is directed that these daily wage earners be paid wages equal to the salary at the lowest grade of employees of their cadre in the Commercial Taxes Department in Government service, from the date of the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court. Since, they are only daily wage earners, there would be no question of other allowances being paid to them. Since, they are only daily wage earners, there would be no question of other allowances being paid to them. In view of our conclusion, that Courts are not expected to issue directions for making such persons permanent in service, we set aside that part of the direction of the High Court directing the Government to consider their cases for regularization. We also notice that the High Court has not adverted to the aspect as to whether it was regularization or it was giving permanency that was being directed by the High Court. In such a situation, the direction in that regard will stand deleted and the appeals filed by the State would stand allowed to that extent. If sanctioned posts are vacant (they are said to be vacant) the State will take immediate steps for filling those posts by a regular process of selection. But when regular recruitment is undertaken, the respondents in C.A. Nos. 3595-3612 and those in the Commercial Taxes Department similarly situated, will be allowed to compete, waiving the age restriction imposed for the recruitment and giving some weightage for their having been engaged for work in the Department for a significant period of time. That would be the extent of the exercise of power by this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution to do justice to them.” 26. In Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation (supra), the Supreme Court, in para 25, observed thus: “The earlier decisions of this Court in Dharwad District PWD Literate Daily Wage Employees' Assn. Vs. State of Karnataka, AIR 1990 SC 883 , State of Haryana Vs. Piara Singh, 1992 AIR SCW 2315, Jacob M. Puthuparambil Vs. Kerala Water Authority, AIR 1990 SC 2228 and Gujarat Agricultural University Vs. Rathod Labhu Bechar, 2001 AIR SCW 351, were held to be not laying down correct law and it was held that the invocation of the doctrine of legitimate expectation cannot enable the employees to claim that they must be made permanent or they must be regularized in the service though they had not been selected in terms of the Rules for appointment.” 27. In Nand Kumar (supra), the Supreme Court observed in paragraphs 25 and 26 as under: “25. We have consciously noted the aforesaid decisions of this Court. In Nand Kumar (supra), the Supreme Court observed in paragraphs 25 and 26 as under: “25. We have consciously noted the aforesaid decisions of this Court. The principle as has been laid down in Umadevi ( AIR 2006 SC 1806 : 2006 AIR SCW 1991) (supra) has also been applied in relation to the persons who were working on daily wages. According to us, the daily wagers are not appointees in the strict sense of the term ‘appointment’. They do not hold a post. The scheme of alternative appointment framed for regular employees of abolished organisation cannot, therefore, confer a similar entitlement on the daily wagers of abolished organisation to such alternative employment. [See Avas Vikas Sansthan Vs. Avas Vikas Sansthan Engineers Association, (2006) 4 SCC 1 32 : AIR 2006 SC 3413 : 2006 AIR SCW 1797]. Their relevance in the context of appointment arose by reason of the concept of regularisation as a source of appointment. After Umadevi (supra), their position continued to be that of daily wagers. Appointment on daily wage basis is not an appointment to a post according to the rules. Usually, the projects in which the daily wagers were engaged, having come to an end, their appointment is necessarily terminated for want of work Therefore, the status and rights of daily wagers of a Government concern are not equivalent to that of a Government servant and his claim to permanency has to be adjudged differently. 26. In these circumstances, in our considered opinion, the regularisation/absorption is not a matter of course. It would depend upon the facts of the case following the rules and regulations and cannot be dehors the rules for such regularisation/absorption.” 28. It will be too much for this Court at this point of time to take the view that the directions issued by the Division Bench should be ignored, and ignoring the same, the relief should be declined. 29. I intend to examine the matter from a limited perspective, i.e. whether the decision of the Board to conduct a written examination followed by an oral interview as a part of the terms and conditions of regulation is in any manner in conflict with the directions issued by the Division Bench or could be termed as unreasonable, arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 30. 30. In my view, the terms of regularisation are in no manner in conflict with the directions issued by the Division Bench nor they are unreasonable, arbitrary or violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. All that the Division Bench directed was to prepare a scheme of regularisation or absorption of the writ-applicants herein by process of scrutiny or selection based on efficiency and past performance of the writ-applicants. For the purpose of determining the efficiency having regard to the nature of duties which the writ-applicants perform, if the Board decided to conduct a written exam followed by an oral interview, then the same by itself cannot be termed as an arbitrary decision or an unreasonable condition. 31. At this stage, the following averments made in the affidavit-in-reply filed on behalf of the Board are relevant: “10. It is required to be noted that the Government Resolution upon which the reliance has been placed by the petitioners, is not applicable in this case. The said G.R is applicable in case of promotion of Government servant and it is having no relevance to the direct recruitment. It is also required to be noted that the Board has decided to give 3 chances to the petitioners. The Board has already informed all the petitioners to get ready for the examinations. It is required to be noted that for direct recruitment there cannot be any discrimination between the general candidates and SC/ST candidates inasmuch as both the categories shall have to pass the department examinations. Even in the year 1986, while regularizing the Rojamdar Junior Clerks, they were recruited after taking examinations. It is submitted that the Junior Clerks so appointed shall be eligible to promotion for the post of Senior Clerk, Chief Clerk, Superintendent, etc. and therefore, the examinations are absolutely necessary. Looking to this conduct on the part of the petitioners, the present petition requires to be rejected in limine with costs.” (Emphasis supplied) 32. In the further affidavit of the Board, the following has been averred, which is relevant: “3. At the outset, I most respectfully submit that Gujarat Secondary and Higher Secondary Education Board has formulated the scheme as per the directions of the Division Bench of this Hon'ble Court in Letters Patent Appeal No. 357/2000, which is under challenge in this petition. In the further affidavit of the Board, the following has been averred, which is relevant: “3. At the outset, I most respectfully submit that Gujarat Secondary and Higher Secondary Education Board has formulated the scheme as per the directions of the Division Bench of this Hon'ble Court in Letters Patent Appeal No. 357/2000, which is under challenge in this petition. I most respectfully submit that the Board has sent the said policy for approval to the State Government vide its letter dated 3.10.2002 The State Government after considering the same, has approved the policy by its Resolution dated 23.1.2003 A copy of the said Resolution dated 23.1.2003 is annexed hereto and marked as Annexure-IV to this reply for kind perusal of this Hon'ble Court. In view of the fact that the policy has also been approved by the State Government, the petition is devoid of any substance and therefore, the same is required to be rejected.” 33. The writ-applicants could have easily preferred an application seeking appropriate clarification from the Division Bench. Justice D.M. Dharmadhikari, CJ. (as His Lordship then was) was elevated to the Supreme Court in March 2002 but Justice P.B. Majmudar, J. (as His Lordship then was), was very much in this High Court till 2007. Instead of preferring this writ-application and obtaining relief in terms of para 17(E), thereby restraining the Board from conducting the exam, necessary clarification could have been sought for if the writ-applicants were of the view that the scheme was not in consonance with the directions issued by the Division Bench. It is very difficult for me to find any major fault with this process of regularisation. 34. In Union of India Vs. Dr. Devendra Vir Sahi, 1995 Supp (2) SCC 463, almost a similar process of regularisation was considered except the fact that in the case before the Supreme Court there was no written examination. The observations in paragraphs 4 and 5 are relevant, which are elicited as under: “4. The respondent challenged the termination of his service before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Allahabad Bench. The Tribunal by its impugned judgment and order has held that the respondent should have been considered for regularisation only on the basis of his Confidential Reports as was done in the case of Assistant Medical Officers who were covered by the judgment of this Court in Dr. A.K Jain's case (1987 Supp SCC 497) (supra). The Tribunal by its impugned judgment and order has held that the respondent should have been considered for regularisation only on the basis of his Confidential Reports as was done in the case of Assistant Medical Officers who were covered by the judgment of this Court in Dr. A.K Jain's case (1987 Supp SCC 497) (supra). The Tribunal further held that until the respondent's case was considered for regularisation on this basis, his services should not be terminated. The appellants have filed the present appeal challenging the order of the Tribunal. 5. The respondent was appointed after 1-10-1984 and hence he cannot get the benefit of the directions given in Dr. A.K. Jain's case (1987 Supp SCC 497) (supra). In respect of Assistant Medical Officers who have been appointed after 1-10-1984, the appellants decided to regularise the services of those doctors who were considered suitable for regularisation by the Union Public Service Commission. The Union Public Service Commission took into account the service record of the Assistant Medical Officers and also interviewed them in order to decide their suitability for regularisation. We do not see any reason for finding fault with this process of regularisation.” (Emphasis supplied) 35. Mr. Trivedi, the learned Advocate General laid much stress on the expression ‘efficiency’. In State of U.P (supra), on which strong reliance has been placed by Mr. Trivedi, the Supreme Court in para 10 observed as under: “10. From the discussions in the judgment quoted above, it appears that the High Court has drawn a distinction between considerations for crossing the efficiency bar and those for promotion. The High Court has taken the view that research work is not necessary for judging the efficiency of a teacher of the medical college though it may be an “additional qualification” for the purpose of promotion. The observations and findings recorded by the High Court in the Judgment are clearly erroneous. We are indeed perplexed to find that the High Court has propounded a principle that in the 21st Century a teacher in a medical college need not engage himself in any research work. The concept is not only out of tune with time but an impediment on improving the standard of teaching in medical colleges. If the observations/findings are accepted as correct then it will mean encouraging mediocrity in the line of medical teaching. The concept is not only out of tune with time but an impediment on improving the standard of teaching in medical colleges. If the observations/findings are accepted as correct then it will mean encouraging mediocrity in the line of medical teaching. Research by a teacher in medical college is desirable and relevant for maintaining a high degree of proficiency in teaching. Medical science has progressed very much in recent times and constant efforts are being made in institutions engaged in medical education and research all over the globe for further development in different specialities. In such state of things to take a view that ‘research’ is not relevant for a teacher in medical college for the crossing of efficiency bar or even promotion (stated to be only an additional qualification) is not correct. We have no hesitation to hold that the observations and findings of the High Court to which reference has been made earlier are unsustainable. Crossing of efficiency bar is a well recognised means of monitoring the efficiency of the employee which helps him to make progress in his service career. In the expression ‘efficiency’ are included all relevant matters necessary for discharging his duties efficiently and satisfactorily. In the case of a teacher,’ particularly a teacher in medical college, it is absolutely necessary that he keeps abreast of all developments in the field of the medical science of his specialisation and he can achieve this better if he is engaged in research work. The manner in which he carries out the research and assessment of the results he obtains are matters of scrutiny by experts; but it cannot be said that a teacher in medical college is not expected to do any research. In order to teach his students properly the teacher has to maintain a high degree of proficiency in the subject. It is relevant to note here that in the prescribed format for making entries in the character roll there is a column relating to research work done by the teacher. This, in our view, is sufficient to hold that the authorities did consider and in our view rightly ‘research’ to be a relevant consideration for the purpose of making proper assessment of the employee. This, in our view, is sufficient to hold that the authorities did consider and in our view rightly ‘research’ to be a relevant consideration for the purpose of making proper assessment of the employee. The position is well settled that while making entries in the character roll proper assessment on the basis of objective standards should be made since character roll is a primary material which forms the basis for further progress of the employee in his service career. The entries in the character roll are necessary and material for the purpose of permitting the employee to cross the efficiency bar as well as for promotion. Unfortunately, the observations and findings of the High Court tend to indicate as if crossing of efficiency bar is a matter of course and an idle formality. Such impression, as noted earlier, is clearly erroneous. Therefore, the Judgment of the High Court in W.P. No. 14686/88 is unsustainable and has to be set aside. Since the judgment in the other case i.e. W.P No. 15989/87 is entirely based on the judgment in the said writ petition, that has also be set aside.” (Emphasis supplied) 36. Mr. Trivedi also placed much emphasis on the word ‘selection’. In A.P. Public Service Commission (supra), the Supreme Court observed as under: “If the word ‘selection’ is understood in a sense meaning thereby only the final act of selecting candidates with preparation of the list for appointment, then the conclusion of the Tribunal may not be unjustified. But round phrases cannot give square answers. Before accepting that meaning, we must see the consequences, anomalies and uncertainties that it may lead to. The Tribunal in fact does not dispute that the process of selection begins with the issuance of advertisement and ends with the preparation of select list for appointment. Indeed, it consists of various steps like inviting applications, scrutiny of applications, rejection of defective applications or elimination of ineligible candidates, conducting examinations, calling for interview or viva voce and preparation of list of successful candidates for appointment. Rule 3 of the Rules of Procedure of the Public Service Commission is also indicative of all these steps.” 37. Let me now consider the decisions on which strong reliance has been placed by Mr. Mehta, the learned senior counsel appearing for writ-applicants. 38. Rule 3 of the Rules of Procedure of the Public Service Commission is also indicative of all these steps.” 37. Let me now consider the decisions on which strong reliance has been placed by Mr. Mehta, the learned senior counsel appearing for writ-applicants. 38. In Valsala Kumari Devi (supra), the Supreme Court considered the expression ‘subject to seniority and suitability’ occurring in the Government Order dated 27th June 1990. Interpreting the same, the Supreme Court observed in para 13 as under: “The expression “subject to seniority and suitability” occurring in G.O dated 27.6.1990 does not mean the comparative assessment of suitability and it only means the suitability for the particular post and the suitability is related to the prescribed qualification and requisite experience. In view of the distinction between the appointment by promotion from General Education Subordinate Service and an appointment to the 75% vacancies earmarked for direct recruitment, we are of the view that the finding arrived at by the Director, Higher Secondary School, Thiruvananthapuram, Kerala that seniority is not the criterion for ‘appointment by promotion to HSST is erroneous and is not in terms of the Government Orders referred to above. Though in the order, it is stated that the 5th respondent is more suitable than the appellant, as rightly pointed out by learned counsel appearing for the appellant, it has not been shown or indicated the reasons or grounds for arriving such decision that the 5th respondent was found more suitable than the appellant for the post. We are also in agreement with the contention that the Director has mechanically accepted the decision of the Selection Committee that the 5th respondent is more suitable than the appellant without reference to selection for appointment by promotion to HSST against 25% quota ear-marked for qualified High School Assistants. We are of the view that the Director has committed an illegality in upholding the selection of the 5th respondent for appointment to the post of HSST. Further the 5th respondent has been preferred to the appellant for the reason that his main subject in B.A is History which is totally irrelevant for promotion to HSST from among HSAs. We are of the view that the Director has committed an illegality in upholding the selection of the 5th respondent for appointment to the post of HSST. Further the 5th respondent has been preferred to the appellant for the reason that his main subject in B.A is History which is totally irrelevant for promotion to HSST from among HSAs. In G.O dated 27.6.1990 the qualification prescribed is a second class Master's Degree in the concerned subject with B.Ed It is relevant to point out that the appellant and the 5th respondent have obtained M.A Degree from Mysore University and the 5th respondent took B.Ed with Social Studies. The other reason given by the Selection Committee for preferring 5th respondent is that he has proficiency in English, Kannada and Malayalam whereas the appellant has proficiency in English and Malayalam. As rightly pointed out by learned counsel appearing for the appellant, once the requirement of the prescribed qualification is satisfied, the selection must be made on the basis of the seniority and suitability and there is no scope for making comparison of qualifications or comparative assessment of suitability. The expression ‘suitability’ means that a person to be appointed shall be legally eligible and ‘eligible’ should be taken to mean ‘fit to be chosen’.” 39. In my view, the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court is of no avail to the writ-applicants. In the said case, the Supreme Court took the view that it was not proper on the part of the selection committee to make selection taking into account the qualifications which were not prescribed in the Government Orders and giving weightage to such qualifications. The term ‘suitability’ was interpreted considering the Government Order dated 27th June 1990. It is difficult to take the view relying on this decision that the selection as directed by the Division Bench can never be by way of a written exam for the purpose of determining the efficiency. 40. The term ‘suitability’ was interpreted considering the Government Order dated 27th June 1990. It is difficult to take the view relying on this decision that the selection as directed by the Division Bench can never be by way of a written exam for the purpose of determining the efficiency. 40. In Parul Debnath (supra), all that the Supreme Court observed in para 45 is as under: “On the question of creation of supernumerary posts, it may be indicated that while it is no doubt true that creation of posts is the prerogative of the executive, in order to meet certain special exigencies such a course of action has been resorted to by this Court and in our view this is one such case where such a direction does not need any intervention.” 41. The aforesaid judgment is also of no avail to the writ-applicants. The dispute in the present case is not one relating to the creation of the supernumerary posts. They have already been created by the State Government. The issue is one relating to the procedure to be adopted for the purpose of filling up of the supernumerary posts. 42. The decision in the case of ONGC Ltd. (supra) is also of no avail to the writ-applicants. The Supreme Court took the view that although due procedure was not followed by the Corporation for the appointment of the workmen, yet the same did not disentitle them of the right to seek regularisation of their services by the Corporation under the provisions of the certified Standing Orders, more particularly, having rendered more than 240 days of service in a calendar year. 43. In the overall view of the matter, I am not convinced with the case put up by the writ-applicants. 44. For the foregoing reasons, this writ-application fails and is hereby rejected. All those writ-applicants who are still in service may appear in the written exam as well as the oral interview in accordance with the scheme of regularisation dated 1st October 2002. If they qualify in accordance with the scheme, their services shall be regularised. Ad-interim relief granted earlier stands vacated. Rule discharged.