JUDGMENT : Sandeep Sharma, J. By way of aforesaid Civil Writ petitions filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, petitioners therein have laid challenge to the common award dated 21.06.2010, passed by H.P. Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Shimla (in short ‘Tribunal’), in reference No. 65 of 1998, 63 of 1998, 66 of 1998 and 67 of 1998, whereby claim of the aforesaid petitioners were rejected and references were answered accordingly. Since common award dated 21.6.2010 passed by learned Tribunal is under challenge by way of aforesaid petitions, same are being taken together for adjudication with the consent of counsel representing the parties. 2. Briefly stated facts as emerged from the record are that petitioners Agya Ram, Lal Chand, Kuldeep Kumar and Khem Raj being aggrieved with the illegal dis-engagement of their services by M/s Gujrat Ambuja Cement Ltd. (in short ‘GACL’) raised industrial dispute. Appropriate government in terms of Section 10 of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (in short ‘Act’) made following references to the learned Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Shimla for adjudication:- “Whether the plea of the contractor of M/s Ess Ess Engineering Contractor to M/s Gujarat Ambuja Cement Ltd. Darlaghat, District Solan, Himachal Pradesh that S/Shri Agya Ram s/o Badri Ram, Lal Chand s/o Dhani Ram, Khem Raj s/o Daulat Ram and Kuldeep Kumar s/o Hukum Chand, workmen have abandoned the services of their own accord is legal and justified? If not, what relief service benefits and post the concerned workmen are entitled to?” “Whether the demand of S/Shri Agya Ram s/o Badri Ram, Lal Chand s/o Dhani Ram, Khem Raj s/o Daulat Ram and Kuldeep Kumar s/o Hukum Chand, workmen that their services be taken on the permanent service/roll of the principal company i.e. Gujarat Ambuja Cement Ltd., Darlaghat is legal and justified? If yes, to what relief and service benefits concerned workmen are entitled to form the concerned principal employer?” 3. Learned Tribunal below vide order dated 21.5.2002 passed in Reference No. 65 of 1998 ordered for consolidation of Reference Nos. 63/1998, 64/1998, 66/1998, 101/1998, 103/1998, 104/1998 and 105/1998 with Reference No. 65 of 1998. However, fact remains that except Reference Nos. 63/1998, 66/1998, 67/1998, which stood consolidated with reference No. 65/1998, Reference Nos. 101/1998, 103/1998, 104/1998 and 105/1998 were compromised, as such, no decision qua the same was made by the learned Tribunal below. 63/1998, 64/1998, 66/1998, 101/1998, 103/1998, 104/1998 and 105/1998 with Reference No. 65 of 1998. However, fact remains that except Reference Nos. 63/1998, 66/1998, 67/1998, which stood consolidated with reference No. 65/1998, Reference Nos. 101/1998, 103/1998, 104/1998 and 105/1998 were compromised, as such, no decision qua the same was made by the learned Tribunal below. Present petitioners claimed before learned Tribunal that they were appointed as Fire and Safety Supervisors in the month of September, 1993 by GACL and they continued, as such, till 1997, when they were not allowed to work. Petitioners further claimed that though record clearly reveals that they worked under the direct control and supervision of GACL but their names were shown on the attendance Roll of M/s Ess Ess Engineering’s (in short ‘Contractor’) with ulterior motives by GACL to avoid its liability under the Labour Law/ legislation. Petitioners also stated before learned Tribunal that they drew their last wages @ Rs.1950/-, Rs.2250/-, Rs.1950 and Rs.2250/-, respectively. Petitioners also stated that they worked for more than 240 days in each calendar year and during this period there was no complaint against them and their illegal termination, that too, in violation of provisions contained in the Act, deserves to be quashed and set aside. Petitioners also claimed regular employment under respondent No. 2-GACL in terms of settlement arrived at between GACL and State Government of H.P., namely, “Scheme for the Settlement and Rehabilitation of Oustees of Himachal Ambuja Cement Factory Darlaghat, District Solan, Himachal Pradesh.” 4. Petitioners contended that respondents while disengaging their services failed to comply with the provisions of Section 25-N of the Act and they are required to be re-instated in services with the benefit of continuity of services or in alternate claimed that they may be taken on roll of GACL by re-instating their services alongwith all consequential benefits. 5. Respondent by way of detailed reply refuted the claim put-forth on behalf of the petitioners by stating therein that petitioners were on the roll of Respondent No.3- Contractor and, at no point of time, their services were ever hired/engaged by respondent No. 2-GACL. Respondent No. 2-GACL specifically stated that petitioners are not covered under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) of the Act and, as such, present petitions are not maintainable and deserves to be quashed and set aside. Respondent No. 2-GACL specifically stated that petitioners are not covered under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) of the Act and, as such, present petitions are not maintainable and deserves to be quashed and set aside. Respondent No.2-GACL specifically contended that in the absence of employer and employee relationship, petitioners cannot raise industrial dispute against the replying respondent. Respondent No.2-GACL further contended that matter pertains to Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970, as such, proper recourse available to the petitioners was to approach the authorities envisaged under Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 and not under the Industrial Disputes Act. Respondents No. 2 -GACL further claimed that since Cement Industries has been declared as controlled industry, appropriate government under the Contract Labour Act is the Central Government, as such, Labour Commissioner had no power to entertain and refer the matter pertaining to petitioners qua the replying respondent (principal employer) to the H.P. Labour Court. Respondent No. 2-GACL has also contended that the appropriate government could only exercise its power under Section 10 only when there exists an industrial dispute as defined under Section 2 (k) of the Act. But in the present case, since petitioners had not been able to prove on record that there is any relationship between petitioners and respondent No. 2-GACL, as such, same is not maintainable before the learned Tribunal. Respondent No. 2-GACL further contended that petitioners are employees of respondent No. 3-Contractor, as such, they cannot claim for any preferential claim of employment in terms of settlement arrived at between them and the State Government. 6. Similarly, respondent No. 3-Contractor also refuted the claim put-forth on behalf of petitioners by stating that GACL had given certain project/work to respondent No. 3-Contractor, wherein, petitioners were engaged by Contractor from June, 1996 as Khalasis at its project site. Respondent No. 3-Contractor has further stated that petitioners themselves refused to do the job assigned to them and they left the job without notice. Respondent No. 3-contractor also reiterated like respondent No. 2-GACL that present petitioners are not covered by definition of workman as provided under Section 2(s), as such, no dispute, if any can be raised under Industrial Disputes Act. Factum with regard to petitioners having worked continuously for 240 days also denied by the replying respondent, rather, claimed that petitioners themselves left the job on their own. 7. Factum with regard to petitioners having worked continuously for 240 days also denied by the replying respondent, rather, claimed that petitioners themselves left the job on their own. 7. In view of aforesaid background, respondent No. 2-GACL and Respondent No. 3-Contractor prayed for dismissal of the claim put-forth on behalf of the petitioners. 8. Record further reveals that learned Tribunal below on the basis of pleadings made available on record by the respective parties, framed following issues:- “1. Whether the plea of the contractor that petitioners have abandoned the service, on their own accord, is justified or not? If so, its effect. 2. Whether the petitioners are entitled to be taken on permanent service rolls of respondent no. 1 as alleged and to what effect? 3. Whether the petitioners are not workmen and the dispute is not an industrial dispute as alleged? 4. Whether there is no relationship between petitioners and employers as alleged? 5. Relief.” 9. Learned Tribunal below on the basis of evidence adduced on record by the respective parties came to the conclusion that neither the petitioners have proved themselves to be the employees of respondent No. 2-GACL nor of respondent No. 3-contractor and, as such, no relationship of employees and employer has been established between the petitioners and respondent No. 2-GACL and accordingly dispute cannot be said to have fallen under Industrial Disputes Act, as per Section 2(s) of the Act. 10. Learned Tribunal below in view of the aforesaid findings, dismissed the reference petitions as filed by the petitioners. 11. In view of the aforesaid background, present petitioners have approached this Court by way of writ petitions, as referred hereinabove, praying therein for quashing of the common award dated 21.6.2010, passed by learned Tribunal. 12. Shri Rahul Mahajan, counsel representing the petitioners vehemently argued that impugned award passed by learned Industrial Tribunal is not sustainable in the eyes of law as the same is not based upon the correct appreciation of evidence as well as law and, as such, same deserves to be quashed and set aside. Mr. 12. Shri Rahul Mahajan, counsel representing the petitioners vehemently argued that impugned award passed by learned Industrial Tribunal is not sustainable in the eyes of law as the same is not based upon the correct appreciation of evidence as well as law and, as such, same deserves to be quashed and set aside. Mr. Mahajan contended that impugned award passed in reference No. 65/1998, titled Agya Ram & others vs. Gujrat Ambuja Cement Ltd., reference has been wrongly answered in negative against the petitioners because evidence led on record by the petitioner has not been dealt with in its right perspective while rejecting the reference referred to it by the appropriate government. Mr. Mahajan further argued that bare perusal of impugned award itself suggests that the same suffers from material irregularities and illegalities in law and same is based upon surmises and conjectures, as such, same cannot be allowed to sustain. 13. With a view to substantiate his aforesaid arguments that error of law is apparent on the face of the record, Mr. Mahajan invited the attention of the Court to the impugned award to demonstrate that candid, cogent and convincing evidence led on record by the petitioners in support of their claims have been brushed aside by the learned Tribunal on a very flimsy ground, as such, great prejudice has been caused to the present petitioners, who admittedly worked more than 7 years with the respondents before there illegal termination. Mr. Mahajan also stated that bare perusal of reply filed by respondent No. 2-GACL itself suggests that there was no specific denial of the averments made in the claim of the petitioners and, as such, same should have been implied considered to be admitted. Mr. Mahajan also stated that learned Tribunal has fallen in grave error while appreciating the statement of the petitioner, wherein, he categorically stated that when he was engaged in the employment of GACL as Fire and Safety Supervisor and as such worked till 1.1.1997, when his services were illegally terminated without any show cause notice, retrenchment compensation and charge sheet. Mr. Mahajan also stated that learned Tribunal has fallen in grave error while appreciating the statement of the petitioner, wherein, he categorically stated that when he was engaged in the employment of GACL as Fire and Safety Supervisor and as such worked till 1.1.1997, when his services were illegally terminated without any show cause notice, retrenchment compensation and charge sheet. Mr. Mahajan further stated that once it stood proved on record that Shri M.K. Verma, the then Manager Safety in M/s Gujarat Ambuja Cement Ltd. had issued circular for the work to be done by the petitioners while engagement with respondent No. 2-GACL, learned Tribunal had no occasion to return the findings that petitioners have not been able to prove on record that there was a relationship of employer and employees between the petitioners and respondent No. 2. 14. Mr. Mahajan also invited the attention of this Court to the monthly work report submitted by Mr. M.K. Verma, the then Safety Manager to demonstrate that petitioners were directly working under his control and supervision and as such, contention put-forth on behalf of respondent No. 2-GACL that petitioners were never engaged by it could not be accepted by learned Tribunal below on its face value. Mr. Mahajan further contended that learned Tribunal below has fallen in grave error in not appreciating the fact that petitioners had placed on record monthly report submitted by Shri M.K. Verma regarding the work done, daily progress report regarding work done and duties performed by the petitioners, which was sufficient to demonstrate that petitioners worked directly under the supervision and control of the Manager Safety, who was the employee of GACL. Similarly, Mr. Mahajan stated that Mr. S.S. Sahni, Manager (Personnel) in his affidavit and cross-examination admitted that he is not aware of the provision of Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 and expressed his inability to produce the Registration Certificate and license under Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970. As per Mr. Mahajan, learned Tribunal miserably failed to appreciate that no registration or license as required under the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 was produced by M/s Gujarat Ambuja Cement Ltd. and Contractor- respondent No. 3 and, as such, adverse inference ought to have been drawn by learned Tribunal below against the respondents. 15. Mr. As per Mr. Mahajan, learned Tribunal miserably failed to appreciate that no registration or license as required under the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 was produced by M/s Gujarat Ambuja Cement Ltd. and Contractor- respondent No. 3 and, as such, adverse inference ought to have been drawn by learned Tribunal below against the respondents. 15. Mr. Mahajan also invited attention of this Court to the specific portion of impugned award, wherein, it finds mentioned that signatures of Mr. M.K. Verma, Safety Manager, was sent for Govt. Examiner of Questioned Documents for opinion, who categorically reported that signatures are of Mr. M.K. Verma, Manager (Safety), as such, same could not be ignored. He further contended that specific report rendered therein by Govt. examiner could not have been brushed aside by the leaned Tribunal below on the ground that respondent No. 2-GACL was not given opportunity to file objection and examine the Government Examiner. He stated that objections, if any, could only filed by respondent No. 2-GACL, who could move an application for examination of Government Examiner and, as such, M/s Gujrat Ambuja Cement Ltd. Cannot take any advantage and the claim put-forth on behalf of petitioners could not be rejected. Similarly, Mr. Mahajan further contended that learned Tribunal has also failed to appreciate that petitioners are workmen under Section 2(s) of the Act and even under the Contractor Labour (Regulation and Abolition Act), 1970 and learned Tribunal had jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute, as such, impugned award deserves to be quashed and set aside. 16. Mr. Mahajan while concluding his arguments forcefully contended that findings of learned Tribunal, wherein, drawing adverse inference under Section 114 (g) of the Evidence Act against petitioners, namely S/Shri Lal Chand, Khem Raj and Kuldeep Kumar in References Nos. 63 of 1998, 66 of 1998 and 67 of 1998 rejected the claims, since they never stepped into witness box to prove their case, is bad in law because learned Tribunal has failed to appreciate that vide order dated 21.5.2000 of Labour Court, all the references as mentioned above were ordered to be consolidated with Reference No. 65 of 1998. Since, authorized representative of the petitioners in Reference Nos. 65 of 1998, 63/1998, 66/1998, 67/1998 led evidence only in Reference No. 65 of 1998, it was incumbent upon the learned Tribunal to consider evidence led in Reference No. 65 of 1998, in all cases. Since, authorized representative of the petitioners in Reference Nos. 65 of 1998, 63/1998, 66/1998, 67/1998 led evidence only in Reference No. 65 of 1998, it was incumbent upon the learned Tribunal to consider evidence led in Reference No. 65 of 1998, in all cases. Moreover, once the references were consolidated by learned Tribunal in view of identical references made to it by Appellate Court, leading of evidence in one reference would not have resulted in drawing adverse inference in other references as the issues to be proved in all references were similar and statement of claim, reply had already been filed in references, as such, learned Tribunal took hyper technical view while rejecting reference Nos. 66 of 98, 63 of 98 and 67 of 98, on the ground that petitioners therein never stepped into witness box to prove their claims. 17. Mr. Mahajan while terming award dated 21.6.2010 harsh, unjust and illegal, prayed for accepting the present petitions by quashing and setting aside the award passed by learned Tribunal in reference petitions. 18. Mr. K.D. Sood, Senior Advocate, duly assisted by Mr. Sanjeev Sood, Advocate, supported the award passed by learned Tribunal below. Mr. Sood vehemently argued that bare perusal of impugned award itself suggests that same is based upon the correct appreciation of evidence available on record as well as law, as such, no interference, whatsoever is warranted in the present facts and circumstances. Mr. Sood strenuously argued that there is no illegality and infirmity in the impugned award because bare perusal of award itself suggests that, at no point of time, petitioners were able to prove their case. Mr. Sood with a view to demonstrate that petitioners were unable to prove its case invited the attention of the Court to the impugned award passed by the learned Tribunal, whereby learned Tribunal while rejecting the claims put-forth on behalf of petitioners specifically returned the findings that neither petitioners were able to prove themselves to be the employees of respondent No. 2-GACL nor relationship, if any, of employees and employer between them and replying respondent. 19. Apart from above, Mr. Sood forcefully contended that there is no document adduced on record by the petitioner to demonstrate that they, at no point of time, were given appointment by the replying respondent, which could entitle them to raise dispute being “workman” as defined under Section 2(s) of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Mr. 19. Apart from above, Mr. Sood forcefully contended that there is no document adduced on record by the petitioner to demonstrate that they, at no point of time, were given appointment by the replying respondent, which could entitle them to raise dispute being “workman” as defined under Section 2(s) of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Mr. Sood contended that no appointment letter, if any, has been placed on record by either of the petitioners to suggests that they were offered appointment by the replying respondent and as such there is no force in the contention put-forth on behalf of counsel representing the petitioners that learned Tribunal below has fallen in error while holding that dispute cannot be said to have fallen under definition of industrial dispute as prescribed under Section 2(s) of the I.D. Act. 20. Mr. Sood further contended that there is no illegality and infirmity in the award, wherein, references bearing No. 63 of 1998, 66 of 1998 and 67 of 1998 have been rejected on the ground that petitioners have not entered into witness box to prove their claims by leading cogent and convincing evidence. But in the present case, since only petitioner, namely, Agya Ram made deposition before the learned Tribunal, that too, qua his claim, there was no occasion, whatsoever, for the learned Tribunal below to return findings qua the claims made by other petitioners. In view of the aforesaid background, Mr. Sood prayed that present petitions may be dismissed being devoid of any merit. 21. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record of the case. 22. At this stage, it may be pointed out that during proceedings of the case, this Court had an occasion to peruse the impugned award as well as evidence led on record by the parties and this Court has no hesitation to conclude that impugned award passed by learned Tribunal is based upon the correct appreciation of evidence led on record by the respective parties, as such, no interference, whatsoever of this Court is called for in the present case. Though during arguments, Mr. Though during arguments, Mr. Mahajan made an attempt to point out certain illegalities having been allegedly committed by learned Tribunal below while passing impugned award but close scrutiny of impugned award suggests that Court below has dealt with each and every aspect of the matter meticulously and it cannot be said that impugned award is not based upon the correct appreciation of evidence adduced on record. But, this Court after perusing material available on record is unable to conclude that there is any perversity in the impugned award passed by the learned Tribunal, which could compel this Court to interfere in the impugned award, which definitely appears to be based upon the proper appreciation of the evidence on record. 23. Apart from above, undisputably no appointment letters, if any, have been placed on record by all the petitioners to demonstrate that they were engaged by respondent No. 2-GACL or respondent No.3. Similarly, though petitioners in their claim stated that they were paid salary/remuneration by respondent No. 2-GACL, but no document worth the name was placed on record to substantiate their aforesaid claims. In this case, petitioners have also not been able to prove that their services were terminated by the respondent No. 2-GACL, whereas respondent No. 2-GACL categorically denied that petitioners were engaged by it. Respondent No. 3 though admitted that services of the petitioners were hired/engaged by it w.e.f. June 1996 as Khalasis at project site but they specifically denied the claim of the petitioners that they were being paid salary @ of Rs.1950/-, Rs.2250/-, Rs.1950 and Rs.2250/- respectively. Respondent No.3 - Contractor further stated that petitioners were being paid wages @ Rs. 65/- per day but the claim of the petitioners that they worked more than 240 days continuously with the replying respondent was specifically denied. Similarly, respondent No. 3 stated that M/s Gujrat Ambuja Cement Ltd. had given some project/work to respondent No. 3-Contractor and petitioners were engaged by respondent No. 3 and their services were never terminated rather they themselves left job on their own. 24. After perusing the entire evidence led on record by the petitioners as well as respondents, there is no doubt that, at any point of time, petitioners were able to prove their appointment as Fire & Safety Supervisors by respondent No. 2-GACL. Similarly, petitioners themselves stated before the learned Tribunal below that they were not employees/workers of respondent No. 2-GACL. 25. After perusing the entire evidence led on record by the petitioners as well as respondents, there is no doubt that, at any point of time, petitioners were able to prove their appointment as Fire & Safety Supervisors by respondent No. 2-GACL. Similarly, petitioners themselves stated before the learned Tribunal below that they were not employees/workers of respondent No. 2-GACL. 25. PW1 specifically stated before the learned Tribunal that he was inducted into employment of respondent No. 2-GACL as Fire & Safety Supervisor and, as such, he continued till 1.1.1997, but as has been observed above, none of the petitioners have placed on record appointment letters, if any, given by respondent No. 2, while engaging them as Fire & Safety Supervisors. As such, this Court sees no illegality and infirmity in order passed by the learned Tribunal below, wherein, it concluded that neither petitioners have proved themselves to be the employees of respondent No. 2-GACL nor that of respondent No. 3-Contractor. Since, petitioners were unable to prove on record relationship of employees and employer between them and respondent No. 2-GACL, learned Tribunal rightly concluded that dispute cannot be said to have fallen under the definition of “Industrial Disputes” as per Section 2(s) of the I.D. Act. At this stage, it would be profitable to refer the judgment passed by Hon’ble Apex Court titled Balwant Raj Saluja and Anr. Vs. Air India Limited and Ors. (2014) 9 SCC 407 , wherein, Hon’ble Apex Court laid relevant factors to be taken into consideration while determining the relationship between the employer and employee, which are as under: “64. It was concluded by this Court in Nalco case that there may have been some element of control with Nalco because its officials were nominated to the Managing Committee of the said schools. However, it was observed that the abovesaid fact was only to ensure that the schools run smoothly and properly. In this regard, the Court observed as follows: “30. … However, this kind of ‘remote control’ would not make Nalco the employer of these workers. This only shows that since Nalco is shouldering and meeting financial deficits, it wants to ensure that the money is spent for the rightful purposes.” 65. In this regard, the Court observed as follows: “30. … However, this kind of ‘remote control’ would not make Nalco the employer of these workers. This only shows that since Nalco is shouldering and meeting financial deficits, it wants to ensure that the money is spent for the rightful purposes.” 65. Thus, it can be concluded that the relevant factors to be taken into consideration to establish an employer-employee relationship would include, inter alia: (i) who appoints the workers; (ii) who pays the salary/remuneration; (iii) who has the authority to dismiss; (iv) who can take disciplinary action; (v) Whether there is continuity of service; and (vi) extent of control and supervision i.e. whether there exists complete control and supervision. As regards extent of control and supervision, we have already taken note of the observations in Bengal Nagpur Cotton Mills case, International Airport Authority of India case and Nalco case.” 26. Careful perusal of aforesaid law passed by Hon’ble Apex Court clearly suggests that Court while examining the question of employer and employee relationship is required to consider several factors as have been culled hereinabove by the Hon’ble Apex Court. Perusal of facts and circumstances of the case as well as evidence adduced on record, nowhere suggests that petitioners herein were able to prove aforesaid factors while claiming employer and employees relationship between them and respondents No. 2 and 3. As has been discussed in detail, petitioners have not placed on record appointment letters, if any, issued either by respondent No. 2 or respondent No. 3. Since, petitioners herein were unable to prove on record that they were appointed by respondents No. 2 and 3, several other factors as have been indicated hereinabove may not have much relevance as far as present cases are concerned. But otherwise also, perusal of impugned award nowhere suggests that petitioners were able to prove that they were being paid salary/remuneration by respondents herein. Similarly, petitioners have not led on record any evidence to demonstrate that respondents No. 2 and 3 had control and supervision over them while discharging official duties. 27. Hence, in view of the above, this Court finds no force in the contention put-forth on behalf of counsel representing petitioners that learned Tribunal below has fallen in error while rendering the findings that petitioners do not fall under definition of Section 2(s) of Industrial Disputes Act. 27. Hence, in view of the above, this Court finds no force in the contention put-forth on behalf of counsel representing petitioners that learned Tribunal below has fallen in error while rendering the findings that petitioners do not fall under definition of Section 2(s) of Industrial Disputes Act. Admittedly, in the present case petitioners were not able to prove on record relationship of employees and employer between them and respondents and, as such, it cannot be said that impugned award passed by learned Tribunal deserves to be quashed and set aside being perverse. 28. Similarly, this Court sees no illegality and infirmity in the impugned award passed by learned Tribunal below wherein reference Nos. 66/1998, 63/1998 and 67/1998 were rejected by learned Tribunal drawing adverse inference under Section 114 G of Evidence Act against Lal Chand, Khem Raj and Kuldeep Kumar because they never stepped in witness box to prove their case. It is well settled that one who claim need to prove the same by leading best piece of evidence. In the present case, though vide order dated 21.5.2002, learned Tribunal had consolidated the aforesaid references but that could not be a ground for the petitioners to not step into witness box to prove their claim. In the present case authorized representative of the petitioner in Reference No. 65/1998 made an attempt to prove the claim of the petitioner, namely, Agya Ram only and by no stretch of imagination it can be concluded that evidence led on record by Shri Agya Ram in Reference No. 65 of 1998 could be read in evidence in other references. Moreover, perusal of evidence led on record by petitioner-Agya Ram in reference No. 65/1998 nowhere suggests that he made any mention with regard to other petitioners and, as such, this Court sees no illegality and infirmity in the impugned award passed by the learned Tribunal. Onus was upon each petitioner to prove their respective claims by leading cogent and convincing evidence, which they failed to discharge by not entering into witness box. 29. Hence, in totality of facts and circumstances, this Court finds no reason, whatsoever, to intervene in the well reasoned award passed by the learned Labour Court. Moreover, this Court has very limited jurisdiction while exercising power under Section 226 to re-appreciate the evidence. 30. 29. Hence, in totality of facts and circumstances, this Court finds no reason, whatsoever, to intervene in the well reasoned award passed by the learned Labour Court. Moreover, this Court has very limited jurisdiction while exercising power under Section 226 to re-appreciate the evidence. 30. Apart from above, findings of fact recorded by learned Tribunal below on the basis of appreciation of evidence cannot be questioned in writ proceedings and writ court cannot act as an appellate court. In this regard, reliance is placed upon the judgment passed by Hon’ble Apex Court in case titled Bhuvnesh Kumar Dwivedi vs. M/s Hindalco Industries Ltd. 2014 AIR SCW 3157. It is profitable to reproduce paras 16, 17 and 18 of the judgment herein: “16. ………The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Article 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior Courts or tribunals: these are cases where orders are passed by inferior Courts or Tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is no entitled to act as an Appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened for questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the interference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised. 17. The judgments mentioned above can be read with the judgment of this Court in Harjinder Singh’s case (supra), the relevant paragraph of which reads as under: 21. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised. 17. The judgments mentioned above can be read with the judgment of this Court in Harjinder Singh’s case (supra), the relevant paragraph of which reads as under: 21. Before concluding, we consider it necessary to observe that while exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution in matters like the present one, the High Courts are duty bound to keep in mind that the Industrial Disputes Act and other similar legislative instruments are social welfare legislations and the same are required to be interpreted keeping in view the goals set out in the Preamble of the Constitution and the provisions contained in Part IV thereof in general and Articles 38, 39(a) to (e), 43 and 43-A in particular, which mandate that the State should secure a social order for the promotion of welfare of the people, ensure equality between men and women and equitable distribution of material resources of the community to sub-serve the common good and also ensure that the workers get their dues. More than 41 years ago, Gajendragadkar, J. opined that: 10…. The concept of social and economic justice is a living concept of revolutionary import; it gives sustenance to the rule of law and meaning and significance to the ideal of welfare State. 18. A careful reading of the judgments reveals that the High Court can interfere with an order of the Tribunal only on the procedural level and in cases, where the decision of the lower Courts has been arrived at in gross violation of the legal principles. The High Court shall interfere with factual aspect placed before the Labour Courts only when it is convinced that the Labour Court has made patent mistakes in admitting evidence illegally or have made grave errors in law in coming to the conclusion on facts. The High Court granting contrary relief under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution amounts to exceeding its jurisdiction conferred upon it. Therefore, we accordingly answer the point No. 1 in favour of the appellant.” [Emphasis added] 31. Consequently, in view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court sees no force in these writ petitions, as such, the same are dismissed being devoid of any merit.