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Gujarat High Court · body

2016 DIGILAW 2028 (GUJ)

Pineshbhai Amrutlal Patel v. Education Officer

2016-09-09

ABHILASHA KUMARI

body2016
JUDGMENT : ABHILASHA KUMARI, J. By preferring this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has challenged the impugned order dated 11.02.2011, passed by the Administrative Officer, Taluka Primary Education Committee, the first respondent herein and the order dated 22.06.2011, passed by the Tribunal, confirming the order of the first respondent by which the petitioner has been removed from service. 2. The petitioner, who was at the relevant point of time holding the educational qualification of having passed the Secondary School Certificate (“SSC”) Examination, was appointed as an Untrained Teacher by the Municipal School Board, Anand, on 12.11.1990 The petitioner was appointed as a Trained Teacher in the year 1995, after having cleared the PTC Course. The petitioner was posted in Municipal School No. 7 when the incident, leading to the passing of the order of removal from service, took place. It so transpired that on 20.01.2011, a girl student studying in Class VII in the Municipal School No. 7 (hereinafter referred to as the girl student) submitted a written complaint to the Head Master of the said school, alleging that the petitioner, who was her teacher, had taken her alone to an empty classroom and molested her. He had further threatened the girl student not to disclose the incident to anyone. The mother of the girl student also addressed a complaint to the Head Master of the school on the same day, regarding the incident that had taken place with her daughter. A Show Cause Notice dated 20.01.2011 was issued to the petitioner who, in a written statement, admitted his guilt and asked for pardon, while promising that he would not behave in such a manner in future. Respondent No. 1 immediately forwarded the entire record to the Director of Primary Education, the third respondent herein, along with a forwarding letter dated 21.01.2011 Respondent No. 3, vide his letter dated 04.02.2011, stated that as the incident was a serious one, appropriate action to bring the services of the petitioner to an end may be initiated. A second detailed Show Cause Notice dated 09.02.2011 was issued to the petitioner, calling upon him to explain why he ought not to be removed from service. The petitioner was asked to appear in person on 11.02.2011, to render his explanation. It is not clear from the record whether the petitioner appeared personally, or not. A second detailed Show Cause Notice dated 09.02.2011 was issued to the petitioner, calling upon him to explain why he ought not to be removed from service. The petitioner was asked to appear in person on 11.02.2011, to render his explanation. It is not clear from the record whether the petitioner appeared personally, or not. However, it is an undisputed position that he did not submit any explanation in his defence. The first respondent, therefore, passed the impugned order dated 11.02.2011, terminating the services of the petitioner. The petitioner preferred an appeal against the said order before the Tribunal constituted under the provisions of Section 24(2) of the Bombay Primary Education Act, 1947, consisting of the Chairman of the School Board and Education Inspector of the District. Before the Tribunal, the petitioner took the stand by filing an affidavit-, that he was forced to give the statement admitting his guilt under pressure, although the incident had never taken place. He further alleged that the girl student, who was mentally retarded, had failed the previous year. Nursing a grudge over this, the girl student and her parents had falsely accused the petitioner. After considering the material on record, the Tribunal rejected the appeal by the impugned order dated 22.06.2011, confirming the order of removal from service passed by respondent No. 1. Aggrieved by the above two orders, the petitioner is before this Court. 3. Mr. Mitesh L. Rangras, learned advocate for the petitioner has submitted that no departmental inquiry, as envisaged by Rules 6 and 8 of the Gujarat Panchayat Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1997 (“the Panchayat Rules”) was carried out against the petitioner. According to him, even as per the proviso to Rule 63(2)(b) of the Bombay Primary Education Rules, 1949, no order of removal from service can be passed until and unless an enquiry has been made as per the procedure envisaged in the Gujarat Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1971. In the present case, no Charge-sheet was served and the necessary procedure of a departmental inquiry was not followed before passing the impugned order. As per the submissions of the learned advocate for the petitioner, the principles of natural justice have thus been violated. 4. It is further submitted that the petitioner was not given an opportunity to produce defence witnesses and no further statement of his was recorded before passing the final order. 5. As per the submissions of the learned advocate for the petitioner, the principles of natural justice have thus been violated. 4. It is further submitted that the petitioner was not given an opportunity to produce defence witnesses and no further statement of his was recorded before passing the final order. 5. It is contended that the authority concerned is required to exercise power within the four corners of the statute, which has not been done by the first respondent while passing the impugned order. According to the learned advocate for the petitioner, the order passed by respondent No. 1 is a non-speaking order. 6. It is submitted that as the petitioner was not afforded a proper opportunity to defend himself and the required procedure was not followed, the impugned orders deserve to be quashed and set aside as they seriously violate the right to life of the petitioner, by rendering him without employment. 7. In support of his submissions, learned advocate for the petitioner has relied upon several judgments that shall be discussed at the appropriate stage hereinafter. 8. Mr. Niraj Ashar, learned Assistant Government Pleader appearing for the second and third respondents, has submitted that the provisions of the Panchayat Rules are not applicable in the present case. However, the provisions of the Bombay Primary Education Rules, 1949, would be applicable. It is submitted that the first Show Cause Notice dated 20.01.2011 was issued on the same day as the complaint was received. The petitioner was asked to appear and render an explanation on the same day. He appeared and admitted his guilt in writing. The petitioner has even apologised and stated that he would not indulge in such behaviour again. Thereafter, respondent No. 1 approached respondent No. 3 by the letter dated 21.01.2011, asking for permission to suspend the petitioner. Respondent No. 3 replied, by the letter dated 04.02.2011, that instead of suspending the petitioner, appropriate proceedings for removal from service be initiated against him. It is submitted that on 09.02.2011, a second Show Cause Notice was issued to the petitioner asking him to appear personally on 11.02.2011, to show cause why he should not be removed from service. The petitioner did not put up any defence and nor did he change his earlier admission of guilt. It is submitted that on 09.02.2011, a second Show Cause Notice was issued to the petitioner asking him to appear personally on 11.02.2011, to show cause why he should not be removed from service. The petitioner did not put up any defence and nor did he change his earlier admission of guilt. Under the circumstances, the impugned order has been rightly passed as there was no necessity of conducting an inquiry after the petitioner has straightaway admitted his guilt. 9. It is contended by the learned Assistant Government Pleader that sufficient opportunity of hearing was granted to the petitioner. It cannot, therefore, be said that the principles of natural justice have been violated. The petitioner has admitted his guilt in writing and did not change this admission after the issuance of the second Show Cause Notice. It is only at the time of filing the appeal that the petitioner changed his stand by stating that he had been pressurised into admitting his guilt. Had that been the position, the petitioner could have stated so when he was called pursuant to the second Show Cause Notice. However, he did not do so at that point of time. The stand taken by the petitioner before the Tribunal is, therefore, an afterthought. 10. It is submitted that after the admission of guilt by the petitioner, no further procedure was required to be undertaken. No prejudice has been caused to the petitioner, as the order has been passed after his own admission. Once the petitioner has pleaded guilty, there can be no allegation regarding the violation of the principles of natural justice by not holding a full-fledged inquiry. 11. Learned Assistant Government Pleader has further contended that while admitting his guilt, the petitioner did not ask for the cross-examination of any person. Nor did he put up any defence pursuant to the second Show Cause Notice, by which he had been put to notice regarding the proposed termination of his services. Even before the Tribunal, while changing his stand, the petitioner has not produced any evidence to the contrary or demanded that he wants to examine any witnesses in his favour. Moreover, the allegations of bias levelled by the petitioner before the Tribunal are totally unsubstantiated. It is submitted that, under the circumstances, the impugned orders require no interference. 12. Even before the Tribunal, while changing his stand, the petitioner has not produced any evidence to the contrary or demanded that he wants to examine any witnesses in his favour. Moreover, the allegations of bias levelled by the petitioner before the Tribunal are totally unsubstantiated. It is submitted that, under the circumstances, the impugned orders require no interference. 12. Learned Assistant Government Pleader has placed reliance on several judgments in support of his submissions, which shall be dealt with later. 13. Mr. H.S Munshaw, learned advocate for respondent No. 1, has supported the order passed by the said respondent and adopted the submissions advanced by the learned Assistant Government Pleader. 14. In rejoinder, Mr. Mitesh L. Rangras, learned advocate for the petitioner, has reiterated the submissions advanced earlier and attempted to distinguish the judgments cited by the learned Assistant Government Pleader. 15. This Court has heard learned counsel for the respective parties at length, considered the submissions advanced at the Bar and perused the impugned orders and other documents on record. 16. The judgments relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner may now be examined. 17. The judgment in the case of Jasubhai Rupabhai Chauhan v. State of Gujarat - Special Civil Application No. 3880 of 2008 decided on 18.11.2011 [2001 (0) GLHEL-HC 226100], has been rendered under the Gujarat Panchayat Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1997. This Court has referred to a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of U.P Warehousing Corporation v. Vijay Narayan - AIR 1980 SC 840 , wherein it was held as below: “The rules of natural justice in the circumstances of the case, required that the respondent should be given a reasonable opportunity to deny his guilt, to defend himself and to establish his innocence which means and includes any opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses relied upon by the appellant-Corporation and an opportunity to lead evidence in defence of the charge as also a show cause notice for the proposed punishment.” 18. In the light of the aforesaid decision, this Court held that the respondents had adopted a procedure which amounted to a mere empty formality before passing the order of dismissal, without holding a departmental inquiry and straightaway issuing the Show Cause Notice and concluding that the misconduct is proved without holding departmental inquiry, which amounts to denial of a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the petitioner therein. In the present case, after the petitioner admitted his guilt after the issuance of the first Show Cause Notice, he has not deviated from this stand even after the issuance of the second Show Cause Notice for the termination of his services. On the facts and in the circumstances of the present case and the admission of guilt by the petitioner, the above judgment would not be applicable to the facts of the case in hand. 19. Another judgment relied upon by the petitioner is in the case of Bhagwatiben Santkumar Bachani v. Director of Education, Ahmed abad - 1989 (1) GLH (UJ) 8. This judgment refers to the proviso to sub-rule 2 of Rule 63 of the Bombay Primary Education Rules, 1949, which provides that no order of reduction, removal, retirement or dismissal shall be passed unless an inquiry has been made into the conduct of the employee concerned as laid down by the Bombay Civil Services Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules. This case is also distinguishable no the ground that it was not a case where the petitioner therein had admitted his guilt, as in the present case. 20. Prithvirajbhai Prahladbhai Chaudhary v. District Primary Education Officer - 2007 (3) GLH 320 , relied upon by learned advocate for the petitioner is also a case regarding the procedure envisaged in Rule 8 of the Gujarat Panchayat Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1997. The Court arrived at the conclusion that as proper procedure as envisaged under the said Rules was not followed, the order of dismissal deserved to be set aside. Such is not the case in the present matter. As already stated hereinabove, the petitioner has admitted his guilt in the first instance. 21. Regarding the alleged violation of the principles of natural justice, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon Meenglas Tea Estate v. Its Workmen reported in AIR 1963 SC 1719 , wherein it has been held that it is an elementary principle that a person who is required to answer a charge must know not only the accusation but also the testimony by which the accusation is supported. This judgment would not be relevant in the present case as the petitioner was very well aware of the allegation against him and has admitted his guilt. 22. This judgment would not be relevant in the present case as the petitioner was very well aware of the allegation against him and has admitted his guilt. 22. Similarly, the judgment in the case of U.P Warehousing Corporation v. Vijay Narayan - AIR 1980 SC 840 has been relied upon regarding the violation of the principles of natural justice. This judgment would also not be applicable in the present case as the petitioner has been granted sufficient opportunity to deny the charges. He has, on the contrary, admitted his guilt in writing and has also asked for pardon. 23. Reliance has been placed upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Orissa v. Dr. (Miss) Binapani Dei - AIR 1967 SC 1269 wherein the Supreme Court has stated that a party to whom prejudice is likely to be caused is entitled to a hearing. The Court fails to understand how this judgment would be applicable in the present case as the petitioner was called twice for hearing and has admitted his guilt. 24. Reliance has also been placed upon a judgment in the case of Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India - AIR 1987 SC 597, regarding the necessity of following the principles of natural justice. As the petitioner has been granted ample opportunity of hearing, this judgment would also not be applicable. 25. Reliance has further been placed upon the judgment in the case of Travancore Rayon Ltd. v. Union of India - AIR 1971 SC 862 . Learned counsel for the petitioner has failed to address the Court regarding the applicability of this judgment. 26. Much emphasis has been laid by learned counsel for the petitioner upon the judgment in the case of M.P Wakf Board v. Subhan Shah (D) by LRs - (2006) 10 SCC 696 , wherein the Supreme Court has held that where the statute creates different authorities to exercise their respective functions thereunder and each of such authority must exercise the functions within the four corners of the statute. This pronouncement of law by the Supreme Court cannot be disputed. However, learned counsel for the petitioner has failed to disclose before the Court which of the authorities has not exercised their powers or functions correctly. This pronouncement of law by the Supreme Court cannot be disputed. However, learned counsel for the petitioner has failed to disclose before the Court which of the authorities has not exercised their powers or functions correctly. It appears that the learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to this judgment in support of his submission that the procedure envisaged in Rule 8 of the Panchayat Rules and Rule 63 of the Bombay Primary Education Rules, 1949, has not been followed before the passing of the impugned orders. It is again reiterated that the petitioner has unequivocally admitted his guilt before the authorities, therefore, there did not arise any action for the said authorities to conduct an inquiry to unravel the truth. The truth had already been admitted by the petitioner, though sought to be resiled from before the Tribunal, without any supporting material. 27. Another judgment relied upon by the learned advocate for the petitioner is in the case of Cyril Lasrado (Dead) By LRs. v. Juliana Maria Lasrado - (2004) 7 SCC 431, regarding the necessity of setting forth the reasons by the Court. If the impugned order dated 22.06.2011, passed by the Tribunal is perused, it is clear that it contains sufficient reasons in support of the conclusion arrived at, namely, the termination of the services of the petitioner. The Tribunal has, upon perusal of the material on record, arrived at a conclusion that the allegations against the petitioner are substantiated. It has taken into consideration the written complaint of the girl student and has also observed that the petitioner failed the said girl student with an ulterior motive to keep her in the same class. It is, therefore, not a non-speaking order, as submitted. 28. On the other hand, Mr. Niraj Ashar, learned Assistant Government Pleader, has relied upon a judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of M.C Solanki v. District Health Officer - 1999 (2) GCD 1268, wherein it has been held as under: “6. In the instant case, when the show cause notice was given, the appellant has not submitted any reply to the charge sheet issued against her on 8.6.1994 The inquiry commenced and before the Inquiry Officer, she appeared and admitted her guilt. It is in view of the said admission of guilt, further proceedings were required to be held. In the instant case, when the show cause notice was given, the appellant has not submitted any reply to the charge sheet issued against her on 8.6.1994 The inquiry commenced and before the Inquiry Officer, she appeared and admitted her guilt. It is in view of the said admission of guilt, further proceedings were required to be held. The learned Judge has rightly come to the conclusion that the appellant has suffered no prejudice on account of failure on the part of the Disciplinary Authority in furnishing copy of the report of the Inquiry Officer.” 29. The second judgment relied upon by the learned Assistant Government Pleader is in the case of State Bank of India v. T.M Solanki, Ex. Employee of SBI - 2007 (3) GCD 2105 , wherein this Court has stated thus: “14…… If somebody, after committing misconduct pleads guilty, then, he does not challenge the charge, one can contest the case on the defences which are available to him or if he finds that he is absolutely defenceless, the case is open and shut, then, he may confess the guilt. Confession of misconduct and admission of the guilt may provide some solace to the delinquent but would not provide a reasonable legal and valid ground to the Court to make inference on the question of punishment. When the Court proposes to interfere on the question of punishment, then, it has to consider the nature and gravity of the charges; whether charges, if proved, could lead to harsher punishment, whether misconduct was a result of mens rea whether misconduct was willful or a mistake, whether in committing such act such deelinquent was to be benefited and whether complainant or the employer was to suffer unnecessarily. Discretion cannot be exercised in air. When the Court wants to award lesser punishment, then, it is obliged to give reasons, the reasons must be germane to the matter before the Court, those must be sound, those must be logical and those must be an outcome of the mind of a prudent man. One cannot say that as he has powers to interfere, he would interfere every time. One cannot say that as he has powers to interfere, he would interfere every time. In a case where delinquent pleaded guilty even in the Court, ordinarily, there would be no reason for the Court to make interference on the question of punishment, however, if the Court proposes to exercise discretion available with it and also wants to exercise powers conferred upon it, then, the Court has to supply reasons which must appeal to all concerned. One cannot say that because somebody had pleaded guilty and prayed for mercy, therefore, the case on hand would become a fit case for showing mercy. If the interference is absolutely Willogical, irrational, is not in accordance with the powers conferred upon the Court, or is a result of a wrong approach to the legal provisions or the facts, then, exercise of such discretion can always be condemned before the appellate forum.” 30. Learned Assistant Government Pleader has further relied upon the judgments in the case of Haryana Financial Corporation v. Kailash Chandra Ahuja - (2008) 9 SCC 31 and State Bank of India v. Bidyut Kumar Mitra - (2011) 2 SCC 316 , on the ground that though it is not admitted that the principles of natural justice have been violated, however, the petitioner has not proved that any prejudice has been caused to him. 31. The main ground of challenge raised by Mr. Mitesh L. Rangras, learned advocate for the petitioner is that, no departmental inquiry has been conducted in the matter. According to learned advocate for the petitioner, Rules 6 and 8 of the Panchayat Rules would be applicable. He has submitted that Rule 8 thereof envisages the procedure for imposing major penalties which can only be passed after a formal inquiry is held as prescribed. According to Mr. Niraj Ashar, learned Assistant Government Pleader and Mr. H.S Munshaw, learned advocate for respondent No. 1, Rules 6 and 8 of the Panchayat Rules are not applicable as the petitioner is a teacher in the Municipal School under the School Board and the matter would be governed by Rule 63 of the Bombay Primary Education Rules, 1949. The proviso to Rule 63(2)(b) reads thus: “63. Powers and duties with regard to the Staff of a District School Board or Authorised Municipality. (1) … … … (2) Administrative Control - The Administrative Officer shall have power. The proviso to Rule 63(2)(b) reads thus: “63. Powers and duties with regard to the Staff of a District School Board or Authorised Municipality. (1) … … … (2) Administrative Control - The Administrative Officer shall have power. (a) … … … (b) to confirm, promote, transfer, censure, fine, withhold increments of, reduce, suspend, remove, or dismiss any member of such staff or require him to retire from service, subject to such general instructions as may, from time to time, be issued by the Director in this behalf. Provided that no order of reduction, removal, retirement or dismissal shall be passed unless and enquiry has been made into the conduct of such member by the Administrative Officer or by a person authorised by him in this behalf in accordance with the procedure laid down in the Bombay Civil Services Conduct Discipline and Appeal Rules.” 32. Even according to this proviso, no order of reduction, removal, retirement or dismissal can be passed unless and enquiry has been made into the conduct of such member by the Administrative Officer or by a person authorised by him in this behalf in accordance with the procedure envisaged in the Gujarat Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1971. Rule 9 of the Gujarat Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1971, lays down the procedure for imposition of a major penalty. As per Rule 9(1), no order imposing the penalties specified in items (4) to (8) of Rule 6 shall be passed except after holding an inquiry. Rule 9(2) states that whenever the Disciplinary Authority is of the opinion that there are grounds for inquiry into the truth of any imputation of misconduct or misbehaviour or of any culpable act or omission, against a Government servant, it may itself inquiry into the truth thereof as per the provisions of the Public Servant (Inquiry) Act, 1850. The requirement of holding an inquiry gains significance where there are grounds for inquiry into the truth of any imputation against an employee. The requirement of holding an inquiry gains significance where there are grounds for inquiry into the truth of any imputation against an employee. In the present case, the petitioner has himself admitted his guilt at the very first instance and even after he was put to notice pursuant to the issuance of the second Show Cause Notice as to why his services be not terminated, the petitioner did not change his stand regarding the admission of guilt and his apology for his behaviour, while undertaking that he would not repeat such behaviour. When the truth of the matter has been admitted by the petitioner, himself, there remained no further requirement of holding a full-fledged inquiry. Even when the petitioner was put to notice about his proposed removal from service, he did not change his stand or the admission of his guilt before the authority concerned. When the petitioner has pleaded guilty, it cannot be said that the principles of natural justice have been violated by not holding a proper inquiry. 33. The allegations of molestation levelled against the petitioner are serious in nature, more so, considering the fact that they have been levelled by a girl student against her teacher. What makes the matter even worse is the fact that the girl student is mentally retarded, as has been stated by the petitioner, himself, in the memorandum of appeal before the Tribunal. The girl student has made a written complaint dated 2 0.01.2011, in her own handwriting, describing in detail the unsavoury incident that took place. It is alleged that the petitioner took her alone to an empty classroom, held her hand, opened the buttons of her top and molested her. The mother of the girl student has also given a complaint regarding the incident, on the same day. Looking to the seriousness of the incident, respondent No. 1 issued the first Show Cause Notice to the petitioner on the very day of the incident, asking him to appear on the same day and tender an explanation. The petitioner appeared before respondent No. 1 and unequivocally admitted his guilt. While doing so, the petitioner even tendered an apology and an assurance not to repeat such behaviour. It appears that the first respondent wrote to the third respondent on 21.01.2011, asking for permission to suspend the petitioner. The petitioner appeared before respondent No. 1 and unequivocally admitted his guilt. While doing so, the petitioner even tendered an apology and an assurance not to repeat such behaviour. It appears that the first respondent wrote to the third respondent on 21.01.2011, asking for permission to suspend the petitioner. By a letter dated 04.02.2011, the third respondent asked the first respondent to initiate appropriate action for the removal of the services of the petitioner instead of suspending him, considering the seriousness of the matter. Consequently, a second Show Cause Notice dated 09.02.2011 was issued to the petitioner in this regard, calling upon him to show cause why he ought not to be removed from service. The petitioner was asked to appear in person in order to render on explanation on 11.02.2011 The petitioner did not give any explanation or put up any defence. Nor did he make any demand to examine any person as a witness. Significantly, the petitioner did not resile from his earlier, written admission of guilt, made on 20.01.2011 For the first time, the petitioner changed his stand before the Tribunal by stating that he had been pressurised into admitting his guilt by three persons namely, the Principal, the Chairman and the Administrative Officer. However, while making such allegations, no material was placed on record in support of the same. Had the petitioner been forced to admit his guilt by any threat or coercion from any quarter, nothing prevented him from stating so on 11.02.2011, when he was asked to appear in person, pursuant to the second Show Cause Notice regarding the termination of his services. On the contrary, at that point of time, the petitioner maintained the earlier stand of admitting his guilt. This Court is, therefore inclined to agree with the submissions advanced by the learned Assistant Government Pleader, that the change of stand to the effect that the petitioner was pressurised into admitting his guilt, is purely an afterthought. 34. It has been submitted on behalf of the petitioner that he was not granted an opportunity of producing defence witnesses and no further statement of his was recorded before passing the final order. The petitioner was granted two opportunities of hearing. The first opportunity was pursuant to the Show Cause Notice dated 20.01.2011 when the petitioner admitted his guilt, apologised and promised not to repeat such behaviour in future. The petitioner was granted two opportunities of hearing. The first opportunity was pursuant to the Show Cause Notice dated 20.01.2011 when the petitioner admitted his guilt, apologised and promised not to repeat such behaviour in future. The second opportunity arose on 11.02.2011, after the issuance of the second Show Cause Notice on which date the petitioner did not raise any defence or make any submissions. At no point of time has the petitioner produced any witnesses in his favour or requested for an opportunity to cross-examine any person. The girl student and her mother have both given written complaints regarding the incident but the petitioner made no demand to cross-examine them. He did not even refute their statements. It is relevant to note that on 21.01.2011, another lady teacher wrote to the Headmaster stating that about a month before the incident, the parents of the girl student had approached her and submitted that the petitioner had tried to molest the girl student. The parents had informed the said teacher as they were ashamed to inform the Headmaster. However, the teacher had forgotten to inform the Headmaster at the relevant point of time. Another teacher has also given a statement in writing that some time prior to the incident, the girl student had remained absent for a long period of time. Upon inquiry, it was found that her absence was due to the reason that she was being sexually harassed by the petitioner. The said teacher has further stated that it has emerged from her conversation with the girl student that the petitioner had indulged in such activities with other girl students as well. The petitioner was very well aware of the statements against him but did not, on any occasion, ask for the cross-examination of the teachers, the girl student or her mother but voluntarily admitted his guilt. It cannot, therefore, be said in this factual scenario, that sufficient opportunity has not been granted to the petitioner. 35. The allegations of bias levelled by the petitioner against the girl student and her mother, on the ground that the girl student nursed a grudge as she had failed in the previous year, are also totally unsubstantiated. Before the Tribunal, the petitioner tried to change his stand by stating that the incident did not take place at all. 35. The allegations of bias levelled by the petitioner against the girl student and her mother, on the ground that the girl student nursed a grudge as she had failed in the previous year, are also totally unsubstantiated. Before the Tribunal, the petitioner tried to change his stand by stating that the incident did not take place at all. Such a stand cannot be believed because not only the girl student and her mother, but two other teachers as well, have made statements about the behaviour of the petitioner with the girl student and other girls studying in the school. The incident cannot be wished away by the petitioner by making a bald statement without placing any material in support of such a stand. 36. As observed earlier, though the petitioner has attempted to change his stand before the Tribunal by stating that he was pressurised into admitting his guilt, no material has been placed on record by him to substantiate this allegation. The allegations of bias against the girl student and her parents have also remained unsubstantiated. At no point of time, even before the Tribunal, has the petitioner requested that he be permitted to examine any person, including the girl student, her parents or the teachers who gave statements against him. Neither has he demanded that he be permitted to produce any witnesses. Merely by stating that the incident never took place, the petitioner cannot wriggle out of his written statement admitting and accepting his guilt. 37. With regard to the admission of guilt, the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Rameshchandra S. Vyas v. State of Gujarat - 1998 (1) GLH 802 is relevant. That was also a case under the Bombay Primary Education Rules, 1949, wherein, the delinquent teacher had admitted his misconduct. It was held by the Division Bench as under:- In a case where a delinquent teacher admitted the guilt, no further detailed enquiry was contemplated. Even so, Committee heard the teacher in full. Relevant documents were also perused. On this basis, a finding of guilt was arrived at by the Committee. Under no circumstances can it be said that the committee acted in violation of the principles of natural justice. When the misconduct was admitted by the teacher, there was no need to have further oral evidence to establish the same. Relevant documents were also perused. On this basis, a finding of guilt was arrived at by the Committee. Under no circumstances can it be said that the committee acted in violation of the principles of natural justice. When the misconduct was admitted by the teacher, there was no need to have further oral evidence to establish the same. Thus, on the facts and circumstances of this case, we come to the conclusion that enquiry in compliance with the principles of natural justice was held by the Enquiry Committee, which was appointed by the Management. In that enquiry, on the basis of the admission made by the delinquent teacher and on the basis of the records, the Committee entered a finding of guilt. That conclusion reached by the Committee can, under no circumstance, be termed as based on no evidence or perverse. When enquiry is conducted in compliance with the principles of natural justice, and conclusion is arrived at on the basis of the evidence adduced in the inquiry, this Court is not to go into the circumstance of misconduct and examine the same as a Court of appeal to see whether the misconduct is proved. In the above circumstance, the quantum of punishment is within the purview of the Management. Imposition of penalty is the right of the Disciplinary Authority and it is not for this Court to interfere with the same… (Para 6) 38. This judgment is squarely applicable to the present case. After the acceptance of his guilt, no further procedure was required to be held as per the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Rameshchandra S. Vyas v. State of Gujarat (supra). 39. The petitioner has failed to raise any convincing legal or valid grounds, justifying the interference of this Court. 40. In the light of the above discussion and for reasons stated hereinabove the petition, being devoid of merit, deserves to be rejected. It is, accordingly rejected. Rule is discharged. There shall be on orders as to costs.