JUDGMENT : Z.A. Haq, J. 1. Heard learned advocates for the respective parties. 2. The Vidarbha Irrigation Development Corporation has filed civil applications seeking leave to file appeal to challenge the award passed by the reference Court under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. 3. The agricultural lands owned by the respondents/claimants in these two matters were acquired pursuant to the notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. After undertaking the prescribed exercise as per the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, the Land Acquisition Officer passed award on 23rd February, 2001 and 10th December, 2001, respectively. Being dissatisfied with the amount of compensation granted by the Land Acquisition Officer, the landowners requested for reference under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 which was accordingly made. In one reference proceedings, the State of Maharashtra through Collector, Wardha and Executive Engineer, Minor Irrigation Division, Wardha and in other reference proceedings State of Maharashtra through Collector, Yavatmal and Executive Engineer, Medium Project Division, Yavatmal were impleaded. V.I.D.C. was not party in the proceedings. The reference Court passed award on 9th December, 2011 and 17th January, 2013 respectively and enhanced the amount of compensation. V.I.D.C. has filed appeals challenging the above awards and these applications are filed seeking leave to file appeal. According to V.I.D.C., it was necessary party in the reference proceedings as it is acquiring body and is required to pay the enhanced amount of compensation. 4. The applications filed by V.I.D.C. seeking leave to file appeal are opposed by the claimants. Shri A.L. Deshpande and Shri K.S. Narwade, advocates representing the claimants in these appeals have submitted that the claim of V.I.D.C. that it is acquiring body and is necessary party to the reference proceedings is unacceptable in law. The submission on behalf of the claimants is that V.I.D.C. is a statutory Corporation constituted under the Vidarbha Irrigation Development Corporation Act, 1997 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act of 1997") and the provisions of the Act of 1997 does not give any power to the Corporation to acquire lands for the projects and on the contrary section 26 of the Act of 1997 shows that the power to acquire lands is with the State Government. It is submitted that the Corporation will not fall in the expression "Local Authority" as defined under section 3(aa) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 or the expression "Company" as defined under section 3(e) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and therefore, it will not have any right of audience or participation in the proceedings either before the Collector or before the reference Court as only "Local Authority" or "Company" has this right as per section 50(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. It is submitted that as the Corporation does not have any right to participate in the proceedings before the Collector and/or reference Court, it cannot file and maintain appeal as of right to challenge the award passed by the reference Court under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. In First Appeal (Stamp) No. 20915/2015, copy of communication issued by the Deputy Collector (Land Acquisition) on 10.10.2011 and addressed to the reference Court is placed on record. In this communication, it is stated that the Joint Secretary, Law and Judiciary Department has taken decision that appeal need not be filed and therefore, the amount of Rs. 21,18,051/- was being deposited before the reference Court. Relying on this communication, the learned Advocate for the claimants has submitted that the application filed by the V.I.D.C. seeking leave to file appeal has to be dismissed. 5. The points which fall for consideration in this appeal are required to be examined keeping in view the established principles of law regarding right of appeal. The relevant provisions are section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Ac, 1894 reads thus:- "54. Subject to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, applicable to appeals from original decrees, and notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any enactment for the time being in force, an appeal shall only be in any proceedings under this Act to the High Court from the award, or from any part of the award, of the Court and from any decree of the High Court passed on such appeal as aforesaid an appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court subject to the provisions contained in section 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and in Order XLV thereof." Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, reads thus:- "96. Appeal from original decree. - (1) Save where otherwise expressly provided in the body of this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, an appeal shall lie from every decree passed by any Court exercising original jurisdiction to the Court authorised to hear appeals from the decisions of such Court. (2) An appeal may lie from an original decree passed ex-parte. (3) No appeal shall lie from a decree passed by the Court with the consent of parties. (4) No appeal shall lie, except on a question of law, from a decree in any suit of the nature cognisable by Courts of Small Causes, when the amount or value of the subject-matter of the original suit does not exceed ten thousand rupees." Though section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, does not provide that the appeal under this provision can be filed only by any of the party to the proceedings before the reference Court, it has to be read to mean that the right of appeal under this provision would be available only to any of the party to the proceedings before the reference Court and a person not impleaded as party before the reference Court cannot file appeal as of right and such person would be able to challenge the award passed by the reference Court by filing appeal after seeking leave of the Appellate Court. The right of appeal under section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, will be available only to the person who was party before the Court which passed the judgment/decree against which appeal is filed and if any person not impleaded as party before the Court which passed the judgment/decree is aggrieved, he may file appeal after seeking leave of the appellate Court. It is well established that the right of appeal is a statutory right. The appeal can be filed as of right by the parties to the proceedings in which the judgment/order, which is challenged, is passed. Apart from the parties to the proceedings, a person who is affected by the judgment/decree/order and who is not party to the proceedings in which that judgment/ decree/order is passed, may seek leave to file appeal and such person is permitted by the Appellate Court to file appeal after it is satisfied that the person seeking leave is affected by the judgment/decree/order. A person who is not party to the proceedings in which judgment/decree/order, which is challenged in appeal is passed, cannot file appeal as of right. Keeping in view the above principles, governing the right of appeal, the contentions of the parties are required to be examined. 6. Shri S.G. Jagtap, advocate along with Shri J.B. Kasat and Shri S.S. Godbole, advocates has submitted that the lands are acquired for the promotion and operation of the projects as per section 18 of the Act of 1997. It is argued that as per section 15 of the Act of 1997, assigned projects and their assets vest in the Corporation. It is submitted that section 19(2)(a) empowers the Corporation to acquire and hold property for performance of its functions, duties and activities and to lease, sale, exchange or otherwise transfer any property held by it. Relying on the judgment given by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of G.M.P.V.M. vs. State of Mah., reported in 2009 (1) Mh.L.J. 883 , it is submitted that the Corporation is proper party to the proceedings and is entitled to participate in the proceedings at all the relevant stages that is before the Collector, before the Reference Court and before the Appellate Court or any other forum in accordance with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. It is submitted that the Corporation is entitled to file appeal to challenge the award passed by the reference Court and as the Corporation was not impleaded as party before the Collector or the reference Court, it is required to file application seeking leave. It is submitted that even if for the sake of argument it is considered that the Corporation will not be covered within the expression "Local Authority" or "Company", it will be covered by the expression "person interested" as defined in section 3(b) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and the Corporation is entitled to file and maintain the appeal to challenge the award. To support the argument, the learned advocates have relied on the following judgments: (i) Judgment given in the case of Abdul Rasak vs. Kerala Water Authority, reported in (2002) 3 SCC 228 , (ii) Judgment given in the case of Draupadi Devi Dharmada Trust vs. Daya Shankar, reported in (2010) 15 SCC 799, (iii) Judgment given in the case of Neyvely Lignite Corpn. Ltd. vs. Special Tahsildar (LA), reported in (1995) 1 SCC 221 , (iv) Judgment given in the case of Union of India vs. Special Tehsildar, reported in (1996) 2 SCC 332 , (v) Judgment given in the case of Regional Medical Research Centre, Tribals vs. Gokaran, reported in (2004) 13 SCC 125 , (vi) Judgment given in the case of Exe. Engineer, Minor Irri. Dvn. vs. Mainabai, reported in 2008 (3) Mh.L.J. 151 . Relying on the above referred judgments it is argued that as the lands are acquired for the benefit of the Corporation, it was proper party to the proceedings before the reference Court and is entitled to file and maintain the appeal. 7. Shri V.G. Palshikar, advocate who represents V.I.D.C. in appeals filed by it has also made submissions on the point that the Corporation is a necessary party in the proceedings before the Collector and reference Court and is entitled to file and maintain the appeal. To support his submissions, the learned advocate has relied on various provisions of the Act of 1997 i.e. Section 2(b), 2(c), 2(e), 4(1)(a), (1), (m), 15, 18, 19, 20, 21, 24, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31 and 36 of the Act of 1997. It is submitted that the Corporation will be covered by the expression "person interested" as defined under section 3(b) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and is entitled to participate in the proceedings as per section 18(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. It is submitted that the embargo put on the "person interested" to seek reference under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is because of the proviso below section 50(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and it does not mean that the Corporation which is covered by the expression "person interested" cannot participate in the proceedings under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and it cannot file appeal. 8. 8. The objection raised on behalf of the claimants to the applications filed by the Corporation seeking leave to file appeal is principally on the ground that the expression "acquiring body" is not found under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and the Corporation cannot seek leave to file appeal on the ground that it is an "acquiring body." The argument on behalf of the claimants is that there is no provision under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 on the basis of which the Corporation can seek leave to file appeal on the ground that it is an "acquiring body." 9. To consider the objection raised on behalf of the claimants, it has to be examined whether the Corporation was a necessary or proper party in the proceedings before the Collector or before the reference Court. To examine this, the provisions of section 3(e), section 3(aa) and section 3(b), section 18(1) and section 50(1) and section 50(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and section 3(31) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 are relevant. Section 50(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 lays down where the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 are put in force for the purpose of acquiring land at the cost of any fund controlled or managed by a local authority or of any company, the charges of and incidental to such acquisition shall be defrayed from or by such fund or company. Sub-section (2) of section 50 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 provides that in any proceeding held before the Collector or the reference Court, the local authority or company concerned may appear and adduce evidence for the purpose of determining the amount of compensation. Thus sub-section (2) of section 50 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 enables the local authority or company to participate in the proceedings before the Collector or the reference Court and it is because the acquisition of land is at the cost of the fund controlled and managed by the local authority or at the cost of the fund of company. In this background, it is required to be examined whether the Corporation falls within the expression "local authority" as defined by section 3(aa) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as applicable in Maharashtra or within the expression "company" as defined under section 3(e) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. 10. In this background, it is required to be examined whether the Corporation falls within the expression "local authority" as defined by section 3(aa) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as applicable in Maharashtra or within the expression "company" as defined under section 3(e) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. 10. The learned Advocates for the Corporation have accepted that the Corporation will not be covered by the expression "company" as defined under section 3(e) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The learned Advocates for the Corporation submitted that it will be covered by the expression "local authority" as defined by section 3(aa) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The submission is that the definition of "local authority" is very wide and inclusive and it covers the statutory body like the Corporation for which the land is acquired. To support the submissions, reliance is placed on the following judgments: (1) Judgment given by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Delhi Development Authority vs. Bhola Nath Sharma (Dead) By LRs. and another, reported in (2011) 2 SCC 54 , (2) Judgment given by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Godavari Marathwada Patbandhare Vikas Mahamandal, Aurangabad vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in 2009 (1) Mh.LJ. 883 , (3) Judgment given by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Regional Medical Research Centre, Tribals vs. Gokaran and others, reported in (2004) 13 SCC 125 , (4) Judgment given by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Abdul Rasak and others vs. Kerala Water Authority and others, reported in (2002) 3 SCC 228 . The learned Advocates for the Corporation have submitted that in any case the Corporation would be covered by the expression "person interested" as defined by section 3(b) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1994 and being "personinterested" the Corporation is necessary or proper party in the reference proceedings and is entitled to file appeal to challenge the award passed by the reference Court. To support the argument, reliance is placed on the following judgments: (1) Judgment given by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Draupadi Devi Dharmada Trust vs. Daya Shankar and others, reported in (2010) 15 SCC 799. To support the argument, reliance is placed on the following judgments: (1) Judgment given by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Draupadi Devi Dharmada Trust vs. Daya Shankar and others, reported in (2010) 15 SCC 799. (2) Judgment given by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Neyvely Lignite Corporation Ltd. vs. Special Tahsildar (Land Acquisition) Neyvely and others, reported in (1995) 1 SCC 221 and (3) Judgment given by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India and others vs. Special Tehsildar (ZA) and others, reported in (1996) 2 SCC 332 . Shri V.G. Palshikar, learned Advocate has relied on the following judgments: (1) Order passed by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Vidarbha Irrigation Development Corporation vs. Shankar @ Shrawan S/o Kisan Mahakulkar and others in First Appeal (Stamp) No. 2294/2007, (2) Judgment given by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Vidarbha Irrigation Development Corporation vs. Mahadeo S/o Kashinath Mahakalkar and another in First Appeal No. 713/2007, (3) Judgment given by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Vidarbha Irrigation Development Corporation vs. Shyam S/o Dnyaneshwar Dadam and others in First Appeal No. 40/2007. In the judgment given in the case of Delhi Development Authority vs. Bhola Nath Sharma (Dead) By LRs. and another, after considering the functions which are discharged by it and the powers conferred on it and exercised by it, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has summed up its conclusions in paragraph No. 29 of the judgment as follows: "29. Undisputedly, DDA is an authority constituted under section 3 of the 1957 Act for promoting and securing development of Delhi according to plan and for this purpose it has the power to acquire, hold, manage and dispose of land and other property, to carry out building, engineering, mining and other operations, to execute works in connection with supply of water and electricity, disposal of sewage, etc. Therefore, it is clearly covered by the definition of the expression "local authority." The Delhi Development Authority is held to be "local authority" for the above reasons. Therefore, it is clearly covered by the definition of the expression "local authority." The Delhi Development Authority is held to be "local authority" for the above reasons. In the case of Abdul Rasak, the Kerala Water Authority for which the land was acquired is treated as "local authority" as per section 3(aa) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and consequently it is held that the Kerala Water Authority was necessary party to the reference proceedings and it had right to participate in those proceedings. In the case of Regional Medical Research Centre, Tribals vs. Gokaran and others, again it is held that it had right to be impleaded in the proceedings and to be given a notice as the land was acquired for it. In the judgment given in the case of Godavari Marathwada Patbandhare Vikas Mahamandal, Aurangabad v. State of Maharashtra, it is held that the body, corporation or company for whose benefit the land is acquired, is a proper party and would be entitled to notice and impleadment in the proceedings before the authorities, the reference Court and the Appellate Court. 11. In the judgment given by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of U.P. vs. Ram Chandra Trivedi, reported in AIR 1976 SC 2547 , in paragraph No. 22, it is laid down as follows : "22. Thus on a conspectus of the decisions of this Court referred to above, it is obvious that there is no real conflict in their ratio decidendi and it is no longer open to any one to urge with any show of force that the constitutional position emerging from the decision of this Court in regard to cases of the present nature is not clear. It is also to be borne in mind that even in cases where a High Court finds any conflict between the views expressed by larger and similar benches of this Court, it cannot disregard or skirt the views expressed by the larger benches. It is also to be borne in mind that even in cases where a High Court finds any conflict between the views expressed by larger and similar benches of this Court, it cannot disregard or skirt the views expressed by the larger benches. The proper course for a High Court in such a case, as observed by this Court in Union of India vs. K.S. Subramanian (Civil Appeal No. 212 of 1975, decided on July 30, 1976) to which one of us was a party, is to try to find out and follow the opinion expressed by larger benches of this Court in preference to those expressed by smaller benches of the Court which practise, hardened as it has into a rule of law is followed by this Court itself." In the judgment given by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of N. Meera Rani vs. Government of Tamil Nadu and another, reported in (1989) 4 SCC 418 , in paragraph No. 13, it is laid down as follows: "13. We may now refer to the decisions on the basis of which this point is to be decided. The starting point is the decision of a Constitution Bench in Rameshwar Shaw v. District Magistrate, Burdwan. All subsequent decisions which are cited have to be read in the light of this Constitution Bench decision since they are decisions by benches comprised of lesser number of judges. It is obvious that none of these subsequent decisions could have intended taking a view contrary to that of the Constitution Bench in Rameshwar Shaw case." 12. Thus the judgments relied upon by the learned Advocates for the Corporation will have to be considered in the light of the judgment given by the Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of UP Awas Evam Vikas Parishad vs. Gyan Devi (Dead) by LRs. and others. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, after analysis of law on the point has summed up its conclusions in penultimate sub-paragraph of paragraph No. 18 as follows: "18........... The Court has also considered the definition of "person interested" contained in section 3(b) of the L.A. Act and has held that the company for whom the land is acquired is a "person interested" for the purpose of section 18(1) of the L.A. Act. The Court has also considered the definition of "person interested" contained in section 3(b) of the L.A. Act and has held that the company for whom the land is acquired is a "person interested" for the purpose of section 18(1) of the L.A. Act. The Court appears to have gone into this question for the reason that the Letters Patent Bench in the High Court had held that the company was not a "person interested" within the meaning of section 18(1) of the L.A. Act. Having regard to the express provision contained in the proviso to section 50(2) of the L.A. Act, it would not be correct to say that a local authority or a company for whom land is acquired is a "person interested" under section 18(1) of the L.A. Act because on that view a local authority or a company would be entitled to seek a reference against the award of the Collector which would run counter to the proviso to section 50(2). It was, therefore, not correct to place reliance on section 18(1). But the conclusion in Himalayan Tiles case that the company had the locus standi to file an appeal is right when the said judgment is read in the context of section 50(2). For that reason, we are unable to endorse the view taken in Municipal Corpn. of City of Ahmedabad vs. Chandulal Shamaldas Patel." In the case of Himalayan Tiles and Marble (P) Ltd. vs. Francis Victor Countinho (Dead) By LRs. reported in (1980) 3 SCC 223 , it was held that the acquisition of land was for "company" and therefore, it had locus standi to file appeal. In the case of UP Awas Evam Vikas Parishad vs. Gyan Devi (Dead) by LRs. and others, it is explained that the "local authority" or "company" for whom the land is acquired would be "person interested" as defined by section 3(b) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. 13. Considering the proposition laid down in the judgment given in the case of UP Awas Evam Vikas Parishad vs. Gyan Devi (Dead) by LRs. and others, any body or authority which does not fall within the expression "local authority" or "company" will not have the right to participate in the proceedings before the Collector or the reference Court or to file an appeal as of right. and others, any body or authority which does not fall within the expression "local authority" or "company" will not have the right to participate in the proceedings before the Collector or the reference Court or to file an appeal as of right. The body or corporation will be covered by the expression "person interested" only if it is a "local authority" or "company" as per section 03(aa) or section 03(e) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. 14. As recorded earlier, the learned Advocates for the Corporation have accepted that the Corporation will not be covered by the expression "company". It has to be examined whether the Corporation will be covered by the expression "local authority". "Local authority" is defined by section 3(aa) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as follows: "3(aa). The expression "local authority" includes a town planning authority (by whatever name called) set up under any law for the time being in force." Section 3(aa) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is inserted by the Act No. 68 of 1984 with effect from 24.9.1984. In the judgment given in the case of Valjibhai Muljibhai Soneji and another vs. State of Bombay (now Gujarat) and others, reported in AIR 1963 SC 1890 , Constitution Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court has examined the tests which are required to be fulfilled by the statutory body or authority to fall within the ambit of the expression "local authority" as defined by section 3(31) of the General Clauses Act, 1897. Paragraph Nos. 11 and 12 of the above judgment are relevant and read as follows: "11. The expression "local authority" is not defined in the Land Acquisition Act but is defined in section 3(31) of General Clauses Act, 1897 as follows: "Local authority" shall mean a municipal committee, district board, body of port commissioners or other authority legally entitled to, or entrusted by the Government with, the control or management of a municipal or local funds." The definition given in the General Clauses Act, 1897 govern all Central Acts and Regulations made after the commencement of the Act. No doubt, this Act was enacted later in point of time than the Land Acquisition Act; but this Act was a consolidating and amending Act and a definition given therein of the expression "local authority" is the same as that contained in the earlier Acts of 1868 and 1887. No doubt, this Act was enacted later in point of time than the Land Acquisition Act; but this Act was a consolidating and amending Act and a definition given therein of the expression "local authority" is the same as that contained in the earlier Acts of 1868 and 1887. The definition given in section 3(31) will therefore, hold good occurring in the Land Acquisition Act. We have already quoted the definition. 12. It will be clear from the definition that unless it is shown that the State Transport Corporation is an 'authority' and is legally entitled to or entrusted by the Government with control or management of a local fund it cannot be regarded as a local authority. No material has been placed before us from which it could be deduced that the funds of the Corporation can be regarded as local funds. It was no doubt submitted by the learned Attorney General that the Corporation was furnished with funds by the Government for commencing for its business; but even if that there were so, it is difficult to appreciate how that would make the funds of the Corporation local funds." Again in the judgment given by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India and others vs. R.C. Jain and others, reported in AIR 1981 SC 951 , a Three Judges Bench has examined the issue. Paragraph Nos. 2, 3 and 4 of the judgment are relevant which read as follows: "2. Let us, therefore, concentrate and confine our attention and enquiry to the definition of "Local Authority" in section 3(31) of the General Clauses Act. A proper and careful scrutiny of the language of section 3(31) suggests that an authority, in order to be a local Authority, must be of like nature and character as a Municipal Committee. District Board or Body of Port Commissioners, possessing, therefore, many, if not all, of the distinctive attributes and characteristics of a Municipal Committee, District Board, or Body of Port Commissioners, but, possessing one essential feature, namely, that it is legally entitled to or entrusted by the Government with, the control and management of a municipal or local fund. What then are the distinctive attributes and characteristics, all or many of which a Municipal Committee, District Board or Body of Port Commissioners shares with any other local authority? What then are the distinctive attributes and characteristics, all or many of which a Municipal Committee, District Board or Body of Port Commissioners shares with any other local authority? First, the authorities must have separate legal existence as Corporate bodies. They must not be mere Governmental agencies but must be legally independent entities. Next, they must function in a defined area and must ordinarily, wholly or partly, directly or indirectly, be elected by the inhabitants of the area. Next, they must enjoy a certain degree of autonomy, with freedom to decide for themselves questions of policy affecting the area administered by them. The autonomy may not be complete and the degree of the dependence may vary considerably but, in appreciable measure of autonomy there must be. Next, they must be entrusted by Statute with such Governmental functions and duties as are usually entrusted to municipal bodies, such as those connected with providing amenities to the inhabitants of the locality, like health and education services, water and sewerage, town planning and development, roads, markets, transportation, social welfare services etc. etc. Broadly we may say that they may be entrusted with the performance of civic duties and functions which would otherwise be Governmental duties and functions. Finally, they must have the power to raise funds for the furtherance of their activities and the fulfilment of their projects by levying taxes, rates, charges, or fees. This may be in addition to moneys provided by Government or obtained by borrowing or otherwise. What is essential is that control or management of the fund must vest in the authority. 3. In Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs. Birla Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Delhi (1968) 3 SCR 251 at p. 288 : AIR 1968 SC 1232 , Hidayatullah, J., described some of the attributes of local bodies in this manner: "Local bodies are subordinate branches of Government activity. They are democratic institutions managed by the representatives of the people. They function for public purposes and take away a part of the Government affairs in local areas. They are political subdivisions and agencies which exercise a part of State functions. As they are intended to carry on local self-government the power of taxation is a necessary adjunct to their other powers. They function under the supervision of the Government." 4. They function for public purposes and take away a part of the Government affairs in local areas. They are political subdivisions and agencies which exercise a part of State functions. As they are intended to carry on local self-government the power of taxation is a necessary adjunct to their other powers. They function under the supervision of the Government." 4. In Valjibhai Muljibhai Soneji vs. State of Bombay (Now Gujarat), (1964) 3 SCR 686 : AIR 1963 SC 1890 , one of the questions was whether the State Trading Corporation was a local Authority as defined by section 3(31) of the General Clauses Act, 1897. It was held that it was not, because it was not an authority legally entitled to or entrusted by the Government with, control or management of a local fund. It was observed that though the Corporation was furnished with funds by the Government for commencing its business that would not make the funds of the Corporation ''local funds." The proposition laid down in the judgment is that the principal test which should be satisfied by the statutory body or authority to be "local authority" is that the body or authority should be entrusted by the statute with such Governmental functions and duties as are usually entrusted to municipal bodies, such as those connected with providing amenities to the inhabitants of the locality, like health and education services, water and sewerage, town planning and development, roads, markets, transportation, social welfare services, etc. It is laid down that broadly the body or authority may be entrusted with the performance of civic duties and functions which would otherwise be Governmental duties and functions. Another important test laid down is that the body or authority should have the power to raise funds for furtherance of their activities and the fulfilment of their projects by levying the taxes, rates, charges or fees. It is laid down that only because the Corporation is furnished with funds by the Government for commencing its business, it would not make the funds of the Corporation "local funds". In the present case, the Corporation does not fulfil the above tests. 15. It is laid down that only because the Corporation is furnished with funds by the Government for commencing its business, it would not make the funds of the Corporation "local funds". In the present case, the Corporation does not fulfil the above tests. 15. It is argued on behalf of the Corporation that the judgments given in the case of Valjibhai Muljibhai Soneji and another vs. State of Bombay (now Gujarat) and others and in the case of Union of India and others vs. R. C. Jain and others will not be applicable in the present case as subsequent to the above judgments section 3(aa) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is inserted defining "local authority" and after the insertion of section 3(aa), the definition as per section 3(31) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 will not be relevant. This submission cannot be accepted as the insertion of section 3(aa) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 does not make any difference. Section 3(aa) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 does not define "local authority" but it widens the ambit of expression "local authority" by providing that "local authority" will include the town planning authority (by whatever name called) set up under any law for the time being in force. For all purposes, the definition of "local authority" as per section 3(31) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 will have to be considered for the purposes of the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and the judgments given in the case of Valjibhai Muljibhai Soneji and another v. State of Bombay (now Gujarat) and others and in the case of Union of India and others v. R. C. Jain and others will be applicable. Applying the ratio of the above judgments, it has to be held that the Corporation is not "local authority" as it cannot be said to be "local authority" as per section 03(31) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 or a town planning authority as required by section 03(aa) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. 16. Applying the ratio of the above judgments, it has to be held that the Corporation is not "local authority" as it cannot be said to be "local authority" as per section 03(31) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 or a town planning authority as required by section 03(aa) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. 16. The various provisions of the Act of 1997 referred and relied upon by the learned Advocates for the Corporation show that the Corporation is established for mobilisation of resources for completion of some irrigation projects and for promotion and operation of those irrigation projects in the Vidarbha region and command area development and schemes for generations of electric energy to harness the water of Godavari and Tapi Rivers allocated to the State of Maharashtra under the Water Dispute Tribunal Award, and the other allied and incidental activities including flood control. The Corporation is established under section 3(1) of the Act of 1997 and is having perpetual succession and a common seal, with power to contract, acquire, hold and dispose of property, both movable and immovable, and to do all things, necessary for the purposes of the Act of 1997. Sub-section (3) of section 15 of the Act of 1997 provides that all suits and other legal proceedings with respect to any scheme for the development of Irrigation Projects and Hydro-Electric Power Projects entrusted to the Corporation, instituted or defended by or against the State Government before the appointed date may be continued again or defended by the Corporation. The above provisions do not mandate that the suit or other legal proceedings shall be instituted against the Corporation or the Corporation can only defend the suit or other legal proceedings. The provisions of section 15(3) of the Act of 1997 are only enabling provisions enabling the Corporation to institute or defend the suit or other legal proceedings and it does not mean that the Corporation gets the absolute right to institute or defend the suits or other legal proceedings on behalf of or against the State Government. As the Corporation has not explained why it has not taken any step to seek permission to participate in the proceedings before the reference Court, now at this stage, the prayer of the Corporation for grant of leave to file appeal cannot be considered. As the Corporation has not explained why it has not taken any step to seek permission to participate in the proceedings before the reference Court, now at this stage, the prayer of the Corporation for grant of leave to file appeal cannot be considered. The provisions of section 19(2)(a) of the Act of 1997 on which heavy reliance is placed by the Advocates for the Corporation, enables the Corporation to acquire and hold property for the performance of any of its functions, duties and activities. It does not enable the Corporation to compulsorily acquire the land under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The power to compulsorily acquire land under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is with the State Government as provided by section 26 of the Act of 1997. The Legislature has consciously used the expression "compulsorily acquire land under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894" in section 26 of the Act of 1997. The expression "compulsorily" is not used in section 19(2)(a) of the Act of 1997. The intention of the Legislature is very clear and the power of compulsory acquisition of the land under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is retained with the State Government and by section 19(2)(a) of the Act of 1997, the Corporation is given the power to acquire and hold property for any of its functions, duties and activities which means the Corporation can lease, sell, exchange or otherwise transfer any property and it cannot compulsorily acquire land under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Similarly only because the Corporation is paying the amount of compensation, it does not mean that the Corporation gets the right to file appeal under section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. It does not mean that the fund of the Corporation can be regarded as "public revenue" and consequently it gets the right to file appeal under section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Similar situation is examined by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the judgment given in the case of Valjibhai Muljibhai Soneji and another v. State of Bombay (now Gujarat) and others and the acquisition of land for the benefit of State Road Transport Corporation was held to be bad in law because though the acquisition of land was for a public purpose, it was found that the amount of compensation was not paid from public revenue. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that even if the funds of the State Road Transport Corporation consisted of the money provided by the State of Bombay, the fund could not be regarded as public revenue. It is held that though the source of the fund would be public revenue, once the money was invested, loaned or granted to the State Road Transport Corporation, it would change its character and become the funds or assets of the State Road Transport Corporation and cannot be regarded as public revenue. Thus the various provisions of the Act of 1997 which are referred and relied by the learned Advocates for the Corporation do not support the submission made on behalf of the applicant/appellant, that it is "local authority." 17. Thus it has to be held that the Corporation is neither "local authority" nor "company" and therefore, it has no right to participate in the proceedings before the Collector or the reference Court. It is unexplained why the Corporation has not taken any steps to intervene in the proceedings before the reference Court and to seek permission for participating in the proceedings before the reference Court. The right of appeal under section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is the statutory right and in the facts of the present case, the Corporation does not automatically get the right to file appeal and this is understood by the Corporation also and therefore, the civil applications seeking leave to file appeal are filed. The learned Advocates for the respective parties have not made any submission on the point whether the Corporation can challenge the impugned award in appeal under section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and therefore, the point is not examined. 18. I am conscious that the provisions of section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, providing for the remedy of appeal, are required to be read in such a manner that any person who is aggrieved by the award passed by the reference Court, does not remain remediless and gets an opportunity to ventilate its grievance. However, the right of appeal being a statutory right, it cannot be availed by any person who was not party in the proceedings before the reference Court. However, the right of appeal being a statutory right, it cannot be availed by any person who was not party in the proceedings before the reference Court. The Corporation has sought leave to file appeal on the ground that it is the acquiring body which fact is not established by the Corporation and as already recorded earlier, the Corporation cannot be considered as the acquiring body. 19. The learned Advocates for the Corporation referred to the judgment given by this Court in the case of The Deputy Chief Executive Officer, MIDC v. Ms. Modem Pottery Industries and others in First Appeal No. 177/2000 decided on 12.3.2015 in which a point was raised that the appeal at the behest of Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation challenging the judgment/award passed by the reference Court is not maintainable. The above judgment is given in the facts of that case and the points which are raised and argued in the present matter relying on the expressions "local authority" "company" and "person interested" were neither raised nor argued in First Appeal No. 177/2000. 20. In the applications filed by the Corporation seeking leave to file appeal, it is stated that the Corporation was a necessary party in the proceedings before the Collector and the reference Court as it is the acquiring body and beneficiary of the acquisition and consequently it has the right to challenge the award passed by the reference Court by filing appeal. The learned Advocates for the Corporation have not been able to show that the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 provides for any expression such as "acquiring body" or "beneficiary". If the Corporation is not covered by the expression "local authority" or "company", as per sub-section (2) of section 50 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, the Corporation will not be a necessary or proper party in the proceedings before the Collector or the reference Court and if it is so the Corporation will not have the right to file and maintain the appeal under section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. In First Appeal (Stamp) No. 20915/2015, undisputedly the State of Maharashtra has taken decision that appeal should not be filed to challenge the award passed by the reference Court. The Corporation will not have independent right to file appeal to challenge the award passed by the reference Court. In First Appeal (Stamp) No. 20915/2015, undisputedly the State of Maharashtra has taken decision that appeal should not be filed to challenge the award passed by the reference Court. The Corporation will not have independent right to file appeal to challenge the award passed by the reference Court. In view of the above, in my view, leave to file appeal cannot be granted to the Corporation and therefore the Civil Applications are dismissed. Consequently, the appeals are rejected. In the circumstances, the parties to bear their own costs. As the Corporation had been filing the appeal or seeking leave to file appeal and leave was granted in several appeals and the practise had been in vogue for considerable period, it would be appropriate that this judgment is kept in abeyance for the period of three months. This judgment shall become operative after three months. Order accordingly.